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REFERENCE

A Dictionary of Scientific Communism

The reference crib for a subject every Soviet student was examined in - 201 entries defining the official vocabulary, and candid enough to call itself a profoundly partisan science.

Aleksei Matveevich Rumyantsev

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

A dictionary makes an unusual polemic, because it does not argue. It assigns. It decides which things in the world are things at all — which deserve a headword, a definition, a settled meaning — and it presents the result as the furniture of reality rather than as a position taken. That is precisely what makes this book worth reading now. A Dictionary of Scientific Communism contains 201 entries and 158,780 words, and almost nothing in it is a lie of the simple sort. The falsification is in the architecture.

The Russian original, *Nauchny kommunizm: Slovar*, appears in this edition's imprint under the editorship of A. M. Rumyantsev — an economist and Academy of Sciences figure who had edited *Problems of Peace and Socialism* and, briefly and unhappily, *Pravda*, and who was associated with the more permissive end of the apparatus rather than its hard core. The volume is not the work of a hack. It is a committee product of the Soviet academic establishment at the top of its form, and it is competent at what it sets out to do.

The date on the spine is the date of the text. The copyright page carries no printing history and the book names no earlier edition; the latest events it cites are the Political Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty member-countries at Prague in January 1983 and the 1983 Law on Work Collectives. Nothing later than 1983 appears anywhere in it. This is a book composed in Andropov's fifteen months and issued in Chernenko's.

What it sets out to do requires explaining, because "scientific communism" was not a literary genre but an institution. From the early 1960s it was a compulsory subject in every Soviet higher-education establishment: engineers, doctors, agronomists and philologists all sat examinations in it. It had chairs, departments, dissertation councils and career ladders. The book's own entry under that headword gives the official self-description — a science with "its own laws and categories", the "most closely and immediately connected with the practical revolutionary struggle" of the three components

of Marxism-Leninism — and then, with real candour about its own character, adds that it is "a profoundly partisan science". This is the crib for a nationwide curriculum, exported in English for foreign students, Western communist parties and sympathetic libraries. Read it as a syllabus and it becomes legible.

Now the architecture. There are no biographical entries at all — no persons among the headwords. That decision does a great deal of work. Lenin is named 408 times across the text; Trotsky twenty-one, nearly all of them inside a single hostile entry; Stalin five. Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko are named nowhere in the book. History has agents in this dictionary only when they are safe.

Test the same architecture against events. There is no entry for collectivisation; the subject is dissolved into "Agricultural Co-operation", which reports that "the most acceptable form proved to be the agricultural artel" and dates its dominance from 1933. The word famine does not appear in the book. Neither does Gulag, Bukharin, Kronstadt, Left Opposition, Luxemburg or Yugoslavia — each checked against the scanner-damage variants that make a mangled name return zero exactly like an absent one, and each surviving the check. Purge appears once, and refers to the Comintern's 1924 decision to purge its member parties of right and "left" elements. Workers' self-management does not occur in the book in any form — a striking absence in a volume whose closest equivalent headword, "Communist Social Self-government", places genuine self-administration safely at the far end of the communist future, after "a new individual" has been "shaped".

Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968 appear as dated events once each, jointly, in the entry on "Counter-revolution", as cases where counter-revolution, "with the support of revisionist and nationalistic elements", posed "a serious threat even for a consolidated new system". Undated, they recur as things that were stopped: "Defence of the Socialist Homeland" records that Soviet efforts "prevented the restoration of capitalism in Hungary and the reprisal against revolutionary

Cuba, and curbed the 'quiet counter-revolution' in Czechoslovakia". Prevented and curbed by nobody in particular. No army crosses a border in this book. Eurocommunism has no entry either: it surfaces in a single subordinate clause in "Revisionism", attached to the French communist Jean Ellenstein.

The most consequential silence is on the years 1936–38, and here the book does speak — in a sentence readers should sit with. Under "Complete and Final Victory of Socialism": "Socialist changes during the second five-year-plan period (1933–37) established socialist production relations throughout the national economy and eliminated the internal forces that wanted to restore capitalism." That is the Terror, rendered as a change in production relations. The string 1937 occurs nowhere in the book. The book's one direct treatment of the period comes under "Personality Cult", at 593 words — shorter than its entry on Aesthetic Education, shorter than its entry on Futurology, and well below the median entry length of 787 words. Stalin, it says, "did a great service to the building of socialism in the USSR"; his cult showed itself in "uncalled-for repressions and other violations of socialist legality, which damaged Soviet society"; and then the closing of the file: "These distortions, though quite serious, did not modify the nature of socialist society or shatter the foundations of socialism in the USSR." No number is given, no institution named, no trial described. The Twentieth Congress is not mentioned in the entry — its single appearance anywhere in the book is inside "Revisionism", where the criticism of Stalin's cult figures not as a reckoning but as an occasion that emboldened revisionists.

There is one place where the aftermath is allowed a particular. Under "National Relations Under Socialism", the denunciation of the cult is credited with "restoration of national autonomy for the Balkars, Ingushes, Kalmyks, Karachais and Chechens". Five deported nations are named. The deportations are not. The reader who does not already know what happened to those peoples in 1943 and 1944 will not learn it here, and will not be given a word for which to look.

The entry on "Bureaucracy" is the keystone, and it is worth reading closely because it is where the book must protect itself. Bureaucracy is defined as a class phenomenon of exploiting societies; "the most developed B. appears in capitalist society"; Lenin is quoted to the effect that it is "purely and exclusively a bourgeois institution". Under socialism only "vestiges" remain, and the remedies proposed are the ones an apparatus proposes for itself: clearer delineation of functions, less redundancy, and — per the

decisions of the 24th, 25th and 26th congresses — "modern means and methods of management (including computers, automated systems, etc)". A theory of bureaucracy that cannot locate a bureaucracy in the Soviet Union is not a theory; it is an alibi. And it is the alibi on which everything else in the volume depends, because once a privileged administrative stratum is admitted to exist, the entries on "Democracy, Socialist", "State of the Whole People" and "Criticism and Self-criticism" have to be rewritten.

The doubling around Trotsky is the clearest single demonstration that the dictionary knows what it is doing. "Uninterrupted Revolution" treats the idea of revolution in permanence as authentically Marx's and Engels's, quotes the 1850 Address to the Communist League with approval, reports Lenin's "We stand for uninterrupted revolution", and says that "a formal approach to this concept made a caricature of it" in Trotsky. "Trotskyism" then describes Trotsky's version of the same idea as "plagiarising" it. The entry is 1,000 words of hostility, but it is also the most informative thing in the book about the tradition it attacks, and it gives away more than it means to: that the Fourth International was founded in 1938, that it holds the socialist states to be "workers' states", some degenerated and others degenerating, that its opponents number "seven rival international groupings", that "in the second half of the 1970s, a reformist trend began to gain strength". One claim is a straightforward falsification and should be named: that Trotskyism "denied the liberation character of the struggle against fascism". It did not. It refused the subordination of workers' organisations to Allied war aims, which is a different proposition, and one the reader is not permitted to see stated.

The Trotskyism entry opens with the sentence on which the classification system in this whole vocabulary turns:

Trotskyism is a petty-bourgeois opportunist current in ideology and politics which is hostile to Marxism-Leninism and shrouds its opportunism with radical leftist phraseology.

Two things should be said about that sentence, and a dictionary is the only kind of book in which they can be said cleanly, because a dictionary has to define its terms in the abstract, with no named opponent to hide the definition behind.

The first is that nothing in it is an act. It is entirely an essence — a current, in ideology and politics, which is hostile. Compare the same word in the hands of the organisation being

described. The Tenth World Congress documents of the Fourth International, printed in full in Intercontinental Press on 23 December 1974, denounce "the ultraopportunist policy of the CPI and the CPI(M) — a policy of governmental collaboration, alliance with the possessing classes and their parties, repression of popular movements, use of violence against other tendencies of the workers movement". (Two notes on that reading. The scan of the issue breaks words across its column gutters and prints CPI for CPI and violence for violence; those are the scanner's marks, not the drafters', and they are corrected here. The printed text also glosses each abbreviation in square brackets — "the CPI [Communist party of India] and the CPI(M) [Communist party of India (Marxist)]" — and the glosses are dropped above.) That is a named organisation, in a named country, doing four named things, any of which could be shown not to have happened. The dictionary's sentence names nothing that could be checked. Worse, it inoculates itself: the clause "shrouds its opportunism with radical leftist phraseology" disposes in advance of the one observation a reader might make against it, which is that the accused sound more revolutionary than the accuser. Sounding revolutionary is converted into further evidence of the charge. In a polemic that might be carelessness. In a dictionary it is a design decision, and the whole entry is built on it.

It is worth being exact about what this does and does not show, because the obvious version of the argument is wrong. It is not a point about how often the word is used. Progress Publishers' own Lenin reader Marx — Engels — Marxism — a volume in this same catalogue — uses opportunism 111 times in 175,563 words, four times the rate across the Progress list and well above the rate in this dictionary. Lenin was not more ritualistic than the people who came after him. He simply had more opponents he was willing to name. In that book the word arrives attached to persons — Kautsky is named more than 130 times, alongside Hilferding, Martov and "the O.C.-ists" — and to a described act: "the opportunists (Social-chauvinists) are working hand in hand with the imperialist bourgeoisie precisely towards creating an imperialist Europe". A reader can go and see whether that is true. There is nothing in the dictionary's definition that a reader could go and see.

