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INTERNATIONALISM

The International Working-Class Movement: Problems of History and Theory, Volume 5

The 1930s and the war - the Popular Front, Spain, the anti-fascist movements and the resistance - by some sixty named historians, in the volume where a Soviet history had most to leave out.

S. S. Salychev and others

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

This is the volume of the seven that had to cross the 1930s, and the way it crosses them is the whole story. Its Russian subtitle — *Sozidatel sotsializma, borets protiv fashizma, "Builder of Socialism, Fighter against Fascism"* — names its two subjects, and between them lie the events a Soviet history of the world workers' movement written in the first year of Gorbachev could confront or could not: the defeat of the Left and United Oppositions, forced collectivisation and the famine of 1932–33, the German catastrophe of 1933, the Popular Front and the Spanish war, and the Moscow Trials and the Great Terror of 1936–38. This book covers every one of those years, and it is where the concealment in this series is densest.

Get the date right first. The spine reads 1985, and it belongs to the year Gorbachev became General Secretary, before glasnost had opened anything. But the text is older. The copyright page carries "© Издательство «Мысль», 1981" above "English translation © Progress Publishers 1985" — so the Russian original was closed in 1981, in the last full year of Brezhnev, and reached English readers four years later with nothing altered. The internal evidence agrees: the latest datable Soviet authority the book leans on is the 1956 Central Committee resolution *Overcoming the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences*, and the freshest political horizon is Brezhnev's, whose name sits in the index and whose "developed socialism" framing governs the closing pages. This is a document of the Brezhnev settlement on the past, not of the moment it was printed in — which matters, because the Brezhnev settlement is precisely a settlement about how much of the 1930s a Soviet reader was allowed to be told.

It is a genuinely large collective work. The USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of the International Working-Class Movement put some sixty named historians to it — a basic team of authors and a further sixty-odd contributors, each carrying a kandidat or doktor degree — under an editorial

board headed by S. S. Salychev, whose name, like several others on the board, is printed inside the black mourning rules that mark a man who died before his book appeared. Above them stands the same General Editorial Committee that signed the earlier volumes, and its first line is the one to note: "B. N. Ponomarev, Chairman, T. T. Timofeyev, Deputy Chairman". Ponomarev was a Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and in December 1971 he had put his name to a twenty-one-page article in *Kommunist* — "Trotskyism, Weapon of Anti-Communism" — instructing the Party's "theoretical and propagandist cadres" to expose Trotskyism's "kinship with open anti-Communism, with opportunism of right and 'left' persuasions," scare quotes and all. The book whose chairman wrote that directive is the book under review, and the directive is legible in it.

The volume runs from 1924 to 1945 — from the year of Lenin's death and the beginning of the drive to build "socialism in one country" to the victory over Germany; "those twenty years to which this volume is devoted," in its own phrase. It is built in three parts: the USSR as builder of the first socialist society; the class battles of the working class in the capitalist countries through the Depression, the fascist seizures of power and the Popular Front; and the national-liberation movements of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The word "opportunism" and its cognates, which peak at nearly thirteen uses per ten thousand words in the 1905–17 volume of this series, have fallen here to about 1.9 — a period instrument, quieting as the narrative leaves the founding split of Bolshevism behind. The interesting things in this volume are not in its word-counts. They are in what it narrates fully, what it narrates in a whisper, and what it does not narrate at all.

The famine that is only ever Western

Begin where the book is most confident, because that is where the silence is loudest. Collectivisation gets a full and celebratory account. The volume takes it back to "Lenin's

cooperative plan" and the Fifteenth Party Congress of December 1927, describes the twenty-five thousand industrial workers sent to the villages, and reports the pace with pride: at the end of 1929 "the nation-wide collectivisation of agriculture began," and "In October–December of 1929, 2,400,000 peasant holdings and in January–February 1930, almost 10,000,000 holdings joined collective farms." The kulaks (well-to-do peasants) are dealt with in the same register. The task, the book says, was "eliminating the kulaks as a class, the class which constituted the largest group of exploiters," and the outcome was clean: their resistance was "of a sporadic, localised nature and were quickly checked," and "The resistance of the kulaks was broken by the joint efforts of the working class and the rural poor in close cooperation with the middle peasants."

What is missing from those sentences is the dying. The forced collectivisation of 1929–33 and the famine it produced across Ukraine, the North Caucasus, the Volga and Kazakhstan killed several million people — the historiography is genuinely contested and the estimates range widely, but they are counted in the millions, and the deportation of the dekulakised to the north and to Central Asia is not in serious dispute. None of it is here. The word "famine" occurs zero times in the volume. Dekulakisation as deportation is absent; the "excesses" that even Stalin conceded in his March 1930 retreat, "Dizzy with Success," are absent; the year 1933 appears constantly, but never in Ukraine.

The demonstration that this is a choice and not a period limitation is that the book is fluent in famine when the victims are someone else's. The words "hunger" and "starvation" occur more than two dozen times, and every one of them describes the capitalist West in the Depression: the "queues and hunger" of the early 1930s, the "hunger marches" of the unemployed, "starvation (despite the existence of huge unused supplies of food)," "seeing one's children starving." The vocabulary of mass hunger was fully available to these authors. They spent it entirely on Chicago and Berlin, and kept none of it for the Soviet countryside in the same years. A book that can write "starvation despite huge unused supplies of food" about the United States in 1932, and cannot write the word "famine" about the USSR in 1933, has told you exactly where its instrument is switched off.

The Terror in the passive voice

The volume covers 1936, 1937 and 1938 in great detail — they are the years of the Popular Front and the Spanish war, which are its core. So the Great Terror falls squarely inside its

dates, and its handling is the sharpest test in the series. The result is not total silence. It is something more precisely calibrated: the Terror is admitted, once, in the exact language the 1956 Central Committee resolution licensed, and then sealed.

The admission runs like this. "Stalin's cult of personality was detrimental to the cause of socialist construction, as was the resulting infringement of the Leninist standards of public life and socialist democracy." And, more analytically than one expects: when socialism "had already emerged victorious," Stalin "put forward the erroneous tenet to the effect that during the further advance of the USSR along the socialist path the class struggle would intensify. In practice this mistaken tenet was used to justify the violations of socialist legality and mass repressions." That is the single most candid sentence in the book — it names the theoretical rationale that powered the Terror. And it is immediately closed off: "However, these violations of the Leninist standards of party and state life, despite their grim consequences, could not change the very nature of socialist society." Every mention is stamped with the same seal. The "negative consequences of the Stalin cult nonetheless did not alter the socialist essence of the Soviet social system."

Now count what the formula leaves out. There are no Moscow Trials in this book — the phrase occurs zero times, as do "show trial," "Great Terror," "enemies of the people." There is no perpetrator: Yezhov zero, Yagoda zero, the NKVD's machinery unnamed. There is no victim: not one of the men shot after the three great trials is linked to his death. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy all appear — but only in the 1920s, as the "Trotskyite-Zinovievite bloc" and the Bukharin–Rykov group "routed" and expelled at the Fifteenth Congress of 1927. They enter as defeated oppositionists and they simply vanish; the reader is never told that Zinoviev and Kamenev were shot in August 1936, that Bukharin and Rykov were shot in March 1938, that Tomsy killed himself ahead of the first trial. Pyatakov, Radek and Christian Rakovsky — the second and third trials' defendants — do not appear at all. Marshal Tukhachevsky and the decapitation of the Red Army officer corps in June 1937 are absent to the letter. Sergei Kirov, whose assassination in December 1934 was the pretext for the whole apparatus of terror, is a single page-reference in the index, deep in the war chapters; the eight times "Kirov" appears in the text it is the Kirov tank works. The victims of the Terror are "some people," and the number is never given.

There is one concrete instance of repression the book will name, and it is worth dwelling on because it tells you where

the line runs. Among the "adverse circumstances" of the cult, the volume lists "unjustified repression of some people in the international communist movement and the dissolution of the Communist Party of Poland." The dissolution of the KPP in 1938 — its leaders summoned to Moscow and shot — is a real event, correctly identified. It can be named because it happened to a foreign party. The Institute's own voice can reach a catastrophe in Warsaw's émigré leadership that it cannot reach in its own Politburo. The constraint is not on the topic of repression; the same paragraph handles repression. It is on the Institute's proximity to the subject.

Error is admissible; the category is not

It would be a mistake, and this series has learned to guard against it, to convict the book of a candour it does keep. This volume records its own side erring, and does so more than once. The "cult of personality" is conceded. Stalin's "erroneous tenet" is named as his. And on the Comintern's ultraleft "Third Period," the book is genuinely and usefully self-critical: it reports that "the assessment of social democracy as social fascism became widespread," calls it a "schematic, sectarian approach," records that Clara Zetkin "came out with a consistently argued attack against the left extremist distortions of the united-front policy" and "objected to the use of the term 'social-fascism,'" and credits Georgi Dimitrov's July 1934 letter proposing to review "former assessments of social democracy, especially the notion of social fascism." That is a real concession, made in the book's own voice, about the line that helped hand Germany to Hitler.

So the reflexivity test — the one this series trusts above frequency counts — has to be put in its sharpened form. The question is not whether the book can admit an error; it plainly can. The question is whether the category ever turns inward. It does not. Stalin is allowed a "mistaken tenet"; he is never an opportunist. The Comintern is allowed "left extremist distortions" and a "sectarian approach"; the disqualifying nouns — opportunism, adventurism, capitulation — are never spent on the Party's own line. They are reserved, entire, for the man who left. Trotsky's is a "notorious policy"; the opposition is "capitulationist"; Trotskyism is "adventurist," "anti-Leninist," a current "undeniably playing into the hands of the international bourgeoisie." A Bolshevik who stayed inside may be wrong on a theory, a vote, a slogan, and the book will say so. Nobody who stayed inside is ever called an opportunist. That is the finding, and it is not about how often a word is used.

The self-criticism on "social fascism" sharpens the point rather

than blunting it, because of who said it first. The volume admits, in 1981, that the Third Period line was a disastrous sectarian error that split the German working class before Hitler. Trotsky said exactly that between 1930 and 1933, in real time, in the *Bulletin of the Opposition* — "The Turn in the Communist International and the Situation in Germany" (September 1930), "For a Workers' United Front Against Fascism" (December 1931), and after the collapse, "The German Catastrophe" (28 May 1933). For saying it when it could still have mattered, he was an "adventurist." The Institute reached his conclusion half a century later and kept the epithet on the man who reached it first. The book can adopt the analysis; it cannot rehabilitate the analyst.

Quotation marks with nothing behind them

Trotsky the man is named five times in 319,000 words; "Trotskyism" and "Trotskyite" carry the rest of the forty-odd mentions. The doctrine attributed to him is stated in a single formula, in scare quotes: the opposition "started out from Trotsky's notorious policy of 'permanent revolution', according to which only the victory of revolution world-wide could save the Land of the Soviets from the restoration of capitalist relations." Elsewhere he "maintained that it was impossible to build socialism in the USSR without 'direct state support' by the Western proletariat," and "proposed the adventurist course of prodding the world revolution by all and every means, not excluding that of war."

Apply the citation test this series has now run on three prior volumes. Does the book cite Trotsky to his own works, or only characterise him? It only characterises him. Across every one of those forty mentions there is not a single footnote to anything Trotsky wrote. The phrases inside the quotation marks are sourced to nothing; the refutations around them are sourced to Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific*, to the resolutions of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, and to Comintern documents. The index entry reads "Trotskyi, L. D. — 27, 40, 150, 714": three pages of text and the index itself. This is exactly the pattern of the 1905–17 volume, where no work by Trotsky was cited once and the doctrine attributed to him sat in quotation marks with no source. An opponent who is quoted can be checked; an opponent who is only characterised cannot, and that is the point of characterising him.

The characterisation is also, on its own terms, a caricature that the record will not bear. "Socialism in one country" is presented throughout as settled Leninism — "Socialism in one country never was and never remained socialism for one

country," the book affirms — and "permanent revolution" as its adventurist antithesis, a demand to prod world revolution by war. The theory the book will not state is stated at length in works this project holds: *Results and Prospects* (1906) and *The Permanent Revolution* (1930) on the growing-over of the democratic into the socialist revolution and the alliance with the peasantry, and above all *The Third International After Lenin* (1928), whose long opening section, "The Program of the International Revolution or a Program of Socialism in One Country?", is the direct contemporaneous answer to the doctrine this volume treats as Lenin's own. A reader who wants to know what was actually argued, rather than what the argument was said to be, has the texts; the Institute had them too.

Spain, and a collectivisation that is condemned

Spain is one of the volume's largest subjects — the Popular Front, the war, the International Brigades, the solidarity of the world's workers all run through it. And its treatment of the POUM is a small masterpiece of the operation. The party is named twice. Once, neutrally, as a signatory of the Popular Front Pact of 15 January 1936. And once as a wrecker: "In Catalonia and Aragon Anarchists and Trotskyists from POUM pushed ahead with forced 'collectivisation' in the countryside, socialised small enterprises needlessly and pursued a policy of 'self-government', thus creating utter chaos and confusion." What the book does not report is what was done to them: the May Days of 1937, the suppression of the POUM, and the abduction and murder of its leader Andrés Nin by Soviet security agents in June 1937. Nin does not appear in the volume.

Read the POUM sentence beside the collectivisation chapters and the whole method stands exposed. Forced "collectivisation" in Catalonia, in quotation marks, is "chaos and confusion." Forced collectivisation in Ukraine, without quotation marks, is the victory of socialism. The same act carries opposite verdicts depending on who is doing it and whether the doer is inside the genealogy. The contemporaneous reply is Trotsky's "The Lessons of Spain: The Last Warning" (17 December 1937), written in the *Bulletin* as the POUM was being destroyed, which argues that the Popular Front's subordination of the revolution to the liberal republic was the cause of the defeat the book blames on the revolutionaries.

The pact, and revolutions that arrived in tanks

On foreign policy the volume tells the honourable-USSR story with real skill: the tireless Soviet campaign for "collective security" in the League of Nations, the mutual-assistance pacts with France and Czechoslovakia in 1935, and the betrayal at Munich, which the book invokes more than two dozen times as the West's abdication. Then the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact is named, correctly dated, and defended: "the Soviet government was compelled to conclude the Soviet-German non-aggression pact of 23 August 1939," justified through a later quotation from Marshal Zhukov that "the pact did not deliver the USSR from the menace of fascist aggression" but bought time. What the account omits is the Secret Additional Protocol signed the same night, which partitioned Poland and assigned Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania to the Soviet sphere — and with it the character of what happened next. The volume carries a section titled "The Socialist Revolutions of 1940 in the Baltic Region," in which Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, "the weakest links in the world capitalist system," pass to socialism through the ripening of "all socio-political contradictions" and "the influence of the victory of socialism in the USSR." The Red Army, which entered under the protocol the book does not mention, is not in the sentence. A revolution that arrived in someone else's tanks is narrated as a revolution that rose from within.

