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ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Contemporary Political Science in the USA and Western Europe

Eight Soviet theorists anatomise Western political science - behaviouralism, systems theory, pluralism, elite theory - and argue it cannot see the class nature of the state it works inside.

Georgi Khosroevich Shakhnazarov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

There is a particular kind of book that indicts its author more surely than its subject, and this is one of them. Contemporary Political Science in the USA and Western Europe is a Soviet survey of how Western scholars study politics — a careful, well-read, sometimes genuinely sharp anatomy of behaviouralism, systems theory, pluralism and elite theory as they were practised in America, Britain, France, Italy and West Germany. Its charge against that scholarship is single and relentless: that for all its instruments and its claims to be "value-free," Western political science cannot see the class nature of the state it lives inside, and so serves power while believing itself neutral. The charge is often true. What makes the book worth reprinting is that it was written by scholars of a state that permitted no independent study of its own power at all — men who could name the American ruling class with precision and were forbidden, on pain of their careers, to ask the same question at home. The instruments they spend four hundred pages dismantling are exactly the ones that would have exposed the society they wrote from. That is the argument of this introduction.

The book and its moment

The English text is Progress Publishers' of 1985, translated from the Russian by James Riordan. It is a collective work — the closing pages of the Introduction name eight authors, N. N. Deyev, S. A. Yegorov, G. V. Gizenko, V. G. Graftsky, P. S. Gratsiansky, B. A. Kurkin, E. N. Ozhiganov and V. V. Smirnov — theorists of the kind the Academy of Sciences' apparatus in the theory of state and law produced, writing from within what the book itself calls "the Marxist-Leninist science of government and law." It carries no single editor's name and reads throughout as a committee product: seamless, unsigned, institutional.

Date the thought, not the spine. The book's freshest primary event is the eleventh World Congress of the International Political Science Association, held in Moscow in August 1979 — an occasion the authors treat as a landmark and return to more than once. Its citations run thickly through the 1970s and thin out sharply after 1980; a stray 1982 reference is about the latest, and the substance of the argument was plainly settled by then. This is a manuscript closed around 1982 or 1983 and issued in English two or three years later, which matters for what it does not contain. The word "Reagan" does not appear. Nor does "détente," even to mourn it. The book reaches print in 1985 — the year of SDI's first appropriations, of the Euromissiles fully deployed, of the downing of KAL 007 still fresh and the Geneva summit not yet held — at the coldest point of what contemporaries were already calling the second Cold War. Its subject is the ideological machinery of the adversary; its timing could not be better; and it is serenely unable to notice that a book proving American political science serves American power was itself commissioned to serve Soviet power in the same contest. The reflex it diagnoses so acutely in others is the one it cannot perform on itself.

Who was it for? Not, this time, the sympathetic Western reader the series has learned to stop assuming. This is an internal Soviet genre — the *kritika burzhuaiznykh teorii*, the critical survey of bourgeois theory — written for graduate students, cadre and specialists who needed to know the enemy's literature and to know, in advance, the correct verdict on it. The Introduction says as much: the study is called for "by both the necessity for well-reasoned criticism of its concepts and by the requirements posed by the further development of Marxist-Leninist social science." One reads Dahl in order to refute Dahl. That the refutation is often intelligent does not change the fact that the conclusion was fixed before the reading began.

The doctrine: apologetics dressed as objectivity

The book's frame is stated on its first page and never relaxed. Politics, following "Lenin's definition of politics as the area of relations of all classes and strata to the state and government," is the science of class power; the state is, in the classic formula, an apparatus of class rule; and any account of politics that does not begin there is not merely incomplete but ideologically interested. From this vantage the whole edifice of American empiricism appears as a single evasion. Its cherished neutrality is a pose. Its methods — surveys, correlations, systems diagrams, game theory — are so much machinery for describing the surface of a class society while declining to name its base.

The strongest form of the charge falls on David Easton and the systems theorists, and here the book quotes a fellow Soviet scholar, V. Y. Chirkin, to drive it home: "To preserve the system is Easton's foremost idea which, if we translate it into class language, means providing recipes for adapting the capitalist establishment to changing conditions." A theory that takes the stability of the existing order as its highest value has, whatever its equations, chosen a side. The same verdict is passed on the elite theorists by way of another Soviet authority, A. A. Galkin, who is quoted to the effect that "recognition of the existence of the elite and a special mechanism for its interaction has turned into an apology for the elitist system." And the Conclusion generalises the whole: "For all their pretensions at objectivity and value-free (i.e., non-class and non-party) ideals," Western political scholars range "from conservative and ultimately apologist in regard to the status quo to liberal and even radical." The parenthesis is the doctrine in miniature — value-free is glossed as non-class, and the non-class standpoint is declared impossible. To claim it is already to have taken the conservative one.

There is real force in this, and we will come back to how much. But note first what the argument quietly assumes. It works by holding up, against the American scholar's professed neutrality, the reality of the class he cannot see — the bourgeoisie whose interests his "value-free" science protects. The move depends entirely on there being a hidden ruling group whose existence the target's method is designed to obscure. It is a superb instrument. The only question the book never permits is where else that instrument might be pointed.

The irony the method forbids

Consider what the authors do with the pluralism-versus-elitism debate — the central quarrel of American political science in these years, opened by C. Wright Mills's *The Power Elite* in 1956 and continued through Robert Dahl's *Who Governs?* and

the "ruling class" school of G. William Domhoff. The book handles this material with evident relish, and its sympathies are unmistakable. Against Dahl's pluralism — the thesis that in a city like New Haven "a number of different sets of leaders governed," no single group in command — it insists that the pluralist's talk of "norms" and "rules of the game" is a mystification, and that beneath the shifting coalitions sits an unchanging fact: "Monopoly capital and its instrument—the state—continue to be the real subject of power in bourgeois democracies." Dahl's refusal to look for that real subject earns his work, in the authors' phrase, "an apologist tenor." Mills and Domhoff, by contrast, are handled gently, almost as allies; Domhoff, tracing the power elite to a "social upper class which owns a disproportionate amount of a country's wealth," is said to come "close to the Marxist position."

Read that against the society the authors lived in and the page turns to glass. Everything the book praises in Mills and Domhoff is a technique for finding the real distribution of power in a society whose formal institutions conceal it — for asking who commands, and who is commanded, behind the constitution and the ballot. Everything it condemns in Dahl is the refusal to ask that question. And the one society on earth to which the authors were absolutely forbidden to apply Mills's method was their own. The Soviet Union had a nomenklatura — a self-selecting stratum of perhaps a few hundred thousand, its membership a state secret, its privileges of housing, supply and access unmeasured and unmeasurable in any Soviet publication, its power over appointment total. It was, on the book's own definition, precisely a "power elite": a group "aware of its privileged status" that disposed of the state without owning it. A Soviet Domhoff, had one been permitted, would have "come close to the Marxist position" by studying it. No Soviet Domhoff was permitted. The word nomenklatura does not occur in these pages, nor could it. The tools the book most admires are the tools its own state existed to keep unused.

This is not a rhetorical trick played on the authors from outside; it is the structure of their discipline. The book is candid, in its first pages, that "the Marxist-Leninist science of government and law monistically combines in itself philosophical, sociological and juridical aspects" — that is, that in the USSR there was no autonomous political science, empirically studying the actual distribution of power, but a single fused doctrine that derived its conclusions from historical materialism and took the leading role of the CPSU as an axiom rather than a datum. There was a Soviet Association of Political Sciences; it hosted the 1979 congress; it published yearbooks. But "political science" in a one-party state is a

science with one forbidden object, and it is the object that matters most. The behaviouralists the book scorns at least studied real elections, real legislatures, real interest groups, however narrowly. The Marxist-Leninist science of government studied the state of the workers and peasants that its own funding depended on calling by that name. Of the two, only one had made the study of who actually governs a hanging offence.

The pattern is not peculiar to this volume; it is the house method of the whole kritika genre, and the reader who has the companion introductions will recognise it at once. Gennady Osipov's *Sociology* (Progress, 1969) performs the identical operation one discipline over: it demolishes Western "social stratification" theory for mapping "a pyramid of social inequality" while refusing to examine "the very base of the pyramid — sacrosanct private property," an objection that works only against societies with private property and, by its own logic, should have left the stratification of a propertyless USSR with nothing to describe — which is exactly why the instrument had to be broken. And the *US Two-Party System* volume (Progress, 1988) shows the mirror image: a Soviet analysis of American politics that is largely correct, and correct because American radicals had reached it first, describing two parties of one ruling class engineered to keep an independent workers' party off the field. The Soviet Americanists could see the machinery of exclusion in Washington with great clarity. What none of these books could do — what the system that commissioned them existed to prevent — was turn the lens around.

The reply the book rules out of order

There was, in fact, a political science of the Soviet bureaucracy. It had been written half a century before this book, by a man the authors could not cite and would not name, and it is precisely the empirical, non-formal study of "who governs" that they applaud in Mills and forbid at home.

Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) asks, in the flat language of the discipline, the question the Marxist-Leninist science of government was built to suppress. Its ninth chapter is headed, without euphemism, "Is the Bureaucracy a Ruling Class?" — and it answers by doing exactly what the book demands of a serious analyst of power and denies to itself: it looks past the legal form to the real relation. "The means of production belong to the state," Trotsky writes. "But the state, so to speak, 'belongs' to the bureaucracy." Formal ownership tells you nothing; command tells you everything, and command had passed to a stratum he described as "the sole

privileged and commanding stratum in the Soviet society." He traced its origin not to malice but to defeat and exhaustion — "the new commanding caste rose to its place upon this wave" of demoralisation after the failed revolutions of the 1920s — and its consolidation to the machinery of appointment and the destruction of the Left Opposition. This is Domhoff's question, pressed onto the USSR: who is the upper stratum, how is it recruited, what does it dispose of, and by what means does it hold what it holds. It is the study *Contemporary Political Science* treats as the summit of honest Western scholarship when the object is Connecticut and as literally unthinkable when the object is Moscow.

The point is not that Trotsky's answer is beyond argument — his category of the bureaucracy as a stratum rather than a class was contested within the anti-Stalinist left for decades, and remains so. The point is narrower and sharper. The book convicts American political science of a blindness to the class basis of its own state. That conviction is only available to authors who possess the technique of seeing through formal institutions to real power. They possessed it; they wielded it against Dahl with skill; and they were the servants of a state that had made its own use of that same technique a crime. The reply to the book is not a rival doctrine. It is the book's own method, returned to sender.

What is genuinely sharp

None of this would matter if the criticism were merely ritual, and it is the standing temptation of a series like this to pretend that it is. It is not, and honesty requires saying where the book is right.

It is right about value-freedom. The claim that a social science can float above politics, describing without judging, was a genuine pretension of mid-century American behaviouralism, and the book is correct that in practice it slid toward endorsement of the status quo — that to take the stability of a given order as one's baseline is already a political act. That this critique was a commonplace of Western thought too does not weaken it; the book knows as much, and reaches for Western witnesses to make it. It quotes Sheldon Wolin — no Marxist — to the effect that the reigning systems and communication theories "are unpolitical theories" that offer "no significant choice or critical analysis of the quality, direction, or fate of public life." It quotes Alvin Gouldner that "much of the history of Academic Sociology ... is unintelligible except as a response to and a polemic against Marxism." It relays Marvin Surkin's mordant typology of the behavioural scholar as New

Mandarin, Public Advocate and Persuasive Neutralist, the last content, in Heinz Eulau's phrase, "to understand and interpret the world, not to change it." These are the discipline's own dissidents, and the book has read them.

Which points to its real and unexpected virtue: it passes the citation test. This series has learned to ask whether a Soviet critique reads its opponents in the original or merely characterises them from Soviet digests, and by that test *Contemporary Political Science* is among the honest volumes. Dahl is cited to *Who Governs?* and *Modern Political Analysis*; Mills, Domhoff and Kornhauser to their own texts; Easton, Almond, Lipset, Wolin, Gouldner all quoted from source and page. The authors did the reading. When they say Dahl argued that no single group governed New Haven, they can show you where he said it. That is more than several of this series' targets can claim, and it is the ground on which the book's better judgements stand.

And it is right, finally, about the entanglement of the discipline with power — the plainest and least ideological of its findings. The Conclusion observes that political scientists are appointed "to the 'brain centres' of political parties, the biggest monopolies and their cartels, and to other loci of political power," and that the demand for their expertise tracks the "normal reproduction of political relations in a class-antagonistic society." A discipline whose graduates staff the National Security Council and the RAND Corporation is not floating above politics, and to notice this is not paranoia but observation. American radicals — Mills first among them — had noticed it too. On this the book is simply a competent witness, and where it is a competent witness it should be read as one.

The tragedy, and it is a tragedy rather than merely a hypocrisy, is that everything the book sees clearly about the American academy was equally true, and more dangerously true, of the Soviet one. The Marxist-Leninist science of government and law also staffed its state's brain centres; also reproduced, faithfully, the political relations of the society that funded it; also mistook the ideology of its own order for objective science. Its authors were, in the exact sense of their own indictment, "conservative political scientists engaged exclusively in describing and analysing prevailing power institutions" — only the power they conserved was not in Washington. They wrote a devastating account of a mirror and never once looked into it. Six years after the English edition appeared, the state whose power they could not study had ceased to exist, brought down in part by men who had finally begun to ask, out loud, the forbidden question the book taught

its readers to ask about everyone but themselves.

REFERENCE

A Dictionary of Political Economy

The settled Soviet vocabulary of economics, entry by entry - value, capital, rent, planning, the laws of socialism - fixed in the second Russian edition of 1981 and exported without a hint of what was coming.

M. I. Volkov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

A dictionary is the most confident form a body of thought can take. An argument invites reply; a definition does not. It states what a word means, closes the entry, and moves to the next letter of the alphabet. When the Political Literature Publishers of Moscow issued the second Russian edition of A Dictionary of Political Economy in 1981, and Progress Publishers put it into English in 1985 under the editorship of Professor M. I. Volkov, the ambition was exactly this: to fix, in alphabetical order and in flat declarative prose, the settled meaning of every category a Soviet economist was permitted to use. The Publishers' Note is precise about the pedigree. The entries refer the reader back to the Collected Works of Marx and Engels and of Lenin "put out by Progress Publishers (Moscow) in English"; cross-references are marked "see"; the whole is a closed system pointing only at itself and at the canon it treats as scripture. This is not a book that argues. It is a book that rules.

The date on the spine is 1985, but the date of the thought is 1981, and the distinction matters. This is the second Russian edition, and its intellectual furniture is entirely that of the late Brezhnev years — the doctrine of "developed socialism", the economy of the tenth and eleventh five-year plans, the capitalist world still defined by the oil shock and "the third recession in the capitalist world during the last decade". There is no perestroika (restructuring) here, no glasnost, not a hint of the acceleration campaign; Gorbachev was a year from power when the English appeared, and the dictionary does not know he is coming. It is a monument raised at the exact moment the thing it monumentalised had stopped growing. Soviet growth rates had been sliding through the 1970s; by 1981 the stagnation was visible to anyone with the figures. The Dictionary records none of it. Its confidence is that of a system describing itself in the mirror it built for the purpose, and it is worth reading precisely because the mirror was official. This is what the largest state claiming descent from October taught its own economists that economics was.

Like its shelf-mates in this catalogue — Rumyantsev's Political Economy (1983), the collectively authored Fundamentals of Political Economy (1980), the Ryndina–Chernikov Political Economy of Capitalism (1974) — the Dictionary is a product of the Soviet academy working to a brief, not the work of a named scholar following an argument where it led. It reads as such: even, anonymous, seamless. Volkov's name sits on the title page, but the prose has no individual author; it is the collective voice of an institution, and the institution's task was not discovery but consolidation. These reference works form a deliberate ecosystem. The textbook (Rumyantsev) teaches the doctrine, the manual (Fundamentals) drills it, and the dictionary fixes it — assigns each term its official meaning so that the textbook and the manual, and every dissertation and lecture downstream of them, can be checked against a single authorised standard. A companion volume, A Dictionary of Scientific Communism (1984), does the same office for the political categories. Together they constitute the boundary-markers of an entire discipline: not books to be read through, but instruments against which other books are measured. That is why the seams matter more here than in any single monograph. A definition that quietly excludes a possibility excludes it not for one reader but for the whole field that treats the dictionary as authority.

What a definition is allowed to say

Begin with the load-bearing entries, because in a dictionary the definitions are the doctrine. The interesting move is consistent, and once you see it you see it everywhere. The categories inherited from Marx's analysis of capitalism — commodity, value, money, the law of value — are not abandoned under socialism. They are retained, and then disarmed. Each is defined twice: once as a blind, coercive force under capitalism, and once as a tame instrument under socialism, the same word wearing a collar.