The second question is the harder one, and it is the one worth putting to any book of this kind: could the category, as this book defines it, ever be turned on the author's own side? Read the definitions and it very nearly could. "Opportunism" — at 318 words the third-shortest substantive entry in the whole dictionary, against a median of 787 — is "adaptation of the policy and ideology of the working-class movement to the

interests and needs of nonproletarian" strata, and, we are told, "is usually associated with revisionism (q.v.) or dogmatism (q.v.)". "Dogmatism" is "a theoretical postulate of all kinds of opportunist distortions", and — this is the sentence that matters — "as a rule, D. is connected with the personality cult (q. v.) and canonisation of statements uttered by a particular theorist". Follow the cross-references the dictionary itself supplies, in the direction it points them, and you go from opportunism to dogmatism to the personality cult; and the only personality cult the book names is Stalin's, in the CPSU, for a quarter of a century. Every link in that chain is the dictionary's own, and it is one step from a conclusion it never draws and cannot draw: that the ruling party of the Soviet Union falls under its own headword.

Everywhere else the definitions are wired to prevent that. "Revisionism", the longest of the deviation entries, states its social aetiology in the second paragraph: "R. is engendered by the economic and socio-political conditions of imperialism", with the labour aristocracy as its social basis — so the disease is produced outside the socialist countries by definition, and can only be imported. There is no headword for sectarianism at all, although the word is used ten times; there is no headword for the state as such. Where the book comes closest to admitting the thing in its own house, it turns outward in the same sentence: the entry on "Violence (Coercion)" warns that "if education, persuasion, and organisation are replaced by bureaucratic administration and coercion, by V., while democratic principles are violated (see Personality Cult), the cause of socialism is seriously damaged" — and then immediately explains that the movement "struggles against opportunist, revisionist concepts". "Survivals of the Past in the People's Minds and Behaviour" concedes "violations of socialist legality, deviations from the principles of socialist democracy, excessive administration by injunction" — as survivals, that is, as residue of an older society rather than a product of this one. And "Criticism and Self-criticism", 1,016 words on the method by which a socialist society is supposed to correct itself, contains the sentence that governs the entire apparatus: "The Communist Party and the socialist state only support criticism that helps society advance along the path of progress and successfully tackle the tasks that arise." Criticism is licensed by its result. There is no instance anywhere in the volume of the CPSU standing as the object of any of these categories rather than as the force combating them. The Fourth International's congress documents, by contrast, record a section's dated self-criticism — "The POR accepted that criticism in its self-criticism of April 1, 1972" — and warn of petty-bourgeois pressures transmitted "into the Fourth International itself". That is the difference, and it is not a

difference about the word.

There is a second, blunter consequence of the same design. "Left"-wing opportunism, we are told, is "now represented by Trotskyism" — on the international scene, by Trotskyism and nothing else. This is a Soviet reference work published in 1984. Mao does not appear in it. Neither does Maoism, Peking or Tito; China occurs once, describing egalitarian land use in ancient rural communities. The largest split in the history of the communist movement, twenty years old and still running, has been removed from the vocabulary altogether, and the whole category has been left to a tendency the same entry dismisses as "small groups standing outside the organised working-class movement". The classification is not a description of the world. It is a seating plan.

None of this means the volume is worthless, and it would be dishonest to imply it. The entries on the history of the workers' movement are, on the whole, careful and usable. "First International", "Second International", "Paris Commune" and "Popular Front" are sober narrative history with accurate dates and real quotation, and the Commune entry in particular is a good short account of the concrete measures of March–May 1871. The entry on the Third International concedes error: at the Sixth Congress of 1928 "a certain deviation to sectarianism and political doctrinairism" appeared, and the slogan "Class Against Class!" "sometimes amounted, in fact, to an underestimation of the importance of working-class unity of action". That is the Third Period admitted, in the official voice, and it is more than one expects. The same entry then narrates the dissolution of the Comintern straightforwardly — "In May 1943 the Presidium of the C.I. Executive Committee adopted a resolution on dissolving C.I." — and quotes the resolution's own reasoning, that the 1919 organisational form "gradually outlived itself as the movement expanded and its tasks in individual countries became more complicated". It offers no view on what else was happening in May 1943, and it does not need to; the reader who wants the wartime diplomacy will look elsewhere. But the entry does not suppress the event, and an earlier reading of this book which said it did was wrong.

The book is also, read against the grain, an excellent map — the best short one available in English — of what the Soviet state wanted taught in its final pre-Gorbachev year. Nearly 4,700 words go to the three peace entries — "Struggle for Peace" alone is the longest in the book at 2,209 words, nearly four times the length of the entry on Stalin's crimes — which is the Euromissile crisis speaking through the curriculum. This is doctrine being set hard at exactly the moment it was about to fail, and its confidence is part of the historical evidence.

The reply existed, and was in print in the same years. Ernest Mandel had argued the case for soviet democracy against the Twenty-Fifth Congress directly in "Brezhnev and Soviet Democracy" (Intercontinental Press, vol. 14 no. 14, 12 April 1976) and at greater length in "The Fight for Soviet Democracy in the USSR" (vol. 14 no. 34, 13 September 1976); his review of Rudolf Bahro's *The Alternative*, "A Powerful Case Against Bureaucratism" (vol. 15 no. 39, 24 October 1977), traces the East European analysis of bureaucracy from Djilas through Kuroń and Modzelewski to Bahro — the literature this dictionary was written to make unnecessary. And in the very month this volume was circulating, Cyril Smuga's "Workers pay for bureaucracy's 'economic reform'" (International Viewpoint 50, April 1984) reported the Polish state of war and what it had been for: the reform plan of 1982, he wrote, was meant to divert the workers from aspirations "expressed in the spontaneous development of the self-management movement during 1981". Poland is named five times in this dictionary — as a people's democracy, as a country with apartment-block committees, as a place where the Catholic Church impeded the cultural revolution. Solidarność is not named once, and neither is the movement Smuga is describing. The dictionary has no word for it. That is the finding.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

A New Information Order or Psychological Warfare?

The Soviet and non-aligned case for a New World Information Order - news concentration, the UNESCO debates, the MacBride report - written weeks before the United States announced it was leaving UNESCO over exactly this.

Aleksandr Alekseevich Grachev and Nikolai Yermoshkin

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

This book went to press at the exact moment its subject came to a head. On 29 December 1983 the United States gave formal notice that it would leave UNESCO at the end of 1984, and the immediate cause was the fight this book is about: the campaign, carried by the non-aligned states and backed by the Soviet bloc, for a New World Information and Communication Order. Britain gave notice a year after that and left at the end of 1985. Our text does not know this. In its chapter "The War Against UNESCO" the American exit is still a menace on a list — "threats of sanctions, almost a blockade (this form of dialogue with the world is a favorite with U.S. Presidents), an end of U.S. contributions to the UNESCO budget and even U.S. withdrawal from the organization." A book written a month later could not have written that sentence.

That is the best evidence we have for the date of the text, because the copyright page did not survive into our copy. What remains of the front matter gives Moscow, a translator (Dmitry Beliaevsky), a designer (Vadim Novikov) and no author at all; whoever wrote it cannot be recovered from the volume we hold, and this introduction will not guess. Nor does the imprint statement survive — the seven occurrences of "Progress Publishers" in the text are all footnotes to the English Collected Works of Lenin and Marx, not the book's own colophon. It is an anonymous book, which for its purposes is the point: it speaks in the voice of a position rather than a person. Nothing in the internal evidence contradicts a manuscript closed in the second half of 1983 and published in English in 1984. The latest datable events are all from that year: Pravda of 4 May 1983, the January 1983 Warsaw Pact conference in Prague, the February 1983 announcement of what Washington called Project Democracy, and the 1983 USIA budget of 640 million dollars. Yuri Andropov is quoted as living General Secretary; he died on 9 February 1984. Grenada appears once, in an appended document from October 1981, as a revolution to be defended — the American invasion of 25 October 1983 is nowhere. One year token looks later

than 1983: an Organisation of African Unity session dated "24 to 27 June 1987". That is scanner damage for 1981, the year of the OAU's eighteenth ordinary session, and it is not evidence of anything.

So: an Andropov-era book, written in the last winter of détente and published in English just as the thing it warned of was happening.

Begin with what is true in it, because a good deal is, and the criticism that follows is worth nothing if this part is fudged.

The core factual case is sound and was sound. In the early 1980s four Western agencies — AP, UPI, Reuters and Agence France-Presse — did supply the overwhelming majority of international news consumed in Asia, Africa and Latin America. The book's estimate that "almost 80 per cent of the information disseminated in capitalist and developing countries originates in the four largest bourgeois news agencies" is of the right order, and its opening image — a Latin American reader for whom six stories in ten come from those four wires — is not invented for the occasion. It was the kind of finding the UNESCO-sponsored studies of the 1970s kept producing, and it was what made the non-aligned demand a demand rather than a grievance. The asymmetry it describes, "the flow of information from developed capitalist nations to Asian, African and Latin American countries, where the majority of mankind lives, is 100 times the amount of news going in the opposite direction," is a contemporary estimate rather than a measurement, and the book does not pretend otherwise, but the direction and the order of magnitude were not in dispute among people who studied it.

Better still are the concrete instances, which are the parts of the book a reader will remember. Telecommunications inherited whole from the colonial cable network: "The Ivory Coast can call Zaire only via the Paris telephone network; a call from Kenya to neighboring Tanzania is routed through London; and a call from Bolivia to neighboring Paraguay, via New York." The price of a newspaper measured in labour — an annual

subscription costs a teacher in Bombay "the money he earns in 23 days". Eight African countries publishing no newspaper at all; thirty Asian and African countries with no television. And a formulation that earns its keep: "Now, the teletypes of Western news agencies serve the aims gunboats used to serve in the imperial era."

The book is also careful, by the standards of the genre, about where it got things. It works from Herbert Schiller, from Rita Cruise O'Brien's Sussex paper, from the UNESCO report Television Traffic — a One-Way Street?, from Christopher Nascimento, Guyana's Minister of Information. Its account of the diplomatic sequence — the Ljubljana symposium of 1968, the Montreal experts' conference of 1969, the Byelorussian draft resolution at the 16th General Conference in 1970, the Colombo summit of 1976, the 1978 Mass Media Declaration, the MacBride Commission, the Talloires Declaration of May 1981 by which the Western agencies declared war on the whole project — is a usable chronology, and one that most Western accounts of the same years simply omitted. It quotes the other side at length and in its own words, including a long passage, taken from Intermedia of March 1981, from a speaker it identifies as Sarah Goddard Power, US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Human Rights and Social Affairs, laying out with unusual frankness what was at stake for the United States: that restrictions on the cross-border flow of images and data "would seriously handicap AP (Associated Press), UPI (United Press International) and other news services, as well as IBM and the hundreds of other US-based multinational corporations", the information industry being "the second largest export enterprise in the United States". That is the sort of quotation that does the arguing for you, and the book was right to find it.