Our own tradition is not owed a free pass here, and it did not give itself one. The Fourth International was divided on the 1939–40 events and said so in the open; the point of citing it is not that it was unanimous but that its disputes are legible, which is the difference the whole series turns on.

What the book is worth

None of this should persuade a reader that the volume is worthless, because it is not, and a reader told so would be badly misled. Three things in it are of real value.

The first is the self-criticism of the Third Period already described. It is more than most Soviet books of its date would risk: it names Zetkin's contemporary objection, credits Dimitrov's correction, and concedes that the "social fascism" formula "provided the opponents of unity with arguments to use to discredit the efforts of Communists." On the greatest strategic disaster in Comintern history, the book tells much of the truth.

The second is the comparative labour history of the capitalist countries in the Depression, which is the bulk of Part Two and is serious work. The account of mass unemployment — the hunger marches, the wage series traced across four countries

and two decades, the movement of the unemployed built "from the very onset of the crisis" — is documented from a wide, largely non-Russian source base: Swedish, French, Danish and German monographs and memoirs cited by title and page. The country-by-country narrative of the fascist seizures and the Popular Front response, and the third part on the working classes of Asia, Africa and Latin America, give English readers material that was not otherwise reaching them in 1985. This is the same institute that produced the outstanding colonial chapters of the earlier volumes, and the craft is intact.

The third is the honest structural observation that the book's virtues and its silences are the same fact seen twice. The Popular Front is both this volume's subject and its alibi. The book can be candid about the "social fascism" error precisely because the Popular Front is the Party correcting itself — the error has a happy ending, and an error that the movement itself overcame is safe to print. And it is that same anti-fascist frame, the movement of 1935–39 as an ascending story of unity and heroism, that makes the Terror and the murder of Nin unprintable: you cannot narrate the Popular Front years as a triumph of proletarian solidarity while also narrating that in those exact years Moscow was shooting the Old Bolsheviks and its agents were killing revolutionaries in Barcelona. The concealment is not a set of separate lies. It is the cost of the frame.

Where the reply is

For this decade the anti-Stalinist left left the fullest contemporaneous record it ever produced, and it is held in this project.

On the great theoretical charge — "socialism in one country" against "permanent revolution" — read *The Third International After Lenin* (1928), part I, and *The Permanent Revolution* (1930), against the caricature the book supplies without a source.

On the German catastrophe and the "social fascism" line the volume now half-repudiates, read Trotsky's real-time argument in the *Bulletin of the Opposition*: "The Turn in the Communist International and the Situation in Germany" (September 1930), "For a Workers' United Front Against Fascism" (December 1931), and "The German Catastrophe" (28 May 1933). The book's belated verdict is his contemporaneous one.

On collectivisation, the bureaucracy and the "cult," the standing answer is *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), written while this volume's events were current — chapter 5, "The

Soviet Thermidor," on the rise of the bureaucratic caste, and chapter 10, "In the Mirror of the New Constitution," the direct reply to the 1936 Stalin Constitution the volume treats as the charter of achieved socialism.

On the Terror and the trials, read *The Revolution Betrayed* alongside Trotsky's warnings written before the first trial — "Bolshevik-Leninists in USSR Face New Frame-Up" (31 March 1935) and "Stalin Plans Wholesale Persecution" (25 March 1936) — and the verdict of the international commission of inquiry chaired by John Dewey, published as *Not Guilty* (1938), which examined the Moscow evidence the book cannot mention and found it fabricated. On the Kirov assassination that opened the whole sequence and which this volume erases, Max Shachtman's "Behind the Kirov Assassination" appeared in *The New Internationalist* for January 1935 — while Shachtman was still inside the orthodox Trotskyist movement, five years before the 1940 split that took him out of it. On the destruction of the Red Army command that the volume passes over in silence, Trotsky's "The Decapitation of the Red Army," from *Bulletin* nos. 56–57 (July–August 1937), was reprinted in *Intercontinental Press*, vol. 8, no. 9, 9 March 1970.

On Spain and the POUM, read "The Lessons of Spain: The Last Warning" (17 December 1937) against the two sentences the book allows the POUM.

The boundary, again

The introduction to the 1905–17 volume in this series concluded that the Institute's constraint was not chronological but genealogical — that within a single book, at a single moment, the section on a Chilean printer could be free while the section on the chairman of the first Soviet could not, and that what determined which was distance from the Party's own line of descent. This volume confirms the finding and adds a wrinkle to it. Here the constraint is legible not as distance in space but as distance in register. The book can name a foreign catastrophe (the Communist Party of Poland) and not a domestic one; it can admit an error the movement itself corrected (social fascism) and not one it never disowned (the Terror, the famine); it can rehabilitate Stalin as the war-leader of 1941–45, chairing the State Defence Committee, and in the same volume file his cult under the 1956 resolution and move on. What is free is the craft, the foreign subject, the corrected mistake. What is not free is the Institute's own voice on the Soviet 1930s, and the name of the man who described those years as they happened.

So read this book the way its own structure asks to be read. The Depression chapters, the Popular Front narrative and the colonial third part are real labour history, and the self-criticism of the Third Period is a document worth having. Then read the chapters on the building of socialism knowing that a famine has been removed from them, that the men tried and shot between 1936 and 1938 walk out of the narrative in 1927 and never return, and that the one figure who reported all of it in real time is present only as a doctrine in quotation marks with nothing behind them.

The US War Machine and Politics

The American national security state anatomised from American sources - the 1947 Act, the services, nuclear strategy, the Pentagon budget - in a 1983 book with a 1985 paragraph welded to the end.

Radomir Bogdanov

Introduction to the 1986 Edition

Radomir Bogdanov's *The US War Machine and Politics* is an institutional history of the American national security state — the 1947 National Security Act, the unification of the armed services, the making of nuclear strategy, and the political weight of the Secretary of Defense — written from inside the Soviet Americanist establishment and built almost entirely out of American sources. It came out of the Academy of Sciences press, and it cites Georgi Arbatov and Genrikh Trofimenko as authorities in the way one cites colleagues. It is a serious book. It is also, on the evidence of its own footnotes, a book about 1983 wearing a 1986 jacket, and the gap between those two dates is where most of what is wrong with it lives.

Start with the date, because this series has been caught by it before. The copyright page carries two claims, one of which the catalogue has silently dropped. The first is © Издательство Наука, 1983 — Nauka, the Academy of Sciences press. The second reads "English translation of the revised Russian text © Progress Publishers", with the 1986 date of the imprint. So the Russian original is 1983, and there was a revision. How much of one can be measured. The latest events named anywhere in the text are the invasion of Grenada (October 1983), the mining of Nicaraguan harbours (early 1984) and the shelling of Lebanese villages (1983–84). The most recent Soviet authority quoted at length is Chernenko, in February 1984. Of the endnotes, the last-dated are Pravda of 5 April 1984 and Pravda of 12 March 1985. The single reference to Mikhail Gorbachev in the entire book is a quotation from the March 1985 Central Committee plenum, dropped into the final pages of the conclusion. That is the whole of the updating: a 1983 monograph, revised through 1984, with one 1985 paragraph welded to the end.

What this means in practice can be stated as an absence. The book does not contain the words "Strategic Defense Initiative". It does not contain "Star Wars". It does not contain "Reykjavik", which is fair enough — the summit came in October 1986 and the English text was closed before it. But

SDI was announced by Reagan on 23 March 1983, and by 1986 it was the single obstacle around which every arms-control negotiation in the world was organised. A book published in Moscow in 1986, whose subject is the political power of the American war machine, and which asks in its closing pages "Will the US war machine be able to control politics?", never mentions the largest and most politically consequential American military programme of the decade. The one gesture toward it is a phrase in the grafted Gorbachev quotation about "ever new weapon systems, whether in space or on earth" — and the reader who does not already know what that refers to will not learn it here.

This is a different fault from the one committed by Vyacheslav Nikitin's *The Ultras in the USA*, a companion volume in this series which carries a 1981 date, is really a mid-1970s text, and manages a history of the American right in which the words "Reagan", "New Right" and "Moral Majority" appear precisely zero times. Bogdanov does know Reagan exists — the name occurs thirty-four times, Weinberger four — and he knows what the Reagan build-up is for. He simply does not know what year it is by the time his book reaches an English reader. The Progress export operation is here doing what it habitually did: shipping a book of the late Brezhnev interregnum into a world that had already moved.

The research is real

It has to be said plainly, because it is unusual: this is a well-sourced book, and its source base is overwhelmingly American. The endnotes run to nearly five thousand words and cite, among others, John Lewis Gaddis on containment and on the origins of the Cold War; Bernard Brodie's *War and Politics*; Samuel Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*; Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith's *How Much Is Enough?*; Maxwell Taylor's *The Uncertain Trumpet* and *Swords and Plowshares*; Roger Hilsman's *To Move a Nation*; Vincent Davis on the admirals' lobby; Etzold and Gaddis's documentary collection *Containment*; and the *Pentagon Papers* as published by the Government Printing Office in United

States–Vietnam Relations, 1945–1967. There are Senate hearings — Department of Defense appropriations for 1962, and the Foreign Relations subcommittee's US–USSR Strategic Policies of 4 March 1974. There is the Center for Defense Information's Defense Monitor. There are five separate Government Printing Office citations. Soviet works are cited too, but they are a minority, and the arguments do not rest on them.

The most technically substantial chapter — on nuclear targeting — is built out of Desmond Ball's "Counterforce Targeting: How New? How Viable?" in *Arms Control Today* of February 1981, and it reproduces the declassified architecture accurately: NSDM-242, the Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy, the SIOP-5 that took effect on 1 January 1976, Carter's PD-18 of 24 August 1977 reaffirming the earlier guidance. It notes, correctly, that the NUWEP required American strategic forces to be able to destroy 70 per cent of Soviet industry in all circumstances, and it observes in a footnote that the exemption of cities from declared targeting was a distinction without a difference, "since the planned destruction of industrial and military targets would inevitably cause enormous casualties among the civilian population, particularly from fall-out." That is not propaganda. That was the argument of the American strategic-studies community itself.

On the political economy of the thing Bogdanov is often exact. He gives the growth of the American military burden as rising "from 1 per cent of the GNP before the war to 5-13 per cent during the postwar period". He notes that the Secretary of Defense administers "the military budget, which amounts to more than 25 per cent of Federal expenditure" — which for the mid-1980s is right. He traces the defence budget from never exceeding \$650 million in 1931–40 to "\$12 billion in fiscal 1948 to \$80 billion in 1970 and to a staggering \$200 billion in 1982". He records that Eisenhower "considered it necessary in his farewell speech to warn his fellow countrymen of the danger of the increasing power of the military-industrial complex" — Eisenhower did, in January 1961, and the phrase is his. And Bogdanov's account of who actually constitutes that complex is not crude:

The group includes the bosses of the military-industrial corporations, the higher ranks of the military-industrial bureaucracy, and legislators from the states whose well-being depends on a militarized economy. The sources of power of the military-industrial complex are not limited to the industrial sphere — they are widely rooted in the regional, political and economic layers of American

society.

That is the correct description. It is a description of a coalition with an electoral geography, not a conspiracy of arms manufacturers, and it anticipates a great deal of later American scholarship on the politics of defence procurement. The parallel passage on the lobbying superstructure — "the think tanks, the University centres and the various lobbyist organizations represent a kind of superstructure over the military-industrial complex" — is equally sound, and his observation that these groups derive their unusual authority from privileged access to classified information supplied by the services they lobby for is both true and, in 1983, less widely said than it is now.

He is good, too, on the missile gap. He quotes Daniel Ellsberg: "Many people in the Air Force and the Pentagon were very proud of the missile gap hoax. They said there was no other way they could get enough tax money for the necessary weapons to maintain our superiority." And he quotes Kissinger, speaking to the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London in 1979, conceding that "Our strategic doctrine has relied extraordinarily, perhaps exclusively, on our superior strategic power." The Soviet critique of the American military-industrial complex was, in its broad outline, substantially accurate, and this book is one of its better statements. Eisenhower named the thing; the revolving door, the cost overruns and the manufactured threat assessments are documented in the American record; the Pentagon's weight in American politics has never seriously been in dispute. A reader who wants a competent, footnoted account of how the American national security apparatus was assembled between 1947 and 1975 can get one here.

Where the analysis fails, it fails by reduction. Having built a careful institutional and regional account, Bogdanov periodically collapses it into the till: "One of the most important reasons for this nuclear madness lies in the fact that the banks and the shareholders of the military corporations demand investment profitability from the military-industrial complex." This is the weakest sentence in the book, and it is weak in a specific way — it explains too much and therefore nothing. It cannot distinguish between the strategic choices it is supposed to explain, and it is flatly contradicted by Bogdanov's own better account, in the same book, of a coalition rooted in state bureaucracy, congressional districts and ideology as much as in profit. He had the sophisticated answer and reached for the vulgar one whenever the argument needed a moral.

What is falsified

One thing above all. Discussing NSC-68, Bogdanov quotes an American source on the document's political problem — "NSC 68 called for a substantial increase in defense expenditures... The problem was how to sell a substantial increase in the defense budget without an imminent threat... The problem was solved on June 25, 1950..." — and then adds, in brackets and over his own initials, a gloss: "(i. e. when the United States began the Korean War.— R.B.)". A page earlier he has written that the directive was approved on 30 September 1950, "i. e. after the beginning of US aggression in Korea."

On 25 June 1950 the Korean People's Army crossed the 38th parallel in force. It did so with Stalin's authorisation, given in April 1950 after months of requests from Kim Il Sung, and with Soviet operational planning assistance. This is not a matter of interpretation or of Western claims; it is documented in the Soviet archival material released after 1991 and published through the Cold War International History Project, including Stalin's own cables. Bogdanov was writing in 1983 and could not have seen those documents. But he was not repeating an honest error of the available record — he was asserting, as a bracketed authorial correction to an American text, a claim that the Soviet state knew to be false when it was first made, and had known for thirty-three years.

The passage is also self-defeating. Bogdanov's own evidence is that the Korean War rescued NSC-68 from a Congress and a Defense Secretary unwilling to fund it; he notes accurately that Louis Johnson opposed the increase for fear of inflation and that "Congress was also very restrained". The war was, in other words, precisely the "imminent threat" the Truman administration needed and had not been able to manufacture. That the North Korean attack was the gift which unlocked the American rearmament of the 1950s is a serious and defensible historical argument. Bogdanov cannot make it, because making it requires naming who fired first.

There is a smaller falsification of the same family. On the Czechoslovak coup of February 1948, Bogdanov writes that American reaction tried to exploit "the events in Czechoslovakia in 1948 which, however, ended with the complete victory of the democratic forces." What ended in February 1948 was Czechoslovak parliamentary democracy. The non-Communist ministers resigned; the Communist Party, holding the Interior Ministry and its police, mobilised armed workers' militias and action committees to purge the state apparatus; Jan Masaryk was found dead beneath a window of the Foreign Ministry on 10 March. Bogdanov's supporting

evidence — Ambassador Steinhardt's report that there were no Soviet troop concentrations on the border, and Marshall's remark that the events would not "materially alter" the international situation — is accurate and beside the point. Nobody serious argues that the February coup was carried out by the Red Army. It was carried out by the Czechoslovak Communist Party, which is why it worked.