Take the commodity, the cell from which the whole of Capital unfolds. Under capitalism, the Dictionary says, "the

commodity is the simplest cell of capitalist economy, containing the seeds of all the specifics and contradictions of this economy." Then the collar goes on: "In the socialist economy, the commodity is the product of directly socialised labour; it is manufactured in a planned way by socialist enterprises for the satisfaction of the social requirements." The same object, the same word, but its danger has been legislated away. Money receives identical treatment. Under private ownership it is "a tool for exploitation of the working people"; under socialism "it embodies social labour united through socialist ownership, and so cannot become a tool of exploitation. The functions of money under socialism become functions of planned economic management." Cannot is doing enormous work in that sentence. It is not an observation about Soviet money; it is a definition, and a definition cannot be falsified by events.

The law of value gets the same architecture. "Given private ownership of the means of production," the entry reads, "the law of value acts as a spontaneous regulator of production" — spontaneous being the key term of abuse throughout the book, the mark of everything blind and unmastered. Under socialism the spontaneity is gone, the law survives only as a "lever" consciously worked by the planners, and the entry looks forward to the day "the law of value will cease to operate" altogether. The whole conceptual apparatus of classical Marxism is thus preserved, embalmed, and made safe. What was a theory of how a system escapes human control becomes a theory of how human control has been achieved.

And at the centre sits the category that certifies all the others: developed socialism. There is, tellingly, no plain entry for "Socialism" in this dictionary of political economy. The alphabet runs from "Socialism, Bourgeois Economic Theories of" straight to "Socialist Accumulation"; socialism itself is defined only in its mature, honorific form, under Developed Socialism, "the totality of socialism's relations of production at its mature stage." And the entry makes the boast plainly: "The society of developed socialism reached in the USSR is to date the highest point of social progress." That is the sentence the whole book exists to protect. Everything else — the tamed commodity, the disarmed money, the consciously wielded law of value — is scaffolding around it. The corresponding law, the "law of planned, balanced development", which one might expect to be the theoretical heart of a socialist political economy, turns out on inspection to be almost empty: barely more than a cross-reference to Long-Term Planning and a single sentence of Lenin. The mechanism is asserted, not analysed. Political economy itself, the entry tells us, "is a component of Marxism-Leninism" — not an inquiry that

might reach an inconvenient result, but a component of a doctrine already complete.

The boundary of the sayable

The sharpest way to read a reference work is not through what it defines but through the line it draws between the sayable and the unsayable — and a dictionary draws that line more starkly than any other kind of book, because to have no entry is to not exist. Here the tells are precise and countable.

Consider the vocabulary of economic malfunction — inflation, unemployment, shortage. Each has a place in the book, and each is defined in such a way that it cannot be predicated of the Soviet Union. Inflation is "a means of redistributing national income and social wealth in the interests of the ruling classes under capitalism, a method of intensifying the exploitation of labour by capital." Not a monetary phenomenon that might occur anywhere money circulates — which, as the Dictionary itself concedes, includes the USSR — but a weapon of a ruling class the USSR does not have. Unemployment is defined in its first four words as "a socio-economic phenomenon unavoidable under the capitalist" system, and the long entry that follows counts only capitalist unemployed, in Chicago and Manchester and the Ruhr. Deficit and shortage appear only in the capitalist and foreign-trade entries; the socialist economy is characterised, on the contrary, "by the absence of budget deficits". The words exist. Their application to the Soviet Union has been defined out of possibility.

The point is not that Soviet economic life was free of these things. Every Soviet consumer knew the queue, the empty shelf, the good that was "deficit" — the word *defitsit* was a fixture of everyday Russian precisely because shortage was a permanent feature of the planned economy. The suppressed pressures on prices were real enough that they would erupt into open inflation the moment controls were lifted at the end of the decade. A political economy adequate to its subject would have had a theory of these phenomena; the Hungarian economist János Kornai was constructing exactly such a theory of the shortage economy in these same years. The Dictionary does not lack the theory by accident. It has defined the vocabulary so that the daily experience of its own readers has no name in the science that claims to describe their society.

The most eloquent gap is one word with no entry at all. Search the whole Dictionary of Political Economy — a work of some 169,000 words — for bureaucracy, and you will find the adjective "bureaucratic" exactly once and the noun nowhere. A

dictionary of political economy with no entry for bureaucracy is like a dictionary of medicine with no entry for infection. The omission is not an oversight; it is the constitutive silence of the entire tradition. To grant bureaucracy an economic definition would be to concede that a social layer standing above the plan might have interests of its own — and that concession is exactly what the category "developed socialism" is built to prevent.

The same boundary runs through the book's treatment of its own tradition's dissenters, and here the erasure is historical as well as conceptual. This is a dictionary of political economy, the discipline of the great debates of the 1920s — the debate over industrialisation, over where the resources for building socialism in a peasant country would come from, over the "scissors" between agricultural and industrial prices. That debate produced the most original Soviet economic thought of the century. Yevgeni Preobrazhensky's theory of "primitive socialist accumulation", Nikolai Bukharin's counter-argument for growth through the market and the *smychka* (the worker-peasant alliance) — this was political economy at the highest level, conducted by the revolution's own economists. The Dictionary contains not one of their names. Preobrazhensky: zero. Bukharin: zero. "Primitive socialist accumulation", the single most important concept the early Soviet economists contributed to the field: absent. In its place stands a bland entry, "Socialist Accumulation", defined as "the planned utilisation of part of the national income" — accumulation without pain, without a peasantry to squeeze, without an argument ever having been had. The men were shot in 1937 and 1938; the book completes the sentence by erasing the thought. A reader coming to Soviet economics through this dictionary would never learn that the questions it answers so smoothly were once the subject of a life-and-death dispute among Bolsheviks.

Trotsky, who cannot be quite erased because he is too large, is instead miniaturised. He appears twice in the entire volume. Once in the entry on Reformism, where "L. Trotsky" is filed in a list of reformists between Vandervelde and Scheidemann — an astonishing placement for the theorist of permanent revolution, but a revealing one. And once, unnamed but unmistakable, in the entry on Opportunism, where "'Left' opportunism (Trotskyism)" is said to use "ultra-revolutionary phrase to cover itself, pushing the people into adventurist actions." Note the scare-quotes around 'Left' — the same scare-quotes the CPSU's ideological apparatus had been printing for a decade, in Ponomarev's directive to expose Trotskyism's kinship with "opportunism of right and 'left' persuasions". The charge is pure essence: a phraseology, a

covering, an adventurism, with no dated act attached that could ever be shown not to have happened. This is the definitional signature of the whole operation. Capitalist categories are pinned to specified, refutable behaviour — inflation does this, unemployment rises in this phase of the cycle. The tradition's own opponents are convicted by definition, of being what they are.

The definitions this dictionary forbids

Set beside these entries the book that answered them in advance. In 1936, in *The Revolution Betrayed*, Trotsky devoted the fourth chapter, "The Struggle for Productivity", to precisely the categories the Dictionary would later embalm — money, value, and the plan — and reached the opposite conclusion on every one.

Where the Dictionary holds that socialist money "cannot become a tool of exploitation" and that its functions "become functions of planned economic management", Trotsky insisted that Soviet money remained money, and dangerously so. "The more elementary functions of money," he wrote, "as measures of value, means of exchange and medium of payment, are not only preserved, but acquire a broader field of action than they had under capitalism." He went further, to the point the Dictionary most needs to suppress: "the sole authentic money is that based upon gold. All other money is only a substitute." A currency the state could print at will was not a mastered instrument but a temptation, and the temptation had been indulged. Trotsky traced the inflation of the first five-year plan through its own official figures — the note issue climbing from 1.7 billion rubles in 1928 to 8.4 billion by 1933 — and named its effect without euphemism: "currency inflation, inevitably producing a credit inflation, entails a substitution of fictitious for real magnitudes, and corrodes the planned economy from within."

That sentence is the exact refutation of the entry the Dictionary would print half a century later. Inflation, the Moscow lexicographers ruled, is a capitalist phenomenon, a weapon of a ruling class; the socialist economy is marked "by the absence of budget deficits". Trotsky had watched the Soviet economy generate inflation on a heroic scale and had watched the leadership deny it was possible — "The ruling circles," he wrote, "were completely possessed by the opinion that with a planned economy inflation is not to be feared. This means approximately that if you possess a compass there is no danger in a leaking ship." The Dictionary's definition of money as a mere instrument of "planned economic management" is the very doctrine Trotsky was mocking: he called the ruble, under

that doctrine, "a conventional label of the planned economy — that is, a universal distribution card", money that "has ceased to be money". And he identified who benefited from the confusion. By manipulating the ruble's purchasing power across different strata, "the bureaucracy deprived itself of the necessary instrument for objectively measuring its own successes and failures" — restoring, in one word, the actor the Dictionary would define out of existence. The book that has no entry for bureaucracy is answered by the book that made bureaucracy the centre of Soviet political economy.

None of this required the Dictionary to lie about a single figure. It required only that it define its terms so that certain sentences could not be formed. Trotsky's chapter is a catalogue of the sentences the Dictionary forbids. His standard — the USSR as a transitional, contradictory formation in which value, money and the market survive because scarcity survives, presided over by a privileged bureaucracy with interests of its own — is the standard against which the Dictionary's serene definitions should be read. The reader who wants the argument the alphabet suppressed will find it in chapter 4, and in chapters 5 and 6 on the Soviet Thermidor and the growth of inequality.

What the dictionary transmits intact

It would be a mistake, and the kind of mistake this dictionary invites by its own dogmatism, to conclude that everything in it is corrupt. A great deal of it is simply competent, and some of it is more than competent. The entries on the categories of Capital — abstract and concrete labour, absolute and relative surplus value, the accumulation of capital, absolute and differential rent, the aggregate social product — are lucid, accurate expositions of Marx, the fruit of a genuine scholarly tradition that ran unbroken from the Institute's editing of the Collected Works. The definition of abstract labour as "the social labour of those who produce commodities; labour in general, regarded independently of its concrete form" is exactly right, and better put than in many a Western textbook. The long biographical entry on Marx himself — tracing the manuscripts of the 1850s and 1860s, the six-book plan of 1857, the fourth volume that became *Theories of Surplus-Value* — is real intellectual history, the sort of thing Progress could do well because the people who did it cared about the texts.

The paradox is worth stating plainly, because it is the key to using the book. On capitalism the Dictionary is often sharp, because on capitalism Marxist categories are permitted to do

their critical work: the entries on state-monopoly capitalism, on capitalist economic programming, on the reserve army of the unemployed are hard-edged and, within their frame, illuminating. It is only when the same categories are turned toward the Soviet economy that they are made to go soft. The instrument is sound; it has simply been forbidden to point in one direction. A reader who takes the entries on classical and Marxian political economy as a genuine reference — and cross-checks the entries on socialism against *The Revolution Betrayed* and against the historical record the book erases — will get real value from both halves, provided the value is not confused with the verdict.

That is finally what this dictionary is: a verdict issued as a set of definitions, the codified self-understanding of a system at the moment before it lost the power to define itself. Four years after the second Russian edition, the words *perestroika* and *glasnost* would enter the language the Dictionary had declared closed, and within a decade the state whose economy it described "to date the highest point of social progress" had ceased to exist. The book did not see it coming, because a dictionary cannot: its whole method is to treat the contingent as the settled, the arguable as the defined, the historical as the eternal. Read as truth, it explains nothing. Read as a document — as the exact boundary of what a Soviet economist in 1981 was permitted to think — it is one of the most instructive objects this series contains. The alphabet, it turns out, has an edge, and everything interesting lies on the far side of it.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM Genocide

Nine essays on genocide in law and history, edited by a serious scholar of Nazism - including a legal chapter candid about the reservation the USSR entered against being tried under the Genocide Convention.

Aleksandr Abramovic Galkin

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

This is a book about a crime in international law, written by a state that had exempted itself from being tried for it.

That is not a rhetorical flourish. It is recorded in the closing chapter by the book's own legal specialist. Victor Menzhinsky's "Judgement of the World Community" sets out, accurately and without embarrassment, that when the USSR ratified the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide it entered a reservation to Article IX — the article referring disputes over the Convention's "interpretation, application and implementation" to the International Court of Justice. The Soviet Union, he writes, "did not consider as binding upon itself" that provision. Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia entered the same reservation. Everything the book does well, and everything it will not do, follows from that sentence.

Genocide is a nine-chapter anthology commissioned and edited by Alexander Galkin, a serious Soviet scholar of German fascism, and put into English by Progress Publishers in 1985. Its latest substantive material dates from late 1983 and early 1984, which places its composition under Andropov and Chernenko, at the coldest point of the second Cold War, and its publication in the year Gorbachev took office. It also places it squarely in a particular campaign: on 29 March 1983 the CPSU Secretariat approved the formation of the Anti-Zionist Committee of the Soviet Public, announced on the front page of Pravda three days later.

The contributors' list is worth reading before the contents. Galkin and Robert Ivanov are both Doctors of Historical Science. Inna Cherkasova is an economist specialising in southern Africa; Vsevolod Sofinsky is a diplomat who sat on the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities; Valentin Shubin is a lawyer, Vice-Chairman of the Supreme Court of the RSFSR, who attended the 1979 Phnom Penh tribunal as an observer for the Association of Soviet Lawyers. And then, credited with no

institution and no degree, there is Konstantin Telyatnikov, "a writer, publicist, historian", who was given Israel.

Take the good chapters first, because there are several and the reader is entitled to know which they are.

Galkin's own chapter on Nazi Germany is the strongest thing in the book and would not embarrass a Western textbook of the period. It is documentary, patient and sourced to the Nuremberg record: Himmler's Untermensch speech, Darré and Rosenberg on race as the key to world history, the Nuremberg Laws, the November 1938 pogrom, Heydrich's letter to Ribbentrop of 24 June 1940 — "A final territorial solution of the problem is essential" — the Madagascar plan, Viktor Brack's March 1941 report to Himmler on industrial sterilisation. It gives the Jewish dead their proper number without evasion or padding: "About 6 million Jews fell victim to fascist genocide." It says that most of them were shot on occupied Soviet territory. Nothing in it is falsified, and it contains none of the pathologies discussed below.

Ivanov's chapter, on the destruction of the Native American peoples, is honest work of the kind he did elsewhere in this series: the Trail of Tears, the scalp bounties, the 1871 reduction of the tribes to "internal, dependent nations", the Dawes Act, the Termination and Relocation Acts, the collapse of reservation land from 138 million acres in 1887 to 43 million by the early 1970s. None of it was invented in Moscow. His claim that over 70,000 Native American women were forcibly sterilised in the 1970s is at the extreme upper end of a genuine scandal; the 1976 General Accounting Office study of four Indian Health Service areas documented 3,406 sterilisations over three years and serious failures of consent. The scandal is real; the number is not established.

Cherkasova on apartheid needs no correction of substance; she opens with Verwoerd's 1963 statement to the House of Assembly that "'Keeping it white' can mean only one thing, namely White domination", and gives the floor to Saul Mkhize of Driefontein, then recently killed, in his own words.

Sofinsky's chapter on Guatemala has aged best of all. Writing in 1983–84, he insists that "terror in Guatemala is directed primarily against the Indians, and is therefore tantamount to genocide against the country's indigenous population" — a claim then largely absent from Western reporting, which preferred a story about the army and the guerrillas. He names Ríos Montt, names El Quiché and Huehuetenango, uses affidavits collected in the Chiapas refugee camps, and cites the International Indian Treaty Council and the new UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations. The Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification, reporting in 1999, found that state forces had committed acts of genocide against Maya groups, and that of more than 200,000 killed or disappeared some 83 per cent were Maya; in 2013 a Guatemalan court convicted Ríos Montt of genocide, a conviction annulled on procedural grounds within a fortnight. Sofinsky was right, he was right early, and he was right for reasons that had nothing to do with his government's convenience.

Now the Israel chapter.

Telyatnikov's argument has to be stated exactly, because a great deal of it is true and the untrue part is not where a hostile reader might assume. The chapter is a sustained account of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon of June 1982, the siege of West Beirut, the Ansar detention camp, the massacre at Sabra and Shatila on 16–18 September 1982, the land confiscations in the occupied territories, and Israeli arms sales to El Salvador, Guatemala, Somoza's Nicaragua, Pinochet's Chile and apartheid South Africa. On the great bulk of that, the chapter describes things that happened. It quotes Yaakov Meridor on the refugees — "They should be driven eastward, in the direction of Syria" — and Golda Meir's Sunday Times interview of 15 June 1969 on the Palestinians, "They did not exist", correctly cited and genuinely said. It quotes Moshe Dayan's 1956 eulogy for Roi Rotberg at Nahal Oz — "We are a generation of settlers, and without the steel helmet and the cannon we cannot plant a tree and build a home" — though it promotes Dayan, then Chief of Staff, to Defence Minister. The medical testimony on phosphorus and cluster munitions is grim and, so far as anyone has shown, accurate. The occupation was and is a system of dispossession; Sabra and Shatila was a massacre carried out under Israeli military control and lit by Israeli flares; Israel's own Kahan Commission found Ariel Sharon personally responsible and recommended his removal. None of that becomes less true because Moscow said it.