Its account of American state propaganda is likewise substantially accurate. Project Truth was authorised by the National Security Council in August 1981; Charles Wick did testify to the House Foreign Affairs Committee on 17 March 1982; the parallel the book draws with Truman's "Campaign of Truth" of April 1950 is a real parallel and a good one. Nobody serious now denies that the Voice of America, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were instruments of American foreign policy, or that the CIA had worked through journalists.

None of that is what is wrong with this book. What is wrong with it is a single, structural thing, and the book is an unusually pure specimen of it because its whole subject is who controls information and who is denied the right to answer back.

Count the word censor in these 57,709 words. It occurs once. It is used of the Governor-General of India, who in 1780 obstructed the circulation of The Bengal Gazette. Jamming occurs zero times. Samizdat, zero. Glavlit — the Chief Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs, the body that actually decided what could be printed in the Soviet Union, and which was operating throughout the writing of this book — zero. These are not scanning artefacts. The scan of this volume is damaged in the ordinary ways — it prints an OAU session of 1981 as 1987, and "dictatorship" for dictatorship — so each absence was tested against the transliterations and character substitutions this corpus is known to produce. They survive all of them.

Radio Liberty is named five times, Radio Free Europe eight, the Voice of America nine. The book has a chapter called "The Radio Armaments Race". It records, precisely, that after 13 December 1981 the Voice of America raised its Polish output from two and a half to five hours a day. It never mentions that the Soviet Union was jamming these stations — which it had resumed doing in August 1980, over Poland, and was doing continuously as the manuscript was written. A reader is invited to be indignant that the signal is transmitted and is not told that it is being blocked.

The Helsinki Final Act is the sharpest case, because here the book does not keep silent — it makes a claim, and the claim is checkable. Helsinki is invoked thirteen times, always as a shield: the signatories undertook not to interfere in one another's internal affairs, therefore Western broadcasting is unlawful. But the Final Act's third basket also commits its signatories to information, and to the book's credit it says so. It reports accurately that the conference "agreed to aid in a broader and freer dissemination of all types of information", and it summarises the section on "Improvement of Working Conditions for Journalists" — "an accord on favorable treatment of journalists' visas, freer permission of trips around the host country, freer direct access to representatives of organizations and official agencies, journalists' right to import the technical equipment necessary for the performance of their professional duties". Then it states the conclusion: "The Soviet Union has taken specific steps in this direction, in full accordance with the decisions of the European Conference... The Soviet Union and other socialist countries implement these accords in an exemplary fashion."

Not one instance is given. The claim is made in the same book that has just spent a hundred and fifty pages demonstrating, case by named case, that Western declarations of press freedom are contradicted by Western practice. The method is

applied outward with real rigour and inward not at all.

And when the book turns to the Soviet press directly, the category it has been prosecuting throughout simply changes its name. Soviet media, it says, are not "free from social responsibility": "The Soviet Union has banned the propaganda of war, racial and ethnic hatred, immorality and violence, as well as slander of the Soviet social and state system." The first four items are the sort of restriction most legal systems recognise. The fifth is not like them. "Slander of the Soviet social and state system" was not a metaphor; it was the substance of Article 190-1 of the RSFSR Criminal Code, and of Article 70 above it, under which people went to camps and to psychiatric hospitals throughout the years this book covers. The book states the rule and does not state that anyone is punished under it. In the same passage it derives Soviet press freedom from the 1977 Constitution's guarantee of "broad dissemination of information".

The general principle appears a few pages earlier, and it is the whole book in a sentence: "States are entitled to restrict access to their territories of information which contains ideas condemned by the international community." Written by an author in a state that had recently barred the entry of a great deal of information, and who nowhere applies the word censorship to that act.

This is the test worth putting to any volume in this series, and it is not a test about vocabulary. Progress authors are perfectly capable of admitting that their own side made mistakes; several books in this catalogue do. What never happens is that the category turns inward. Error is admissible; the classification is not. Across this catalogue as a whole, ninety passages place the language of opportunism within a few lines of "the CPSU" or "our Party", and in every one the Party is the subject combating it, never the object of the charge. This book contains the word opportunism not once — its classifier is different, its subject being different — but the shape is identical. Monopoly control of the means of information, denial of access, the manufacture of consent, the propaganda blockade: every one of these is a real thing that the book describes accurately, and not one of them is ever a thing that a socialist state might do.

Two specific falsifications should be named, because generalities are cheap.

In the chapter "The Propaganda Blockade" the book prints a list of what it calls manufactured news about Afghanistan. The last item on the list is: "Soviet army officers took part in the

execution of over 1,000 civilians in the Afghan village of Kerala." Whether Soviet officers were present at Kerala, in Kunar province, on 20 April 1979 has been argued about. That something on that scale happened there has not been seriously argued about since; it is among the best-attested massacres of the war, reported by survivors who reached Pakistan, and it was carried out by the Afghan government's own forces some months before the Soviet entry. The book's technique is to quote the claim in its most contestable form — the participation of Soviet officers — and dispose of the event by disposing of the clause.

The same list contains "chemical weapons used by the Soviets in Afghanistan" and "toxic agents used by the Vietnamese in Kampuchea", and here honesty requires a concession. The "yellow rain" allegation was a genuine American overclaim, and the scientific case against it — that the samples were largely bee faeces — was made and has held. The book is closer to right on that item than its critics were. But it sits in the same list as an item about which the book is flatly wrong, and elsewhere the book denies the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak of April 1979 as another Western invention, "some 'bacteriological weapons accident in the Urals'". That accident happened, at a military microbiology facility, and the Soviet state maintained the denial for thirteen more years. The list makes no distinction between the fabrication and the fact, because its sorting principle is not evidential.

The second is a silence, and it meets the strict condition: the author had the fact, had a reason to use it, and did not. Martial law in Poland is named twice, both times dated exactly to 13 December 1981, and both times only as the occasion for an increase in Western broadcasting. What martial law did to the Polish press — the suspension of publication across the board, the re-licensing of journalists that removed a substantial part of the profession, the internment of editors, the closure of *Solidarność's* own papers — does not appear. This is a book about the right of a people to inform itself, written by someone tracking Polish media week by week closely enough to know the Voice of America's Polish schedule to the half-hour.

What did the other tradition say? Here the honest answer is uncomfortable, and it should be printed before anything else, because it cuts against this introduction as much as against the book.

It said almost nothing. Intercontinental Press ran weekly from 1968 to August 1986 — the whole life of the New World Information and Communication Order, from Ljubljana to the American exit — and across all 763 issues there is no article

on UNESCO as a political arena, none on the MacBride Commission or its 1980 report, none on the American or British withdrawal, and no sustained critique of the four agencies. Seán MacBride turns up a handful of times and always in his other capacities — chairman of Amnesty, United Nations Commissioner for Namibia, member of an investigative team sent to North Vietnam — never once as chairman of the commission that bears his name. Herbert Schiller, the author this book leans on hardest, appears nowhere in Intercontinental Press or in International Viewpoint; every "Schiller" in the archive is Karl Schiller, the West German finance minister, or an American publicist of the same name. The plainest measure is the endgame itself: across 1983 to 1986, the years of the American withdrawal, UNESCO is mentioned thirteen times in the whole paper, and every one of the thirteen is incidental — a source of literacy statistics, an aid donor, a name in a list of agencies. Not one is about the fight. The French review *Quatrième Internationale*, publishing across 1983–85 in exactly these years, is equally silent: no UNESCO, no MacBride, no NOMIC, no Schiller in 1.17 million words. So the silence is not an artefact of one review or one language.

In the entire archive there is a single reference to the demand itself, and it is not in our own voice. It is Maurice Bishop, speaking in solidarity on 3 November 1981 and printed in Intercontinental Press vol. 19 no. 47, 21 December 1981, under the title "Grenada Is Not Alone": informing the world about his revolution "is part of the broad struggle against the imperialist, monopoly control of the media and for a new world information order." A Caribbean revolutionary said it; the paper printed his speech; nobody took up the argument.

And in the same eighteen years that paper covered Soviet and East European control of information continuously and in detail. That asymmetry is the finding, and it runs both ways: the book was written to deflect precisely the subject our tradition pursued, and our tradition never engaged the subject the book was right about.

Take the reply the book's own chapters invite. Against "The Radio Armaments Race" — pages of accurate complaint about the Voice of America and Radio Liberty, with no mention of jamming — set Pyotr Grigorenko's open letter to the French, Italian and British Communist Parties, carried by the Fourth International's *Inprecor* and reprinted in Intercontinental Press vol. 15 no. 29, 1 August 1977. Grigorenko is writing to Western Communists as a Soviet Communist: "the only sources of information we have are the BBC, the Voice of America, Radio Liberty, and other radio stations of this type.

But these are jammed. Yes, dear comrades, they are jammed... The country is covered with jamming equipment. But look in the budget for the record of the funds spent on this." That is the missing half of our book's chapter, published seven years before it, by a man who had been held in a special psychiatric hospital for saying so.

Against the claim that the socialist countries implement the Helsinki accords "in an exemplary fashion", set Gerry Foley's interview with Paweł Bąkowski of the Polish Workers' Defence Committee, Intercontinental Press vol. 16 no. 30, 31 July 1978. Bąkowski describes the Third Basket working exactly as far as it was allowed to: "On the basis of the Third Basket of the Helsinki Agreements, International Press clubs have been opened in many places, where you can find Newsweek, Time, l'Humanité, and so on. But strangely in the last two years I have not seen one article about Poland." When the Italian party's *l'Unità* wrote about Poland, he says, that issue did not appear. And in the universities, "all books in Polish published abroad are forbidden, as are books by writers that the government claims are enemies of People's Poland." (The scan renders books as hooks and but as hut — the b→h fault that runs through this archive; corrected here.)