The mirror

Now the part that costs this book most, and it can be established by counting.

The following do not appear anywhere in *The US War Machine and Politics*: any figure for Soviet military expenditure; any figure for Soviet defence spending as a share of Soviet national income or GNP; the Soviet defence industry; the SS-20; Afghanistan.

The last of these is the largest. This book was published in English in 1986, in the seventh year of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan — an occupation which by then involved something over a hundred thousand Soviet troops, had driven several million people out of the country, and was being prosecuted with the same instruments the book spends its whole length describing in American hands: aerial bombardment of villages, counterinsurgency, a client government sustained by foreign force. The word does not occur once. A book whose entire argumentative structure is that a great power's military apparatus acquires political weight and then drives policy, published by a state seven years into a war its own general staff had advised against and its own leadership could not end, is the case where the silence costs everything. It is not a gap in coverage. It is the disqualification of the method.

The SS-20 is nearly as bad, because the book does discuss the Euromissiles. It opens by condemning "the deployment of medium-range nuclear missiles in Western Europe" as a chief cause of the crisis, and returns to "improvements in the medium-range missiles deployed in Europe which are capable of delivering a pre-emptive strike". The RSD-10 Pioneer, which NATO called the SS-20 and whose deployment from 1976 produced the NATO double-track decision of December 1979, and therefore Pershing II and the cruise missiles, is absent. So is the double-track decision itself. The reader is given a causal chain with its first link removed.

Then there is the metric. Bogdanov possesses, and uses well, the correct analytical tool: the share of national product

absorbed by the military, and the share of the state budget it commands. He applies it to the United States and gets 5–13 per cent of GNP and over 25 per cent of federal expenditure. He never applies it to the Soviet Union. Had he done so honestly he would have arrived at a number several times the American one. The range is genuinely contested — Western estimates of 15 per cent of Soviet GNP were current in the early 1980s, the CIA revised its own figures upward more than once, and Soviet officials after 1988 published numbers far above anything admitted before — but no serious estimate put the Soviet burden below double the American. On the book's own measure, the USSR was much the more militarised society.

Nor is there any Soviet military-industrial complex, though the institutional resemblance is close enough to be embarrassing. Soviet arms production was run through nine defence-industrial ministries coordinated by the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers, a structure with first call on the best materials, the best plant and the best engineers in the country, and with a political representation in the Central Committee that no civilian ministry could match. It had its own revolving door between the general staff, the design bureaux and the ministries. It had its own institutional interest in threat inflation. What it did not have was Bogdanov's Congress, his Congressional Record, his Government Printing Office hearings, his Center for Defense Information, or his Daniel Ellsberg — which is precisely why he could write this book about America and not about home. Every American source in his footnotes is evidence of something his own state did not permit.

The nearest the book comes to acknowledging that the USSR builds weapons at all is a sentence in the conclusion: "A challenge thrown down by the American side only means the Soviet Union will have to answer in kind—by building its own weapons systems." The Soviet arms programme thus appears once, in the last pages, purely as reflex — an effect with no domestic cause, no constituency, no cost and no interests behind it. The book's whole thesis is that armaments generate politics. Crossing the frontier, they become inert.

And one further silence, smaller but telling. The phrase "peace movement" does not occur in this book. The Western anti-nuclear mobilisations of 1981–83 — the largest street demonstrations in postwar European history, the ones Soviet diplomacy was investing enormous effort in that very year — get a single clause in the conclusion, about "the antiwar, anti-nuclear movement" taking "vigorous, purposeful action". Bogdanov has no interest in it. His subject is states,

apparatuses and elites, and his hope, stated repeatedly, is for "realistically minded" members of the American ruling class to reassert themselves. That is a diplomat's book, not a socialist's.

The reply that existed

Everything this book could not say was being said in English, in print, in the years it was written and revised, by a left that opposed both war machines at once.

The most direct answer to it is a document that predates the English edition by three years. On 27 June 1983 Intercontinental Press printed "No to war, no to nuclear missiles!", the statement of the Bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, co-signed by eleven European sections and distributed at the disarmament conference held in Berlin on 9–14 May 1983 by the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation and European Nuclear Disarmament. It reaches Bogdanov's conclusion about the United States and reaches it with numbers: "From 1980 to 1983 American military spending increased by 12 percent a year in real terms, going from \$142 billion to \$257 billion"; SIPRI's finding that NATO accounted for 43 per cent of world arms spending in 1980 against the Warsaw Pact's 26 per cent; and the verdict, "Imperialism is still the principal warmonger and the main threat to peace." Then it does the thing Bogdanov's book is built not to do. It applies the metric to both sides — "While declared American arms spending is 7 percent of the GNP and estimated USSR spending 15 percent of the GNP, the American GNP is double the Soviet GNP" — and draws the consequence Bogdanov cannot: "Soviet military expenditure is a great burden on the Soviet Union, to the point of worsening economic and food supply problems." Under the heading "Solidarity with peace movement in eastern Europe" it characterises Soviet policy abroad as resting not on internationalism but on "pacts and agreements of coexistence or division of the world with imperialism", and at home on "the negation of the most elementary political, trade-union, or national rights — as shown by the Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and Jaruzelski's tough crackdown on the Polish workers (1981)." Its demands include both "say no to Pershing and cruise missiles!" and "For a nuclear-free Europe from Poland to Portugal, from Sicily to Scandinavia!" — and the observation that an independent Eastern antiwar movement "would strike a blow against imperialism 1,000 times more deadly than a few more Soviet missiles."

Put the two documents side by side and it is obvious which is doing analysis and which is doing diplomacy.

The same current was equally willing to criticise the West's own peace movement and, more to the point here, the official Soviet bodies working inside it. A report on the independent peace movements of Eastern Europe in *International Viewpoint* no. 79 (July 1985), bylined Jacqueline Allio, describes the hostility that "the very 'official' Soviet Committee for Peace was subjected" to throughout the Perugia convention: "Any attempts by this committee to win conference round were a dismal failure, particularly since the authorities in the 'socialist' countries had refused to allow independent peace movement supporters visas to come to the convention. Enquiries about the cases of independent activists imprisoned for several years because of their activity for peace were met with the reply that, 'They are hooligans'." The report then weighs, seriously, the counter-argument of the Moscow Group for the Establishment of Trust between the USSR and the United States — that a Western break with the official committees would only deepen the independents' isolation. Those people existed while Bogdanov was writing. They are not in his book, and neither is the committee.

On the Euromissiles specifically, John Ross's dissection of Reagan's zero option in *International Viewpoint* no. 21 (10 January 1983) is the model of what Bogdanov could not attempt. Ross sets out exactly what the proposal required — the Soviet Union to dismantle the SS-4, SS-5 and SS-20, in return for which the United States would forgo Pershing II and cruise while retaining every existing warhead and its entire missile submarine force in the surrounding seas, with Britain and France free to keep and modernise theirs — and calls it one of the most grotesque offers in the history of imperialist peace talks, ranking with the Gulf of Tonkin. He then explains, technically, why the SS-20 was a replacement for two fixed-site liquid-fuelled missiles two decades old and useless against an American first strike. That is the argument. Ross could name the SS-20 and still oppose Pershing II. Bogdanov had to erase the missile in order to make his case, and the erasure is why his version persuades nobody who is not already persuaded.

On SDI, note the dates. *International Viewpoint* no. 75, in May 1985, carried a full treatment of Reagan's Star Wars speech of 23 March 1983 — SDI as "a skillful ideological camouflage job designed to conceal from American and international public opinion the objectives and the manifold consequences of this new program of militarization, the most ambitious and expensive of all the military programs ever conceived by the Pentagon." That is a year before the Progress edition of a book on the political power of the American war machine went to press without the subject in it at all.

There is one more point on which this literature is sharper than Bogdanov, and it goes to theory rather than politics. A Fourth International document printed in Intercontinental Press on 8 February 1982 warned against precisely the reflex that produces his "banks and shareholders" sentence. Reagan's election, it argued, "amplifies the tendency to the growing militarization of the crisis-ridden capitalist economy, characterized by the diversion of research towards military ends, by an unprecedented growth in military spending" — but then: "Certain neutralist currents, while understanding this tendency of the capitalist economy to transform itself into a gigantic military-industrial complex, underestimate the political will that is part and parcel of it, and therefore only partially grasp the meaning of the capitalist's remilitarization effort." The militarisation was real. Reading policy straight off the balance sheet was not Marxism but a shortcut around it, and Bogdanov takes the shortcut at exactly the moments his own institutional evidence would have carried him further.

For the long history, Ernest Mandel's *The Meaning of the Second World War* was published by Verso in the same year as this translation and is its natural counterweight. In the final chapter, "The Legacy" (pp. 171–73), Mandel gives the account of the military-industrial complex that Bogdanov gestures at and never completes — an expanding military establishment "means a burgeoning sector of industry and capitalist firms geared to weapons production. These have a vested interest in such production, for they receive a large slice of the profits, guaranteed by the state, thanks to constantly escalating armaments output. Hence the birth of the 'military-industrial complex', to quote the phrase aptly coined by Eisenhower, himself a general turned President of the United States." Mandel also notes what Bogdanov's chapter on alliances circles without saying: that the American military machine served to keep allies within "certain bounds of financial, commercial and industrial autonomy within the alliance."

None of these writers doubted that the Pentagon was what Bogdanov says it is. They simply declined to believe that the Soviet general staff was something else.

What the book is for

Read it as the best available statement of the Soviet case against American militarism, made by someone who had read the American literature closely and could quote it accurately. On the architecture of the national security state, on nuclear targeting doctrine, on the political economy of the defence coalition and on the manufactured threat assessments of 1957–61, it is a competent and honest guide, and there were

Western commentators in 1986 who were less exact.

Read it also for what a Soviet Americanist of the highest rank was permitted to write, and was not. Bogdanov had the concepts. He had the method. He had, in his own footnotes, a working demonstration of what an open society's documentary record makes possible for a critic of its armed forces. He applied every one of these to a foreign country and none of them to his own, and the book he produced is therefore evidence of two war machines: the one it describes, and the one that commissioned it.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Ten Years of the Ethiopian Revolution

Ten Soviet Africanists on the Ethiopian revolution at its tenth anniversary - land reform, the peasant associations, the new party, the army - written at the height of the alignment and just after the famine.

A. Gromyko and others

Introduction to the 1986 Edition

Ten Years of the Ethiopian Revolution is a collective work of the Africa Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, assembled out of a scientific conference "devoted to the 10th anniversary of the Ethiopian revolution and held in Moscow on October 10, 1984." Ten Soviet Africanists contribute chapters — V. Vigand on the economic base, V. Tolstykh on industry, Georgi Galperin on the peasant associations, O. Nikolayeva on culture, Y. Sumbatyan on the armed forces, O. Dolgova on the party, others on foreign policy and the propagation of scientific socialism — under a long unsigned introduction and a framing essay by A. Gromyko. It carries the imprint of Progress Publishers and the copyright line "© Progress Publishers 1986," and this is a genuine Progress book, not one of the volumes in this series misfiled under that house.

Date the argument, not the spine. The 1984 conference supplied the raw material, but the text was updated well past it: its latest datable event is Mengistu Haile Mariam's working visit to the USSR of 31 October–9 November 1985, and the joint communiqué of 12 November 1985. This is a book of 1985, published in 1986 — no translation lag, no earlier Russian edition standing behind it. It reads exactly as what it is: an anniversary volume written at the high-water mark of the Ethiopian regime's Soviet alignment, with the great famine barely past, the Workers' Party of Ethiopia founded the year before, and the collapse still six years away and wholly unforeseen. What it was commissioned to do is not hidden. It is a celebration, and it is a doctrinal showcase: Ethiopia is to be shown as a model of what Soviet theory called the "non-capitalist path of development," the "socialist orientation" — a backward peasant country crossing over to socialism, in the introduction's own words, "repudiating the capitalist way of development," and "Bypassing capitalism and creating prerequisites for a socialist revolution."

The doctrine, and its scandal

The organising idea is the one this whole series exists to examine, here in its late colonial dress. A national-democratic revolution completes the anti-feudal, anti-imperialist tasks; a socialist revolution is to follow, reached "bypassing capitalism"; and the guarantor of the passage is the guiding hand of the Soviet Union. The reader who has met the drafted Indochina volumes of this series will recognise the schema exactly. Kaysone Phomvihane's Revolution in Laos (Progress, 1981) sets a peasant nation of three million on "the direct transition to socialism bypassing the capitalist stage of development"; Divilkovsky and Ognetrov's The Road to Victory runs the same two stages for Vietnam; and the sibling Academy of Sciences survey USSR and Countries of Africa (Progress, 1980) builds its entire case on the "non-capitalist road" for a string of "socialist-oriented" African states, "Socialist Ethiopia" among them. One doctrine, exported from Aden to Vientiane to Addis Ababa, and this book is its Ethiopian instance.

But the Ethiopian instance carries an extra scandal the others do not, and the book states it without appearing to feel it. The vanguard here is not even a workers' party. It is a committee of army officers. The revolution's leading organ, on the book's own account, is "the PMAC, made up of the progressively-minded servicemen," which "assumed military-political leadership of the revolution"; the Workers' Party of Ethiopia, founded in September 1984, is conceded to rank, "from the point of view of its social composition, political experience, maturity and ideological development," "among the vanguard revolutionary-democratic parties" — that is, it is not a workers' party at all, and the authors know it, devoting pages to explaining why it was nonetheless given the name. The book is candid enough to record that the objection was raised at the time, in the Ethiopian student debates it reports: "whether advancement towards socialism was possible under military rule." It records the question in order to dismiss it. A group of soldiers who seized power in 1974, liquidated their rivals, and then constituted a "workers' party" from above

is presented as the instrument by which the Ethiopian working class will reach socialism.

This is the precise proposition against which the anti-Stalinist tradition was formed, and its answer was in print half a century before this conference met. Trotsky put the colonial case in the second thesis of *The Permanent Revolution* (1930) in words that read as though written against this book: "With regard to countries with a belated bourgeois development, especially the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the theory of the permanent revolution signifies that the complete and genuine solution of their tasks of achieving democracy and national emancipation is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proletariat as the leader of the subjugated nation, above all of its peasant masses." The quarrel is not over sympathy for Ethiopian liberation. It is over whether socialism can be administered into being from above, by a vanguard standing in for a proletariat that scarcely exists, under the tutelage of a foreign power — or whether that substitution of party for class, and of decree for struggle, produces something else entirely and calls it socialism.