The chapter is nonetheless dishonest in its figures, and the

pattern is consistent: every number goes up. It opens with "Over 30,000 Lebanese and Palestinians... killed and some 70,000 wounded". The Lebanese authorities' own count for the 1982 war was 19,085 killed and about 30,000 wounded; the An-Nahar survey of police and hospital records gave 17,825 killed. At Sabra and Shatila "some 3,300 Palestinians were massacred in these camps"; estimates run from Israeli military intelligence's 700–800 to Palestinian figures approaching 3,500, and the chapter silently takes the ceiling as the fact. At Deir Yassin, "all 300 persons present in the village at the time were murdered by a gang led by Shamir" — above every serious estimate, the Birzeit University research finding evidence of no more than 107 dead, and an attribution the chapter's own next sentence undercuts by identifying Begin as the Irgun's leader. Qibya, in October 1953, becomes a massacre "in which 54 children were murdered"; it killed around 69 people, roughly two-thirds of them women and children. These are real atrocities being inflated, which is the particular kind of falsification that hands the argument to the other side.

And the chapter never once names the Kahan Commission. It calls it only "the special committee", sources its contents to Pravda of 17 September 1983, and reports that it found the massacre "perpetrated with the knowledge and connivance of Tel Aviv and Washington". It found nothing of the kind about Washington, and what it found about Israel was a chain of indirect responsibility the chapter converts into sponsorship. The reason not to name it is obvious: an Israeli government commission that forced out its own Defence Minister four months after the event is an awkward object for a thesis about "fascistization", and it has no counterpart anywhere else in the volume.

Then there is the comparison, which is the reason this chapter needs to be discussed at length rather than filed with the others.

The equation is stated on the chapter's second page and never qualified: "The bloody crimes of Zionism in Lebanon are only comparable in their ruthlessness with the crimes of nazism in World War II and the atrocities of the American military in Vietnam." It recurs — "Just like the leaders of Hitler's Reich, the Zionists openly promulgate their expansionist goals" — and it is given a theoretical form: "The crimes of the Israeli military in Lebanon are not sporadic acts of cruelty and sadism by an embittered soldiery. They constitute the logical practice of the misanthropic ideology of Zionism."

It is worth being precise about what makes this the antisemitic

move rather than merely an overheated one, because the distinction matters in both directions. Criticism of Israeli state policy is not antisemitism, and treating it as such is a slander that has done real damage to Palestinians and to honest argument. What is happening here is different, and it can be located in three specific operations.

First, the selection. Of all the comparisons available for a modern army's conduct in an invaded country — and the chapter itself reaches for *My Lai*, *Guernica*, *Lidice* and *Oradour* in a single sentence about Sabra and Shatila — the analysis returns, again and again, to the one crime committed against Jews as Jews. Nothing in the argument requires it; every point the chapter makes about Lebanon could be made without it. What the choice accomplishes is to inform Jewish readers that the Holocaust was not something uniquely done to them but a technique they have inherited and are now applying.

Second, the essentialisation. Once the crimes are "the logical practice" of an ideology rather than the acts of a government, and once soldiers are described as "impregnated with the pernicious spirit of Zionist ideology", the people holding that ideology have stopped being political actors capable of choosing otherwise and become carriers of a contaminant. That is the grammar of racial thinking, applied here to the victims of the original.

Third, the slippage. The chapter is formally careful with its vocabulary: across forty-one uses of "Zionist" and "Zionism" it uses the word "Jewish" exactly once, and that once is inside a quotation from someone else. The distinction holds at the level of nouns. It fails at one sentence: "Zionist propaganda, the systematic brainwashing of the population, education of the youth in the spirit of Judaic dogmas have ensured the Zionist rulers of Israel the support of a substantial part of the country's population." Judaic dogmas. At the point where the chapter has to explain why Israelis believe what they believe, the political category gives out and a religious one takes its place. One sentence is not a doctrine, and it should not be inflated into one; but it is the sentence in which the vocabulary stops holding the argument back.

Two things must be said against overstatement, and they matter.

This book does not make the worst of the charges that disfigured Soviet anti-Zionist publishing after 1967. There is nothing here about the Ha'avara transfer agreement, nothing about the *Judenräte*, nothing about Kastner, no suggestion

anywhere that Zionists collaborated in the destruction of European Jewry. Some Soviet titles of the period did make that claim; it is absent from this one, and Galkin's chapter on the Holocaust treats the Jewish dead as victims and nothing else.

And the chapter's authority for the Nazi comparison is not Soviet but Jewish and Israeli: Yeshayahu Leibowitz on a "Judeo-Nazi policy", Israel Shahak on a "Judeo-Nazi mentality", the Communist Party of Israel and MAPAM on "fascistization", and above all Uri Davis, quoted at length. Two things follow, and the second is the more damning.

The sourcing is thinner than it looks. The Leibowitz claim — that the Israeli government pursued a Judeo-Nazi policy, and "that Israel had accomplished about the same as Hitler had done after six years in power" — carries no footnote at all. The Shahak phrase, the Davis passage and the Dayan quotations are all cited to a single pamphlet from a single Washington conference, *Judaism or Zionism: What Difference for the Middle East* (6–7 May 1983), and three of them to the same page of it, page 23. The chapter's Israeli chorus is one page of one pamphlet.

More important: Telyatnikov's own claim goes far beyond his witness's. Read what Davis actually says in the passage the chapter prints. He compares the legal position of Palestinians under occupation to that of German Jews between the 1935 Nuremberg Laws and 1939 — and then stops, deliberately, to disavow the rest: "I wish to make completely clear that I am not saying the Palestinian Arabs are being murdered in Israeli gas chambers. Nor am I saying that it is likely that Palestinian Arabs will be murdered in the future in Israeli gas chambers." Davis draws the line. The chapter quotes him drawing it, and has already crossed it forty pages earlier, in a sentence of its own about the crimes of nazism in the Second World War. That is the whole method in miniature: borrow a Jewish anti-Zionist's carefully bounded analogy, print the boundary, and argue as though it were not there.

The tradition this series writes from has never had a difficulty holding both halves of this. Palestinian national rights — return, self-determination, an end to occupation — and implacable opposition to antisemitism are not in tension and never were; they are the same commitment to not judging people by their descent. The equation of Zionism with Nazism is not a stronger version of the first. It is a surrender of the second.

There is one more thing in the chapter, and Telyatnikov cannot use it. He records that on 25 September 1982, after Sabra and Shatila, "400,000 Israelis — young people, office employees,

students, scientists and military men, who were outraged because of the bloodbath in Lebanon — demanded that the government put an end to the invasion of that country." He records Peace Now's hundred thousand on 3 July. If Israeli society is "impregnated" with a misanthropic ideology and undergoing fascistization, who were those people? The chapter reports them and has no theory that can accommodate them. As so often in this series, the best argument against the book is in the book.

Which brings us to the silence, and here the finding is arithmetical.

Search this anthology on genocide, published in Moscow in 1985, for the Crimean Tatars: nothing. For the Chechens and Ingush: nothing. For the Volga Germans, the Kalmyks, the Balkars, the Karachais, the Meskhetians: nothing. For collectivisation, for the famine of 1932–33, for Katyn: nothing. For the "rootless cosmopolitan" campaign of 1949 or the Doctors' Plot of 1953: nothing. The phrase "anti-Semitism" occurs exactly once in sixty-five thousand words, in Galkin's account of Weimar Germany, where it names a thing that had "been implanted in the German minds since the Middle Ages" and stayed there. The Soviet Union appears in this book in one capacity only: as the liberator of Oświęcim and the largest victim of the fascist enemy.

Robert Ivanov also wrote *Blacks in United States History*, published by Progress in the same year and introduced elsewhere in this series, where the identical silence was found. There the omission could at least be called a matter of scope. Here it cannot, because this book is about the legal category itself — and because it tells the reader, in its own voice, why the category was built the way it was. Menzhinsky records that the Soviet delegation proposed a preamble stating that genocide "was organically related to fascism and misanthropic racist theories", and complains that its defeat left the Convention with "shortcomings". Galkin's preface supplies the same proposition in the language of historical materialism: genocide is "not a natural and objective form of relations between nations, not an integral phenomenon of human history, but a hideous deviation born of decrepit and outdated social relations."

If genocide is organically related to fascism, and a deviation produced by outdated social relations, then a socialist state cannot commit it — not as a matter of evidence but as a matter of definition. That is why there is no chapter on the deportations. The silence is not an oversight and it is not only censorship; it is the doctrine working as designed. It is also the

reason for the Article IX reservation: a state that has defined itself out of the offence has no reason to accept a court that might disagree.

The deportations of 1943–44 were forty years in the past, and within the professional lifetime of every contributor. On 14 November 1989 — four years after this book appeared — the Supreme Soviet of the USSR adopted a declaration recognising the forcible resettlement of the deported peoples as illegal and criminal acts. The word the book could not print about its own state, that state's own legislature printed within five years.

The Kampuchea chapter shows the same machinery at work on recent history. Shubin was in the room at the Phnom Penh tribunal, and his account of the Khmer Rouge is substantially accurate and in places unbearable: the emptying of Phnom Penh, the three categories of population, the near-annihilation of the Cham, the destruction of the mosques and pagodas, Tuol Sleng. He still uses the three-million death toll adopted by the People's Republic of Kampuchea; the serious range is roughly 1.5 to 2 million, Ben Kiernan's much-cited estimate around 1.7 million, which is a fifth of the country. But the striking thing is his first sentence: "In January 1979, a popular uprising swept away the bloody clique of Pol Pot from the long-suffering land of Kampuchea." The word "Vietnam" does not appear in the chapter. Not once. In the 1979 Progress anthology *Kampuchea: From Tragedy to Rebirth*, the Vietnamese invasion at least had to be argued away — Burchett and Ozerov spent paragraphs denying it. By 1985 the argument has been retired and the fact deleted. The chapter assigns the catastrophe to Mao, and says nothing about what Moscow said or failed to say between April 1975 and late 1978.

One last structural observation. Hitler is this volume's universal solvent. He is invoked against Israel, against the United States, and — most revealingly — in Edgar Cheporov's chapter on Northern Ireland, which honestly concedes that "there is no more of the mass extermination of the indigenous population in Ulster" and then asks anyway: "In his time, Hitler turned the better half of Europe into a giant concentration camp... And isn't it genocide that the British authorities are practising in Ulster?" Discrimination in housing and employment, internment, and the Derry killings of January 1972 are all real and all worth condemning in their own terms. Calling them genocide, in a book that has just described Treblinka in detail, does not raise their gravity; it lowers the word's. A comparison available for every case discriminates nothing — and a book that will make it in seven directions but never in one has told the reader where its limit is.

Every argument in this introduction was made in print before the book was written, in the same tradition, and mostly in the Trotskyist press.

On the Soviet campaign itself, the decisive text is fourteen years older than this volume: Nathan Weinstock, "The Soviet Bureaucracy as a Source of Zionism", *Intercontinental Press* vol. 9 no. 3, 25 January 1971, written on the Leningrad trials. Weinstock names Trofim Kichko, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences author whose antisemitic caricatures had embarrassed even Western Communist parties, and states the finding flatly: the "anti-Zionism" of the USSR "has a strong odor of anti-Semitism", and this is "a crime — a crime against the Jewish community, against the cause of socialism, and against the Palestinians". Three victims, in that order, from one act. He returned to it in "Anti-Zionism and Anti-Semitism", *Inprecor* no. 44, 19 February 1976, observing that the anti-Jewish purge in Poland after 1967 was conducted "in the name of 'anti-Zionism'", as the campaigns of Stalin's last years had been conducted under the banner of "cosmopolitanism".

That same issue of *Inprecor* carries G. Stepanovich's "Crimean Tatars: The Struggle of an Entire People", part of a dossier on the imprisoned Tatar leader Mustafa Jemilev. It gives the night of 18–19 August 1944, the twenty minutes to pack, the 238,500 deported of whom 205,900 were women and children, and the finding that slightly more than half survived. It names the Volga Germans, Balkars, Chechens, Ingush, Karachais, Meskhets, Kalmyks and Black Sea Greeks, dates each deportation, and disposes of the collaboration pretext. One issue of a small European Marxist fortnightly, nine years before this book, printed both halves of the argument that a Moscow anthology on genocide could not print at all.

On Lebanon the reply was immediate and conceded nothing to Israel. *Intercontinental Press* vol. 20 no. 31, 4 October 1982, carried a joint statement issued on 21 September by the French LCR, the Italian GCR and the American SWP, observing that the massacre "had to take place" before Reagan, Mitterrand and Pertini "'discovered' that the Palestinians were threatened with real genocide by Begin and his Lebanese fascist friends". The same issue carries "400,000 demonstrate in Tel Aviv", built from first-hand reports by members of the Fourth International's Israeli section — Michel Warschawski, Lea Tsemel and others — which is to say from precisely the movement Telyatnikov could count but not explain. And in the same issue David Frankel states this introduction's position in eleven words: the programme for Palestinian national liberation "is anti-Zionist, but it's not aimed against the Jewish people." *International Viewpoint* no. 14, 4 October 1982,

added what Moscow could not: that the crocodile tears flowed in Washington, Paris, Rome, Riyadh, Damascus "and even Moscow whose silence and passivity largely contributed to the isolation of the Palestinians."

And on Guatemala, where this book was right, the same press was right alongside it: Fred Murphy, *Intercontinental Press* vol. 21 no. 16, 5 September 1983.

Read Galkin on Nazi Germany, which is scholarship. Read Sofinsky on Guatemala, which was ahead of its time and has been vindicated by a truth commission and a court. Read Cherkasova on apartheid and Ivanov on the reservations for accurate history that Cold War convenience did not have to distort. Read the Israel chapter with the Kahan Commission open beside it, and with the Palestinian claim held firmly in one hand and the Nuremberg analogy refused in the other — the two are not alternatives. And read the whole as the deposition it is: sworn by a state that had, in the same instrument, reserved the right not to be cross-examined.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

War Is Their Business: The US Military-Industrial Complex

Not the pamphlet its title suggests but a heavily documented study of how American defence contracting is financed - the banking groups behind the contractors, the procurement machinery, and a refusal of conspiracy theory.

Georgi Tsagolov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

The title is a promise the book does not keep, and that is the first thing worth saying about it. War Is Their Business sounds like a pamphlet: a moral indictment of arms manufacturers, aimed at a reader who wants to be angry rather than informed. What Georgi Tsagolov actually wrote is a densely footnoted study of American corporate finance — more than two hundred notes across two hundred and ninety pages, a full historiographical survey of the American literature on the subject, and an explicit, repeated refusal of the conspiracy theory the title invites. Somewhere between the manuscript and the jacket, a serious book acquired a shouting cover. Progress Publishers did this often, and it has cost this volume readers it deserved.

Start with the date, because the spine lies by about a year. The latest event named anywhere in the text is the American invasion of Grenada in October 1983, which appears as "the latest indication" of Washington's resort to force. The most recent Soviet authority quoted is Konstantin Chernenko — at the February 1984 plenum of the Central Committee, and in his speech to the Kuibyshev District constituency, which was delivered in March 1984. An unemployment figure is offered for "early 1984". Nothing later than the spring of 1984 appears. The years that run ahead of that — 1986, 1987, 1989, and a NATO procurement programme extending to 1993 — are all forward projections of budgets and contracts, not citations. So this is a manuscript closed around the middle of 1984 and published in English in 1985: an Andropov-to-Chernenko book, written in the coldest stretch of the second Cold War, before Gorbachev, before Geneva, before anything had begun to move. Gorbachev's name does not occur in it.

Of the author the book tells us almost nothing. There is no institutional affiliation on the copyright page; the jacket copy

survives in the scan only as a column of upside-down and largely illegible text. What can be established comes from inside the notes. In a footnote on the coalition structure of American finance capital, Tsagolov cites, in the third person, a book of his own — published by Mysl in Moscow in 1968, on the new groups of United States high finance. (The title word is mangled in the scan and I will not guess at it.) That single self-citation is more informative than a biography would be. It tells us he had been a specialist in American corporate ownership for sixteen years before he wrote this, and it explains the book's centre of gravity: this is not a work about strategy, doctrine or weapons, but about who owns the firms. He also cites, in the same register of professional colleagues, S. M. Menshikov's *Millionaires and Managers* and B. D. Pyadyshev's *The US Military-Industrial Complex* — the Voenizdat original of 1974 — both of which Progress published in English and both of which are companion volumes in this series. These people were reading each other.

