Progress PublishersMoscow

Dialectical Logic

The book

This introduction was written for Dialectical Logic, E. V. Ilyenkov.

Near the start of this book there is a sentence that every Soviet student of philosophy in 1974 would have recognised, without being told whose work it described. Dialectics, Evald Ilyenkov writes, can be turned into "a collection of extremely general statements about everything on earth and not about anything in particular (something of the sort of that 'everything in nature and society is interconnected', or that 'everything develops' and even 'through contradictions', and so on)." Understood like that, it "is tacked on to the real process of cognition in a purely formal way, through examples 'confirming' one and the same general proposition over and over again", and the result does not "deepen our understanding of either the general or the particular by a single jot, while dialectics is transformed into a dead scheme."

That is a fair description of the most widely printed text on dialectics ever published: the chapter "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" in the Short Course history of the Communist Party, issued under Stalin's name in 1938. It listed the "principal features" of the dialectical method (everything is connected, everything changes, quantity passes into quality, development proceeds through contradiction) and illustrated each with examples. For two decades it was the shape of philosophy in Soviet schools, and the shape outlived its author's disgrace. Ilyenkov does not mention it. He attributes the criticism to Lenin, who did indeed warn against reducing dialectics to "the sum-total of examples". But the target is plain, and the method of the whole book is in that move. It says what it has to say about Soviet philosophy without once naming Soviet philosophy.

The book and its author

Dialectical Logic: Essays on Its History and Theory appeared in Russian from Politizdat, the state publisher of political literature, in 1974. Progress issued this English version in 1977, translated by H. Campbell Creighton, who a decade later translated D. P. Gorsky's Generalisation and Cognition for the same house. The two books belong together, and a reader of this series has both. Gorsky headed the logic sector of the Institute of Philosophy; Ilyenkov was the Soviet philosopher most hostile to the idea that formal logic could be the science of thought. The question between them ran through Soviet philosophy for thirty years.

Ilyenkov (1924–1979) was the most original philosopher of his generation in the USSR, and the one who paid most for it. He went to the front as an artillery officer, came back to study philosophy at Moscow University, and in 1954–55, with his colleague Valentin Korovikov, put forward theses arguing that philosophy is the science of thought: of its forms and laws, not a catalogue of general truths about the universe. The theses were condemned and both men were removed from teaching at the university. Ilyenkov stayed at the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Philosophy, where the flap of this book still places him. His study of The Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete in Marx's "Capital" (written in the mid-1950s, published in cut form in 1960, and issued by Progress in English in 1982) and his 1962 encyclopaedia article on "the ideal" made him the centre of a school. He worked with the psychologist Alexander Meshcheryakov on the education of deaf-blind children at Zagorsk, a project that tested his account of how human minds are formed. In March 1979 he took his own life. The standard account in English is David Bakhurst's Consciousness and Revolution in Soviet Philosophy: From the Bolsheviks to Evald Ilyenkov (Cambridge University Press, 1991).

This book is the nearest he came to a systematic statement. It is eleven essays in two parts. The first six are a history of logic from Descartes to Hegel: what each thinker took "thought" to be, and why the answer kept escaping him. The last five set out Ilyenkov's own position. The history is not a detour. In his Introduction he says that the "historical" collisions are only "the factual material" through which "the clear outlines of the 'logic of Matter' gradually show through"; the shape of the argument is the argument.

What the book argues

The central claim is simple to state and hard to hold. Thought is not something that happens inside a skull. Ilyenkov defines it as "the ideal component of the real activity of social man transforming both external nature and himself by his labour." Logic, accordingly, is not a set of rules for manipulating sentences, but the science of the forms in which that activity reproduces its object, and those forms are the forms of the object itself. This is what he takes Lenin's notebooks on Hegel to mean when they say that dialectics, logic and theory of knowledge are "one and the same thing", and he insists on the strong version: "not 'unity' only, but precisely identity, full coincidence".