And on Poland itself, where our book has its most conspicuous silence, the archive is dense. Four months before martial law, a Solidarity organiser interviewed in vol. 19 no. 30, 24 August 1981, explains what the government's draft censorship bill was for: it "is heading toward censorship of union bulletins. Solidarity says that censorship of the union bulletins would be the beginning of the end of the free trade union, because all the independent publications of the union are one of the most important accomplishments of the union." When the coup came, the Bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International issued a statement on 17 December 1981 — printed in vol. 20 no. 1, 18 January 1982 — listing among the counter-revolution's aims the "abolition of the free and uncensored working-class press". Ten months into martial law the paper reported that some 1,700 underground bulletins and newspapers were being published, and that several union radio stations were still broadcasting (vol. 20 no. 32, 18 October 1982). The Polish press did not stop; it went under the floor, and the count of it exists.

The sharpest item of all comes two years after our book, and it makes the argument from inside. In January 1986 Intercontinental Press printed the text of Yevgeny Yevtushenko's speech to the Soviet Writers' Congress with the passages the censors had cut set in italics (vol. 24 no. 1, 13 January 1986). One of the cut passages is this book's thesis

turned around: "How long are we going to go on helping all those foreign Maria Alekseyevnas who happily concoct at least half their poisonous radio menus from things that we hide and hush up? A nation that allows itself to analyze its own mistakes and tragedies bravely knocks the ideological weapon out of its enemies' hands, for it is spiritually invincible." A Soviet poet told a Soviet audience that concealment is what feeds the foreign broadcasters — the very broadcasters our book devotes a chapter to — and the censors cut the sentence in which he said it. There is no more exact demonstration available of what was wrong with the book's argument, and it was produced by the system the book was defending.

Two things complicate this, and they belong in the record. First, on the largest information event of the year the book went to press, our tradition and this book converge. *Intercontinental Press* vol. 21 no. 17, 19 September 1983, led with Steve Wattenmaker's "Korean jet uproar: U.S. launches anti-Soviet propaganda barrage", which reads much like a chapter of the volume in your hands — Washington "manipulating the air disaster", the Western press repeating the official account "without hesitation", the facts beginning to undermine the case. Second, the archive's hardest attack on Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty is not the cultural-imperialism argument this book makes but a documentary one: that the stations employed men who had governed the German puppet administration in Byelorussia, among them Stanislaw Stankievich, who in 1941 "ordered the police to round up the city's 6,500 Jews and kill them all in one day, which they did" (vol. 20 no. 22, 14 June 1982). Where our tradition hit these stations hardest, it hit them with names and dates. That is the difference the reflexivity test is really measuring, and it is a difference of method rather than of side.

But the argument this book needs answering had been answered, in its strongest form, forty-six years earlier and in exactly the setting the book cares about — a dependent country whose press was foreign-owned. In August 1938, in Mexico, Trotsky wrote the editorial for the first issue of *Clave* against a campaign by the CTM leadership to curb the reactionary press by censorship or ban. He conceded the entire premise. "The real tasks of the workers' state do not consist in policing public opinion, but in freeing it from the yoke of capital. This can only be done by placing the means of production — which includes the production of information — in the hands of society in its entirety." Having conceded it, he refused the conclusion: "only those blind or simpleminded could think that the workers and peasants could be freed from reactionary ideas by the banning of reactionary press. In fact, it is only the greatest freedom of expression that can create

favorable conditions for the advance of the revolutionary movement in the working class." And he named what the Soviet arrangement was: "We have before us a living example of such a dynamic, with the hated suppression of the freedom of expression and of the press in the Soviet Union. And this has nothing to do with the interests of the dictatorship of the proletariat. On the contrary, it helps protect the interests of the new caste in power against the attacks of the workers' and peasants' opposition." The positive proposal is the one this book could not make: that "all currents of opinion which have not taken arms against the dictatorship of the proletariat must be able to express themselves freely", and that it is the duty of the workers' state "to put in their hands, to all according to their numeric importance, the technical means necessary for this, printing presses, paper, means of transportation." (The text was found in the Trotsky Archive at Harvard around 1977; the version quoted here is the marxists.org translation from the French and Greek.)

The Fourth International restated this in its own name almost immediately after our book appeared. Its Twelfth World Congress of January 1985, in the thesis on proletarian dictatorship and socialist democracy printed in *Quatrième Internationale* nos. 17–18 (September 1985), held that ideological struggle can only fully succeed under conditions of open confrontation — meaning freedom for the defenders of reactionary ideologies to defend their ideas, and cultural and ideological pluralism, so long as they do not take violent action against workers' power. Ernest Mandel put the material argument back on its feet in *Quatrième Internationale* no. 28 (April–June 1988), replying to Alec Nove's claim that a free press requires a market because printing requires scarce means of production. Mandel accepted the premise and asked why a society that can allocate resources to arms cannot allocate one per cent of them to presses, printers and paper, so that every group of readers gets the paper it wants. The alternative, he wrote, is a limitation of press freedom by centralised control — by big capital, or by the state, or by both. That third disjunct is the one this book cannot see. It is not a rebuttal of the book's case against the wire agencies. It is the completion of it.

Which is why the book's own thesis survives its author's tradition better than the author would have liked. Read it for what it documents and it is a serious brief: the four agencies, the colonial cable map, Talloires, the money at stake, the sequence from Ljubljana to MacBride. The demand for a right of reply was not a Soviet invention and did not die with the Soviet Union; the concentration it described has since become far greater than anything in these pages, and the question of

who owns the pipes is more urgent now than it was in 1983. The damage the book does is to that case, and it does it by supplying the answer its opponents wanted. When Rosemary Righter and the Talloires signatories argued that the new information order was a licence for governments to control the press, the most useful evidence available to them was a book like this one, published in Moscow by a state house, which held that governments are entitled to restrict information containing ideas the international community condemns, and that the state doing the restricting had implemented its Helsinki obligations in exemplary fashion. The case for a new information order was always stronger than the states that carried it. It is stronger still now that they are gone.

There is a last accounting, and it is ours. For eighteen years the anti-Stalinist left had a weekly paper and a clear view, and it used them, rightly, on the jammers, the censors and the imprisoned. It never once took up the argument this book gets right. The wire agencies, the cable map, the terms on which a poor country may speak: those pages went unanswered, because the case was being made by people we could not stand beside, and it was easier to leave it to them. That was a mistake, and the cost of it is on both sides of the ledger. The book cannot be trusted because it exempts itself. The reply is thin because it conceded the ground. A reader in 1984 deserved better than either, and a reader now can at least have both halves in one hand.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

A World Without Arms?

Five centuries of the disarmament idea, from Erasmus through the Hague conferences and the interwar failures to SALT - closed in mid-1983, just before the Euromissile crisis broke over it.

Igor Usachev

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

The title is a question, and the book's last page answers it:

"The ideal of socialism has been and remains a world without arms." Between the two sits a serious, oddly literate, heavily footnoted history of the disarmament idea from Erasmus to Andropov — the best-argued of the five Progress volumes on militarism that this series has now examined, and the one that states most explicitly why its own argument may not be applied to the state that commissioned it.

Start with the date, because for once it can be fixed almost to the month, and because the months in question are the sharpest in the decade.

The spine says 1984. The Soviet publishing code on the copyright page ends in 83. The internal terminus is tighter than either: the latest dated event anywhere in the text is Yuri Andropov's reply to questions "put in May 1983 by representatives of several Finnish public organisations", with a Warsaw Pact proposal of 17 February 1983 behind it. Andropov is quoted ten times and is alive throughout; he is "General Secretary of the CC CPSU" in the present tense. Chernenko does not appear. Gorbachev does not appear. The manuscript closes around the middle of 1983 and reached English readers a year later.

What that means is best said as a list of things the book cannot know. It does not know that a Korean airliner would be shot down over Sakhalin on 1 September 1983. It does not know that the first Pershing IIs would arrive in West Germany in November, or that the Soviet delegation would walk out of the Geneva intermediate-range talks on 23 November and out of the strategic talks in December. It does not know that Andropov would be dead in February 1984, or that the USSR would boycott the Los Angeles Olympics in May. None of those absences is a finding; they are chronology, and the honest thing is to say so rather than bank them.

One case is genuinely borderline and I decline to bank it either.

Reagan announced the Strategic Defense Initiative on 23 March 1983, roughly two months inside the book's window. Neither "Strategic Defense Initiative" nor "Star Wars" occurs here. But space weapons are not absent: the book records the Soviet call for "the demilitarisation of outer space" and the UN's support for measures "to prevent the spreading of the arms race to outer space". A speech given eight weeks before a manuscript closed, in a book that took a year to translate, is a plausible near-miss rather than a suppression. I record the nil and refuse to argue from it.

The volume tells the reader almost nothing about its author. There is no institutional affiliation, no preface, no jacket note in the scan — only a name, which the digitisation renders as "Usacfiév" and which is Igor Usachev, the ch having collapsed into a ligature. I can establish no post for him and will assert none. Nor does the reply corpus help: across all 763 issues of Intercontinental Press from 1968 to 1986, the name does not occur once. That is a fact about our holdings, not about him.

The book is better than its genre

This has to be said at length, because the criticism that follows is worth nothing otherwise.