What kind of book this is

The comparison that matters is with Radomir Bogdanov's *The US War Machine and Politics*, published by Progress a year later and introduced elsewhere in this series. Bogdanov wrote an institutional history of the American national security state out of American scholarly monographs and primary documents: John Lewis Gaddis, Samuel Huntington, Desmond Ball on nuclear targeting, the Pentagon Papers as printed by the Government Printing Office, five separate GPO citations, Senate hearings. Tsagolov's source base is quite different, and the difference is measurable. Across those notes there is exactly one Government Printing Office citation, no Congressional hearings cited directly, and no Congressional Record. What there is instead is the American business press: *Fortune* thirteen times, *Time* eleven, *Business Week* ten, *Newsweek* six, the *New York Times* six, with the *Washington Post*, *Aviation Week and Space Technology*, the *Financial*

Times, *Le Monde diplomatique* and *The Nation* behind them. Where he needs a documentary fact — the growth of retired officers on contractor payrolls from 768 in 1959 to 2,072 in 1969, with 210 at Lockheed and 169 at Boeing — he takes it not from the Senate survey itself but from Adam Yarmolinsky's *The Military Establishment*.

This is a weaker evidentiary base than Bogdanov's for questions of strategy, and Tsagolov largely does not ask those questions. For his actual subject it is close to the right base. If you want to know who controls Hewlett-Packard's stock, what proportion of aerospace deliveries nine firms account for, or why Northrop sank two hundred million dollars of its own money into a bomber before anyone had promised to buy it, *Fortune* and *Business Week* are where that was reported in 1983, and he reads them attentively. The register did change with the sourcing — but downward in formality, not in seriousness.

Because the serious thing about this book is that it argues. Consider the strongest objection to the whole military-industrial complex thesis, then and now: military spending was five to eight per cent of American GNP, and military output less than that, so how can so small a sector command national policy? Tsagolov states the objection in the sceptic's own words — "Hence the conclusion that the influence of the military-industrial complex is negligible: the tail cannot wag the dog" — and then answers it, at length, in two ways. First, that the sector's weight is political rather than proportional, because war preparation aligns with the strategic interests of the bourgeoisie as a whole and so recruits allies far beyond itself. Second, and more interestingly, that the complex borrows the weight of others: "the complex uses its ramified connections among finance and industrial monopolies", so that its leverage is that of the banking groups it is embedded in, not of its own payroll. Whether or not one accepts the answer, posing the objection at full strength and then meeting it is what analysis looks like. Bogdanov never posed it.

The same seriousness shows in the chapter on profits, which is the place a lesser book would have collapsed into the till. Tsagolov's finding is a differentiated one: "there is no single profit rate universal for the war industry." Prime contractors reap what he calls superprofits because they receive government progress payments as free working capital, use government-owned plant to make civilian goods on the side, and face a single buyer in what American economists call a bilateral monopoly. Subcontractors, denied all of this, earn ordinary commercial returns. He quotes Richard Kaufman's finding that "no large prime contractor has ever lost money on

a contract with the Defense Department", and concludes that fifty firms holding sixty per cent of contracts take around eighty per cent of the industry's profits. That is a real political-economic argument with a distribution in it, and it is markedly better than Bogdanov's habit — noted in the companion introduction — of collapsing his own careful institutional account into a sentence about banks and shareholders demanding investment profitability.

Most striking of all, Tsagolov explicitly disowns the reading his title advertises. Opening the last section of his final chapter he writes: "It is very difficult to say precisely how the military-industrial complex influences US imperialist foreign policy today. It is hard to determine the degree to which distinctive goals of the military-industrial complex shape Washington's political moves." (The printed text misspells "imperialist"; I have corrected it silently, here and nowhere else.) He adds that "The term 'American reactionaries' is much broader than the military-industrial complex", instances the fact that some arms executives actively promoted East-West trade during détente, and had earlier written that "One cannot blame the military-industrial complex alone for militarism and the arms race." His considered formulation, given in the conclusion, is that the term is a misnomer he keeps only because it is familiar; what actually exists is a "military-state-monopoly group" fusing contractors with the militarist wing of the state apparatus. Whatever else that is, it is not a theory of a cabal of arms manufacturers.

He is good, too, on Eisenhower, where most Soviet writers were merely pious. Tsagolov gives the farewell address of 17 January 1961 its due as "perhaps the most often quoted statement by a US President", and then declines to be impressed: he notes that the phrase was not Eisenhower's own but his speechwriter Malcolm Moos's, and reads the speech as a retiring president shifting onto an abstraction the blame for policies his own administration had pursued. That is a sharper handling of Eisenhower than one finds in a good deal of Western commentary. And the small details are often the best things in the book — as when, describing the Armed Services Committees, he records that congressional staff ask the Pentagon to supply both the questions and the answers in advance, with the result that "confusion sometimes results when committee members read out both the questions and the answers by mistake."

There is real research here. A reader who wants an account of American defence contracting in the early 1980s — the ownership structures, the revolving door, the RAND Corporation, the Committee on the Present Danger, the arms

export trade, the "foot in the door" technique of underbidding a programme to get it started — will find a competent and well-referenced one, and will not often be misled on matters of American fact.

Where it fails, and how

Two small errors first, because they illuminate the method. Twice the book calls the Hewlett-Packard co-founder who served as Nixon's deputy defense secretary and co-founded the Committee on the Present Danger James Packard. His name was David Packard. It is not a scanning artefact — the error is consistent across both passages, and the surrounding shareholding figures are exact. Second, Tsagolov states that American unemployment left "more than 12 million people jobless in early 1984—a record over the past 40 years." Twelve million was indeed the postwar record, and it was reached in late 1982; by early 1984 the figure had fallen by roughly a quarter. He has taken a 1982 number and moved the date forward to make his manuscript current. Both slips are what happens when a book is built from press cuttings and then hurried into print.

The large failure is the one this series keeps finding, and Tsagolov commits it in a more revealing form than Bogdanov did. The following words appear nowhere in these 65,000: Afghanistan. SS-20. Strategic Defense Initiative. Star Wars. Warsaw Pact — though "the Warsaw Treaty countries" are named once, in the conclusion, purely as authors of peace declarations, never as an alliance that fields weapons. No figure is given anywhere for Soviet military spending, in roubles, dollars, or as a share of anything. The GNP metric, which Tsagolov deploys against the United States and then comparatively against Britain, France, Japan and West Germany, is never once turned eastward.

That the nil returns match Bogdanov's exactly — and match a third Progress title on the same subject, Nuclear Strategy and Common Sense — settles a question but is no longer, by itself, an interesting one. Three authors, three institutional milieux, three methods, the same holes: this is not one man's evasion but the shape of a genre, and the finding can be recorded and set aside. What is worth attention is the difference between the three books, because it runs the other way from what one would expect. The most popular in register is not the least honest.

But Tsagolov goes further than silence, and it is here that his book indicts itself. He knows the counter-argument, because he quotes it — twice, at length, in his own text. He reproduces,

from The Age of Uncertainty, Galbraith's account of a double symbiosis — first between the American services and their contractors, then between the two superpowers, each of whose innovations creates the incentive for the other's — so that "Both countries are caught in a squirrel wheel, a trap." He then quotes Richard Barnet's *The Giants: Russia and America*: "Military bureaucracies are developing in the Soviet Union that are mirror images of American bureaucracies. Their expansion risks the further militarization of policy." He sets out both cases with real fidelity, and he identifies correctly what is at stake in them — that Galbraith's version rests on a thesis of convergence between the two systems, which a Soviet Marxist could not accept. But having seen the stake, he does not argue the point. He disposes of it in a single sentence:

Typically, both Galbraith and Barnet are reluctant to deal at length with the "Soviet military-industrial complex." The reason is clear: in the Soviet Union or other socialist countries there are no classes, social strata or professional groups interested in war or war preparations.

That is not an omission but a refutation by definition. No evidence is offered, and none could be, because the claim is not empirical — it is a deduction from the premise that the USSR has no antagonistic social groups at all. And it is made by a man whose entire professional competence lay in identifying exactly such groups: the coalition structures, the interlocking directorates, the personnel flows between ministry and industry. He possessed a method for finding a military-industrial complex, applied it with skill on one side of the world, and was obliged to declare the object non-existent on the other. Bogdanov's version of this failure was to look away. Tsagolov's was to look straight at it and deny what he saw. Read the sentence twice and the book's real subject becomes visible: not the American arms industry, but the boundary of what a Soviet economist could publish.

One divergence from Bogdanov deserves credit. Bogdanov's book does not contain the phrase "peace movement"; Tsagolov's does, and he takes the movement seriously as an actor rather than an audience. He records the demonstration of over a million people in New York on 12 June 1982, and the march on Washington of 27 August 1983, and he notes that the resurgence of American antiwar feeling blunted the electoral targeting operations of the New Right. He is interested in mass movements in a way the diplomat Bogdanov simply was not. He is interested, of course, only in Western ones.

The reply that was already in print

The answer to this book did not have to wait for the archives. It was in English, in journals Tsagolov's readers could not obtain, decades before he wrote.

The Fourth International was analysing the American permanent arms economy twelve years before Eisenhower's farewell address gave it a name. An unsigned editorial review in Fourth International vol. X no. 3 (whole no. 93), March 1949, titled "The Military Welfare State", set out the thesis in a sentence: reviewing Truman's cabinet and his budget, it concluded that "The physical composition of the executive power is symbolic of the unbroken unity of the government, the military and finance capital." That is Tsagolov's "military-state-monopoly group", including his own refinement about finance capital, in 1949. The same review noted that "military expenditure strengthens the big trustified industries like steel, chemicals and oil while it weakens the competitive consumer goods industries and places intolerable burdens on the people" — which is, in one clause, the argument of Tsagolov's sixth chapter. Arne Swabeck's "Inflation and the Arms Economy", written in March 1952 and printed in vol. XIII no. 3 (whole no. 116), worked the same ground statistically, showing personal consumption falling from 75.9 per cent of gross national product in 1929 to 66.1 per cent in the first year of the Korean War while corporate profits after tax rose 28.9 per cent. Michel Pablo's "Capitalist Economy and the Atlantic Pact" in vol. XII no. 3 (whole no. 110) belongs to the same effort.

By the mid-1970s the analysis had matured. Dick Fidler's review article "America's Permanent War Economy", in Intercontinental Press vol. 13 no. 20, 26 May 1975, took Melman's *The Permanent War Economy* — a book Tsagolov also cites — and set it in a Marxist frame, arguing that armaments production is "a vital means by which the state guarantees monopoly profits through increasing public expenditure at cost of expanding the public debt and undermining the stability of the currency", financed by taxation and inflation and therefore constituting a redistribution of national income toward the trusts. There is no substantive disagreement between that and Tsagolov's chapter on the tax burden of militarism. They are the same analysis.

The difference is what happens next, and the decisive text is three weeks earlier in the same journal. Intercontinental Press vol. 13 no. 17, 5 May 1975, printed Roy Medvedev's reply to Solzhenitsyn's "Letter to Soviet Leaders" under the title "What Lies Ahead for Us?". One of its sections is headed "The Military-Industrial Complex and the Threat of War", and it reads:

Also clearly hampering detente is the pressure from the military-industrial complexes in the USA as well as in the USSR. The influence of the Soviet military and military-industrial circles on the adoption of fundamental political decisions has grown since Stalin's death, but it would not do either to underestimate or to exaggerate this factor.

Medvedev goes on to observe that "the bulk of Soviet divisions stationed to the west of our borders serve not so much to shield us from possible aggression from Western countries as to guarantee that Soviet influence will be maintained in the East European countries." He was a Soviet Marxist historian writing in Russian, in Moscow, ten years before Tsagolov's book — not a Cold Warrior, not an émigré, a socialist who thought the Soviet Union worth saving. The social stratum Tsagolov declared could not exist had already been named, weighed and rationed for exaggeration by a compatriot. (I have searched the whole run of 763 Intercontinental Press issues from 1968 to its close in August 1986: Medvedev's is the only article in the entire archive that puts "Soviet" and "military-industrial" in the same breath. The idea was not common currency on the Western left either. It was, however, available.)

Nor was the Fourth International reflexively hostile to Soviet figures. Intercontinental Press of 2 March 1981 ran a detailed demolition of Reagan's claim that Moscow had outspent Washington for a decade, showing that the CIA had produced the result by retrospectively recomputing Soviet expenditure at American dollar prices, and that on the older and more accurate method "the Soviet Union spends only 60 to 70 percent of what the Pentagon spends." Then, in the statement of the Bureau of the United Secretariat printed in Intercontinental Press vol. 21 no. 12 on 27 June 1983 — discussed at greater length in the introduction to Bogdanov — it did the thing Tsagolov's book is constructed to make impossible, and applied the metric to both sides: "While declared American arms spending is 7 percent of the GNP and estimated USSR spending 15 percent of the GNP, the American GNP is double the Soviet GNP", from which follows both that "Imperialism is still the principal warmonger" and that "Soviet military expenditure is a great burden on the Soviet Union, to the point of worsening economic and food supply problems." Tsagolov was writing in the months that statement appeared. He had the first half of it and was denied the second.

The theoretical completion came only afterwards, and it is worth being exact about the date rather than enlisting it as

though it were contemporaneous commentary: Ernest Mandel, "The significance of Gorbachov", *International Marxist Review* vol. 2 no. 4, Winter 1987 — two and a half years after this translation, and written into a world Tsagolov's manuscript had not yet entered. Mandel names three goals the Soviet bureaucracy had pursued since Khrushchev and could no longer fund simultaneously: high investment, rising living standards, and "continuing the arms race with American imperialism". Gorbachev's disarmament initiatives, he argues, were sincere in a way earlier ones were not, precisely "because the bureaucracy really needs to put a stop to the nuclear arms race in order to reduce the share of the Soviet Union's available resources devoted to non-productive ends." There is the Soviet social stratum with a determinate material interest in the level of arms spending, identified and located. Mandel's *The Meaning of the Second World War*, published the year after Tsagolov's translation, sets out the long history in its final chapter, "The Legacy", where he credits Eisenhower with aptly coining the phrase.

And then the verdict arrived from the only source Tsagolov would have had to respect. In June 1990 *International Viewpoint* reported a congress of the new independent Soviet workers' movement at which a resolution, drawn up with Shield — a trade union of Red Army officers — "attacked the military-industrial complex as one of the main sources of poverty in Soviet society, and called for the right to strike to be extended to workers in military enterprises." Two years later the same journal described Chelyabinsk, where "as much as 90% of the industry in and around Chelyabinsk is to some extent related to military purposes" — an electoral and regional geography of arms production of exactly the kind Bogdanov correctly identified in America. By 1995 *International Viewpoint* was describing the Russian complex as "a powerful lobby" which "draws its strength from its links with the state apparatus", which is a fair paraphrase of Tsagolov's own definition of the American one. Within five years of his death sentence on the concept, Soviet workers, Soviet officers and Soviet journalists were all using it about themselves.

What the book is for

Read it for the American research, which is genuine, and for the argument, which is better than its title and better than its reputation. On contracting, ownership, superprofits, the revolving door and the political sociology of the defence coalition, Tsagolov is a competent guide who read the American business press closely, refused the vulgar version of

his own thesis, and left an honest record of the limits of his own certainty about how much the complex actually determines.

And read it against its companions for what it shows about the relation between a book's audience and its honesty. One might expect the popular title to be the crude one — that a book called *War Is Their Business*, written from magazines rather than from government documents, would trade analysis for assertion and name villains where the scholarly volume named institutions. The opposite is the case. Tsagolov's sourcing is thinner than Bogdanov's and his subject narrower, but his argument is more careful at precisely the points where popular writing usually fails: he states the strongest objection to his own thesis and answers it, he differentiates profit rates instead of invoking profit, and he says in plain words that he cannot measure how far the complex actually drives American policy. Bogdanov, with the better archive, reached more often for the cash register. The gradient across these three books does not run from scholarly to vulgar. It runs from one kind of constraint to another, and the constraint that mattered was never the register.

Read it, finally, as the sharpest specimen this series has yet produced of a particular kind of intellectual injury. Bogdanov's book fails by leaving things out. Tsagolov's fails in the open, on the page, in a sentence where he sets out Galbraith's and Barnett's mirror thesis with scrupulous accuracy and then abolishes it by decree. He had the method. He had, in his own bibliography, the American authors who had turned that method on their own state and published the results. What he did not have was a *Fortune*, a *Proxmire*, a Yarmolinsky, or an Armed Services Committee of his own — and the absence of those is the whole explanation of why this book could be written about Washington and not about Moscow. Every American footnote in it is a measure of what his own country would not let him cite.

PHILOSOPHY

History of Ancient Philosophy

Greek and Roman philosophy from Thales to the closing of the Academy, read from the fragments and the doxographers rather than at second hand - by a Moscow State University professor who spent a career on it.