The later record settled the question in the tradition's favour, and settled it brutally. The Workers' Party of Ethiopia and its Marxist-Leninist state did not survive. In May 1991 the Derg collapsed; Mengistu fled to Zimbabwe; the regime that this book presents as marching "along the road of social progress" was overthrown, and Ethiopia moved to a market economy. What "socialist orientation" produced in Ethiopia was not socialism but a decade of war, famine and mass killing, followed by a rout. The book cannot be blamed for failing to foresee 1991. It can be read against it.

What the anniversary erases

An anniversary is a choice of what to remember, and this one's silences are the finding. Ten years of the Ethiopian revolution — 1974 to 1984 — contained the Red Terror, the destruction of the civilian left, the wars in Eritrea and the Ogaden, and a famine in which the regime's own policy was deeply implicated. Test the book against each.

Begin with a name that never appears. Haile Selassie is not in this book. In more than forty thousand words on the revolution that overthrew him, the emperor deposed in September 1974 — and, by every serious account, killed in his palace the following August — is referred to only as "the Emperor," and his removal is narrated in a single glacial clause: the military committee "disbanded the government and parliament and overthrew the Emperor. That paved the way to socialist

orientation." A man ruled Ethiopia for forty-four years and died at the hands of the men this book celebrates; the book cannot print his name or the fact of his death. This is the erasure-of-the-ending that recurs throughout the *Progress* catalogue, applied here to the *ancien régime* it was safe to attack.

The larger erasure is of what the Derg did to the left. In 1977–78 the regime unleashed the Red Terror — a campaign of mass killing directed at the civilian Marxist opposition, above all the Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party (EPRP) and the All-Ethiopia Socialist Movement (Meison), in which tens of thousands were murdered, students and schoolchildren among them, their families sometimes made to pay for the bullets before collecting the bodies. In this book the phrase "Red Terror" does not occur. The word "terror" appears three times, and every time it is assigned to the other side: "the spread of the counterrevolutionary terror," to which "the revolutionary authorities were forced to resort to the armed suppression of the counter-revolution"; the "terrorist methods" of the counter-revolutionaries; the "counter-revolutionary acts of terrorism." The state's own name for its own killing is turned inside out and hung on its victims. The EPRP — a Marxist party of the Ethiopian left — is named exactly once, filed among "the ultra-leftists and anarchists," yoked in "a broad coalition" with "former feudal lords and monarchists." Meison, the movement the Derg first used and then destroyed, is not named at all.

Here the reply corpus is not an outside opinion but a contemporaneous witness to precisely what the book removes. The Fourth International's weekly *Intercontinental Press* covered the Ethiopian revolution closely from 1974 onward. On 27 February 1978 — while the killing was at its height — it reported that "hundreds of alleged supporters of the underground Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Party have been killed over the past few months in what the Dergue calls its 'red terror.'" The paper had already, on 28 March 1977, described the EPRP plainly as "an underground group opposed to the military junta." And in June 1978 it reported the suppression of Meison, whose ideologues were driven into exile or, in the case of Hailu Fida, imprisoned by the Dergue. The category the book will not turn on the regime, its own tradition applied without hesitation, in the moment, on the page.

The point is not that the book errs on a date. It is that a category never turns inward. A candid *Progress* volume can admit that this or that leader was mistaken; what never happens is that the label — "terror," "dictatorship" — is

allowed to attach to the men in charge. The book even stages this refusal openly, dismissing "some of the Western statesmen, bourgeois sociologists and journalists" as "libellous to the point of accusing Ethiopia's revolutionary leaders of taking dictatorial and totalitarian attitudes, provoking bloodshed." The Red Terror is not answered; it is pre-emptively reclassified as slander.

On Eritrea, the book is not silent but inverted. The Eritrean movement — armed against Ethiopian rule since the early 1960s, and led in large part by the left — appears as "the Eritrean nationalists, who are clearly under the thumb of the imperialists and the reactionary Arab sheikhs," "separatist bands" bent on depriving Ethiopia of its coast. Set this beside the same Intercontinental Press, which on 20 February 1978 recalled that "In 1962, Selassie dropped all pretenses of maintaining the federation and formally annexed Eritrea as Ethiopia's fourteenth 'province.' It is in fact a colony." The war the book describes as imperialist subversion was, in the reply corpus's reading, a colonial reconquest — waged, after 1977, by an Ethiopian army newly armed and stiffened by the Soviet Union and Cuba. The book is even willing to let a corner of the truth show: its own chapter on the peasant associations notes that in Eritrea and Tigre "the normal course of life is still disturbed by the secessionists" — an admission, in passing, that a decade into the "socialist orientation" the regime did not control the north.

And on the Ogaden, the book performs the same operation as its sibling USSR and Countries of Africa, only more completely. The Somali invasion of 1977–78 is narrated at length as an "aggression" by "the Siad Barre regime," "encouraged by the West," repelled "owing to the friendly assistance from the Soviet Union, Cuba, the GDR and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen." What is missing is that until the year before, the Soviet Union had been Somalia's patron — arming and training the very army that invaded. Intercontinental Press supplied the sentence the book cannot: Moscow "also armed and helped train the troops of the Somali regime until its advisers were expelled in November." The USSR equipped both sides of the same war within a single decade, switching clients as its strategic interest dictated; the book presents the outcome as internationalism and the reversal as though it had never occurred. (Interestingly, this 1986 volume is franker than the 1980 USSR and Countries of Africa on one count: it names the Cuban military role openly and repeatedly, where the earlier book had dissolved the Cuban brigades into "the socialist countries" and never printed the word. By 1986 the intervention was too large and too celebrated to hide.)

The hardest case is the famine, because here the book speaks — and is partly right. It acknowledges "the disastrous drought of 1984 which is followed by famine that has caused suffering to more than 7,000,000 Ethiopians," and it scores a genuine point against the old regime: "The former regime closed its eyes to the people's suffering and concealed the data illustrating the scope of drought and famine that ravaged the country in the early 1970s, when hundreds of thousands of Ethiopians died of starvation." That concealment was real, and it was one of the crimes the 1974 revolution exposed. But the book then presents the regime's response as pure relief, and slides past the policy that made the catastrophe worse. It records, as an achievement, that "Nearly 500,000 people from these districts have been resettled in Western and South Western regions where land is fertile. In 1985, another 1,250,000 people are to be resettled." This is the resettlement programme — the forced, often violent transfer of northern peasants, carried out with the army, at a cost in lives that later human-rights investigations put in the tens of thousands; it was accompanied by the "villagisation" drive and by the diversion of the state's resources to the wars in the north, and it was denounced at the time by relief agencies, Médecins Sans Frontières being expelled at the end of 1985 for saying so. The word "villagisation" does not appear; the coercion does not appear; the deaths in transit do not appear. A programme that was among the deadliest single acts of the decade is entered in the ledger as fertile land and open appeal.

Honesty requires a caution here about the reply corpus, and it cuts against easy point-scoring. On the famine, the Fourth International's press was not a reliable critic of the Ethiopian regime. Intercontinental Press in February 1985 treated the famine chiefly as "imperialism's legacy," worried that Western relief was being "used by the imperialists for political purposes, as part of their effort to discredit the Ethiopian government," and did not train its fire on the resettlement policy. The sharpest contemporaneous witnesses to that policy's coercion were the relief NGOs, not our own tradition — a fact about the limits of the reply corpus, stated plainly rather than papered over.

What is genuinely usable

None of the foregoing touches the popular content of the revolution of 1974, and the criticism is worthless if it does. What happened in Ethiopia in February 1974 was the overthrow of one of the last feudal absolutisms on earth. The book is right that it began from below — "not a military coup, but an outburst of the working people's indignation," in the

taxi-drivers' and teachers' strikes and the general strike of March 1974 — before the officers of the Coordinating Committee gathered its leadership into their hands. The reforms that followed were real and were popular. The land reform of March 1975 abolished landlordism at a stroke: as the book accurately says, "the land was nationalised and handed over to the peasants without redemption or compensation," the aristocracy and the church forfeited their estates, tenancy and farm-labour bondage were abolished. In a country that had been, in social structure, closer to European feudalism than almost anywhere else in Africa, this was a transformation of the lives of millions. The literacy campaign that mobilised tens of thousands of students into the countryside was substantial and internationally recognised; the exposure of the palace's concealed famine of 1973 was a real service to the truth.

On this, remarkably, the reply corpus and the book agree. Intercontinental Press, no friend of the regime, wrote in February 1985 that "the revolution and the land reform freed the peasantry from the exploitation of the old aristocracy." And *Africa in Struggle*, the small Trotskyist review of African liberation whose subtitle is "in the whirlwind of permanent revolution," wrote in June 1978 that "The upsurge which finally did away with Haile Selassie was not initiated by the military but by the action of the masses themselves." An introduction that convicted the 1974 revolution of the crimes of the regime that captured it would be doing tribalism, not criticism.

What that same review supplied — and what this book cannot — was the class characterisation that makes sense of everything the anniversary leaves out. *Africa in Struggle* judged that "The most accurate description of the Derg is Jacobin": that the officers had carried through "the democratic task of expropriation" of the feudal landed class — a radical bourgeois revolution — but that theirs was "a strange military dictatorship which tolerates (however unwillingly) organisations which call for a return to civilian rule," and that this was no road to socialism but a military-bureaucratic regime holding down, in the name of an absent working class, the very masses whose upsurge had made the revolution. That verdict was reached in 1978, from inside our own tradition, on the evidence then available. Thirteen years later the collapse of the regime confirmed it.

Read *Ten Years of the Ethiopian Revolution*, then, for what it documents and for what it dares not. The chapters on the land reform, the peasant associations and the literacy drive carry real information about a real transformation, and the Africa Institute's scholars knew their subject. But read the whole

beside the Fourth International's press of 1974–78 and beside the fate of the regime it praises. The book set out to prove that a committee of army officers, guided by Moscow, was leading Ethiopia to socialism "bypassing capitalism." What those ten years actually held — the killing of the left the book calls counter-revolutionary terror, the colonial war it calls the crushing of separatist bands, the deadly resettlement it calls fertile land, and the emperor it cannot name — is the answer the doctrine could not survive.

REFERENCE

The Soviet Constitution A Dictionary

The Soviet constitutional order defined term by term by its own senior jurists - among them the man who drafted it, the man who later joined the 1991 coup, and one of Gorbachev's closest reformers.

Vladimir Nikolaevich Kudryavtsev and others

Introduction to the 1986 Edition

Three men edited this book. Vladimir Kudryavtsev was a criminologist who had directed the Institute of State and Law of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1973 and would become a vice-president of the Academy in 1988. Georgy Shakhnazarov was president of the Soviet Association of Political Sciences and was about to become one of the half-dozen advisers closest to Mikhail Gorbachev, and one of the more genuine reformers among them. Anatoly Lukyanov had worked on drafting the very Constitution this dictionary explains, in 1975–77, and on 15 March 1990 he became Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR; he was arrested on 29 August 1991 for his part in the attempt to save the state by force. The volume was compiled by B. N. Topornin of the same Institute, with some two dozen other jurists — T. Ye. Abova, V. G. Boyarshinov, Yu. V. Dolgoplov, N. P. Farberov, M. G. Galkin, O. Ye. Kutafin, B. N. Lazarev, V. A. Maslennikov, G. S. Ostroumov, A. S. Pavlov, R. A. Safarov, N. G. Salishcheva, I. S. Samoshchenko, M. A. Shafir, A. I. Shcheglik, Ye. K. Smirnitsky, V. K. Sobakin, L. A. Steshenko, B. A. Strashun, N. V. Vitruk and N. A. Zolotarev.

That is not an apparatus hack-list. It is close to the whole senior faculty of Soviet constitutional law, and the book they produced is a competent, sober, professionally drafted piece of legal exposition. It is also the last full statement of the constitutional order of the Soviet Union before that order was dismantled, in part by the people who wrote it.

The date on the spine is the real one. This series has been burned in both directions by Progress imprints — translations of texts years older, reprints wearing new jackets — so it is worth saying plainly what the internal evidence shows. The book cites the Twenty-Seventh Congress of the CPSU by name and reports that "In 1986, 'the 27th Congress of the CPSU approved the new edition of the Party Programme'; that congress sat from 25 February to 6 March 1986. Years as late as 1990 appear eight times, and every one of them is the horizon of the twelfth five-year plan — "the Guidelines for the

Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1986–1990 and for the Period Ending in 2000", adopted by that same congress. There is no OCR corruption and no backdating: this is a book finished in the spring or summer of 1986, in Gorbachev's second year.

Which makes the silences in it a matter of weeks rather than decades. The words *perestroika*, *glasnost*, democratisation and Chernobyl do not occur. Gorbachev is not named — nor is Brezhnev, Khrushchev, Andropov or Chernenko. Neither is Stalin: the string appears once in the entire book, inside "the medal For the Defence of Stalingrad". Trotsky is absent, as is Bukharin. The most conspicuous near-miss is the headword *Publicity* — *glasnost*, translated as the 1977 Constitution translates it — which turns out to mean only what Article 9 had meant since 1977: "informing the population through the mass media and other means of information about the establishment and activity of government and nongovernment bodies". The word was already in the constitutional text. What Gorbachev was in the process of doing to it has not reached this book. Read it as the last photograph taken before the exposure changed.

Now the method, which the companion volume in this series, *A Dictionary of Scientific Communism* (1984), sets out: a reference work argues by assignment. It decides what is a thing. So count. There are 177 headwords, of which 32 are bare cross-references, leaving 145 substantive entries across roughly 95,000 words. As in the companion volume there are no biographical entries, no persons among the headwords at all. But test something sharper. Go to the letter F, where a dictionary of a constitution might be expected to earn its keep. The entries are: Flag, National; Foreign Nationals; Foreign Policy; Forfeiting Citizenship of the USSR; Fundamentals of Legislation of the USSR and Union Republics. There is no entry for freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, freedom of demonstration or freedom of conscience. There is no entry for secession, for emigration, for censorship, for the press. Every political liberty in the Constitution has been folded into a single entry — "Basic Rights and Freedoms of Citizens", at 3,946 words the longest in the book — where it

can be handled in context.

Read that entry and you see why. The exposition of the social and economic rights is expansive, statistical and, on the whole, true. The political freedoms get three paragraphs, and here is the second of them in full:

The Constitution of the USSR guarantees freedom and equality, including political freedoms, not for some particular section of the population but for the whole of the Soviet people, including all classes and social strata. Citizens' rights and freedoms must not, however, be used against the socialist system or the socialist state. Slander of the socialist system, anti-Soviet propaganda or agitation are prohibited bylaw.