A World Without Arms? is built out of Western sources to a degree that would embarrass most of its companions. Of fifty-three footnote blocks, the great majority send the reader to books published in London, New York and Paris. Merze Tate's *The Disarmament Illusion* (Macmillan, 1942) is cited six times and is the spine of the pre-1914 chapters. There is Headlam-Morley's *Studies in Diplomatic History*; Oppenheim's *International Law*; Schwarzenberger's *Power Politics*; three separate works of Philip Noel-Baker's, from 1926, 1958 and after; C. Wright Mills twice, *The Power Elite* and *The Causes of World War Three*; Adam Yarmolinsky's *The Military Establishment*; John M. Swomley's book of the same title; Richard Barnet; J. A. Hobson's *Democracy After the War*; Theodore Dreiser's *Tragic America*; Stuart Chase's *The Tyranny of Words*; the collection edited by Carroll

Pursell; Strausz-Hupé, Kintner and Possony's *A Forward Strategy for America*, read in order to be answered. There are two citations to the *Foreign Relations of the United States* series for 1950, volume I, and one to the 1920s volumes. Colin Gray's *The Soviet-American Arms Race* — a hawk's book — is used twice, once against the American "gaps". Soviet secondary literature appears perhaps four times in the whole apparatus.

Set beside this the fact that the book's one polemical attack on a named political current, the paragraph on Trotskyism, carries no footnote of any kind. That is the pattern this series keeps finding, and it is starker here than usual precisely because the rest of the apparatus is so full.

The historical chapters have a register Progress rarely permitted. Erasmus, William Penn, John Bellers, Kant on standing armies, Montesquieu, Mazzini at Geneva, Maupassant's *Sur l'eau*, Heinrich Mann on Hitler, Stefan Zweig. Usachev treats disarmament as a four-hundred-year idea with a real intellectual history rather than as a Soviet policy with decorative ancestors, and the effect is that his account of the Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, of the Washington naval conference of 1921–22, and of the League's Preparatory Commission is a genuine piece of diplomatic history rather than an indictment with dates attached.

The strongest single stretch is on verification, and it is strong because it is honest against interest. Usachev sets out the American position of the 1920s and quotes it from the primary record — Secretary of State Frank Kellogg's instructions to Hugh Gibson, the American representative on the Preparatory Commission:

You should make it clear that the United States would not agree to place the supervision of its armaments or the carrying out of any programme for the limitation of armaments in the hands of the League of Nations or any other international body.

And then, remarkably:

We do not condemn this attitude. On the contrary, we approach it with understanding, inasmuch as it appeals to the principle of international good faith and observance of treaties, a principle worthy of respect.

That is not what this genre normally does with an American document. Nor is what follows: he quotes Noel-Baker for the defence, against the Western powers rather than against Moscow — "a careful study of the record shows that since

May 1955 the Russians have made considerable efforts to reach agreement including the acceptance, in principle, of a large measure of international inspection and control; while the Western Governments have withdrawn the reasonable 'comprehensive' proposal for a first-stage disarmament agreement which they had previously urged". The Soviet proposal of 10 May 1955 was a real concession and the Anglo-American reservation of that September was a real retreat; a reader coming to this episode cold will not be misled.

He also states the Soviet verification doctrine plainly, which is more than most Soviet writing on the subject did: "control measures must be in strict accord with the disarmament measures being implemented. So, until forms of inspection are worked out it is necessary initially to agree on specific disarmament measures." Disarm first, verify afterwards. That is a defensible negotiating position, it was the actual Soviet position, and it is also the reason a comprehensive test ban failed in 1963. Usachev does not draw the second conclusion, but he does not conceal the premise, and a reader can draw it for himself.

Then there is the argument the book exists to make, which is true. Nuclear war would have no victor; the destructive means have outrun any political object they could serve. Usachev makes this as a Clausewitzian point and makes it well — war has become "the continuation of politics" by means that can no longer serve any politics, and therefore "militarism has arrived at its dialectical negation". Around that he builds a two-part thesis of a "crisis of militarism", economic and military-technical, and the economic half is argued from the UN's own *Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race* and of *Military Expenditures* and from Jacques Rueff's warnings about American deficits. His demolition of the "clean" and "humanising" nuclear weapon — the neutron bomb "supposed to be effective against tank crews and harmless to civilian population" — is short and correct.

And he is capable of a maturity his companions are not. On what a disarmament agreement requires:

It would be superfluous here, and even harmful, to talk of winners and losers.

That is a diplomat's sentence and a good one. The passage that follows — that no state will accept an agreement detrimental to its security, and that none can be forced into one — is the beginning of wisdom about arms control and is truer than most of what was said on either side in 1983.

He takes the Western peace movement seriously, which

Bogdanov never does and Luzin cannot. He counts it: "nearly 20 million activists took part in major peace demonstrations throughout capitalist countries in the spring of 1982, as compared to the 5 million who did so during the whole of 1981." He describes its composition accurately — "from communists, socialists, and social democrats to Christians, liberals, environmentalists, and certain groups of conservatives" — and does not pretend it is a communist front. On the record, this is the most open-eyed account of the Western movement in the Progress militarism list.

The sentence where the book decides not to be criticisable

Now the finding, and it is not a silence. It is an argument, stated in the author's own voice, in the middle of the chapter called "The Social Roots of Militarism".

Usachev raises the symmetrical model of the arms race — country A arms, country B responds, and so on — names it the "action-counteraction" formula, and concedes its force: "This logic, although simplified, contains a grain of rationality and is therefore somewhat convincing." Then:

But on the whole it is an insidious political trap. This logic disregards the political character of states opposed to one another, equates, without any ground, the various motives of states, ignoring the more important things which determine the position of a state in the world arena.

And, immediately before that: it "erases the distinction between states with different social systems, between states seeking peace and those pervaded with the spirit of militarism."

This is the reflexivity test answered in advance, explicitly, as a matter of method. Bogdanov's version of this failure was to look away from the Soviet side; Tsagolov's was to deny by definition that a Soviet military-industrial complex could exist. Usachev's is more candid and more damaging: he argues that any account which would let the two sides be measured on the same scale is a trap laid by the enemy. The category cannot be turned on the speaker because turning it is itself the error.

The examples he chooses to license the asymmetry give the game away. Would it be just, he asks, to object to "neutral Switzerland's increasing of military potential during the First and Second World Wars", or to "the Angolan people's desire to have the possibility to defend themselves against aggressive attacks from South Africa"? Nobody would object to either.

Neither has anything to do with a state holding tens of thousands of nuclear warheads. The asymmetry is established on cases where it is uncontested and then applied where it is the whole question.

What follows is the purest specimen in the volume. Usachev proposes a criterion — a real one, and a good one:

A state's refusal to seek military superiority, possessing only that which corresponds to its defence needs, is the main criterion to judge its peaceful intent.

And in the very next sentence he applies it:

The Soviet Union, by the way, has time and again announced at the highest level that it does not and will not seek military superiority.

The standard is met by the announcement. A test that any government could pass by saying so is not a test, and the man who wrote the sentence spends four chapters demonstrating that American declarations of peaceful intent are worthless because declarations are worthless. Error is admissible in these books; the category is not. Here even the category is offered and then discharged on the author's own side without evidence, in the space of one paragraph.

The SS-20, and the gradient

The hypothesis carried into this draft — that these volumes cannot name the SS-20 — is refuted. Usachev names it three times. He names the SS-4 and SS-5 as well. He is, on this, the most forthcoming author on the Progress militarism list: Luzin could describe the Pioneer deployment only as "the updating of some Soviet tactical weapons"; Bogdanov and Tsagolov have the designation at zero.

So the interesting question is what he does with it, and the answer is that naming the missile does not restore the causal chain. Here is the first occurrence in full (the scan drops a stray running-head fragment into the sentence; I have removed it silently, as I have corrected scan damage throughout without further notice):

The decision on them was taken at the NATO Council session in December 1979 on the grounds that the USSR has allegedly gained superiority over the West by stationing what Western experts refer to as SS-20 missiles. But it is not the Soviet Union that holds the initiative in deploying medium-range missiles.

"What Western experts refer to as" — the designation is quoted rather than used, held at arm's length as a foreign coinage. The other two occurrences are both inside Soviet negotiating offers: the moratorium under which "there would be no replacement of outmoded missiles known as SS-4 and SS-5 by the newer SS-20", and the 26th Congress undertaking to reduce medium-range forces in the European part of the country "by hundreds, including the SS-20s" (the footnote to the Congress documents interrupts the sentence in the printed text). The weapon exists in this book only as something the Soviet Union is offering to give up. It is never deployed, never counted, never dated, never given a range or a payload.

That last point is the one that matters, and it replicates a finding this series has now made twice elsewhere. Usachev does count: he reproduces Brezhnev's figures from the Der Spiegel interview — "the NATO countries have 986 such weapons, the USSR—975." Those are carriers. Warheads appear four times in sixty-three thousand words, and every appearance is inside a Soviet proposal about future parity "in regard to carriers and warheads". No Soviet warhead total is given anywhere. The RSD-10 carried three warheads where the SS-4 and SS-5 it replaced carried one, which is precisely why a launcher count and a warhead count told opposite stories in 1983. The book counts on the metric that favours it and treats the other as a negotiating category.

What is not there, and why each absence counts

Against a text this well documented, the following returns are all nil, and all of them were available to a man writing in Moscow in 1983.

No figure for Soviet military expenditure. Not in roubles, not as a share of national income, not as a share of the state budget. The metric itself is in the book and Usachev handles it competently — he prices American military spending as "the largest item in the American budget" from 1920, notes that Japanese defence spending is "less than 1 per cent of the GNP" and treats that as a cause of Japanese economic success, and follows the NATO 3-per-cent-real-growth undertaking of May 1978 through the West German debate. He applies the burden metric to the United States, to Japan, and to the NATO allies. He never applies it eastward. Bogdanov gave the American figure and omitted the comparison; Luzin gave no figure of any kind; Usachev gives the metric a workout across four countries and stops at the Soviet border. That is the same hole in the same place for the fourth time, which makes it a rule of the genre rather than a fault of an author.