Aleksei Sergeevich Bogomolov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

A. S. Bogomolov's History of Ancient Philosophy: Greece and Rome is a university textbook, and it announces as much on its first working page: "This book is primarily intended for students of the humanities, but will also be found helpful in self-education." Progress Publishers issued it in English in 1985, translated from a Russian original of the same period, and unlike many titles in this series it carries no hidden earlier date — no lag between a manuscript closed in one decade and a jacket printed in another. This is late-Soviet academic philosophy caught almost in real time: a survey of the Greeks and Romans, from Thales to the closing of the Athenian Academy in 529, written for the last cohort of Soviet students before perestroika reached the philosophy faculties. Bogomolov was a genuine scholar — a professor at Moscow State University who spent a career on ancient thought, on Hegel, and on the currents of twentieth-century Western philosophy — and the book shows it on nearly every page. It also shows, from its opening paragraphs onward, the frame he was obliged to build it around, and the interest of the volume lies almost entirely in the friction between the two.

What the book was for shapes what it is. A textbook of the history of philosophy is not a foreign-policy tract or a piece of legitimization for a Party congress; its job is to carry a body of difficult material to students and to the self-taught, and it is judged, first, on whether the exposition is any good. Bogomolov's is. One measure worth stating up front, because it inverts a pattern common in this series: where many Soviet books on Western thought reach their subjects at second hand, through Soviet intermediaries and approved summaries, Bogomolov reads the Greeks in the Greek sources. He works from the fragments and the ancient doxographers — the compilers such as Diogenes Laertius and the commentators who preserved what the originals lost — and from the modern critical editions, weighing the evidence rather than relaying a verdict. The apparatus is a working scholar's, not a propagandist's. That is the ground on which the volume earns its keep, and it is also what makes the doctrinal frame chafe so

visibly: a mind this well furnished with the actual texts is forever noticing things the schema has no room for.

The frame is stated without apology. The history of philosophy, the Publishers' Note explains, illustrates "the inevitability of the split of all philosophers in a class society into two big camps." The whole of the two-and-a-half-thousand-year story is to be read as a single sustained conflict between materialism and idealism — and, more than that, as a conflict with sides, a fight in which the historian is expected to enlist. Bogomolov gives the doctrine its canonical pedigree at once, quoting Lenin's challenge from *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* (1908): "Could the struggle between materialism and idealism, the struggle between the tendencies or lines of Plato and Democritus in philosophy ... have become antiquated during the two thousand years of the development of philosophy?" That sentence is the master key of the book. The entire history of ancient thought is recast as the opening act of a struggle between the line of Democritus and the line of Plato — a struggle that, on this account, is still being fought, and whose latest chapter is the reader's own present. Bogomolov spells out the pairing in his own voice at the head of the classical period: "the materialist line ... represented by Democritus" against "the idealistic line ... represented by Plato." Two men, two teams, and a game whose winner is already known.

The division itself is the one Engels drew, and Bogomolov quotes him for it: the answer each philosopher gives to "the great basic question of philosophy," the relation of thinking to being, "split them into two great camps. Those who asserted the primacy of spirit to nature ... comprised the camp of idealism. The others, who regarded nature as primary, belong to the various schools of materialism." So far this is ordinary Marxism, and it is not, in itself, an unreasonable way to sort philosophers. What turns a distinction into a doctrine is the next step, and Bogomolov takes it explicitly. The method of the history of philosophy, he writes, calls not only for historical accuracy but "for partisanship which demands of a historian of philosophy to occupy a clear-cut social and philosophical position in assessing every phenomenon under

investigation in the light of struggle between materialism and idealism." The word carrying the weight there is partisanship — in the Russian, *partiinnost'* (party-mindedness), the demand that scholarship take the party's side. It is not a Bogomolov coinage. It is the principle that Andrei Zhdanov made compulsory for Soviet philosophy in the celebrated "philosophical discussion" of 1947, when the Party publicly rebuked G. F. Alexandrov's *History of Western European Philosophy* for treating past thinkers with too even a hand and too little combat. From that point the history of philosophy in the USSR had a required form: the militant struggle of materialism against idealism, narrated by a historian who has already chosen his side. Bogomolov, four decades later, opens his book by restating the rule as method.

What the rule does to the actual history is worth watching closely, because the flattening is precise and it is visible in the text. Plato — the greatest of the idealists, and a thinker Bogomolov plainly loves — is processed into a class-symptom. His philosophy, we read, "represented an immediate ideological reaction to the atomistic doctrine of Democritus"; his system was "reactionary as it was"; his ideal Republic makes him not a precursor of socialism (a reading the book is anxious to refuse) but "the ideologist of such feudal organisations as monastic societies and knightly fraternities." Idealism, on this schema, does not have reasons; it has causes. It arises when a declining class needs a consoling picture of the world, and its content is decoded as the reflex of that need. The materialists, meanwhile, are graded on a single scale — their distance from dialectical materialism, the doctrine that is assumed to complete the line they began. Democritus is praised for consistency; Epicurus is credited with an advance; the whole ancient materialist tradition is read forward, as an approach toward a destination it could not have known.

This is where the frame turns on itself, and the problem is not a Trotskyist objection smuggled in from outside — it is a problem the book's own method generates. If every philosophy is to be judged by the class whose interests it served, and graded by its service to a "line," then the obvious question is what happens when the method is turned on the philosophy doing the judging. Soviet Marxism-Leninism was the official doctrine of a particular state, taught by its universities, published by its ministries, and policed by its Central Committee. It had, on its own account of how ideas work, a social base and a class function as surely as Plato's idealism did. Yet the one philosophy the book never treats as a class-bound ideology is its own. Dialectical materialism is not offered as one more position in the struggle it describes; it is the vantage point from which the struggle is scored, the true

philosophy from which all the others are ranked. That exemption is the tell. A method that can explain every world-view as the ideology of a class, and then quietly excuses itself from the explanation, is not a science of philosophy but a philosophy that has declared itself the end of the story. Ask of the book the simple reflexive question — could the category "class-bound ideology" ever be applied to the author's own standpoint? — and the answer is no, and cannot be otherwise. The category only ever points outward.

The sharpest reply to this is not a heresy but the tradition's own founding texts, several of which Bogomolov cites while missing what they were doing. Take the young Marx, whom the book invokes with real warmth. Marx's doctoral dissertation of 1841, on the difference between the natural philosophy of Democritus and that of Epicurus, is one of the sources Bogomolov leans on for his chapters on atomism — and rightly, because it is a small masterpiece. But its whole point cuts against the two-camps grid. Marx did not sort the ancient materialists into a single "line"; he found a drama inside materialism itself. Democritus and Epicurus taught almost the same physics, and yet, Marx argued, they were opposites in spirit: where Democritus made the atom's fall a matter of rigid necessity, Epicurus introduced the tiny, spontaneous swerve (the *clinamen*), the atom's unpredictable declination from the straight line — and in that swerve Marx read the germ of freedom, of self-consciousness breaking the chain of mechanical cause. Bogomolov knows the passage; he quotes Marx that the declination "is ... not a particular determination which appears accidentally in Epicurean physics. On the contrary, the law which it expresses goes through the whole Epicurean philosophy," and he generously credits Marx as the first to see it. What he cannot absorb is the lesson of the method: that "materialism" is not a team to be cheered but a field of real, unresolved differences, and that the interesting history runs within the camp, not merely between the camps. Marx read the ancients as a philosopher arguing with them. Bogomolov's schema can only read them as troops in a line of battle.

The same young Marx supplies a second corrective the book quotes without quite hearing. Bogomolov defends the long Greco-Roman period — the Epicureans, Stoics and Sceptics that older handbooks dismissed as the "decline" of ancient thought — by citing Marx's own doctoral theses, in which the future author of *Capital* wrote that the "post-Aristotelean" schools, "and primarily the cycle of the Epicurean, Stoic and Sceptic schools, are more significant and interesting for the subjective form, the character of Greek philosophy," precisely the dimension that had "until now been almost entirely

ignored." It is a fine, humane point, and Bogomolov is right to lean on it. But notice what Marx is praising: the subjective form, the inner life and temper of these philosophies, the thing a two-camps ledger of "materialist" and "idealist" entries cannot record at all. The touchstone the book reaches for keeps handing it a richer method than the one it is committed to.

Engels, from whom the "two great camps" sentence is taken, is subtler than the use made of him. The passage comes from Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy (1886), and in that same essay Engels is careful to confine the division to one question only — the primacy of thought or being — and warns against inflating "idealism" and "materialism" into general terms of praise and abuse. More tellingly, the essay's hero is Hegel, an idealist, whom Engels honours as the thinker who carried the dialectic to its highest pre-Marxist form. The founder of the "two camps" formula did not think that being an idealist disqualified a philosopher from being the greatest dialectician of the age. The schema built on Engels' authority forgets the very generosity that made his own history of philosophy worth reading.

And then there is Lenin — the decisive case, because it is his name the whole edifice rests on. The two-camps history is quarried almost entirely from Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, a polemic Lenin wrote in 1908 in the heat of a factional fight, its purpose to club a group of Bolshevik philosophers back into line. It is his least dialectical book, and he knew it. Six years later, filling his notebooks with a close reading of Hegel's *Logic* — the private working papers published long after as the *Philosophical Notebooks* — Lenin wrote in something like the opposite spirit. There he insisted that "intelligent idealism" stands closer to "intelligent materialism" than crude, mechanical materialism does; that idealism is not simply priestcraft and reaction but a one-sided, exaggerated development of a genuine moment of knowledge — a "sterile flower," in his image, that nonetheless grows on the living tree of human cognition. The Lenin of the *Notebooks* would have found the flat sorting of Plato into the reactionary bin a piece of the "stupid materialism" he despised. The Zhdanovite history of two camps was built on Lenin's name but on his narrowest book, and it dropped the dialectician for the polemicist. This matters for the volume in hand because Bogomolov's own best pages, as we will see, are written in the key of the *Notebooks*, not of the 1908 polemic — and he seems not to have noticed the tension.

The anti-Stalinist Marxist tradition made this criticism directly, and it is worth hearing in its own voice, though with an honest caveat: the Fourth International's press did not

review a Soviet Greek philosophy textbook of 1985, and the reply gathered here is one of principle, made decades earlier against the same operation, not a contemporaneous encounter. In December 1940 the American Marxist George Novack, reviewing Engels' *Dialectics of Nature* — which the Stalinist state had just published — put the point exactly. "The Stalinists might preserve some relics of past Marxist thought," he wrote, "as the medieval schoolmen preserved the writings of Aristotle or as they themselves mummified Lenin's body: to exhibit the decaying glories of the past while violating their spirit in the present." That is the charge in a sentence. The living dialectic — the method that reads an opponent for what is true in him, that finds the struggle inside each position and not only between the labelled camps — is embalmed into a catechism of two lines, and the embalming is performed in Lenin's name. A history of philosophy conducted as *partiinost'* keeps the vocabulary of the tradition while losing the thing the vocabulary was for.

None of this is a reason to put the book down, and a reader told that its frame is compromised has been told the least interesting thing about it. Bogomolov was a real historian of philosophy, and the scholarship is frequently first-rate — often precisely where it strains hardest against the schema it is required to serve. Three things deserve concrete credit.

First, his treatment of the earliest Greeks. Bogomolov refuses the lazy convention that files the thinkers before Socrates as a mere warm-up. He objects to the very word "Pre-Socratic" as a nineteenth-century coinage that makes a great age of thought look "transitory, auxiliary and insignificant," and he restores Democritus in particular to the centre of the story, insisting that it was the atomist "who created a complete and consistent doctrine of atomistic materialism, a classical system which can well compare, in terms of maturity, with the systems of Plato and Aristotle." The command of the material behind that judgement is real: the book works directly from the ancient doxographers and the modern critical editions, weighs the fragments, reconstructs the arguments, and is never content to paraphrase a handbook. Whatever one makes of the "line of Democritus" as ideology, the chapters on early Greek natural philosophy are a serious piece of exposition.

Second, and best, the Aristotle. The long central chapter on Aristotle's physics and metaphysics is the finest thing in the volume, and it is finest exactly at the point where Bogomolov abandons the two-camps scoreboard for the patient tracking of a mind at work. His pages on *entelechy* — Aristotle's term for a thing's inner drive toward its own completion — and on the paired concepts of potentiality and actuality are lucid,

sympathetic and philosophically alert; here, he writes, we see "the living germs of dialectics, this time in the concepts of matter and form, potentiality and actuality." Note the verdict he reaches on Aristotle's overall standing: "Aristotle wavers between idealism and materialism on a number of issues, but the idealist trend is generally prevalent." That "wavers" is an almost direct echo of the Philosophical Notebooks, where Lenin found Aristotle forever hesitating on the threshold between the camps — and it is the dialectical Lenin, not the polemicist of 1908, whom Bogomolov is following when his exposition is at its most illuminating. The great idealist is not decoded as reaction here; he is read as a thinker whose contradictions are productive. The book is at its best when the schema is quietest.

Third — and this is the volume's deepest and least intended interest — Bogomolov's scholarship keeps crediting idealists with achievements his own frame is supposed to file under reaction, and he keeps saying so out loud. Plato's system, "reactionary as it was," nonetheless "synthesised the dialectical achievements of previous Greek thought." Anaxagoras's idealism "stepped in to fill the gaps" in his materialism, which is a concession that idealism did explanatory work. Most striking of all is his account of Proclus, the last great pagan Neo-Platonist, whose doctrine of the One and the many Bogomolov describes as "profound and extremely fruitful" — a "dialectical idea" that "marked an important step forward in the development of idealist dialectics," and was then, in his phrase, "utterly emasculated" by the theological system built around it. Stop on that. A committed partisan of the materialist line has just told the reader, twice, that idealism developed the dialectic — that some of the most important advances in the history of dialectical thought were made by philosophers on the wrong side of the great divide. The historian in Bogomolov keeps overrunning the ideologist. He cannot help registering what the sources actually show, even when what they show is that the two lines are not two teams, that the "reactionary" thinkers built the tools the tradition would later claim, and that the real history is a single tangled growth rather than a two-thousand-year tug of war.

That tension — between the loyal frame and the honest scholarship that keeps breaking it — is the reason this book survives its own doctrine. Read as the official Soviet history of ancient philosophy, it is a period document, an example of *partiinost'* applied to the Greeks, and instructive chiefly as such. Read for its exposition of Democritus, its Aristotle, its careful handling of the Hellenistic schools and of Neo-Platonism, it is a capable and often admirable guide, made by a man who knew the material and, at his best, could

not stop himself from doing it justice. The frame tells you that the history of philosophy is a battlefield with two armies and a foregone winner. The scholarship, again and again, quietly reports something more interesting: that the losers built half the weapons, that the winners borrowed them, and that the truth of a philosophy is not settled by the class it is assigned to. Where those two accounts collide, believe the second — and know that Bogomolov, the historian rather than the partisan, would very nearly have agreed.

SOVIET SOCIETY

India: Spotlight on Population

India's population across a century of censuses, from 1872 to 1981 - density, migration, mortality, urbanisation, literacy - reconstructed with care and candid about where the record gives out.

Victor Petrov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

Most of the books in this series are doctrine. This one is a data set. Victor Petrov's *India: Spotlight on Population*, issued in English by Progress Publishers in 1985 and translated from the Russian by Glenys Ann Kozlov, is a Soviet demographer's monograph on the movement of India's population "from 1872 to 1981" — the run of the great Indian censuses, from the first universal counts under the Raj to the fourth taken by the independent Republic. The publisher's own blurb describes it accurately: "This book by the Soviet scholar, Professor V. Petrov, is devoted to the movement of population in India from 1872 to 1981. The author deals with the numbers, density and composition of the population, its natural growth, migration, and so forth." Its chapters march through size, density and distribution; national and religious composition; sex and age structure; mortality and natural increase; migration; urbanisation; literacy; and the relation of population to the economy. It is a genuine Progress book — the imprint occurs where the front and back matter place it and nowhere it does not belong — and, unlike a good deal of what this house exported, most of it is real scholarship performed with care.

That is the first thing to establish, because a reader who comes to a Progress title expecting a tract will misread this one. Petrov reconstructs India's population back through the pre-census centuries by triangulating tax rolls, army sizes, epidemic mortality and the accounts of foreign travellers; he weighs the competing estimates of Kingsley Davis and the Indian demographers J. M. Datta and P. Nath against one another and declines to pretend the record is cleaner than it is; he is candid that once the indirect indices multiply, "we may become utterly confused by these contradictory indices, since the greater their number, the less likely they are to tally." He knows the Indian census literature — Gopalasvami, Gozulov, the margins of error argued over the 1951, 1961 and 1971 counts — and he uses it. Where the book states its own date it states it plainly enough: the latest hard material is the preliminary 1981 census and the UN forecasts revised in 1981, and the newest policy instrument it discusses is the Sixth

Five-Year Plan (1980–85). The Russian manuscript therefore closed around 1982–83 and reached English in 1985. Nothing in the argument turns on the two-year lag; what matters is that everything the book might have said about the previous decade was fully available to its author.