That is the whole of it. Article 50's own qualifying clause — the freedoms may be exercised "in accordance with the interests of the people and in order to strengthen and develop the socialist system" — is printed a few lines earlier without a word of comment, as though a right conditional on the approval of the body it might be exercised against were a right at all. And the sentence about slander and agitation names no statute, no article, no court and no case. The instruments were Article 70 of the RSFSR Criminal Code and its 1966 supplement Article 190-1, under which several thousand people were tried; a dictionary of the Constitution written by the country's leading criminologist could have cited them in a clause. Instead the reader is told the prohibition exists and then immediately redirected: "Western ideologists interpret political freedoms in an abstract manner, trying to conceal their real class content." The next sentence but one asserts that the Soviet freedoms, "unlike bourgeois practice", "are not purely declarative".

The book is more forthcoming when it is not on the defensive, and that is where it gives itself away. Betrayal of the Motherland does have its own headword — treason merits an entry where speech does not — and the entry is unembarrassed:

B.M. (high treason) is premeditated act committed by a citizen of the USSR to the detriment of state independence, the territorial integrity or the military might of the Soviet state by going over to the side of the enemy, engaging in espionage, divulging an official or military secret to another state, escaping abroad or refusing to return to the USSR from abroad, rendering assistance to a foreign state in carrying out hostile activities against the USSR, or conspiring to seize state power.

The penalty, the entry adds, is "deprivation of liberty for a term of from 10 to 15 years, or by the death penalty", and failure to report a treason "under preparation" is itself criminal. There is no entry for emigration anywhere in the book. So the reader learns what leaving is: it is treason, on a scale with espionage, and it can be capital. The entry then produces one of the most instructive sentences in the volume — "No objective conditions exist for the commitment of crimes of this kind in the Soviet state of the whole people" — and in the very next sentence explains that they are committed anyway, by "individual renegades and morally unstable persons". A theory in which the phenomenon cannot exist, followed by an account of who does it: this is the characteristic move of the whole book, and it recurs wherever social reality has to be met.

The same flatness is worth crediting where it cuts the other way. Punishment for Criminal Offence lists the basic penalties without euphemism — "deprivation of liberty; exile; restricted residence; corrective labour without deprivation of liberty" — and notes that "Application of the death penalty is an exceptional measure of punishment." A Western reader in 1986 could learn from this book that internal exile and restriction of residence were ordinary sentences of Soviet law, which is more than the propaganda volumes in this series would have told them.

Now the deepest hole. Union Republic states that a republic "retains the right freely to secede from the USSR"; the entries on the 1924 and 1936 Constitutions each say the same. Three assertions, no headword, and — this is the point — no procedure. Nowhere in ninety-five thousand words of constitutional exposition is there a sentence about how a republic would exercise that right: which body would initiate it, by what majority, on what timetable, subject to what conditions. Every other constitutional mechanism in the book, down to the two-and-a-half-year terms of people's assessors and the fifteen-day limit on answering a citizen's complaint, is set out in procedural detail. Article 72 alone floats free. When the Baltic republics tested it in 1989–90 the Union had to legislate a secession law from nothing, in a hurry, and it was designed to be unusable. The blank space in this dictionary is where that crisis was already sitting.

There was, of course, a procedure of a kind, and it had been named in print nine years earlier. Reporting the treason charge against Anatoly Shcharansky, Marilyn Vogt observed in Intercontinental Press that "While the right of a republic to secede from the USSR is guaranteed by Article 17 of the 1936 Soviet Constitution, Article 64 of the Stalinists' Criminal Code makes attempts to agitate for such secession punishable by

death" (vol. 15 no. 22, June 1977). Article 64 is the treason article — and the dictionary's own entry on Betrayal of the Motherland is a faithful summary of it, down to the flight abroad and the death penalty. The two halves of the mechanism are both in this book. They are simply nine hundred words and one letter of the alphabet apart, and no cross-reference joins them.

The article that did more work than any other gets 2,175 words, the third-longest entry: Communist Party of the Soviet Union, opening with Article 6. It is the most doctrinally confident thing in the volume, and it contains a claim that deserves preserving: "the Party, its organisations and all Communists have no privileges of any kind, or advantages compared to other mass organisations or individual citizens." On 14 March 1990 the Third Congress of People's Deputies struck the leading role out of Article 6 by 1,956 votes to 276. The following day it elected Anatoly Lukyanov — this book's co-editor — Chairman of the Supreme Soviet.

State Security is the entry on the KGB, and it is written as institutional genealogy: the Committee for State Security is placed in direct descent from the All-Russia Extraordinary Commission set up in December 1917 under Felix Dzerzhinsky, which "waged an unrelenting struggle against internal and international counter-revolution, exposed numerous conspiracies against the USSR and prosecuted its enemies". Lenin is quoted for the necessity of such an institution. Between 1917 and "at present" there is nothing — no NKVD, no 1937, no Beria, no rehabilitation. The line of descent is claimed and the fifty years in the middle are simply not there.

Which brings us to the entry on the Constitution of the USSR of 1936, 972 words, and to the one falsification in this book that is a matter of dates rather than emphasis. The entry narrates the drafting with care: the Seventh Congress of Soviets resolved on changes in 1935; a Constitutional Commission was established; "On June 12, 1936, after the Commission had finalised its draft, it was published for nationwide discussion, in which over 50 per cent of the country's adult population participated and about two million additions and amendments were proposed"; it was "adopted by the Extraordinary Eighth Congress of Soviets of the USSR on December 5, 1936"; and then, in the last substantive sentence, "Between January and March, 1937, the constitutional legislation in all the Union and Autonomous republics was updated."

Set the calendar beside it. The draft was published on 12 June

1936. On 19 August the trial of Zinoviev, Kamenev and fourteen others opened in Moscow; all sixteen were shot on 25 August, in the middle of the "nationwide discussion". The Constitution was adopted on 5 December. In January 1937 Pyatakov and Radek were tried; at the Central Committee plenum of February–March 1937 — precisely the window in which the republican legislation was being tidied up — Bukharin and Rykov were arrested and the mass operations were authorised. The dictionary's chronology is accurate to the day and describes a country that did not exist. It does not lie about the dates; it lies by giving them.

Nor is the document ever called what everyone called it. The 1936 Constitution was the Stalin Constitution, drafted under his chairmanship. His name does not appear. The result is a text that manages to narrate the single most notorious constitutional episode of the twentieth century without an author, without a victim and without a year that means anything.

One more silence, quieter and quite deliberate. Autonomous Republic lists all twenty ASSRs then in existence, and the alphabetical roll of the sixteen inside the RSFSR runs "Bashkir, Buryat, Daghestan, Kabardin-Balkar, Kalmyk, Karelian, Komi, Mari, Mordovian, North Ossetian, Tatar, Tuva, Udmurt, Chechen-Ingush, Chuvash, and Yakut". The Kalmyk and the Chechen-Ingush republics were abolished in 1943–44 and their entire populations deported to Central Asia and Siberia; both were restored, incompletely, after 1957. The Crimean Tatars and the Volga Germans, whose republics were not restored, appear nowhere in the book at all. A dictionary organised around the constitutional equality of nations lists the survivors and does not mention that the list once had other names on it.

It would be dishonest to leave it there, because the other half of this Constitution was real and the dictionary documents it well. The right to work meant guaranteed employment, and the entry is right that "Unemployment was stamped out in the USSR in 1930 and the country has enjoyed full employment ever since." Free medical care at 41.2 physicians per 10,000 population in 1984, one of the highest ratios in the world; a housing programme under which, the book claims, 28,000 people a day improved their conditions and roughly 80 per cent of urban dwellers had separate apartments by 1985; universal compulsory secondary education and free higher education with maintenance grants; pensionable ages of 55 and 60, among the lowest anywhere. These were not fictions. They were delivered, at a level no comparable economy matched, and any account of the Soviet Union that cannot say so is not

worth reading. The procedural entries are also genuinely useful: Complaint, Amnesty, Courts, Legal Procedure and Punishment for Criminal Offence are clear, specific descriptions of how Soviet law actually operated, and there is no comparably compact account in English. The critique is not that this book invents the social rights. It is that the political articles were qualified into nullity by clauses which the dictionary prints, in its own voice, without noticing that it is printing them.

The reply was written fifty years before this book, by a man who had read the previous Constitution the same way. In April 1936, before the draft was even published, Trotsky argued in *Biulleten' Oppozitsii* that the reform's purpose was to abolish the soviets as class organs and to dissolve the workers "into the general mass of the population", and that a state which had abolished classes yet retained the GPU had refuted itself: "The classes have been destroyed, the soviets are being abolished, the class theory of society is reduced to dust, but the bureaucracy remains. Q.E.D." Later that year, in chapter 10 of *The Revolution Betrayed*, "The Soviet Union in the Mirror of the New Constitution", he turned to the guarantees themselves:

To be sure, the new charter "guarantees" to the citizens the so-called "freedoms" of speech, press, assemblage and street processions. But each of these guarantees has the form either of a heavy muzzle or of shackles upon the hands and feet.

He was writing about the muzzle from outside it. The present volume, in 1986, prints the muzzle in the ordinary descriptive prose of a reference book, under no compulsion to mention that it is one.

The same reading was applied to the 1977 Constitution while its draft was still in circulation. Gerry Foley, reviewing it in *Intercontinental Press* under the title "Brezhnev's New Constitution" (vol. 15 no. 23, June 1977), fastened on the identical hinge that this dictionary steps over: draft Article 39, "The exercise of rights and freedoms by citizens must not damage the interests of the society and the state." Foley's gloss was one sentence — "That is, rights can only be used for what the rulers of the society consider positive purposes" — and it is the sentence this book was written to make unnecessary. He also noted what the dictionary presents as the Constitution's crowning achievement and Foley took as its confession: that Article 6 wrote the fusion of party and state into the fundamental law, where "even [Stalin] did not dare refer to it openly in his constitution." Whatever one thinks of the politics, the prediction held. Trotsky's underlying test is worth restating

because this dictionary fails it on its own chosen ground. The Party programme of 1919 had held that "deprivation of political rights, and all other limitations of freedom whatsoever, are necessary exclusively in the form of temporary measures", to lapse as exploitation disappeared. This book announces that exploitation disappeared long ago, that the dictatorship of the proletariat has given way to a "socialist state of the whole people" of which it says that "The social base of the S.S.W.P. is represented by the whole of society" — and it retains, in the same volume, treason charges for leaving the country, criminal liability for anti-Soviet agitation, exile and restricted residence among ordinary penalties, and a security service in unbroken descent from the Cheka. On the doctrine's own terms those things should have withered. The dictionary never asks why they did not, because the entry that would have had to ask — an entry on bureaucracy — is one of the ones that does not exist.

That is finally what a reader should take from this book. It is not a tissue of lies; it is an honest inventory of an order that had stopped being able to describe itself. Within five years of its publication the leading role of the Party had been struck out of the Constitution it explains, Article 72 had been used for the purpose the book declined to specify, and one of its three editors was in Lefortovo. Nobody who wrote it can have expected that. It is worth reading precisely because they did not.

REFERENCE

A Concise Psychological Dictionary

Soviet psychology's own reference work, from the school of Petrovsky and Yaroshevsky - several hundred entries setting out what the discipline took itself to have settled about the mind.

Petr Nikolaevich Shikhirev

Introduction to the 1987 Edition

A dictionary does not argue; it rules. Where an ordinary book advances a case a reader may weigh and reject, a reference work sets down what the words mean and expects to be believed, and it does its most consequential work in the entries it declines to write. A Concise Psychological Dictionary is the authoritative Soviet reference on the mind — several hundred alphabetical entries, from Abilities through to Will, each pronouncing in the flat, agentless voice of settled science. To read it critically is not to catch it lying about a date, as one catches the historical volumes in this series. It almost never does. It is to watch where the definitions bend, which foreign findings are admitted and which quarantined, and above all to notice the gaps on the shelf: the ordinary facts of the human interior for which the science of the psyche, in the last decade of the state that funded it, had built no entry.

Establish the date of the text first, because here the spine and the substance point to slightly different years and the gap is the interesting part. The English edition is 1987, issued by Progress Publishers in Moscow and co-imprinted in New York by International Publishers — the house of the American Communist Party — so that the volume reached Anglophone readers doubly certified, Soviet science under a Soviet-aligned jacket. The Library of Congress data record it as a translation of *Kratkii psikhologicheskii slovar*; the front matter of this edition credits Pyotr Shikhirev, a Candidate of Sciences in philosophy, as editor of the translation, and designer and translator besides. The compilers of the underlying Russian work are not named on the English title page, but their fingerprints are on nearly every page: the volume is the collective product of the school of A. V. Petrovsky and M. G. Yaroshevsky, the dominant figures of academic Soviet psychology, whose particular theories — Petrovsky's "stratometric" account of the collective, his concept of personalisation, the doctrine of "collectivist self-determination" — are cited throughout not as one position among several but as the discipline's established results. This is not the work of an apparatus functionary padding a quota. It

is the settled house style of a genuine and, in parts, first-rate scientific establishment, writing at the top of its authority.

That authority dates the book more precisely than the imprint does. Search the entries for the vocabulary of the moment they were printed in and you find nothing: no glasnost, no perestroika, no Gorbachev, no reference to the Twenty-Seventh Congress of February 1986. The intellectual furniture is entirely that of the years before the thaw in official language — the Russian compilation belongs to the middle 1980s, and reads as a document of the discipline as it stood at the close of the Brezhnev-Andropov period, translated into English just as the political surface above it began, at last, to crack. One entry alone shows the crack running down into the science, and we will come to it: the treatment of Freud is warmer than a reader of the older Soviet manuals would expect, and the warmth has a date — the Tbilisi symposium on the unconscious of 1979, after which the subject could no longer simply be dismissed. But the frame around that entry, and around all the others, is pre-thaw. What the book was for is plain from its form: it is the export reference, the object a Western student or sympathiser was meant to consult to learn what the largest psychological establishment on earth had decided a given term meant. International Publishers carried it to exactly that reader.

Begin, then, with the doctrine, because the dictionary states it more cleanly than any monograph could — a monograph has to persuade, a dictionary only has to define. The keystone is the category of activity, and the entry says so without embarrassment: "The category of A. is a distinctive feature of Soviet psychology based on the Marxist-Leninist methodology." This is the tradition of Sergei Rubinstein and Alexei N. Leontyev, named in the entry as the men who introduced action into Soviet psychology as its unit of analysis, and it is the genuine theoretical achievement of the school — the insistence that mind is not a thing sealed inside a skull to be inspected, but a process that forms in and through a subject's practical, object-directed, socially organised dealings with the world. Beneath it sits the still deeper category of reflection, and here the pedigree is made explicit and political

in a single sentence: "Lenin made an exceptionally significant contribution to the teaching that cognition is R. of reality. Hence, the dialectical-materialist theory of R. is called the Leninist theory of R." The whole edifice of Soviet psychology is built on Materialism and Empirio-Criticism — mind as the reflection, in the reflecting matter of the brain, of a material world that exists independently of it. From this the entry on consciousness follows as a theorem: consciousness is "the supreme level of mental reflection of objective reality, inherent in man exclusively by virtue of his socio-historical essence."