The essay on Spinoza is the heart of the book, and the most famous thing Ilyenkov wrote. Descartes had left thought and extension as two substances and then had to find God to join them. Spinoza, Ilyenkov argues, did not solve the problem so much as dissolve it: "the problem is insoluble only because it has been wrongly posed." Thought is not a second thing alongside the body; it is what a certain kind of body does. "Thinking is not the product of an action but the action itself, considered at the moment of its performance, just as walking, for example, is the mode of action of the legs". The essays that follow trace how Kant, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel each recovered part of this insight and lost another part. Hegel comes closest, and is then turned on his head in the familiar way. But the reading of Hegel is close, patient and frequently admiring, which in the Soviet literature of the period was itself a position.

Two further claims carry most of the second half. The first is that contradiction is not a defect of thought to be eliminated but the form in which thought registers a real contradiction in its object. Ilyenkov is scathing about logicians who concede that things may be contradictory but insist that "The contradiction is in the object but must not be in the ideas about it", and who make the principle of non-contradiction "an absolute, formal criterion of truth, into an indisputable a priori canon". He calls that position "difficult to call other than eclectic". The second claim, in the essay on the general, is that the universal is not what a set of things have in common, the least common denominator, but the law of their connection, which may appear in no single case in pure form.

What holds and what does not

The strengths are real, and they are why this book still has readers. The history of philosophy is first-hand: Ilyenkov quotes Spinoza, Kant, Fichte and Hegel at length and reads them as people trying to solve a problem, not as specimens of a class position. The account of thought as social activity, objectified in tools, language and institutions, is one of the most fertile ideas Soviet Marxism produced; through Ilyenkov and the activity theory of the psychologists around Vygotsky and Leontyev it reached Western education and cognitive science. And the polemic against reducing dialectics to examples is a genuine contribution, not a gesture. It is one of the few serious answers the Soviet literature ever gave to the Short Course.

The weaknesses are of two kinds. The first is Ilyenkov's own. His hostility to formal and mathematical logic is a blind spot. In his Introduction, logic in "the hands of Neopositivists" becomes "a purely technical discipline, a description of systems of manipulations with the terms of language", and the book never engages the achievements of that discipline on their merits. A reader in 1977 might have expected some acknowledgement that the "technical discipline" had, within living memory, produced results about the limits of formal systems that bear directly on his own subject. There is none. Russell appears mainly as Spinoza's hostile historian; Wittgenstein and Carnap barely appear at all. The same contempt shapes his history of the Second International, where the economists Hilferding and Cunow fail "not because they lacked talent, but rather because of a pettybourgeois class orientation and a false epistemological position". That is the official verdict, delivered in the official vocabulary. Ilyenkov was capable of much better, and on his own territory he does better.

The second kind is the frame. The Introduction opens with the ritual assurance that "only Marxist-Leninist dialectics has the capacity to be the method of scientific understanding", and the book takes Lenin's notebooks as an authority to be interpreted rather than a set of reading notes to be argued with. Ilyenkov uses Lenin against the textbook, and uses him well. But the procedure of finding the correct reading of a canonical text and then arguing from it is the procedure his own Introduction warns against.

The test the book sets itself

That warning is the place to read this book against its circumstances. "When dialectics is converted into a simple tool for proving a previously accepted (or given) thesis," the Introduction says, "it becomes a sophistry only outwardly resembling dialectics, but empty of content." In the essay on Kant, Ilyenkov describes what a scientific dispute requires: the warring parties must be "fully self-critical", and the pursuit of one's principle must not be "converted into paranoic stubbornness, into dogmatic blindness preventing the rational kernel in the theoretical opponent's statements from being seen." Then "Criticism of the opponent then becomes a means of perfecting one's own theory".

Every one of these sentences describes, and condemns, the official philosophy of the state that published them. Soviet diamat (dialectical materialism, as taught and examined) was a tool for proving previously accepted theses; that was its function. Its disputes were settled not by self-critical argument but by intervention from above, and the cost of being on the wrong side was not an unanswered review. Ilyenkov's own theses had been condemned in 1955 by exactly the procedure he describes here as the death of dialectics. The book never says so. It never names a Soviet philosopher, a Soviet controversy, a resolution or a Party document. The words Stalin, Zhdanov, CPSU and Congress do not occur in it; "Party", in the capitalised sense, not once. This is not timidity in the usual sense. It is the only way the argument could be printed: as a history of German idealism, with the present left for the reader to supply.