The argument that holds

The core of the book is an argument against Malthus, and it is the right argument. Petrov sets himself squarely against the neo-Malthusian claim "that today's population growth exceeds that of material benefits and that the situation will get worse as time goes on," and he answers it not with slogans but with India's own history. If sheer numbers determined welfare, he observes, then Indians ought to have been better off when there were fewer of them — and they were not:

"there were almost threefold less people in India at the beginning of the century than there are at present, but at the same time the standard of living of the Indians was no better than it is today. On the contrary, they were even more poverty-stricken at that time, which means that the number of people on the subcontinent in itself by no means determines their standard of living. As always and everywhere, the well-being enjoyed by the masses is determined by the development of the productive forces and the share of the benefits that the people can retain for themselves."

From this he draws the correct structural conclusion: that "population growth cannot be regarded as a self-sufficient phenomenon and the restriction of that growth as an aim in itself," and that under India's existing "relations of production" the poor will stay poor whatever the birth-rate does. He notes, pointedly, that at the 1965 World Population Conference in Belgrade "India's representatives referred to the poverty in their country as the consequence of the numerousness of its population" — and he rejects that alibi. Throughout, he ties India's demographic weight to colonial underdevelopment, to the caste barriers that immobilise labour, to agrarian

overpopulation and the "relative agrarian overpopulation" that drives men into the towns, rather than to any biological failing of the poor to control themselves.

This deserves to be said without hedging, because in 1985 it was the honourable side of a real argument. The Western population-control establishment — the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, the World Bank, the population-planning apparatus of the American state — had spent two decades insisting that the poverty of the global South was a problem of too many babies, and had put money and pressure behind programmes to reduce their number. Petrov's Marxist demography, which locates the problem in the distribution of land and product rather than in the fertility of the poor, was analytically the stronger position, and the coercive disasters of the very population-control movement he was arguing against would prove him more right than its funders. On the level of theory, India: Spotlight on Population wins its case.

The silence at the centre

Which makes the book's central omission all the more telling. A Soviet volume published in 1985, "spotlighting" India's population, devoting a full treatment to the family-planning programme, and arguing on principle against the coercion of the poor in the name of the birth-rate — such a book runs directly at the largest coercive population-control programme in human history, which had taken place in India less than a decade before it was written. And it does not mention it.

Between 1975 and 1977, under the Emergency that Indira Gandhi declared on 26 June 1975 and that suspended civil liberties for twenty-one months, her son Sanjay Gandhi's family-planning drive carried out mass sterilisation on a scale never attempted before or since — on the order of six million operations in 1976–77 alone, overwhelmingly of the poor, and falling with particular weight on Muslims and on slum and pavement dwellers who were sterilised as the price of a ration card, a house plot, or freedom from the bulldozer. It produced riots, police shootings and deaths, and it was a principal reason Gandhi lost the general election of March 1977. It is the single most important fact about India's population policy in the twentieth century, and it is exactly the sort of thing Petrov's own argument exists to condemn.

Petrov writes it out of the record. The words Emergency, Indira, Sanjay, coercion and vasectomy do not appear in the book at all; sterilisation appears once. The check for scanner-mangled names confirms these are true absences and not artefacts of the digitisation — there is no damaged

"Indira," no damaged "Sanjay," nothing but the ordinary words emergence and indirect. What Petrov gives instead is a bureaucrat's chronicle of the family-planning programme as an administrative project: "For many years now the government of India has pursued a policy of so-called family planning which really boils down to decreasing the birth-rate." He tabulates its budgets plan by plan, describes the training of personnel and the building-up of Family Planning Departments in Delhi and the states, and reports the Sixth Plan's forward target — clinics "where it is planned for 22 million Indians to undergo sterilisation." The single occurrence of the word is a projection of future operations, cited as a neutral planning figure. Of what had actually been done to millions of Indians under that same programme in 1976, there is not a syllable.

The shape of the omission is precise. Petrov's roll-call of five-year plans names the first, second, third, fourth and sixth — every one but the fifth. The Fifth Five-Year Plan (1974–79) is the one that brackets the Emergency, and it is the one plan missing from his account. The narrative of the family-planning programme thus steps neatly from the fourth plan to the sixth, across the exact years in which the programme became a machine for hauling men off the street. This is not the reticence of a demographer who lacked the data. Coercive sterilisation was headline news across the world in 1976; the campaign's collapse and Gandhi's defeat were headline news in 1977; and by the time Petrov's manuscript closed, the Shah Commission had already reported on the abuses in India itself. The absence is a choice.

Reflexivity: the category that never turns toward the ally

This series has learned to test a Soviet book not by how often it condemns coercion or opportunism or Malthusianism, but by whether the category it wields can ever be turned on its own side. Petrov passes the easy half of that test and fails the hard half. He is genuinely, and correctly, against the coercion of the poor in the name of population control — but only when the coercers are Western foundations or the neo-Malthusian conference circuit or the Indian delegates who blame numbers for poverty. When the coercer is the government of India itself, executing precisely the programme his theory indicts, the category shuts off. The critique of coercive population control, sharp in the abstract, never once reaches the actual episode of coercive population control that took place on the ground he is writing about.

The reason is not far to seek, and it is a matter of state rather than of scholarship. India was the Soviet Union's closest

partner in the non-aligned world; the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation had been signed in 1971, and Moscow backed Indira Gandhi's government throughout the Emergency and its sterilisation drive. The Fourth International's press documented that backing as it happened. Intercontinental Press reported in its issue of 21 July 1975 that "Moscow, which hailed Gandhi's June 26 coup, gave its stamp of approval to her economic program as well," and noted that the pro-Moscow Communist Party of India "hailed Gandhi's state of emergency from the very beginning" (19 January 1976). When the Emergency ended and Gandhi was swept from office, the same paper recorded the CPI conceding that it had "overestimated" her "progressive potentiality" (16 May 1977). Petrov's silence is the scholarly form of that alliance. A book that named the sterilisation campaign for what it was would have had to name it as the work of a government the USSR was underwriting — and so the demographer who can see the neo-Malthusians clearly cannot see the bulldozers in Delhi at all.

There is a smaller, parallel blindness worth noting. Petrov refers to China some forty times, always and only as a demographic magnitude — the one country larger than India, the great uncertainty in the world totals. He never once mentions that China had, in 1979–80, launched the other giant coercive population programme of the age, the one-child policy. For a Soviet author writing at the height of the Sino-Soviet quarrel, with every polemical incentive to point at Beijing's compulsion, the omission is striking; but it follows the same logic. To attack China's coercion would have invited the obvious question about India's, and about the Soviet friendships that made one sayable and the other not. Easier to treat both as columns of figures.

The reply that was written at the time

The answer Petrov declined to give had already been given, week by week, in the press of the tradition from which this introduction is written. Where the Soviet demographer left a blank, Intercontinental Press — the Fourth International's English-language weekly, and the outlet of a movement with a long-standing Indian and Ceylonese section — filed the story in full.

On 31 May 1976 it ran the events under the headline "Riot Police Crush Protest Against Forced Sterilization / Muslim Demonstrators Gunned Down in Delhi," and described the mechanism of the "voluntary" programme without euphemism: "The Gandhi regime offered to relocate them only if they underwent 'voluntary' sterilization." A month later, on 28 June

1976, it printed a small report titled "How Indian Authorities Meet Sterilization Quotas," on the town of Barsi in Maharashtra, whose "municipal authorities... met their targeted amount of sterilizations for the week of January 27 to February 3" by having the police drag men off the streets — including one who, protesting that he had already been operated on, "was held down and sterilized once again." When the Emergency fell, the paper of 23 May 1977 summed up what Petrov would eight years later leave out: "Mandatory sterilization was adopted as government policy during former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's two years of emergency rule. As administered by her son, Sanjay, the policy was bitterly opposed and contributed to the former prime minister's recent election defeat" — with more than a million operations recorded in January 1977 alone before the campaign collapsed.

The contrast is the whole point. It is not that a Soviet author could not know these things — a weekly printed in New York knew them contemporaneously and in detail. It is that the anti-Stalinist tradition could name the coercion of the poor whoever committed it, including a government its own Indian comrades were fighting, while the Progress author could name it only where the culprit was a class enemy. Both were against Malthus; only one was against Malthus's methods when a friendly state employed them.

That is where India: Spotlight on Population should be left — credited for the demography and the argument, which are better than the Western orthodoxy they oppose, and convicted of the silence, which is not an oversight but the exact shape a scholar's caution takes when the facts embarrass an ally. The census tables are sound. The chapter on the birth-rate is the one to read against the record, for what it declines to see.

Emotions, Myths and Theories

Not a book about feeling but a treatise on knowledge - the senses against reason, how thought gets into the human head, and emotion as the charge an organism puts on what it perceives.

Viktor Georgievich Panov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

The English title promises a book this is not. *Emotions, Myths and Theories* sounds like a survey of feeling — the sort of volume that would take on William James and Freud and the existentialists and settle accounts with the Western psychology of emotion. It is nothing of the kind. Open it and you find a dense, patient treatise on the theory of knowledge: the ancient quarrel between the senses and reason, sensationalism against rationalism, and the problem that has run under that quarrel since Plato — how does thought get out of the animal and into the human head? The chapters are "A Contribution to the History of an Old Dilemma," "Did Hume Think Animals Perceive the World?", "Time and Space as Objective Entities," "Myths and Logic," "The Social Premises of Reason." Emotions do appear, but as the affective ground of sensory reflection — the positive and negative charge an organism puts on what it perceives — not as the subject. The translator's title fishes three attractive nouns out of a work whose real name says plainly what it is about. The Foreword gives that name: the book is "a revised version of our monograph *The Sensory, Rational, and Experience* published in Russian by the Moscow University Press in 1976."

That sentence is the first thing a reader should hold onto, because it dates the book. The spine and the catalogue say 1985, and the Progress edition is genuinely of that year — commissioned, the Foreword tells us, by the publisher's philosophy department for translation into English and Swedish. But the thought is a decade older. This is a mid-1970s monograph of the Brezhnev academy, lightly revised and exported in a 1985 jacket — and it reads like its real date, not its printing date. The formula "developed socialism," which the Twenty-Seventh Congress of 1986 would quietly retire, is used without embarrassment; there is no Gorbachev, no perestroika, no glasnost, no Chernobyl, nothing that would betray the later 1980s at all. The English citations reach editions printed as late as 1982, but those are the Progress translations of Marx, Engels and Lenin the author happened to quote from; they date the type-setting, not the

argument. What we are reading is the settled dialectical materialism of the Soviet philosophical establishment as it stood before the ground began to move.

Of V. G. Panov the volume itself tells us almost nothing beyond the name on the title page and the Moscow University provenance of the original. He is a professional philosopher of the theory of knowledge, and the book is an academic monograph rather than a party primer: it carries no study questions, no glossary, no numbered topics, none of the apparatus that marks the cadre manuals in this series. It was written for people who already read Kant and Carnap in the original, and it treats them at that level. Whatever else is to be said about it, it should be said with that in view. This is not a pamphlet; it is a serious book by a serious man, and it deserves to be argued with rather than merely exposed.

What the book teaches

The doctrine is the dialectical-materialist theory of reflection, worked out for the specific problem of how rational knowledge arises from sensory knowledge. Panov's starting point is orthodox and, on its own terms, unimpeachable: "the sole source of our knowledge is sensation," in the words of Lenin he quotes and returns to throughout. The whole of Materialism and Empirio-Criticism stands behind the book, and its polemical targets are Lenin's brought up to date — the neopositivists (Carnap, Reichenbach, the Vienna Circle) in the seat once held by the Machists, phenomenology (Husserl) and intuitionism (Bergson) in the seat of idealism, and behind them all the old sceptic, David Hume.

But sensation cannot be the whole story, and here is the dilemma the book is built around. If all knowledge comes from the senses, where do general concepts come from — "tree," "cause," the universal that no eye ever saw? Panov states the trap that has caught every consistent sensationalism with real force. He runs the classic examples: no number of observed white swans licenses "all swans are white"; a flash of lightning followed a thousand times by thunder still cannot guarantee

the thousand-and-first peal. Push sensationalism to the end and you reach Hume's scepticism about causality, and then the modern positivist retreat into probability logic, in which — Panov's phrase, and it is a good one — "the human mind proves doomed to skate about on the surface of events." Push rationalism to the end and you reach an intellect stocked with truths the senses never delivered, which the rationalists could only explain by an innate faculty or, at the limit, by God. Kant's mediating "third term," the productive imagination, is examined at length and credited with seeing the real problem while failing to solve it from subjective-idealist premises.

Panov's own solution is the interesting part, and it is where the book is at its best. The missing middle term between sensation and reason is not in the head at all: it is labour. Man, unlike the animal, does not confront nature directly; he "interacts with nature in an indirect mediated way, putting natural objects that he has altered between himself and nature as an intermediary" — the tool, "second" or "humanised" nature. "A tool is therefore an object that represents 'humanised nature' or a 'subjectivised object'." The tool has a relative self-action: the campfire burns by itself once lit, the axe does its work once swung. In grasping the tool's own activity — foreign to him, external, "alienated" from his own body — primitive man is compelled to form the first mediating representation, and out of that, over immense stretches of time, grows the general concept, the word, the second signalling system, speech. Reason is not a gift of nature to one favoured species; it is precipitated out of social, tool-using practice. Concepts are, in the deepest sense, historical and social products. That is what the two culminating chapters, "The Social Premises of Reason" and "Class and the Human in Socio-Historical Experience," are for.

Two threads that the English title pulls out of the book deserve their own word, because they are genuine and they are good. The first is emotion. Before reason, Panov argues, there is feeling: the living organism evaluates everything it perceives on a single scale — conducive to survival, or hostile to it — and registers the verdict as positive or negative emotion. Emotion is thus the original evaluative background against which mere sensation becomes meaningful, and as tool-using labour transforms "the whole sphere of sensibility, including instincts, emotions, perceptions, sense of needs," feeling is intellectualised along with everything else, until the satisfaction of making a tool or solving a problem can dominate the raw reflexes of pain and hunger. It is a materialist psychology of the emotions in miniature, embedded in an epistemology — which is presumably what the translator reached for in the title, and it is more interesting than the title's

promise of settled scores with the West. The second thread is myth. The chapter "Myths and Logic" treats mythological consciousness not as mere error to be swept away but as a real and necessary stage in the historical formation of reason — the long period, the Foreword says, that man "passed through" before he could construct theoretical models and a scientific picture of the world. That is a genuinely dialectical point and a humane one: it declines to write off pre-scientific thought as simple stupidity and insists it be understood as a stage in a real development. Both threads show the book at its characteristic best — patient, genetic, materialist about mind without being crude about it.

This is a real philosophy, and a good deal of it holds up. The genetic account of concept-formation through tool-mediated labour is not Panov's invention — it belongs to one of the twentieth century's genuinely first-rate intellectual traditions, the Soviet activity theory of Vygotsky, Leontyev and Ilyenkov, the "cultural-historical school" that a companion volume in this series, Karl Levitin's *One Is Not Born a Personality*, portrays from the inside. The thesis those psychologists made famous — that the specifically human mind is built, assembled in the individual out of the signs and tools a culture hands him — is exactly Panov's thesis carried into epistemology, and where the psychologists showed it working in the deaf-blind child learning to think, Panov shows it working in the descent of the concept from the flint. His engagement with the opposition is likewise the real thing and not a set of straw men: he reads Hume seriously enough to take the problem of induction as a problem, quotes Kant and Hegel at length in their own words, and follows Carnap and Reichenbach and even Thomas Kuhn's "normal science" into their own territory. Where so many volumes in this series only characterise the Western thinkers they attack, Panov actually reads them. A reader who wants to know what the best of Soviet philosophy could do when it was doing philosophy rather than liturgy will find it here.

The senses as history — and the silence in it

The root of all this is older and better than the Brezhnev academy, and Panov knows it: it is the young Marx. The chapter "Humanisation of Nature" is Marx's theme under Marx's name, and Panov cites the *Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts* of 1844 directly. It was there that Marx wrote that "the forming of the five senses is a labour of the entire history of the world down to the present" — that even the capacity to perceive is a social and historical acquisition, not a fixed biological endowment. Against every biologism that would

read the mind off the nervous system, and every idealism that would find it already complete in the newborn, this is the materialist charter, and Panov deploys it honestly and well. When he insists that reason is socially conditioned, historically formed, and cannot be understood apart from the collective and its practice, he is standing on solid Marxist ground.