It is worth pausing on how far down that reflection concept is made to reach, because the ambition is the doctrine's signature. The reflection entry does not begin with the human mind at all; it begins with matter as such, defining reflection as "a universal property of matter, essentially the ability of objects to represent with varying degree of adequacy the features, structural characteristics and relationships of other objects." From there it climbs a single continuous ladder — irritability in the simplest organism, then sensibility, then sensory and finally logical images in man — so that consciousness is presented not as a break with physical nature but as its highest rung, the point at which matter has organised itself densely enough to reflect itself. The move is elegant and it is metaphysical: it stakes the whole of psychology on Lenin's theory of knowledge and lets nothing fall outside it. That is intellectually serious. It is also why nothing in the resulting science can ever indict the arrangement that produced it, for the arrangement, too, is just matter reflecting matter, and the reflection is by definition adequate.

That last phrase carries the third pillar, the one this series encounters in volume after volume: personality as a social product, not a natural given. The dictionary's personality entry defines the term as "a systems quality which is acquired by an individual in object-oriented activity and communication," formed "in the process of social practice," and it closes on the note that betrays the whole enterprise's purpose: "The task of communist education is the all-round, harmonious development of an individual's P." A dictionary of an ostensibly neutral science has, at the entry for its central object, written down a Party slogan as the object's telos. The tell is not that the claim is false — that persons are socially formed is among the more durable insights the tradition holds — but that the definition of the term and the goal of the state's pedagogy have been fused, so that to define the human personality just is to name the task of communist education. This is what a reference work reveals that an argument conceals: the seam where science and directive have been welded shut.

None of which is to say the science is worthless. The opposite is the case, and honesty about the doctrine's political welding depends on saying so. Threaded through these entries is the transmission of a body of work that is, without qualification, among the twentieth century's permanent contributions to the study of the mind. Lev Vygotsky is named repeatedly and used seriously — his "unit" method of analysis is invoked in the activity entry; his concept of the "social situation of development" anchors the entry on age; the whole cultural-historical account of how the higher mental functions are built up socially and then turned inward is present, correctly, as the discipline's foundation. Alexander Luria, the founder of modern neuropsychology, stands behind the entries on the aphasias, the agnosias and the localisation of function; Sergei Korsakov is credited by name in the entry on amnesia for the syndrome that still bears his name. A reader who wants to know what Soviet psychology actually accomplished — and it accomplished a great deal that Western psychology spent the 1970s and 1980s catching up to — will find it here, defined crisply and, on the clinical and developmental material, without ideological freight. On the neurology, the psychophysics, the developmental science, the dictionary is simply a competent professional reference, and should be used as one.

The ideological freight gathers, predictably, at the border with foreign psychology, and it is at that border that the book's real subject — the boundary of the sayable — comes into view. Consider first the surprising case, the one where the boundary has recently moved. Freudianism receives a long, and by the standards of Soviet reference-writing a remarkably fair, entry. It grants that "Freud introduced several important problems into psychology" and enumerates them without sneering: unconscious motivation, the relation of the normal to the pathological, psychological defence, the effect of childhood trauma on the adult, the conflicted structure of the personality. Only after that concession does the verdict fall — that Freud built on "scientifically unacceptable biologicistic tenets," that pansexualism and the war of conscious against unconscious are errors, and that by subordinating history and culture to the drives psychoanalysis "mystified both, having thus taken on a reactionary ideological purport." The separate entry on the unconscious is franker still: it accepts the phenomenon as real, expounds Freud's mechanism of "dynamic suppression" accurately, and rests its objection on a specifiable ground — that the foreign schools "ignore the fact that the U. is conditioned by sociohistorical factors." This is a criticism with content; one could argue with it. That such an entry could be printed at all is the glasnost opening showing through the science, and it should be credited: sixty-six mentions of Freud

across the volume, and a reader is left knowing roughly what he actually said.

The opening, though, is calibrated rather than open, and the calibration is itself instructive. The dictionary carries full entries on neo-Freudianism, on psychoanalysis, on psychological defence and its mechanisms of repression, projection and rationalisation — Karen Horney, Erich Fromm and Harry Sullivan are named and their arguments summarised with reasonable accuracy. But each concession is fitted with the same closing clause. The neo-Freudians "try to overcome the biologism of classic Freudianism," the entry allows, only to fault them because their revised doctrine still "regards society as a source of 'general alienation' and as hostile to the fundamental tendencies of personality development." The objection, once again, is that the foreign school treats the individual and society as originally opposed — precisely the opposition that Soviet doctrine holds cannot obtain under socialism, where person and collective are supposed to develop in harmony. The permission to discuss Freud, in other words, is granted on the standing condition that his account of a self at war with its society be quarantined to the other side of the class line. The border has moved; it has not come down.

Now the entries where the border is sealed rather than negotiated, because they are the ones that map the limit of the sayable. The category of alienation — Marx's own category, the fulcrum of the 1844 manuscripts — is admitted to the dictionary only after being carefully defanged: the psychological entry warns that "the notion of A. should not be confused with the alienation of the personality in an antagonistic class society." Alienation as a felt psychological state may be discussed; alienation as a structural fact of a society is ring-fenced as something that happens under antagonistic — that is, capitalist — class relations, and therefore, by the silent logic of the sentence, not here. The most revealing entry of all is conformity. It is defined, studied and then disowned as a foreign finding: the investigation of conformity "was begun in the works of Solomon Asch," the entry notes, before delivering the correction — "Soviet social psychology rejects the theses of C.'s universality and generality as a form of an individual's reaction to the influence of a social community." Asch's conforming subject, the entry explains, was an artefact of the American laboratory's "diffuse groups," in which real values and goals had been "deliberately neutralised." Introduce genuine collective values and the phenomenon dissolves into its socialist antithesis, "collectivist self-determination," a "conscious solidarity of an individual with a collective." The matching entry on the collective completes the manoeuvre, defining it as "a group most

characteristic of the system of socialist social relationships." The result is a psychology in which conformity is something that happens to Americans in a psychologist's cubicle, while the pressure to conform inside the actual Soviet collective — the meeting, the kollektiv, the unanimous show of hands — has, by definition, no name. The same figure recurs wherever a Western result touches the social order: the entry on achievement motivation reports McClelland's work and then notes that "Soviet psychology rejects the idea of A.M. being formed exclusively during early childhood," and dismisses his attempt to explain national economic development from it as "counter to the historical approach."

What is missing follows from what is quarantined, and the omissions are the sharpest finding the book offers, because the Publisher's Note tells us they are deliberate. That note announces the dictionary is "intended for a wide range of readers seeking information," and then draws its own boundary: it excludes terms that "actually belong to other branches of knowledge, such as philosophy, pedagogy, anatomy, and physiology." Fair enough as a principle of concision. But run down the alphabet for the psychological realities of late-Soviet life and the concision starts to look like something else. There is no entry for alcoholism, the era's great destroyer of the Soviet interior. There is none for suicide. There is no entry — there could not be one, in this vocabulary — for the psychology of the double life, the dvoemyslie of the person who recites one thing in the meeting and believes another on the way home, though it was the defining mental operation of the society the book was written in. The dictionary has an entry for abulia, the pathological absence of will, and for acalculia, the inability to do sums; it has fine entries on the neuroses considered as clinical objects. What it cannot constitute as an object of psychological science is the ordinary, structural, non-pathological adaptation of a self to a state that demanded assent. Conformity is Asch's problem, alienation is capitalism's, and the field of the sayable closes precisely where it would have had to turn its instruments on the conditions of its own production. This is the deepest sense in which a dictionary is a boundary: not the entries it gets wrong, but the shelf of entries it was not possible to write.

The tradition this series speaks from would locate that limit exactly. It is a commonplace of Marx that social being determines consciousness; the dictionary keeps the formula — consciousness as reflection of a socially conditioned reality, "conditioned by external factors independent of C.," "primarily by the structures of the social system in which the individual exists" — and cannot spend it. For to ask what the specific social being of the Soviet 1980s was doing to the

consciousness formed in it would be to write the missing entries, and those entries would not have passed. The critical point is not that the dictionary's materialism is false but that it is applied in one direction only: unfailingly to the psyche under capitalism, never reflexively to the psyche under the system that commissioned the book. Readers who want to watch the same seam open in fuller works should turn to the sibling volumes in this series — to V. A. Lektorsky's *Subject, Object, Cognition* (1984), the research-frontier version of the identical reflection theory; to Anatoly Rakitov's *The Principles of Philosophy* (1989), the schoolroom catechism of it; and, best of all, to Karl Levitin's *One Is Not Born a Personality* (1982), a journalist's warm and genuinely admiring portrait of the very psychologists — Vygotsky's heirs, Leontyev, Luria — whose findings this dictionary distills, and which tells the truth about their science while keeping the same careful silence about what the state did to them and could not let them study.

That double character is the honest last word on the volume. A *Concise Psychological Dictionary* is two books bound as one. It is a competent, often excellent professional reference to a scientific tradition that earned its standing — the place to learn, accurately, what Vygotsky, Luria, Leontyev and their students established about development, activity, neurological function and the social formation of mind. And it is a map of a frontier, drawn by the discipline itself, showing exactly how far the science of the psyche was permitted to travel toward its own society before the entries had to stop. The first book is worth keeping. The second is worth reading as what it is: the outer wall of the thinkable, in the last years before the wall came down.

SOVIET SOCIETY

They Came to Stay

The Americans who emigrated to the USSR in the Depression and never went home - above all the Black cotton scientists of Soviet Uzbekistan - recorded by an American ethnographer who found the survivors fifty years on.

Paula Garb

Introduction to the 1987 Edition

Somewhere in the archive of the twentieth century there is a photograph that this book keeps almost taking and never quite develops. It is Christmas Eve, 1932, in a white-painted cottage forty miles from Tashkent, and a group of Black cotton scientists from Tuskegee and Hampton are singing "Silent Night" with Langston Hughes, who has come across the mud of the new Uzbek republic to spend the holiday with them. Oliver Golden, born on a Mississippi plantation where his father had been a slave, is their host. He had come to Soviet Central Asia to grow cotton and to raise a daughter he did not want to see subjected to American racism, and here, Hughes wrote, among "these cotton-collective Negroes from America in the middle of a mud-cake oasis frosted with snow," he "didn't feel homesick at all." Paula Garb found the survivors of that world, and their children, half a century later, and wrote their lives down before they were lost. That is a real service, and it should be said first, because most of what follows is an argument about what the book cannot see.

They Came to Stay is an American anthropologist's oral history of the North Americans — workers, engineers, Communists, and above all Black Americans — who emigrated to the Soviet Union, mostly in the Depression years, and remained. Garb is not a propagandist by trade. She was a genuine ethnographer, at the time of writing a doctoral candidate at the Academy of Sciences' Institute of Ethnography under Victor Kozlov, and she went on to serious fieldwork on the Caucasus. She lived the subject: she settled in Moscow in 1975, raised two sons in Soviet schools, and the book closes with a long first-person account of her own contented Soviet life. The voices she recorded are real voices, and her affection for the people in them is not feigned. The book is warm, humane, and — this is the point of the introduction — built on a foundation it never names.

The date, and what it makes sayable

Spine and text agree for once: this is a 1987 book, and it reads like one. The latest events it can cite are the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress of 1986, a Gorbachev interview in L'Humanité of February 1986, and an Izvestia feature of April that year; Garb moved apartments in 1985 and dates her fieldwork to August of that year. The words glasnost and perestroika never appear, and Gorbachev enters only as a reformer cited approvingly for cracking down on absenteeism and drink. This is the second year of glasnost, before the great opening of 1988 — the year, it is worth remembering, that Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev and Rykov were judicially rehabilitated. Garb wrote in the narrow window when the Terror had become speakable in the Soviet Union but the men it destroyed were still, officially, its enemies. That window is the pressure point of the whole book, and it explains both its unexpected candour and its limits.

What is genuinely rescued here

Take the pull seriously, because it was serious. The Great Depression is the engine of the first half of the book, and Garb gets the texture right: skilled workers and radicals who watched mass unemployment at home and saw, in a country building itself from nothing, both a job and a cause. The Kemerovo "Kuzbas" colony of American workers in Siberia (1921–1926), the Karelian project that drew Finnish-Americans from Michigan and Minnesota with their own tools and savings, the Seyatel agricultural commune near Rostov — these were real ventures, and Garb researched them in local archives and with local historians rather than inventing them. Her Finnish-American subjects are not cardboard enthusiasts; Sally Laakso remembers being unable to bear the "easy-going attitude of many workers she saw in the 1930s," and Garb lets the complaint stand.

And then there is the moral centre of the book, which no amount of critical framing should be allowed to patronise. For Black Americans in the 1930s, the appeal of a state that outlawed racial discrimination as a matter of constitutional

principle was not naïveté; it was one of the century's real moral facts, and Garb documents it concretely. Oliver Golden's whole life is here — the Klan at his heels in Mississippi, expulsion from Tuskegee after quarrelling with a white official, the first white man ever to offer him a handshake turning out to be a Communist, the theatre outside Harlem where the audience rose and left when he and his white wife Bertha sat down. A man who had heard Golden speak in Harlem in 1927 remembered, decades later, that Golden said "he had been treated with dignity for the first time in his life." Golden organised sixteen Black families, "specialists in subtropical agriculture," and took them to Uzbekistan in 1931; his cotton work, Garb says, helped lay the foundation of the republic's cotton industry, and he was elected to the Tashkent city soviet. His kidneys, which killed him in 1940, had been damaged years earlier when New York policemen breaking up a demonstration "struck Oliver repeatedly on his sides." This is history worth preserving, and preserving it is a real contribution to the record, one that a hostile reading of the book would only obscure. The USSR's promise to Black Americans was cashed, for these particular people, in dignity and work, and the book is the better for saying so.

The book the survivors could not be in

Here is the structural fact from which everything critical follows. A collection assembled in 1987, out of the North Americans who stayed, prospered, and remained loyal enough to sit for a Progress-published interview, is by construction a survivorship sample. Garb interviewed "approximately one hundred people"; a few declined — one "bitter about his life in the Soviet Union," one afraid his "career opportunities could be hurt" — and she notes them and moves on. The immigrants who came in the 1930s and were then swept into the Great Terror, arrested as spies and shot or worked to death in the camps, are by definition not among her narrators. The question that decides the book is whether they appear at all.