No Soviet military-industrial complex. The phrase occurs thirty-nine times and is American in every one. The nine Soviet defence-industrial ministries, the Military-Industrial Commission of the Council of Ministers, their first claim on the country's best plant and engineers — none of it exists here, in a book whose central chapter is titled "The Social Roots of Militarism" and whose method is to find the domestic constituency behind a foreign policy.

Soviet policy has no authors. This is the absence I did not expect and it is the sharpest of them. Usachev names American officials freely and precisely: Kellogg, Gibson, Charles Hughes, Dulles, Truman, Kennedy, McNamara, Kissinger, Carter, Reagan, Weinberger, Haig, Baruch, Proxmire; he names the British minister Anthony Nutting and quotes him against his own government. On his own side the roll is: Andropov ten times, Brezhnev three, Gromyko once at the 34th UN General Assembly, Chicherin once — in an endnote about Genoa — and Zorin once, in the name of the "Zorin-McCloy Accord". Litvinov does not occur. The Soviet total-disarmament proposals to the Preparatory Commission of 15 February and 23 March 1928, which Usachev gives dates and a quotation for, are attributed to "the USSR" and "the Soviet delegation"; the man who made them is not there. Khrushchev does not occur. The proposal for general and complete disarmament of 1959, which the book calls "a landmark" and returns to four times, was put to the General Assembly by Khrushchev in person on 18 September 1959; it appears here as "the Soviet proposal" and "the proposal from the socialist countries". Stalin does not occur at all. Soviet diplomacy in this book is performed by an abstraction called "socialist diplomacy", which has initiatives but no diplomats — except the incumbent, who is quoted by name and by dated document. Every American who ever obstructed disarmament can be named and held responsible. No Soviet official who ever advanced it can be, once he has ceased to be current.

Czechoslovakia is never 1968 and Hungary is never 1956. Czechoslovakia occurs four times: as Hitler's victim in 1938, as a party to the Vienna force-reduction proposals of February 1982 and February 1983, as a co-signatory of the 1978 draft convention on neutron weapons, and in the index. Hungary occurs four times, one of them the revolution of 1919 and the rest signatory lists.

But this book, unlike its companions, does not merely leave the gap. It fills it with doctrine:

Their function is to safeguard socialist gains, not to seize the land of others, not to conduct a policy of expansion, and

not to oppress the working people. Hence the profoundly defensive task of the socialist armed forces, even in the event of them having to combat anti-socialist forces within their own country—i.e., the political support for such forces ultimately lies abroad, in the imperialist camp.

Read that clause again. The armed forces of the socialist countries remain defensive even when they are fighting the population of a socialist country, because opposition inside is by definition sponsored outside. It licenses East Berlin 1953, Budapest 1956, Prague 1968 and martial law in Poland in one subordinate clause, without naming any of them. Two sentences later comes the only contemporary application: "Take, for instance, the recent events in Poland."

Afghanistan occurs twice, which puts this book between The Priorities of Soviet Foreign Policy Today — which named the intervention twenty times and defended it — and Bogdanov and Tsagolov, which have it at zero. Neither occurrence contains a Soviet soldier. The first:

Events in Afghanistan, and then in Poland, exposed the miscalculations of international and internal reaction in those countries and were latched onto as just such an excuse.

An "excuse", that is, for the Western campaign that killed SALT II ratification. The invasion is not an act with an author; it is an event that happened in a country, and its significance is what Washington did with it afterwards. The second occurrence is more remarkable still:

The Afghan counter-revolutionary bands, fighting the lawful Kabul government, were also supplied with US-made means of chemical warfare.

That is the whole of Afghanistan in a book about disarmament published in the fifth year of the occupation, with something over a hundred thousand Soviet troops in the country: a place where the Americans are accused of chemical warfare. The chemical allegations of that period ran hard in both directions and neither side's case was as good as it claimed, so I make no finding on the substance. The structural point needs none. A book whose method is to trace armaments to the interests that produce them has removed the largest armed operation its own state was conducting, and the removal is not an omission — a sentence had to be written to accomplish it.

The title, and the sentence after it

The book's title and its last line both derive from four words of Lenin's, quoted in chapter III:

As Lenin put it, "disarmament is the ideal of socialism".

The footnote sends the reader to the Collected Works, volume 23, page 95. That is the essay "The 'Disarmament' Slogan", written in October 1916 and first published in Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata no. 2 that December — the identification is not mine; another Progress volume, USSR and Countries of Africa (1980), names the article for the same quotation.

Here is what the passage says when the sentence after it is allowed to stand. The text is Lenin's, from the transcription mirrored in this project's `etol-ni` corpus:

Disarmament is the ideal of socialism. There will be no wars in socialist society; consequently, disarmament will be achieved. But whoever expects that socialism will be achieved without a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a socialist. Dictatorship is state power based directly on violence.

And, three paragraphs later, the essay's actual conclusion:

An oppressed class which does not strive to learn to use arms, to acquire arms, only deserves to be treated like slaves.

And in face of this fact, revolutionary Social-Democrats are urged to "demand" "disarmament"! That is tantamount to complete abandonment of the class-struggle point of view, to renunciation of all thought of revolution. Our slogan must be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie.

"The 'Disarmament' Slogan" is a polemic against putting disarmament in a socialist programme. Lenin's four words are the concessive opening of an argument whose conclusion is the opposite of the one they are made to carry. The book takes its title from them, closes on them, and never reproduces the sentence that begins "But".

This is a house habit rather than a personal one, and it is worth being exact about the degree. Lenin: A Biography (Progress, 1983) and Afanasyev's Scientific Communism both quote one sentence further, through "consequently, disarmament will be achieved", and stop there. The Soviet Constitution: A Dictionary (1986) and Problems of Common Security (1984) — the companion disarmament volume from the same year — stop where Usachev does. Nobody in the catalogue prints the

"But". The cut is not at a random place. It is exactly at the word that turns the sentence round.

The same operation is performed on Engels, who "had once called disarmament a 'guarantee of peace'". Usachev's footnote for that phrase is to the Werke, volume 22, page 373. That volume contains the late articles published as Can Europe Disarm? in 1893, and the book presents them as settled Marxist doctrine on the subject.

What was being said instead, in the same months

Everything this book could not say was in print, from the other side of the split, in the years it was written and shipped — and for the first time this series can quote it in the language and the season the book was closed in.

The decisive document is the editorial of Quatrième Internationale, the French theoretical review of the Fourth International, dated 1 December 1983 — three weeks after the first Pershing IIs reached West Germany and a week after the Soviet walkout from Geneva. It is signed by Ernest Mandel. It concedes to Usachev exactly what should be conceded: that the USSR is not a capitalist country driven by internal contradictions to global expansion; that the "Soviet invasion of Western Europe" is "un mythe dangereux et absurde"; that since 1945 it is always imperialism that has taken the initiative in the nuclear arms race and "Le Kremlin n'a fait que réagir à ces menaces, sans jamais les égaier ou les dépasser" — the Kremlin has only ever reacted to those threats, never matching or exceeding them. Very few of the concessions Usachev wanted from the Western left are withheld here.

And then it says why the anti-war movement will nevertheless not take his instructions. Its suspicion of Moscow is not the product of "propagande antisoviétique" but of experience:

les interventions armées qui ont réprimé la révolution hongroise de 1956 et le « Printemps de Prague » en 1968 ; les pressions militaires et politiques ouvertes contre la montée des luttes et de l'auto-organisation prolétariennes en Pologne en 1980-81 ; l'intervention militaire en Afghanistan ; la terrible répression des dissidents (non seulement pro-occidentaux, mais aussi socialistes et communistes oppositionnels) en URSS ; l'absence des libertés démocratiques élémentaires de la classe ouvrière, telles que le droit de grève

— the armed interventions that crushed the Hungarian revolution of 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968; the open

military and political pressure against the rise of workers' struggles and self-organisation in Poland in 1980-81; the military intervention in Afghanistan; the terrible repression of dissidents, not only pro-Western but also socialist and communist oppositionists; the absence of the most elementary democratic liberties of the working class, such as the right to strike. That is the list Usachev's chapter III converts into a single clause about anti-socialist forces whose backing "lies abroad".

Mandel's conclusion is the exact negative of this book's method. The peace movement must not, he writes, turn itself into a "groupe de pression diplomatique à Genève, à Washington et à Moscou", because governments in thirty-eight years have managed only to "control" the arms race by mutual consent and never to end it. Therefore:

Le problème du désarmement nucléaire ne sera pas résolu autour des tables de conférence diplomatiques, mais dans la rue et dans les usines.

The problem of nuclear disarmament will not be solved around diplomatic conference tables, but in the street and in the factories. A World Without Arms? is, from its first page to its last, a book about the conference tables. Its heroes are delegations; its evidence is drafts, protocols, sessions and accords; its peace movement exists to create the conditions in which delegations can succeed. Mandel's charge is that this is precisely the arrangement by which nothing gets disarmed, and that the bureaucracy prefers it because a mass movement it could not control would be worse for it than the missiles.

The historical half of Usachev's book has an answer too, and it appeared while the English edition was in production. In Quatrième Internationale of July 1984, Raimund Löw published "Grève générale ou désarmement : deux pôles dans la politique de paix du mouvement ouvrier international" — general strike or disarmament, the two poles of the international labour movement's peace policy — tracing exactly Usachev's terrain from the First International through Stuttgart and Copenhagen to the Comintern. It reaches the Engels pamphlet under a heading Usachev's chapter could not print: "LE DESARMEMENT : VOEU DE VIEILLESSE D'ENGELS". Disarmament as Engels's old-age wish. Löw shows that for decades Marx and Engels had no interest in disarmament at all, that Marx opposed the International's involvement with the Ligue de la paix et de la liberté and called the whole business "tarte à la crème de la paix", and that the late articles rest on a claimed common interest of capital and labour in avoiding war — "voilà les arguments qu'il

avance et qui seront repris jusqu'aujourd'hui", the arguments he advances and which will be repeated down to the present day. That is not a hostile reading; Löw sets out Engels's reasons fairly. But it establishes that the doctrine Usachev presents as the settled Marxist position on disarmament was a late, particular and contested turn — and it does so in the same year, in the same tradition Usachev dismisses in one unfootnoted sentence.