The reader of the time knew what was being supplied. In June 1947 Andrei Zhdanov, Secretary of the Central Committee, had told a conference of philosophers that in Soviet society the struggle between old and new took place, in Raya Dunayevskaya's translation, "in the form of criticism and self-criticism, which is the genuine motive force of our development", and that this was "a new dialectical law". Dunayevskaya, writing in Fourth International in September 1948 ("Stalinists Falsify Marxism Anew"), saw what the new law was for: "With the demand for a new dialectical law free of contradictions, they seek to make, not the masses, but the totalitarian bureaucracy ('the critics'), the driving force of history." A quarter of a century later Ilyenkov insisted, against the "eclectic" logicians, that contradiction is "the nucleus of dialectics" and that thought which forbids it falls ill from "a most rigorous metaphysical diet". He was writing about logic. He was also restoring the category that had been removed from Soviet philosophy because it was dangerous to the people who removed it.

The argument with formal logic

On the question that divides this book from Gorsky's, the anti-Stalinist Marxists who wrote on logic were closer to the moderate position Ilyenkov attacks than to Ilyenkov. Trotsky, in "The ABC of Materialist Dialectics" (December 1939), called dialectics "a science of the forms of our thinking insofar as it is not limited to the daily problems of life", and put the relation in an image: "The dialectic and formal logic bear a relationship similar to that between higher and lower mathematics." George Novack's lectures on logic, delivered in 1942 and revised by him in 1963 (An Introduction to the Logic of Marxism, 5th ed., New York: Pathfinder Press, 1971), take the same line: the classical dialecticians "did not look upon formal logic as worthless", which remained "quite indispensable even now for correct thinking", but in the modern school "the purely formal side of logic becomes subordinated" to dialectics. That is roughly the settlement Soviet philosophy itself reached in the early 1950s, when formal logic was allowed a domain of its own as the logic of "elementary" thinking, beside dialectics.

Ilyenkov rejects the settlement, and the reader can judge between them with both books in hand. His case is stronger than the subordination formula allows: the formula leaves unanswered what formal rules are rules of, and his essays on Kant and Hegel show how that question drove German philosophy from one system to the next. Trotsky and Novack's case is stronger than Ilyenkov allows: formal and mathematical logic did not become a mere "technical discipline" in the century after Hegel, and a dialectics that refuses to learn from it pays for the refusal. What they share matters more than what divides them. All three treat dialectics as a method of thinking that has to prove itself in use, not as a list of truths to be illustrated. In "The Party in the Field of Art and Philosophy" (June 1933), Trotsky held that in philosophy the party occupies "a distinct militant position" and then drew the line Ilyenkov spent his life defending: this "least of all" means that "the party can act as if all questions have already been resolved for it, and that it has nothing to expect from the further development of scientific thought."

It should be said plainly that the anti-Stalinist press did not review this book. A search of the English Trotsky, the Bulletin of the Opposition, Fourth International from 1940 to 1956, Intercontinental Press, International Viewpoint and the collected Novack finds no mention of Ilyenkov at all. The critics of the Soviet state followed the moments when it broke into science, such as Lysenko and Zhdanov's conference, and not the philosophers who worked on inside the walls. That was a loss. In a philosopher who would not let thought be separated from activity, or contradiction from development, they had more of an ally than they knew.

Why read it now

The Conclusion is modest in a way official Soviet philosophy never was. Logic, Ilyenkov writes, should become "an equal collaborator with the other sciences, and not their servant, and not their supreme overseer, not a 'science of sciences'"; philosophical dialectics "no longer claims a monopoly realisation" of the scientific world outlook. That was a proposal to abolish the role his discipline had been given in the Soviet state: the arbiter that told biologists, linguists and physicists what their results were allowed to mean. It is also a fair statement of what a Marxist philosophy might be once the arbiter's chair is empty.

What lasts in this book is not its system, which he did not finish and said no single person could. It is the conviction that thinking is a form of human activity, social through and through, and that the logic of thought is to be found in what people make and do, not in a list of rules or a list of examples. Read the history for its learning, the essays on the ideal and on contradiction for their argument, and the silences for the shape of the room in which he wrote. He could describe the illness of a philosophy turned into a tool for proving what was already decided. He could not name the patient. The reader can.

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