They do — and this is where the easy hypothesis breaks. It would be convenient to report that the Terror simply does not happen to these people, that the purges are a silence. They are not. This is a glasnost book, and it says a remarkable amount. "Immigrants were among those arrested," Garb writes flatly. "Many former North American Finns who had come to help build up Karelia were taken away to labor camps, accused of being spies. Former North American farmers who had developed the Seyatel agricultural commune in the Rostov Region vanished in the night. Some of the immigrants who had remained in Kemerovo from the Kuzbas project of the 1920s

were also arrested." The international club on Herzen Street in Moscow, where the immigrants had gone to dance, "was suddenly deserted." Anna Preikshas's father, brother and husband were arrested in 1937 "as 'enemies of the people,'" perished in the camps during the war, and were "exonerated in 1957." Garb even records a second wave, the anti-cosmopolitan campaign of 1948–53, when "most of the foreign-born were affected," people lost their jobs and some were exiled, and the immigrants learned the phrase "rootless cosmopolitan." She names the Kirov-era figures too: after the Seventeenth Party Congress of 1934, she reports, "1,108 of the 1,966 delegates were arrested and later shot."

An earlier Progress volume would not have printed a line of this. Garb prints pages of it, and the honesty is real. She refuses her own subjects' consolations: many immigrants believed the purges were the work of "infiltrators" sabotaging the socialist state from within, and Garb writes, in her own voice, "there is no scholarly support for this view." She admits the epistemic hole: "Not having any archival or census data on that period, it is impossible to say what percentage of the immigrant community was arrested." She quotes Lenin's Testament against Stalin — "I suggest that the comrades think about a way of removing Stalin from that post" — in a book published by the state Stalin built. All of this deserves credit, and the credit is the precondition for the criticism, not a softening of it.

The category that never turns inward

So the finding is not a silence. It is a frame, and the frame is the 1956 frame, lightly refreshed for 1986. Watch where Garb locates the cause. The Terror begins, in her telling, with the enemy outside: "false evidence planted by German intelligence linked top Soviet Party leaders and military commanders with German espionage" — she footnotes this, tellingly, not to a Soviet source but to the American Marxist sociologist Albert Szymanski's *Human Rights in the Soviet Union*. From there, "Josef Stalin's response to real and perceived threats turned into spy mania," and "the situation was further complicated by the illegal actions of Beria." The 1956 Central Committee decision "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences" supplies the verdict she adopts: the purges were "the most flagrant violations of socialist legality." The Twentieth Congress condemned the personality cult; Gorbachev, in 1986, reaffirmed the condemnation; the account is closed.

Every element of that frame does the same work: it removes

the state as agent. The Terror is caused by German provocation, by one man's paranoia, by Beria's criminality, by a "personality cult" — anything but the ordinary functioning of the society these immigrants had joined. The word for the deaths is "excesses." The word for what the deaths violated is "socialist legality," which presupposes a socialist legality that the Terror merely transgressed and did not express. And the victims, crucially, keep their standing: they are "innocent," "loyal Communist Party members," "devoted Communists," "dedicated government officials." Nobody in this book who was destroyed by the state is ever anything other than a good and loyal servant of it who was destroyed by mistake.

This is the discriminator that matters, and it is not about how often a bad thing is admitted. It is about whether the category can turn on the speaker's own side. Error is admissible here — Stalin erred, Beria was criminal, mistakes were made and later corrected. What is inadmissible is that the Soviet state, as such, could be the subject rather than the accidental instrument of the crime. The purges arrive already sorted into loyal victims and external villains, with the system itself preserved intact in the middle, and the survivors' own loyalty is the proof that the system was sound: they stayed, and they were right to stay, and the dead were simply unlucky. A memoir of the loyal cannot hold the thought that the same state which welcomed them at Leningrad harbour in 1931 also, in the same years, emptied the Herzen Street club at night.

You can see the frame's outer wall in what does not appear. The Moscow show trials, as trials, are absent — the word does not occur in that sense in the entire book. The Left Opposition is named once, obliquely, as the thing Stalin overcame by "annihilating his opposition"; Trotsky appears exactly once, and only as a face Nick half-remembered from pre-revolutionary photographs. The Terror, in other words, is stripped of its politics. It becomes a weather event — spy mania, a climate, a tragedy visited on innocents — rather than what it also was: the physical destruction of the revolutionary generation and its rivals, a settling of political accounts. This was not, in 1987, wholly Garb's choice to make. The men who could have supplied the political content were still officially guilty; their rehabilitation was a year away, and in Trotsky's case never came. The 1956 frame was not merely the lazy option in 1987 but very nearly the ceiling of the sayable. That is the fairest thing that can be said about it, and it is also the sharpest, because it means the book's central silence is not a personal failing of a decent scholar but the exact shape of what the state would still not let itself think.

There is one more turn of the screw, and it is the specific fate

of the foreigners. What made the émigrés from Detroit and Winnipeg peculiarly vulnerable in 1937 was precisely that they were foreign: cut off, conspicuous, and — in the case of the Americans — holding or having surrendered passports that no longer protected them. That mechanism is the one thing Garb's frame structurally cannot name, because "German intelligence" and "Beria" cannot explain why it was the international club that emptied first. Her book is full of passports, but every one of them runs the other way: immigrants happily acquiring Soviet citizenship, the Goldens "issued Soviet passports," Carl Watts's family given theirs at the new Soviet embassy in Ottawa. The American passport as a trap — surrendered at the counter, allowed to lapse, useless when the arrests came, while the US embassy under Ambassador Davies looked the other way — is nowhere. It could not be documented from inside the loyal community, and it would not have survived the frame. It was documented later, most fully in Tim Tzouliadis's *The Forsaken* (2008): the American emigrants who queued at the Moscow embassy for help and were turned back into the street, and then into the Gulag. Garb, writing in 1987 from within the community of those who were spared, could hold the arrests only as a rumour of the missing, at one remove, in the memories of the loyal. The forsaken themselves are, by the book's construction, unreachable.

The reply that was already in print

The anti-Stalinist left did not need Tzouliadis, or 1988, or the opening of the archives, to see what Garb's frame keeps out. It saw it at the time. Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*, written in 1936 — the very moment Oliver Golden was sitting on the Tashkent city soviet and the Seyatel farmers were still alive — is the exact counter-text to the personality-cult frame, because it refuses to explain the Terror by Stalin's psychology or Beria's crimes or German provocation at all. It locates the coming slaughter in the material interests of a privileged bureaucratic caste defending its own position. "The sword of the dictatorship," Trotsky wrote, "which used to fell those who wanted to restore the privileges of the bourgeoisie, is now directed against those who revolt against the privileges of the bureaucracy. The blows fall not upon the class enemies of the proletariat, but upon the proletarian vanguard." Where Garb's 1956 decision speaks of "violations of socialist legality," Trotsky had already described the machinery of the trials — "judicial forgeries, which have become the normal thing," confessions "dictated by itself" and wrung "under threat of the firing squad" — two years before the last great Moscow trial and while the constitution Garb's sources would praise was

being drafted.

And on the one point the survivors' memoir cannot reach, Trotsky is explicit. Writing in 1936, he counted the foreign victims among the rest: "During these years hundreds of Oppositionists, both Russian and foreign, have been shot, or have died of hunger strikes, or have resorted to suicide." The foreign militants who vanished were not a discovery of the glasnost press or of later American historians; their fate was named, from exile, as it was happening.

This is worth pressing, because of where these emigrants had come from. They were, most of them, formed on the American left — the Communist Party, the Finnish halls, the Pullman porters' union, the milieu that recruited Oliver Golden with a handshake. That same left was, by the late 1930s, tearing itself apart precisely over the news from Moscow: the trials, the confessions, the disappearances. The knowledge that Garb's frame keeps at arm's length was circulating, bitterly and publicly, in the very neighbourhoods her subjects had left. To notice this is not to convict anyone of bad faith. It is to locate the book's silence exactly: it is not the silence of a world that did not know, but of a community that had staked its life on the other answer, narrated by an anthropologist writing from inside the state whose 1956 verdict she could refine but not exceed. The Finnish-Americans she names — "taken away to labor camps, accused of being spies" — were among the hardest hit of all the immigrant groups, and the book can say that they suffered without being able to say that their suffering was anything other than a wrong done to loyal people by a system that was otherwise sound.

The honest contrast this book invites is therefore not between Garb's warmth and some colder truth, but between two things that were true at once and that her frame cannot hold together: the same Depression-era hope that brought the Goldenes and the Laaksos to build a new world, and the terror that consumed their comrades in the building of it — a terror that their own tradition's dissidents had analysed, in real time, as intrinsic to the thing and not an aberration upon it.

None of this is a charge against the people in the book. Their idealism was real, their courage in leaving was real, and the dignity a Black cotton scientist found in Uzbekistan in 1932 was as real as the cross the Klan burned outside Anna Preikshas's house in West Virginia in 1916. Garb honoured them by writing them down, and the reader who wants to know why anyone crossed an ocean toward Stalin's Russia will learn more from her interviews than from a shelf of denunciations. The criticism falls on the frame, not the faces:

on a book that can see the empty club on Herzen Street and record that the immigrants "vanished in the night," and still cannot say what made them vanish, because the only word its moment would give it was mistake. The people came to stay. So did the question the book leaves standing — the one about everyone who came, and did not.

INTERNATIONALISM

The International Working-Class Movement: Problems of History and Theory, Volume 6

Workers in the West from 1945 to 1979 - the long boom, the unions, the mass parties, 1968, the crisis of the seventies - written not by the labour historians but by the Academy's specialists on capitalism.

N. N. Inozemtsev and others

Introduction to the 1987 Edition

The sixth volume is where the series finally reaches its own present, and something changes on the title page before a word of the history is read. The first three volumes were produced by the USSR Academy of Sciences through its Institute of the International Working-Class Movement, the body set up in 1966 to write exactly this history. This volume is credited to a different institute of the same Academy: the Institute of World Economy and International Relations — IMEMO, the Academy's establishment for the study of the capitalist world — with N. N. Inozemtsev named on the page as editor-in-chief and a team led by G. G. Diligensky, K. G. Kholodkovsky and S. P. Peregudov. The General Editorial Committee is unchanged and still spans all seven volumes: B. N. Ponomarev as chairman, T. T. Timofeyev and A. I. Sobolev as his deputies, with Zagladin, Fedoseyev and the rest of the twenty-odd names that signed Volume One. The subject has passed from the historians of the labour movement to the specialists in Western capitalism, and it shows: this is the most empirical book in the series and, on its polemical surface, the least strident. Both facts have the same cause, and it is worth being precise about what that cause is.

Establish the date of the text before anything else, because the spine is the most misleading thing about this book. The Russian subtitle names the coverage exactly — The Working-Class Movement of the Developed Capitalist Countries after the Second World War (1945–1979) — and the internal evidence dates the manuscript to the turn of that decade, not to 1987. The document the volume treats as its standing authority is the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU of February 1981, quoted and footnoted a dozen times ("Documents and Resolutions. The 26th Congress of the CPSU"); the narrative of events runs out in 1980 — the British steel strike of "early 1980", the Swedish general strike of "the spring of 1980", "the victory of the Republican Reagan at the 1980 presidential elections", the Italian local elections of June

1980. A handful of footnotes reach a little further: one records that in "1983–1984 the Socialist-led government" in France "went over to the policy of 'austerity'", forcing the Communists out of it, and the bibliography carries imprints as late as 1985. Only in the introduction does a later date surface: there the authors invoke "the new edition of the Party Programme adopted by the 27th Congress" — the congress of February–March 1986, Gorbachev's first as General Secretary. So the shape of the object is a late-Brezhnev manuscript, substantially closed around 1980–81, lightly refreshed through the mid-decade, its front matter updated to salute the 27th Congress, and issued in English in 1987 — the second full year of perestroika and glasnost.

That gap is the whole story of this volume, and it can be read off the page with a single set of searches. 1987 was the year Soviet historians began, publicly and under official cover, to reopen what had been sealed: the year the rehabilitation of Bukharin was being argued in the press, the year Ogonyok and Moscow News printed what had been unprintable, the year the phrase "blank spots" entered the language of Soviet history. None of it is here. Gorbachev, perestroika, glasnost, Chernobyl, Bukharin, rehabilitation, "blank spots" — every one of these returns zero across 288,000 words. This is not a book that shows the first cracks of glasnost; it is a book that glasnost has not reached, wearing a jacket printed after glasnost had begun. What it says about the international labour movement it says in the voice of 1980, and the interesting question is what that voice can and cannot do when the subject is the movement's own crisis, which by 1980 was well advanced and which this book was written inside of.

Start with the vocabulary, because this series has taught its readers to count it. In the third volume the word opportunism and its cognates occurred 383 times, 12.9 per 10,000 words, the densest in the entire catalogue; here it occurs nineteen times, 0.66 per 10,000, the sparsest of the six. The collapse is real and it is not evidence of anything by itself — a companion study in this project retracted the argument from frequency to

ritual on the good ground that Lenin scores higher on the same measure than the Progress volumes do, and a historian of the post-war West has less occasion to write "opportunism" than a historian of the Second International's collapse. What the low count actually conceals is a substitution. The classifier doing the work in this volume is reformism, which appears 233 times, with revisionism (22) and centrism (25) behind it; and its target is almost always Social Democracy, the party of the reformist "compromise" and the "consolidation of opportunist trends in the labour movement". The apparatus has not been dismantled. It has been retrained on the nearer enemy.

The question this series exists to ask is not how often the word is used but whether the category it names can ever be turned on the speaker — whether error is admitted only in others or also at home. In the first five volumes the answer was uniform: error was freely admitted, but the disqualifying category never turned inward. A Soviet volume appearing in 1987, contemporaneous for the first time with its subject's own crisis, is the single place in the catalogue where that might change. It comes closer here than anywhere else in the series, and it does not cross.

It comes closer because this book, alone among the six, says out loud that something went wrong in the Soviet-led movement. It names "the impact of the Stalin personality cult and ... the violation of the Leninist norms of party life". It concedes that the Cominform — the "Informbureau" — worked under conditions that "affected some of the assessments and conclusions it made", and that when it excommunicated the Communist Party of Yugoslavia in 1948 this "led to a prolonged isolation of the party from the international communist movement and did harm to the latter". It even allows that the Twentieth Congress of 1956 "exposed the Stalin personality cult and its consequences". Set beside the earlier volumes, in which the name Stalin occurred zero times, this is a genuine loosening, and it should be credited as one. Error is on the page.

But it is the error of 1956, not of 1987, and the difference is decisive. "Personality cult" is the Khrushchevite formula, and its function is precisely to localise the whole catastrophe in one man's character and stop — to name a defect without naming a system. The book does exactly that. The cult is Stalin's; "the violation of the Leninist norms" is a lapse subsequently corrected; the Cominform's crime was an "error" of "assessment". At no point is a critical political category — not opportunism, not revisionism, not bureaucracy — attached to the CPSU or the Soviet state. Those words are reserved, as ever, for others: for Social Democracy; for Earl Browder,

whose "right-wing opportunist policy" the CPUSA is praised for repudiating in 1945; for the "'left' revisionists", meaning the Chinese; for the "ultra-left anarchist, Trotskyite and other similar groups" who, in the volume's single use of the word in 288,000 words, "assumed the leadership in the student movement" in May 1968 and conducted "unremitting propaganda against the Communist Party and the CGT". The mirror is never turned. Error is admissible; the category is not. The reflexivity test does not break in 1987, and that non-event, in the second year of glasnost, is the most important thing this volume records about itself.