On the metric, the answer is dated to the month the manuscript closed. On 27 June 1983 Intercontinental Press printed "No to war, no to nuclear missiles!", the statement of the Bureau of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, co-signed by eleven European sections and distributed at the disarmament convention held in Berlin that May. It agrees with Usachev where he is right: the Pershing II is "to be used above all for a first-strike surprise attack against the Soviet Union"; SIPRI's 1980 figures show NATO responsible for 43 per cent of world arms spending against the Warsaw Pact's 26; "Imperialism is still the principal warmonger and the main threat to peace." Then it does the thing the whole Progress list is built not to do:

While declared American arms spending is 7 percent of the GNP and estimated USSR spending 15 percent of the GNP, the American GNP is double the Soviet GNP.

— and takes the consequence: "Soviet military expenditure is a great burden on the Soviet Union, to the point of worsening economic and food supply problems." Two documents, the same subject, the same month, one of which can put both numbers on the table.

Usachev's judgement about the peace movement was also tested, and quickly. In International Viewpoint of November 1983, François Vercammen reported the autumn mobilisations from inside them:

Neither imperialist pressure, nor the advocates of the 'lesser evil', nor the threats and promises of Yuri Andropov, have got the better of the anti-missiles movement's political determination to hold to its course of mass mobilisations around a clear, simple and understandable objective: unconditional opposition to the Nato missiles.

He describes a movement acting on "a limited unilateralism" born of "the continuing deadlock in the negotiations on disarmament between the American imperialists and the Soviet bureaucrats — both equally interested in maintaining the political and social status quo in the world". Usachev's twenty million marchers were not waiting to be mobilised behind a Soviet negotiating position, and their leaderships had reasoned

their way past it.

And on the missile itself, the movement had already gone further than he had. Intercontinental Press of 2 April 1984 printed the call for that year's Danish Easter march, agreed by the three main Danish peace organisations — one of whose officers stood as a Communist Party candidate:

We unconditionally say no to Pershing 2, cruise missiles, SS-20, SS-21, SS-22, SS-23, the French and British nuclear strike forces, and all other atomic weapons. Nothing can justify nuclear weapons.

The same call records that the Soviet Union had "begun making preparations to install missiles in the GDR and Czechoslovakia". These are people doing precisely what Usachev asked of them — marching, unconditionally, against nuclear weapons — while declining the one condition he needed, which was that they should stop counting at the Elbe.

What it is for

Read A World Without Arms? for its history and against its jurisprudence. On the disarmament idea before 1914, on the Hague conferences, on the Washington naval agreements, on the American refusal of international control between the wars, on the London subcommittee of 1955 and the test-ban negotiations, it is a competent and well-sourced guide, more scrupulous with Western documents than most of what Progress printed on militarism, and its central moral claim — that a nuclear war would have no victor and must not be fought — was true, was urgent, and was worth a book. Usachev was not wrong to write it. He wrote it better than his colleagues did.

Read it also for the paragraph in which a serious man explains why his own argument may not be run in reverse. Everything else in this volume follows from that paragraph: the missile that exists only as a concession, the warheads that are never counted, the burden metric applied to Japan and withheld from home, the diplomats who vanish from their own initiatives the moment they stop being current, the tanks that stay defensive when they are pointed at the citizens of a socialist state. None of it is carelessness. Usachev saw the symmetrical account of the arms race clearly enough to describe it accurately, granted that it contained "a grain of rationality", and ruled it out of order. That was the price of publication, and he paid it in the open, on the page, which is more than most of his colleagues did. It is also why the book cannot persuade anyone who has another source — and why, in the autumn between the closing

of the manuscript and its appearance in English, the largest peace demonstrations Western Europe had ever seen were made up of people who agreed with every word of its moral argument and were shouting a slogan it could not print.

HISTORY

Behind the Scenes of Third Reich Diplomacy

The Nazi attempts in 1945 to split the Allied coalition - Ascona, Himmler's feelers, the approaches through Sweden - with footnotes identifying the American officers present as the men then negotiating at Geneva.

Herman Rozanov

Introduction to the 1981 Edition

The date on the spine is 1984. The date of the book is 1981, and the copyright page says so without being asked: "© Politizdat, 1981. English translation © Progress Publishers 1984." Nothing inside contradicts it. The latest events cited are the 26th Congress of the CPSU, whose documents Rozanov quotes from the Novosti edition of 1981, and Brezhnev, quoted twice and alive. The most recent Western sources are from 1978 — Die Zeit of 29 December 1978, Zeit-magazin of 20 October 1978, an article in the 1978 volume of Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte. Andropov and Chernenko do not appear. The word detente appears six times and is used as a live policy, not an obituary. This is a late-Brezhnev book that reached English readers after Brezhnev was dead, and it should be read from 1981.

That matters, because 1981 is the year the argument was aimed at. Rozanov twice interrupts his 1945 narrative to attach a footnote to the present. Major-General Lyman Lemnitzer, one of the two Allied officers sent in civilian clothes to negotiate with the SS at Ascona in March 1945, is identified as later commander of NATO and "today one of the leaders of an extreme right organisation in the US—the Committee on the Present Danger." Paul Nitze, present at the meeting with Speer at Glücksburg castle on 19 May 1945, is "future Deputy Secretary of State and leader of the extreme Tightest organisation, Committee on Present Danger." (The office is wrong — Nitze's senior appointments were at Defense, not State — but the identification is not.) When this was written, Nitze had just been named the American negotiator on intermediate-range missiles at Geneva. The book's real proposition is not about 1945 at all: it is that the men who tried to convert the anti-Hitler coalition into an anti-Soviet one in the spring of 1945 are the same men, or the heirs of the same men, now deploying Pershing IIs. The Conclusion says it in plain words: "Much of the deceit and treachery employed by the Nazis in their diplomacy is now characteristic of reactionaries in the West."

Everything else about the commission is legible. Progress advertised the Sipols volume, Diplomatic Battles Before World War II, on the last page of this one — the two are companion pieces bracketing the war, and this series has already published an introduction to Sipols. Rozanov is a working researcher rather than an institute committee: he reads German, cites Goebbels's diaries in the 1977 Hoffmann und Campe edition, Koller, Schmidt, Steinert, Görlitz, Trevor-Roper, Toland, Ryan and the Foreign Relations of the United States volumes, and reports that in West German archives "this writer managed to uncover a photocopy" of the Ribbentrop memorandum of January 1945, the original of which is in American custody among the German documents captured in 1945. That archive is real, it is large, and it has never been Moscow's to censor. A good deal of what follows in this introduction is criticism, so let it be said at the front: on his own subject Rozanov is often the better historian in the room.

The subject genuinely excludes the Pact

Four books in this series have now been examined on the Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August 1939 and its Secret Additional Protocol, and each evaded it differently. Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II (1973) evaded by terminus, stopping its documents on 1 September 1939. Deborin's Secrets of the Second World War (1971/72) evaded by assertion, calling the partition "the old lie" and then, thirty pages later, relying on the river line the protocol had drawn. Sipols (1982) evaded by substitution, using the word protocol fourteen times, every one of them an instrument the USSR proposed or signed in the open. Rzheshhevsky (1984) evaded by silence: in some ninety-two thousand words the word does not occur.

Rozanov's subject is 1944–45. His narrative opens at a secret meeting at the Obersalzberg on 6 July 1944 and closes with the arrest of the Flensburg government on 23 May 1945. The Pact is simply not in the field of view, and it would be a cheap trick to convict him of an omission his subject does not require. He

is not evading; he is writing about something else. That should be said clearly, and the reader should not be told otherwise.

But the habit is visible anyway, and it is visible in a way that is almost too neat. The word protocol occurs twice in this book. Once, Himmler and Schellenberg discuss "points of protocol" — whether to greet Eisenhower with the Nazi salute or a handshake. Once, Speer describes his last visit to Hitler as "merely a matter of protocol." In a fifty-thousand-word study of secret annexes, back-channels and unpublished understandings, the word never once denotes a document. Nor does the secret protocol on the Far East signed at Yalta in February 1945 — the one Deborin defended as proof of Soviet openness — appear in a book whose third chapter is titled "Ribbentrop's Memorandum and the Crimean Conference." There is a shape here that is not accidental, even where the omission is innocent.

What holds, and it is a great deal

The core of the book is the strongest sustained thing in any of the five Soviet war volumes this series has taken up, and a reader who dismisses it will be embarrassed the first time they open a Western monograph on Operation Sunrise.

Rozanov's account of the Wolff–Dulles channel is detailed, sourced and, in its essentials, correct. Karl Wolff, Himmler's chief of staff and from late 1943 the senior SS and police officer in occupied Italy, met Allen Dulles in Zurich on 8 March 1945; Major-Generals Lyman Lemnitzer and Terence Airey came to Switzerland in civilian clothes carrying American soldiers' papers and met the German delegation at Ascona on 19 March; Donovan gave the operation the codename Sunrise. Rozanov quotes the terms Wolff put on the table — that hostilities cease on the Italian front and that Army Group C be allowed home intact, so that "the continued existence of the German order is guaranteed and will in the future be determined by Germans themselves" — and records that Dulles "demanded only one thing: that the negotiations be kept top secret and that other Allies not be contacted."

He then does something a propagandist would not bother to do: he prints the instrument that made this a violation rather than a discourtesy. The Moscow conference of foreign ministers of October 1943 adopted a "Resolution on Peace-Feelers from Enemy Countries" by which the three governments agreed "to inform each other immediately of any peace-feelers which they may receive from the government of, or from any groups or individuals in a country with which any of them is at war." He cites it to the Foreign Relations of the

United States series, where it is. Molotov's proposal of 12 March 1945 that a Soviet officer attend was refused by both ambassadors; the Stalin–Roosevelt correspondence that followed is quoted from the Moscow edition. The judgement Rozanov builds on this — that the Bern channel was a real breach of a real undertaking, and that its purpose on the German side was to free divisions for the East — is not a Soviet invention. It is what the record shows.