But the 1844 Manuscripts contain a second doctrine bound to the first, and it is here that the book quietly declines to follow its own logic. The senses are formed by labour; and labour, under private property, is alienated — the worker's own activity confronts him as an alien power. Panov has this too, and he uses it with force and precision — against capitalism. In class society, he writes, the collective force of men's own interdependence "was not then separated from them or counterposed to them as an alien force standing above them," but with the division of labour it "now already stood above them as an alienated, mysterious, dominant force," and its personification as political power "was not long in coming." He quotes *The Holy Family* on the mutual self-estrangement of proletariat and bourgeoisie. The analysis is real, and it is turned, unwaveringly, outward — at monopoly capital, at "mass culture," at the wage system, at exploitation.

Turn to the same category and ask it the reflexive question — does the alienated force that "stands above" society still stand above Soviet society? — and the book goes abstract exactly where it had been concrete. Socialism, Panov writes, "is a decisive step toward eliminating alienation," and "for the first time in history the state is becoming the real and not the fictitious representative of the overwhelming majority of the public, and then of the whole nation." The estrangement is not simply declared abolished; that would be cruder than Panov is. He concedes, in a single guarded sentence, that it can return: "Subjectivism in direction of the economy that does not take objective laws into account leads to that force coming out again into the open as a necessity counterposed to people." It is a remarkable admission, and it is left hanging in mid-air as an abstract hazard of bad management — a possible error of "subjectivism," never an existing institution with a name, a payroll and a policy. The category built to name an alien power standing above society is applied to every social formation in history except the one the author is living in.

That is the book's silence, and it is the standard silence of this whole library, appearing here in its most refined form: not a falsified date or a doctored quotation — this is a philosophy book, and it has very little history to falsify — but the refusal to turn its own sharpest instrument on itself. The instrument was made for exactly this cut. The Fourth International's

answer had been in print for half a century, and it uses Panov's own vocabulary. Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) describes a Soviet bureaucracy that, far from withering, "has grown into a hitherto unheard of apparatus of compulsion," "an uncontrolled force dominating the masses"; a stratum that "rises above the new society" and "succeeded in raising itself above society and getting its fate firmly into its own hands" (chapters 3, 5 and 9). That is Panov's "alien force standing above them," reconstituted — not in the capitalist West, but in the state Panov calls the majority's real and no longer fictitious representative. Panov's own concession about "subjectivism in direction of the economy" is the door through which that analysis walks; he opens it a crack and looks away. A reader who takes the book's materialism seriously — as it asks to be taken — is obliged to finish the sentence the author would not, and *The Revolution Betrayed*, above all its chapters 5 and 9 on the Thermidor and on the real social relations of the USSR, is where the finishing has been done.

There is a smaller irony worth marking, because it cuts both ways. Early in the book, defending objective truth against relativism, Panov writes that "the fighters for truth who do not recognise the existence of objective truth in some way attribute the status of universal truth to their own subjective convictions." He means the positivists and the pragmatists. But the sentence is a mirror held up to a state philosophy that had, within living memory of 1976, raised particular Party convictions to the "rank of universal, extra-historical" truth and shot the men who disagreed. Panov's defence of objective, mind-independent truth is philosophically correct and, against the crude relativisms he attacks, entirely welcome. It is also the last doctrine a Soviet philosopher should have wanted examined too closely for its institutional record. The point sharpens a page later, where Panov — again following Materialism and Empirio-Criticism to the letter — dismisses Bogdanov's notion of truth as "socially organised experience," which, he writes, "had nothing in common with the position of historical materialism about the objective character of the operation of the laws of social development." He is right against Bogdanov. But "socially organised experience" is an uncomfortably exact description of a régime in which what counted as true was what the Party had organised society to affirm, and the objective laws Panov invokes against Bogdanov are the same laws his own concession admits "subjectivism in directing the economy" had been violating. The philosophy is sound; it is the standing on it that will not bear weight.

What to keep

None of this is a reason to dismiss the book, and a reader told it were worthless would be badly served. Panov's central achievement is genuine and it is portable: a materialist account of how reason is generated out of social, tool-using labour, developed with real philosophical care and in serious dialogue with the Western philosophy of science. The treatment of the Hume problem, of Kant's productive imagination, and of the neopositivist collapse into an epistemology that skates on the surface of events is worth any philosophy student's time. The rooting of the whole enterprise in the young Marx's 1844 Manuscripts — the senses themselves as a work of history — is the durable core, and it is the same root from which the Vygotsky–Leontyev–Ilyenkov psychology grew, so that this volume and Levitin's belong on the same shelf and illuminate each other. Where Soviet philosophy was doing philosophy, it could be this good.

The book fails only where the whole tradition failed: at the mirror. It possesses, and wields brilliantly, a theory of alienation that explains precisely the society it was written in — a bureaucratic apparatus risen above the producers, appropriating their collective power as an alien force — and it points that theory everywhere but home. Read it, then, for its materialism, which is real; and read it against its one evasion, which is the evasion this series exists to name. The concept that would have let Panov see the state he lived under is in his own hands, on his own pages, borrowed from the same Marx he cites by chapter and verse. He tells us the alien force can return through what he calls subjectivism in directing the economy. He simply neglects to mention that, by 1976, it had never left.

The Contemporary Revolutionary Process

The official theory of world revolution stated whole - the three detachments, the roads of transition, the strategy of alliances - by a senior Soviet theorist, months before the vocabulary was revised out from under him.

Yuri Krasin

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

Yuri Krasin's *The Contemporary Revolutionary Process* carries 1985 on its spine, but the book was finished before the year it announces. Nothing in its eleven essays knows that Konstantin Chernenko would die in March 1985, that a new General Secretary would within weeks begin talking about uskoreniye (acceleration) and then perestroika, or that the Twenty-Seventh Party Congress of February 1986 would revise the very vocabulary Krasin treats as settled. The words perestroika, glasnost and Gorbachev do not appear. The latest Party congress cited anywhere in the volume is the Twenty-Sixth, of 1981, quoted a dozen times as the current word; the most recent source in the apparatus is a 1984 Progress edition of Andropov's speeches. This is a Chernenko-interregnum manuscript in a 1985 jacket, and it reads like one — the last full-dress statement of the CPSU's doctrine of the "world revolutionary process" before the ground moved under it. That timing is not incidental to how the book should be read. It is a summing-up delivered on the eve of the event that would settle its central claim, and it has the serene confidence of a doctrine that does not yet know it is about to be tested.

Krasin was a senior theorist of the Soviet party-academic establishment, a specialist in Lenin's theory of revolution who had spent a career on exactly the questions this book systematises. The volume is not reportage and not polemic in the manner of the anti-Trotsky pamphlets Progress was issuing in the same years — Mikhail Basmanov's *Contemporary Trotskyism*, the Basmanov–Leibzon *Revolutionary Vanguard*. It is the general theory those books presuppose: an attempt to state, at the level of principle, the laws governing revolution in the second half of the twentieth century. Its companion is the 1975 Progress volume *Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and Our Time*, drawn from the same doctrinal well; where that book and Rostislav Ulyanovsky's writing on Asia and Africa work particular regions, Krasin works the architecture. The commission, in other words, was to give the international

communist movement its map of the whole — the definitive account of how the pieces of world revolution fit together, and of who moves them.

The map is worth stating precisely, because its precision is the point at which it can be argued with. For Krasin the revolutionary events of the age — he opens with a genuine roll-call: Chile, the Portuguese Revolution of the Carnations, the Vietnamese victory, Laos, Nicaragua in 1979, El Salvador, the transformations in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia — are not a scatter of separate national dramas but moments of a single process. "For all its diversity, fragmentation and complexity, it is an indivisible and integral process," with "its own inherent objective laws." That process has three great forces: the world socialist system, the working-class movement in the capitalist countries, and the national-liberation movement of the former colonies. And it has a hierarchy. The decisive force, the one that gives the others their scope, is "existing socialism" — the Soviet bloc as a state formation. Krasin is unembarrassed about this. He writes of "the interests of existing socialism as the leading force in the world revolutionary process," and of socialism as "the leading force and the vanguard of the world-wide social revolution." The changing balance between the two state systems is the mainspring; peaceful coexistence is the form the contest takes in the nuclear age; and revolution advances, above all, as the weight of the socialist camp grows.

Follow that logic to its root and you reach the sentence that gives the book away. The "main contradiction of our epoch," Krasin writes, "is, in effect, the shift of the antagonism between labour and capital into the sphere of international and inter-state relations." Read that twice. The class struggle — the conflict between those who work and those who own — has been relocated. It no longer runs primarily through the factory, the street or the ministry of any given country; it runs between two blocs of states, "one of which is backed by the state-organised working class, and the other, by monopoly capital." The proletariat's antagonist is no longer, in the first instance, its own bourgeoisie but a rival government. And the

proletariat's own weapon is, correspondingly, a government: "existing socialism, as the leading progressive force in the basic contradiction of our epoch." What began, in Marx, as the self-emancipation of the exploited has become the foreign policy of a group of states.

This is the hinge on which the whole book turns, and it is worth naming plainly what it costs. Once revolution is defined as the advancing weight of the socialist bloc, the human content of revolution — the exploited acting for themselves — becomes secondary, a variable that the "objective laws" will sort out. Krasin does not hide this; he theorises it. In his account of life inside the bloc, he writes that the development of socialist society proceeds through "dialectical leaps which, however, do not require the substitution of one socioeconomic formation for another," and that "the new ways and means for their resolution" of social contradictions are precisely those "not involving class struggle or social revolution." Inside the leading force of world revolution, in other words, there is no more class struggle and no more revolution. History's motor has been installed in a machine that has switched it off. The exploited of Chile, Salvador and Soweto are to be liberated by the growth of a system whose own defining virtue is that within it nobody struggles against anybody. The doctrine asks the world's workers to invest their emancipation in a state that has declared its own social peace complete.

The Fourth International's tradition had a name for a workers' state whose bureaucracy had made social peace with itself and reoriented its politics around the defence of the existing order, and it had made the argument half a century before Krasin. In *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) Trotsky traced exactly this migration of the revolutionary idea from class to state. "The 'theory' of socialism in one country," he wrote, "already signaled an effort to liberate Soviet foreign policy from the program of international revolution"; and the end point of that effort was a bureaucracy that, "having betrayed the world revolution, but still feeling loyal to it," had directed its chief energies to "neutralizing the bourgeoisie" and dreamed of nothing grander than "an eternal pact of non-aggression between socialism and capitalism." Krasin's peaceful coexistence is that pact, forty-nine years on, elevated from a diplomatic expedient into the master principle of the world revolutionary process. What Trotsky described as a symptom of degeneration, Krasin presents as the crowning achievement of Leninism. The two men are looking at the same thing. They disagree only about whether it is a betrayal or a triumph — and the disagreement is the whole quarrel between the two traditions descended from October.

Here it is worth applying the test that this series applies to every volume: not whether the book uses militant vocabulary — it does, and so did Trotsky — but whether its central category can ever be turned on the author's own side. In Krasin the answer is a clean no. The CPSU appears throughout as the subject that combats opportunism, revisionism and adventurism; it is never once their possible object. The bloc is the actor of history and never the thing acted upon; its "subjective mistakes and miscalculations" are conceded in the abstract but attached to no named decision, no dated event, nothing a reader could check or contest. The word Czechoslovakia does not appear in a book about the world revolutionary process written seventeen years after 1968; Hungary appears only as the name of a country that "carried out" its revolution. A doctrine in which the leading force is by definition beyond criticism is not a theory of history but a theology of one of its institutions — and a theology is falsified not by argument but by events.

The book's treatment of Chile shows the doctrine working on a real case, and it is the sharpest place to test it, because here the theory issues a concrete verdict about a concrete defeat. Krasin returns to Chile repeatedly; the Popular Unity government of 1970–73, overthrown by Pinochet's coup and, in his own honest phrase, "strangled by fascist reaction," is his central laboratory. His reading is unambiguous. The Chilean Communist Party, he writes, adopted a strategy of a multi-stage revolutionary process, "a peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism" — and this was correct. The catastrophe is charged to the left. He quotes Carlos Altamirano, then general secretary of Chile's Socialist Party, who held that the party "sees the revolutionary process as an uninterrupted advance, without stages or premature consolidations within the existing capitalist system," and condemns this as an "ultra-leftist view" that could only produce "an instant break-up of the bourgeois system." The extremists in the Socialist Party, on this account, disorganised the alliance with the middle strata and handed reaction its opening. The strategy that ended in the National Stadium is vindicated; the people who wanted to arm the workers are blamed.

Every element of this is answerable, and was answered — in some cases before Krasin wrote, in one case by the very tradition he indicts. The charge against Altamirano — "uninterrupted advance, without stages," a "leap" over the democratic phase — is word for word the caricature of permanent revolution that Stalinism had aimed at Trotsky since the 1920s, and Trotsky had dismantled it in *The Permanent Revolution* (1930) by pointing out that it describes

nobody's actual position. "The dictatorship of the proletariat," he wrote there, "does not come after the completion of the democratic revolution," but grows out of it "through a number of sharpening social clashes"; his repeated retort to the accusation of skipping stages was simply, "Where is the ignoring of the democratic stage?" The theory of permanent revolution was never a call to leap over democratic tasks; it was an argument about which class would have to carry them out. Krasin, like the polemicists before him, convicts the left of a position it did not hold, and the refutation was sixty years old and in print.

More to the point, the Fourth International's actual reading of Chile was the reverse of Krasin's, and it was published as the events unfolded. Six weeks after the coup, Intercontinental Press laid the defeat not at the door of those who pressed too fast but at that of those who held the masses back: because the task of building a revolutionary party "was not undertaken," it wrote, "because of the treacherous role played by the Social Democrats and above all the Stalinists," "the Chilean workers were thus left disarmed politically." The Popular Unity strategy of legality and gradual advance — the strategy Krasin praises — had, on this reading, kept the workers within a constitutional framework and a faith in the "constitutionalist principles" of the officer corps right up to the morning the officers moved. The disagreement is exact and it is total. For Krasin the workers of Chile were destroyed by an excess of revolutionary impatience; for the tradition this series writes from, they were destroyed by a strategy that disarmed them in the name of not frightening the middle class.

Ernest Mandel had already given that argument its general form, and its most damaging historical precedent, in a text written before any of the events Krasin analyses. In "Peaceful Coexistence and World Revolution," published in the *International Socialist Review* in the spring of 1970 — a full-length treatment of precisely the doctrine Krasin systematises — Mandel walked back through Spain in the 1930s, where the Communist Party had insisted the workers subordinate social revolution to the anti-fascist war: "the CP called upon them to win the war first, and then to complete the revolution. This led to the crushing of the revolution, which could only produce defeat in the war." The formula Krasin recommends for Chile — democratic tasks first, stage by measured stage, socialism deferred to a later and safer moment — is the Spanish formula, and Mandel had already traced where it leads. He had also, in the same essay, named the specific illusion Krasin still trades in: the Soviet expectation of a stable "state of national democracy" in the newly liberated countries, which Mandel argued the actual class dynamics of

the post-colonial world were tearing apart. That the counter-argument was in print, from the pen of the man Soviet publishing treated as the arch-heretic, and that Krasin's book proceeds as though it did not exist, is itself a finding: this is a doctrine that has decided in advance which objections it will hear.

One further mechanism deserves notice, because it recurs across this series and Krasin performs it too. He derives the whole edifice of peaceful coexistence from Lenin, and specifically from the Decree on Peace of 1917. But in the passage where he does so, the words inside the quotation marks are not the doctrine being credited. Lenin is quoted saying that the Bolsheviks are "establishing completely different international relations," and that a transitional epoch has opened "throughout the whole period in which there remain two property systems" — neither of which contains the phrase "peaceful coexistence" or the policy Krasin hangs on it. The pedigree is asserted in Krasin's own voice; the citation, examined, points somewhere else. The Decree on Peace did not use the term, which entered Soviet diplomacy later. This is the same move that recurs whenever these volumes derive a foreign-policy doctrine from Lenin: the quotation marks are produced as evidence, and the thing they are meant to prove is not inside them.