Where the constraint becomes visible is not in what the book says but in the two events it will not name, both of which are load-bearing for its own subject. The book is a history of the Western labour movement, and the two moments that most shaped the Western communist parties between 1945 and 1980 were the Soviet interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 — the events that drove members out by the hundred thousand and that, in the Italian and Spanish parties, produced the whole phenomenon later called Eurocommunism. Neither invasion appears. Hungary occurs three times: as a founder member of the Cominform, as the venue of a 1949 Informbureau meeting, and inside a list of socialist states. Czechoslovakia occurs five times: the Cominform again, the Karlovy Vary security conference of 1967, Prague as a place of publication, the 1949 peace congress, the 1978 world trade-union congress. "Prague Spring", Dubček, "socialism with a human face", Nagy, Kádár — all zero. The year 1956 does appear in the book at the point where it matters most, and what it means there is Suez: "The USSR responded resolutely and without hesitation to the aggression unleashed by Britain, France and Israel against Egypt in 1956, compelling the aggressors in a very short period to abandon their military action." In the paragraph nearest the Hungarian revolution, 1956 is the year the Soviet Union heroically stopped an imperialist war — not the year Soviet tanks entered Budapest. The nearest the book comes to the actual events is a single sentence of pure abstraction: "The imperialists and reactionaries were attempting to use forces hostile to socialism still to be found in some of the socialist countries, and also the mistakes and miscalculations made in the course of socialist construction ... These attempts failed completely." "Mistakes and miscalculations" can be admitted; a country, a date, a tank cannot.

The same suppression governs the treatment of Eurocommunism, and here it takes the form of a set of missing names. The book covers the Western communist parties in detail and with evident sympathy. It follows the Italian party's

"historic compromise" through the Fourteenth Congress of 1975; it narrates the French party's electoral fortunes and Georges Marchais's 15.4 per cent in 1974; it devotes pages to the Portuguese party under Álvaro Cunhal and the Spanish party's emergence from the Franco years. Yet Berlinguer — Enrico Berlinguer, general secretary of the Italian Communist Party from 1972 and the author of the very "historic compromise" the book discusses — never appears. Nor does Carrillo: Santiago Carrillo, general secretary of the Spanish party, who in 1977 published "Eurocomunismo" y Estado and was denounced for it by name in the Soviet press. The word Eurocommunism itself occurs nowhere. In the Spanish chapter the book names Dolores Ibarruri, the party's ceremonial president — "Dolores Ibarruri, President of the Communist Party of Spain, became a Deputy for a mining constituency in Asturias" — and omits the general secretary who actually ran it and who had made himself an enemy in Moscow. The pattern is exact and it recurs across the series: the Moscow-loyal figurehead is named, the heretic who criticised the USSR is unpersoned. The book can describe every effect of the Eurocommunist turn — the national roads, the parliamentary strategy, the compromise policies, even the falling membership — while suppressing its cause, which was these parties' recoil from Soviet tanks in Prague. It presents their autonomy as flowing from the wisdom of the Twentieth Congress, "peaceful coexistence as a special form of class struggle" and the discovery that "the passage to socialism occurs in a variety of forms" — never as a breach with Moscow. The word anti-Sovietism does not occur, because the thing it would have to describe cannot be allowed onto the page.

None of that should be allowed to bury what is genuinely good in this book, and a reader told the whole thing is apparatus would be badly misled. Underneath the framing chapters is a substantial and honestly documented comparative history of the post-war Western working class, and it is the best sustained empirical writing in the series after the colonial chapters of Volume Three. The middle chapters — on the changing social structure of the class, on wages and unemployment, on consumption, on the strike wave of the late 1960s and 1970s, on the trade unions — work from Western sources and cite them openly: Labour Party and Trades Union Congress conference reports, OECD manpower statistics, United Nations national-accounts yearbooks, Thorez's memoirs, the French party's own *Histoire*, the collective agreements of the Scandinavian federations. The account of the 1974 FIAT lay-offs, when "together with the car workers the whole of Turin came out on strike, forcing the administration to back down", is specific and unsentimental; so is the reckoning of the

1980 Swedish lockout, when "about a million people took part in the greatest labour dispute in the country's history" and "85 per cent of all industrial enterprises were shut down". The sociology of the "foreign workers", the office proletariat and the semi-proletarian strata is careful and undogmatic, and the book resists the temptation — to which the earlier volumes sometimes yielded — to collapse every gain into the account of the proletariat as such. This is IMEMO doing what IMEMO was good at: the close, comparative, statistically grounded study of developed capitalism. Read chapters 4 through 9 as the serious labour history they are.

Where should a reader go for the other side — for the two events the book cannot name and the movement it cannot describe? For once the timing is generous, because the anti-Stalinist left answered these things as they happened, and its journal of record for the period began publishing in the very year the book erases. The *International Socialist Review* of the American Socialist Workers Party — on this series' own side of the 1940 and 1953 splits — opened its life in 1956 with issues titled "The Poznan Uprising" and, that autumn, "Revolution in Poland and Hungary". Its editors wrote, while the fighting was still going on, that "the Polish and Hungarian workers launched a general revolutionary uprising against the rule of the Kremlin bureaucracy", that what "manifested at the summits of Soviet society in the Twentieth Congress was the result of the deep stirrings of the revolutionary workers", and — flatly, against the Progress volume's Suez — that "the Kremlin's army is entering Budapest once again ... The Nagy government has been arrested. A Kremlin puppet government has been appointed." That is the same year, the same country, from the tradition this series speaks for; the difference between "mistakes and miscalculations ... These attempts failed completely" and "a general revolutionary uprising against the rule of the Kremlin bureaucracy" is the difference the book exists to obscure. (*International Socialist Review*, vol. 17 no. 4, Fall 1956, pp. 111–112.)

For Eurocommunism, the reply is Ernest Mandel's *A Critique of Eurocommunism* (NLB, 1978), which is built around precisely the men this book will not name — Berlinguer, Carrillo, Marchais — and which argues, from their own texts, what the Progress volume needs its readers never to notice: that their turn was a response to Soviet reality, not a gift from the Twentieth Congress. For the doctrine of "peaceful coexistence as a special form of class struggle" that the book derives from the Twentieth Congress and treats as self-evidently benign, Mandel's "Peaceful Coexistence and World Revolution" (*International Socialist Review*, vol. 31 no. 2, March–April 1970) traces the phrase's real history back

through Brest-Litovsk and the Comintern. And for the theoretical frame beneath all of it — the conception of the Soviet order that "personality cult" was designed to prevent anyone forming — there is the book this series takes as its standard, Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), whose ninth chapter states the thing the Progress volume spends a paragraph avoiding: "The Soviet bureaucracy has expropriated the proletariat politically in order by methods of its own to defend the social conquests." A book that can name Stalin's personality but not the stratum that outlived him has told you where its limit is.

That limit is the same one the first volume's introduction identified and the third confirmed: not chronological but genealogical, the distance of a fact from the party's own line of descent. What is new in the sixth volume is only that the fact and the party have finally arrived in the same decade, so that the constraint operates not on the distant past but on the living present of the movement the book is describing — on Budapest, on Prague, on Berlinguer, on the crisis these authors were sitting inside as they wrote. And what is newest, and saddest, is the date on the spine. A book that could not name 1956 or 1968 was being sent out to English readers in 1987, at the exact moment the country that commissioned it had begun, at last and too late, to name them itself. The jacket is a Gorbachev jacket; the book is a Brezhnev book; and the year between them is the measure of how much a serious institute of the Academy of Sciences could see of its own world and still not be permitted to say.

MARXISM

The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky

Lenin's reply to Kautsky, written with a would-be assassin's bullets still in him - on why "pure democracy" is a fiction and every republic has a class content.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Introduction to This Edition

This is a book written in anger, and the anger was earned.

Lenin composed it in October and November 1918, in the worst months of the civil war, with a Socialist-Revolutionary's bullets still lodged in his body — Fanny Kaplan had shot him on 30 August — while the young Soviet republic fought for its life against White armies, famine, and the intervention of a dozen foreign states. He wrote it after reading Karl Kautsky's pamphlet *The Dictatorship of the Proletariat*, which charged the Bolsheviks with strangling democracy in the name of socialism. The edition's own preface remembers that Lenin "was literally burning with anger" and sat up night after night to answer. He was right to burn, and the tradition from which this introduction is written has always said so.

Kautsky had been, for a generation, the Pope of Marxism — the guardian of the doctrine after Engels's death. In August 1914 that authority collapsed: the German Social-Democratic Party voted the war credits for the Kaiser, and Kautsky supplied the theology for the surrender. To Lenin he was a renegade, a man who had deserted the cause he once led, and when the deserter began lecturing the republic that had actually made the revolution, Lenin answered with the whole weight of Marx behind him. The answer holds up. Kautsky's master-category, "pure democracy," is a fiction: democracy always has a class content, and the parliamentary republic he idealised is, for the propertyless, "democracy for the rich" — formally equal, materially rigged at every turn by money, the press, and the courts. Against this Lenin restored what Kautsky had buried: that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" is not Lenin's coinage but Marx's own, the content of the Paris Commune — the rule of the labouring majority, suppressing the resistance of the dispossessed minority. Kautsky, posing as the friend of democracy in general, had "turned Marx into a common liberal," draining the revolution out of him to make him fit for respectable company. On these points Lenin scores hits that have not aged, and the Fourth International has never

wished them unscored. Its own founder answered Kautsky in the very same voice: Trotsky's *Terrorism and Communism* (1920) took up the identical quarrel and defended the Red Terror as the necessary answer to the White — the plain truth that a revolution besieged by men who shoot workers cannot fight them with a debating society. To read *The Renegade Kautsky* sympathetically is not to make excuses. It is to grant that on the war between revolution and reformism, Lenin and Trotsky were right, Kautsky was wrong, and the civil war was real.

It is true that Lenin, pressed to a formula, wrote hard words: the revolutionary dictatorship is "rule won and maintained by the use of violence... unrestricted by any laws." Read as a doctrine for all seasons, the phrase is dangerous, and honest revolutionaries have said as much ever since. But it was not written for all seasons. It was written by a man describing an emergency he had not chosen and did not expect to outlast the year — the temporary, ruthless self-defence of a workers' power with its back to the wall. The danger in it was genuine: a rule exercised by a party in the name of a class can decay into a rule over the class. But the decay, when it came, was not the logical unfolding of a sentence in a pamphlet, as both liberal anti-communists and Soviet catechists have pretended in their opposite ways. It had causes that Lenin's detractors never mention and his idolisers could never admit.

Those causes were objective, and Trotsky set them out in *The Revolution Betrayed*. The revolution had staked everything on spreading to the industrial West; the German revolution failed, and Soviet power was left marooned in a ruined peasant country. The civil war this book defends had, in the very act of winning, consumed the class that was supposed to rule — the advanced workers killed at the front or drawn up into the state machine — and the soviets emptied of the living argument that had filled them in 1917. Into that vacuum rose not the proletariat but an apparatus: a bureaucracy that made itself the arbiter over an exhausted society and then its master. The dictatorship of the proletariat became, by degrees, the

dictatorship of an officialdom over the proletariat — the precise inversion of everything this book argues. Lenin saw the beginning of it and spent his last active months fighting it: against Stalin's brutal handling of Georgia, against the swelling apparatus, in the suppressed Testament that begged the party to remove Stalin from a post he was already abusing. He died with that fight unfinished, and the apparatus won.

Then the apparatus did to Lenin the thing that is the real subject of introducing this book today: it reified him. Over his widow Krupskaya's protest it embalmed his body and raised a shrine to it; it froze his living, self-correcting thought into a catechism it christened "Marxism-Leninism"; and it minted a ritual couple — "Lenin and Stalin" — that yoked the revolutionary to his gravedigger and let the second draw on the authority of the first. Stalin, who had already boiled "Leninism" down to a manual in his *Foundations of Leninism* of 1924, was hailed as "the Lenin of today." The purpose of the cult was never reverence; it was licence. A Lenin turned to stone can be quoted for anything, and this text above all was quoted for the proposition that proletarian rule is "unrestricted by any laws" — now pointed exactly where Lenin never pointed it: at the peasantry in the collectivisation famine, at rival socialists, at the Left Opposition, at the Old Bolsheviks in the dock of the Moscow Trials, at the workers themselves. A formula written to defend a workers' republic against its class enemies was made the warrant for a bureaucracy's terror against the working class.

Which brings us to the volume in your hands: Jim Riordan's translation, from Volume 28 of the *Collected Works*, issued by Progress Publishers in 1974. By 1974 the state printing this defence of soviet power had not held a free soviet election in half a century. The living, arguing soviets whose superiority to parliament is the beating heart of Lenin's case had been hollow instruments of the apparatus since the 1920s; the Constituent Assembly was merely the first of the rival bodies suppressed, and the last were the factions, oppositions and parties of the revolution's own left. The Soviet editorial framing lets none of this show. Its preface presents Kautsky's every charge as slander and Lenin's every answer as vindicated by events — when the plain event of the intervening half-century was that Kautsky's one prescient fear, that a power answerable to no rival would devour the democracy it claimed to fulfil, had come true: not, as Kautsky imagined, through Bolshevik wickedness, but through the Stalinist counter-revolution that the pamphlet's own editors served. The apparatus needed Lenin timeless because its own existence was the standing refutation of his confidence.

There is a second afterlife of the renegade, and it is the one the Soviet edition could least afford to notice. If in the East the dictatorship of the proletariat was inflated into the dictatorship of an apparatus over the proletariat, in the West it was quietly handed back to Kautsky. By the later 1970s the great Communist parties of Italy, France and Spain — the Eurocommunists — had renounced it outright: Santiago Carrillo's Spanish party struck the term from its programme in 1978, and with it went everything Lenin had wrung from Marx in these pages, surrendered to the "pure democracy" this book exists to demolish. Ernest Mandel, answering them for the Fourth International in *From Stalinism to Eurocommunism*, showed the surrender was no accident but the doctrine's own trajectory: the parties of "socialism in one country" had travelled, by way of the popular front and peaceful coexistence, all the way back to the renegade their tradition was founded to bury. Lenin's polemic outlived its target only to watch him reborn — this time inside the parties that still flew the red flag.

So read this book, first, for what it is: Lenin at his most formidable, dismantling a great authority who deserved dismantling, in defence of a revolution that deserved defending. Refuse it to the liberal reading that folds Lenin into Kautsky, and refuse it just as firmly to the official reading that folds Lenin into Stalin. The honest way to read it is the way its author would have wanted and its publisher could not permit — as the argument of a revolutionary for the rule of the working class, and therefore as the sharpest available indictment of the state that reprinted it, which had put the rule of officials in the workers' place and called the substitution Leninism. This book was not the licence for what followed. It was one of the things betrayed.