None of this makes the book worthless, and it would be a poor introduction that pretended otherwise. Krasin is a serious writer working at the top of his tradition's capacity, and there are registers in which the book is genuinely honest. Its opening survey of the anti-imperialist struggles of the 1970s is not propaganda; it is an accurate and even generous inventory of real movements — the Carnation Revolution, the Sandinista victory, the Salvadorean insurgency, the southern-African liberation wars — and Krasin names Pol Pot's "bloodstained regime" for what it was and welcomes its overthrow, at a time when this was not a costless thing to write. He quotes at length, and fairly, the Salvadorean Communist leader Schafik Handal on the transitional character of a democratic anti-imperialist power, letting a voice from the actual struggle speak. His insistence that revolution cannot be imported — that socialism "has nothing in common with the vulgar adventurist 'export of revolution' concepts," and that the transformation of any capitalist country "is the business of the working class and the other progressive forces of these countries" — is a real principle, honestly held, and it sits awkwardly against the state-centred logic of the rest of the book in a way that is to Krasin's credit. His rejection of the "spurious North–South face-off" in favour of a class analysis of imperialism is sharper than much of what passed for radical

development theory at the time. And he concedes, of Chile, that the Popular Unity's own economic programme failed to reach the urban middle strata — a genuine self-criticism, even if it is aimed away from the strategic question it should have raised. He closes the whole work with a modesty rare in this literature, presenting his theses as "considerations which remain open for further discussion and deeper analysis." A reader is not asked to despise this book. A reader is asked to notice where its honesty stops.

Where it stops is the leading force. Everything in Krasin's system rests on the durability and momentum of "existing socialism" — on the premise that the socialist bloc is the growing weight that will tip the world's balance and, by growing, carry the exploited everywhere toward liberation. The book was finished around 1984. Within seven years the leading force had ceased to exist. The Soviet Union dissolved, the bloc it anchored dissolved with it, and it did so not under the blows of imperialism but from its own internal exhaustion — the exhaustion of a system that, as Krasin had insisted, no longer generated any internal struggle capable of renewing it. It is not necessary to gloat over this, and it would be cheap to read 1991 back into 1985 as though Krasin should have seen it coming; he could not have, and neither did his opponents predict the date. But the collapse is a verdict of the event on the doctrine, and it fell exactly where the two traditions had located their disagreement. Krasin had staked world revolution on the permanence of the Soviet state and had theorised that state as a place beyond class struggle. Trotsky had argued, in the book this series holds up as the standard, that a workers' state resting on an unaccountable privileged bureaucracy was not a summit but an unstable and provisional formation, liable to be pulled apart by the contradictions it refused to name. When the leading force came apart, it was Krasin's certainty, not Trotsky's warning, that the event refuted.

That is finally what makes *The Contemporary Revolutionary Process* worth reprinting. It is the most lucid available statement of a way of thinking that identified the fate of world revolution with the fate of a group of states — and it was published at the last moment when a serious theorist could still make that identification and believe it settled. Read today, its confidence is its most instructive feature. Here is the doctrine complete, its logic followed to the end, its alternatives dismissed, its verdict on Chile pronounced — and here, standing just outside the frame, is the history that was about to answer it. Krasin asked his readers to trust that the exploited would be freed by the growing weight of an existing state. The century's last decade returned the question to the exploited themselves.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

The American Utopia

Why the most self-consciously pragmatic nation on earth kept producing social dreams - the utopian strain in American thought from the colonies to the counterculture, by a philosopher of Arbatov's institute.

Eduard Batalov

Introduction to the 1985 Edition

Eduard Batalov's *The American Utopia* is one of the more surprising things Progress Publishers put into English in the mid-1980s: a genuine monograph, by a genuine specialist, on a subject most of the export list would not have touched. Batalov was a philosopher on the staff of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies in Moscow — Georgi Arbatov's institute, the closest thing the Soviet Union had to a professional Americanist establishment — and he had already given Progress a serious book on Herbert Marcuse and the New Left (*The Philosophy of Revolt*, 1975) and, with colleagues, a study of American political consciousness. This is not a folder of clippings dressed as a book, of the kind the series usually meets. It is an argument, built out of wide reading in its subject, about why a nation that likes to think of itself as the most hard-headed and pragmatic on earth has in fact been one of the great producers of social dreams.

The English carries 1985 on the spine, and that is the translation date. The text is a little older. Its latest heavy sources are Alvin Toffler's *The Third Wave* (1980) and Daniel Bell writing in 1975; its political present is the Reagan turn — the "shift to the right, recently discussed so much in the West," the moment when "champions of this policy gain control of the government, the way it happened in the United States in the early 1980s." So this is a book of the very early Reagan years, written in Russian around 1981–82 and reaching English readers three or four years later. Nothing in it needs a later date; nothing in it reads like glasnost. It belongs to the last Brezhnev winter, and it is worth reading with that clock in mind.

It is worth asking, too, what a book like this was for. The Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies existed to produce expert knowledge of the American adversary — some of it genuinely serious, some of it the raw material of foreign policy, all of it under the constraint that the knowledge could travel in one direction only. A study of the American utopian imagination sat comfortably inside that mandate: it let a Soviet

scholar demonstrate real command of American culture while arriving, by a sophisticated route, at the reassuring conclusion that American dreaming is the froth on an insoluble contradiction of American capitalism. Unlike much of the export list, this volume is unusually free of the ritual deviation-vocabulary — the drumbeat of "opportunism" and "revisionism" — that fills the Institute's more polemical productions; Batalov's weapon is not denunciation but the calm application of a theory. That is what makes the book effective, and it is also what makes its single exemption so conspicuous. A theory this general, applied this carefully, that nonetheless never once completes the circuit back to the society that funded it, tells you something the polemics conceal: the limit was not the author's competence but the permitted direction of the instrument.

What the book actually covers is broad and, for the most part, competently mapped. Batalov begins with a theoretical chapter — what a utopia is, what functions it serves — and then traces the American utopian tradition across two centuries: the folk utopias of the lower orders and the "official" utopias manufactured at the top; the agrarian dream of a farmers' America; the romantic utopia; the utopian socialism of the nineteenth century and the communitarian experiments it inspired, from Owen's New Harmony through Fourierist phalanxes to Cabet's Icaria; the antiutopia, from Ignatius Donnelly's *Caesar's Column* through Huxley and Orwell; and, at greatest length, what he calls the modern technocratic utopia — the post-industrial and futurological literature of Daniel Bell, John Kenneth Galbraith, Zbigniew Brzezinski, Herman Kahn, B. F. Skinner and Toffler. A closing chapter on "the living utopia" returns to the communes, nineteenth-century and 1960s alike. The reach is real, the sources are read in the original, and a reader who wants a Marxist's guided tour of American social dreaming will find one here.

The engine of the book is the oldest distinction in the tradition: Engels's separation of utopian from scientific socialism. Batalov never lets it out of his hand. A utopia, for him, is an ideal "postulated arbitrarily by consciousness" — "an image (ideal) of the desired (and in this sense, perfect) human

commonwealth." Utopian consciousness is the kind of thinking "oriented on a break with the objective laws governing the operation and development of nature and society, and on arbitrary construction of an ideal." Against this he sets the Marxist procedure, in which the social ideal "should not be simply thought up, even by a good thinker, but deduced from the actual historical development of society" — Marx's insistence, as Batalov puts it, that the ideal be "the image of its necessary state," arising "from the solution of the existing contradictions." The utopian invents his future; the scientific socialist reads it out of the present. This is Engels's argument in *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* (1880), and Batalov applies it with care.

He also applies, and this is the best thing in the book, the corollary that a utopia is never merely a mistake. It is a symptom. "Utopias are coded expressions of social ideals and actual interests of classes, groups and individuals"; to decode a utopia is to read off the real contradiction that produced it and that the utopia exists precisely in order not to resolve. Handled this way, the method is genuinely illuminating, and the chapters on the technocratic utopia are where it pays off. Batalov sees, correctly, that the American futurology of the 1960s and 70s had quietly changed the meaning of the word. The classical utopia projected the stability "of a society which had reached the uppermost limits of perfection"; the technocratic utopia projects something meaner and more revealing — "the stability of a system threatened by disintegration, stability as a means of survival." He catches Galbraith admitting that an organization's overriding goal is "its own survival," and turns it against the whole genre: this is not a dream of the good life but a dream of not collapsing, dressed as one. He is sharp on the class content of the meritocratic promise — the "welfare state" minimum offered in exchange for the surrender of any control over the system's direction — and sharp on the futurologists' habit of transferring power from politicians to "experts" while calling the result freedom, when in it "freedom is not an end... but only a means of maintaining society's rational and effective functioning." When Kahn and Bruce-Briggs paint their post-industrial paradise of two homes and household robots and "little Sally who is sleeping around," Batalov's deflation of it as a bourgeois daydream needs no help. This is real criticism, and where the book does it, it should be credited plainly.

The historical chapters earn their keep as well. Batalov's distinction between the folk utopia of the lower orders and the official utopia "constructed at the top" is a genuinely useful analytic grid, and he lays it over the American material with a

light hand — the Declaration of Independence read as a document whose most stirring clauses were "essentially Utopian," "sharply at variance with the objective trends of capitalist development"; the "American Dream" treated not as propaganda but as a real structure of national feeling with real historical roots in a continent that seemed to promise that "nothing was impossible." His account of the nineteenth-century communitarian experiments — from Owen's New Harmony through the Fourierist phalanxes to Cabet's Icaria — is sober and informed, and he is honest about their fate: the utopian community, in the words of the British Marxist A. L. Morton that Batalov endorses, "may be compared to a bridge, which, when one is on the far side of a river, is a means of crossing it, but which, when once crossed, leads only backwards." He is equally clear-eyed that the modern American utopian socialism of Fromm, Lerner and Michael Harrington is "barren," a retreat from the practicable transformation of capitalist society into moralizing prescription. All of this is competent, and some of it is better than competent. The trouble is never that Batalov cannot think historically about utopia. It is that his history stops at a particular frontier and does not cross it.

It should also be credited for its honesty about its own tradition's ancestors. Batalov does not pretend the utopian socialists were fools. He records Marx and Engels's high regard for Fourier and Saint-Simon; he treats the American communitarians as a serious experiment whose failure taught something. Most striking, he tells on the young Engels. In 1845 Engels had published an enthusiastic notice of the American communist colonies, concluding that "communism... is not only possible but has actually already been realized in many communities in America... with the greatest success." Batalov quotes it in full — and then, quietly, corrects it: Engels's article, he writes, "reflects both insufficiency of information and what a historian has termed 'illusions of previous socialist thought.'" A Soviet author willing to catch Engels believing too easily in a utopia is not a hack. Hold that sentence; we will need it.

Because the book has one enormous blind spot, and it is not an accident of emphasis. It is structural, and it is the reason this volume is worth republishing. The American Utopia is a study of the arbitrary ideal — the promise a society makes about its own future that its real development cannot deliver — written and published by the state that had made the most spectacular such promise of the century, and had just watched it fail. In October 1961 the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU had adopted a new Party Programme that pledged to build the material and technical base of communism "in the main" by

1980, and declared, in a sentence every Soviet citizen of Batalov's generation knew, that the present generation of Soviet people would live under communism. By 1985, when this book appeared in English, 1980 was five years in the past and communism had not arrived. The regime had quietly retired the promise, folding it into the indefinite holding-pattern of "developed socialism." Here, if anywhere, was a utopia in Batalov's exact sense: an ideal "postulated arbitrarily," "at variance with the objective trends," proclaimed by the state as its "necessary state" and then contradicted by the state's own history. It is the perfect specimen for his theory, and it is the one specimen the theory is never allowed to touch.

The avoidance is measurable. In roughly 84,000 words about the illusions societies tell themselves, the phrase "Soviet Union" does not occur. "USSR" occurs once — in the biographical note on the back flap, naming one of Batalov's earlier books. "In our country" never appears. The taxonomy that sorts American dreaming into folk, official, romantic, technocratic, democratic and socialist utopias has no category for a Soviet utopia, official or otherwise, and no line to spare for the possibility that the machinery of "official utopia" he describes so well — the ideal "constructed at the top... by professional ideologists working to fulfill a social order of the officialdom," reflecting "the elite's distinct social status" — might have a Moscow address. The nearest the book comes to Russia is its Conclusion, where Batalov reaches for Lenin's 1912 essay "Two Utopias" to supply his "methodological key." But Lenin there is dissecting the pre-revolutionary utopias of the Narodniks and the liberals — utopia safely quarantined in Tsarist Russia, before October. After October, in Batalov's map of the world, utopia is something only other countries have.

The book's long chapter on the American antiutopia makes the same evasion visible in a second way, because here the mirror is literally in the text and Batalov steadily turns it away from himself. Orwell's 1984 and Huxley's *Brave New World* run through these pages, and Batalov reads them with intelligence — but always as warnings addressed to the West. He is scornful of the Cold War use of Orwell, of the American reader who was told the novel's totalitarian nightmare was "a direct result of attempts to implement the 'communist Utopia,'" and he is right that this was a crude weaponizing of a subtle book. He endorses, approvingly, the American futurologist David Goodman's claim that the "Orwellian world" may be "a natural outcome of the functioning of traditional bourgeois-democratic institutions." He quotes Fromm's afterword warning that "men all over the world will lose their most human qualities, will become soulless automatons," and

Fromm's plea that the American reader not be "smugly certain that the book had nothing to do with" his own society. Every one of these anti-smug applications points outward, at Washington. Not once does Batalov entertain the possibility that a Soviet reader, in 1985, holding a book about doublethink and the manufacture of official happiness, might find the warning pointed rather closer to home — that the "soulless automaton" and the proclaimed paradise had an address he could see from his office window. Fromm's rebuke of smugness is exactly the rebuke the book itself never absorbs.

This is the finding, and it is worth stating as a general property of the series, not a personal failing of one able scholar. The instruments Batalov turns on Bell and Toffler are precise; the question is whether they could ever be turned on the author's own side. They cannot. He can correct Engels's 1845 credulity about a utopia; he cannot mention the 1961 Programme. The category is built to point outward only. That is the reflexivity test this series applies to every volume, and *The American Utopia* fails it about as cleanly as a book can, precisely because it is otherwise so good — the sharper the tool, the louder its refusal to cut in the one direction that matters.

The anti-Stalinist left had drawn exactly this conclusion half a century earlier, and with the same instrument. Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) is, among other things, a demonstration that the Soviet bureaucracy's characteristic product is the official utopia — the proclamation of the ideal as already achieved. Writing of the Stalin Constitution of 1936, which announced that "in the Soviet Union, the principle of socialism is realized," Trotsky called the formula "the lie with which, as a mirror of the ruling stratum, the new constitution is imbued." The mechanism he described is the one Batalov catalogues in others: an ideal detached from the real relations of production, asserted by officialdom, serving to conceal the contradiction it cannot solve. Trotsky even used Batalov's own key word against Batalov's own state. The doctrine of building a completed socialism inside a single backward and encircled country he named, flatly, "the utopian idea of an isolated socialist society." The revolutionary Marxist tradition did not lack the concept of a Soviet utopia. It coined it.

And it did so, crucially, without abandoning the future to the cynics. This is where Trotsky answers not only Batalov's silence but the deeper temptation his book flirts with — the temptation to treat every promise of abundance as a fairy tale. Trotsky insisted on the opposite. Real communism — labor ceasing to be a burden, "the distribution of life's goods, existing in continual abundance" — was no utopia at all; it was

"a really modest perspective," and to call it utopian was, he wrote, "pretty dull-witted." The fraud was never the goal. The fraud was proclaiming the goal reached — announcing paradise in order to sanctify the very inequalities that proved it had not come. By Engels's test, which is also Batalov's, the 1961 Programme was utopian in the strict sense: an ideal thought up and imposed from above, "an arbitrary form in relation to the actual world," rather than deduced from what Soviet society could actually become. Batalov had the definition in his hands and the specimen in his own passport, and the book's whole architecture exists to keep the two apart.

None of this means the book should be read cynically or discarded. That would be the lazy conclusion, and it would waste what is here. Batalov is a real reader of American thought, and *The American Utopia* remains one of the few Soviet studies of its subject with any claim on a serious reader's attention. Its account of the technocratic utopia as a survival-ideology of a system in trouble is a contribution in its own right, one that stands beside the best Western criticism of Bell and Toffler rather than below it. Its treatment of the nineteenth-century communitarian experiments — New Harmony, the Fourierist phalanxes, Icaria — is fair and informed. Even its use of Engels's utopian/scientific distinction is, considered simply as exposition, more careful than most of what the export list produced. Read for what it says about America, the book earns its place. Read for what it cannot say about Russia, it becomes a different and more interesting document: an involuntary self-portrait, in which a Soviet philosopher describes, with real acuity, the exact mechanism by which a ruling stratum manufactures dreams it cannot keep — and never once looks in the mirror he is holding.

The reader who wants the mirror should go to the sources Batalov keeps just out of frame. Engels's *Socialism: Utopian and Scientific* is the short classic statement of the distinction that governs this whole book, and it is worth reading beside Batalov to see how consistently he applies its outward edge and suppresses its reflexive one. Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* is the text that completes the argument — the demonstration that the "official utopia" Batalov finds everywhere in America had, by 1936, a fully developed Soviet form, and that the categories of utopian and scientific cut both ways or they are not scientific at all. Between the two of them they supply the chapter Batalov did not write, and could not have published: the one on the American utopia's Moscow twin.