Nor is it disputed by the tradition this series writes from. Ernest Mandel's *The Meaning of the Second World War* (Verso, 1986) reaches the same point from the opposite political direction. Discussing the Ardennes offensive in ch. 15, "The Final Onslaught", Mandel writes that its broader strategic objective "was based on the hope that the internal contradictions of the Allied camp, and especially the prospect of Soviet occupation of Eastern and Central Europe, would convince the Anglo-Americans to go for a separate peace" — precisely Rozanov's reading of "Watch on the Rhine", and Mandel quotes Hitler telling his generals in December 1944 that "in all history there has never been a coalition composed of such heterogeneous partners as that of our enemies." More striking still, in ch. 16, "The Outcome", Mandel disposes of the Western right's mirror-image complaint and concedes Rozanov's fact in the same breath: the claim that Eisenhower and Montgomery delivered millions of Germans to Soviet rule by refusing an armistice in the West alone "is pure demagoguery. The records show that a de facto one-sided surrender in the West did transpire which enabled the Western Allied armies to advance further east than they would otherwise have done." Two writers who agreed on almost nothing else agreed that the Wehrmacht opened the western door and that the Anglo-Americans walked through it.

Some of Rozanov's individual finds are simply good. Churchill's answer in the Commons in 1954, that he had telegraphed Montgomery to stack captured German arms "so that they could easily be issued again to the German soldiers whom we should have to work with if the Soviet advance continued", is quoted accurately and used well. Churchill's own eight-point summary of his spring 1945 strategy — "that a new front must be immediately created against her onward sweep... that this front in Europe should be as far east as possible" — is from *Triumph and Tragedy* and needs no gloss. The chapter on the twenty-three days of the Doenitz government at Flensburg is genuinely valuable and hard to find elsewhere in English: the British zone left the Flensburg enclave unoccupied, German officers kept their sidearms, the Doenitz radio station stayed on the air, "Heil Doenitz!" was heard in the street, and Doenitz drove about in Hitler's

armoured Mercedes for a fortnight after the surrender. Rozanov's source for the arithmetic of German formations kept under joint command is de Guingand, Montgomery's own chief of staff.

Underneath the narrative there is a real thesis, and it is a Marxist one rather than a nationalist one: that the diplomacy of the dying Reich was not the improvisation of cornered gangsters but a project of German capital, executed through men it owned. Rozanov documents Himmler's *Freundeskreis* — Bingel of Siemens-Schuckert, Bütetisch of I.G. Farben, Flick, Rasche of the Dresdner Bank, some fifty in all — and the special "R" account through which they paid the SS from 1932, and shows that the man who collected and distributed that money was Karl Wolff. The Strasbourg meeting of 10 August 1944, at which German industrialists were told to move capital abroad against the day after the defeat, is documented from Förster and Gröhler. Speer's obstruction of the scorched-earth order of 19 March 1945 is followed through the visits to Weichs, Heinrici, Himmler, Guderian and Model and the meeting of twenty Ruhr industrialists at Landsberg — with the conclusion that the monopolies "supported and encouraged a 'total war' as long as it raged outside Germany's borders." Rozanov is not credulous about his main witness, either: he twice catches Speer's memoirs going quiet at the useful moment — "though Speer is usually generous with minor details in his memoirs, he does not relate what was said in this important conversation with Himmler." That is a historian's habit, and it earns him the right to be read.

Yalta, and where the asymmetry begins

The brief question can be answered directly: Rozanov does not treat Yalta as a betrayal, and he does not treat it sceptically either. He treats it as a weapon. The publication of the Crimean decisions on 12 February 1945, he writes, "completely crushed Nazi hopes for an official separate peace with the West based on anti-Soviet sentiment" — the conference is the instrument that defeated Ribbentrop's memorandum, and its unconditional-surrender clause is the standard against which Churchill and Dulles are then convicted. That is a coherent position and, on its own terms, defensible. It is also the exact opposite of the émigré and Western-conservative reading, and both readings share a premise Mandel rejected: that the shape of post-war Europe was settled at conference tables. Mandel's answer, that the outcome "was determined on the battlefield", cuts against Rozanov as much as against the Yalta-betrayal school.

But the asymmetry is total, and it is the book's real failure. Every peace-feeler in this book runs in one direction. Berlin approaches London and Washington; London and Washington are tempted; Moscow refuses and reports. There is no chapter, paragraph or sentence in which Soviet wartime diplomacy is examined with the scepticism applied to everyone else's — and there was material. The German approaches through Stockholm in 1943, and how far Moscow entertained them, remain genuinely contested among historians and the evidence is thin; but the contest existed, and Rozanov does not acknowledge that anyone has ever raised it. Mandel notes in ch. 12 that the British government trod carefully with Stalin in 1942 partly "for fear that Moscow might sign a separate peace with Berlin" — the fear ran both ways, and only one direction is in this book. Krebs's mission to Chuikov on 1 May 1945 is narrated at length, but as a Nazi provocation heroically refused; the possibility that a Soviet reader might want to weigh it as diplomacy does not arise. The Warsaw Rising, which fell in the months this book covers, is absent; the word Warsaw appears once, in the phrase "Warsaw Treaty". So the book ends with the sentence that gives its method away: the defeat of Germany was "not just the victory of the Soviet Army... but the victory of Soviet diplomacy."

Fairness requires noting that this produces one genuinely surprising judgement. Having spent seven chapters showing Churchill, Dulles, Hoare, Montgomery and the State Department reaching for a deal with the SS, Rozanov concludes that "overall, during 1941–1945 the US and Great Britain pursued a realistic foreign policy," and quotes Churchill's tribute of 27 February 1945 to a Soviet government whose "word is their bond." This is 1981 detente reaching back to arrange 1945 into a usable precedent. It is more generous to the West than anything in Rzhnevsky. It is also, in its way, the same operation in reverse: the past being asked to say what the present needs.

The SS chapter, and what is not named

The fifth chapter, "The SS in Action", is where the book fails in a manner that is not a matter of emphasis.

Auschwitz does not appear in this book. Neither does extermination, genocide, or Holocaust. Jew and Jewish appear fifteen times between them, and every occurrence falls inside the account of Himmler's negotiations, where Jews are the object of a transaction — the currency in which the SS hoped to buy a hearing in the West. The camps appear as a "pretense" available to Anglo-American reactionaries: "negotiations with Himmler and other SS officers could be cloaked under the

pretense of concern for the prisoners being held in Nazi concentration camps."

The passage that settles the matter is the meeting between Himmler and Norbert Masur of the World Jewish Congress on the night of 20–21 April 1945. Rozanov prints, from Joseph Kessel's biography of Felix Kersten, what Himmler said: "These men helped the Resistance. They fired on our troops from their ghettos. And, moreover, they carry diseases such as typhus. It was to stop epidemics that we sent them to the ovens... The concentration camps! They should be called education camps." Rozanov offers not one word about this. The next sentence is: "Passing on to the most important issue, Himmler then asked Masur to act as a mediator in the negotiations with the West." A man has just described the gas chambers and offered the standard falsification of what they were for, and the book steps over it to reach the diplomacy. That is the whole method in four lines. The killing of European Jewry is not denied here; it is not disputed; it is simply never the point.

What replaces it is worse. Masur, who had flown into Tempelhof in the last fortnight of the Reich to bargain with Himmler, "did not interest him in the slightest" — Rozanov's judgement, offered without evidence, of a man who went to negotiate with the head of the SS. Gillel Storch — in Rozanov's description a representative in Stockholm of the Jewish Agency and the World Zionist Congress — did not go to Berlin, Rozanov writes, not from fear of the Gestapo, because "he had too much in common with the men who worked there"; the phrase "ulterior motives of the Zionist reactionaries" follows a paragraph later. Bernadotte's shuttling is dismissed as a cover for saving the Nazi regime, on the strength of a letter of March 1945 in which he is said to have written that "Jews are just as unwelcome in Sweden as they are in Germany." Rozanov takes that letter from the opening pages of a 1978 article in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte* and treats it as settled. He does not tell the reader that the standing scholarly question about that document is where it came from, and that its provenance runs through the Kersten circle rather than through any archive of Bernadotte's own — the very question the journal article was about. And in a chapter of nearly six thousand words on negotiations conducted over the fate of camp prisoners, not a single prisoner is recorded as having been released. Some were. The white buses ran; women came out of Ravensbrück in April 1945.

Set beside this, Mandel's chapter 9, "Ideology", is not a corrective of detail but of category. The Holocaust, Mandel wrote, "the deliberate and systematic killing of six million

men, women and children simply because of their ethnic origin — stands as a unique crime in mankind's sad criminal history"; and in the same chapter he records that "the Danish resistance saved nearly all the Danish Jews from the Holocaust by transporting them overnight to Sweden." That is the rescue Rozanov's chapter is unable to see, in the same geography, in the same war. Mandel is at the same time explicit that the Nazis and the extreme proponents of racial superiority "by no means intended the enslavement and extermination only of the Jews; gypsies and sections of the Slav people figure on the same list" — so the corrective is not a nationalist one. It is that the crime has to be named before anything else can be said about the men who bargained over it.

The pattern is not Rozanov's invention. It was the settled Soviet practice, from the suppression of the Black Book in 1947 onward, to dissolve the murder of the Jews into the general figure of Soviet and European losses. Rozanov inherited it. Inheriting it is not the same as being blameless for it.

The reply, made at the time

It was made while the events were happening, and it was not the reply Rozanov's Western critics would have made.

The Fourth International's American organ reviewed the Crimean conference within weeks. Its "Month in Review" in *Fourth International*, vol. VI no. 3, March 1945, treated Yalta as neither charter nor betrayal but as a carve-up: "The 'Big Three' have further perfected at Yalta their ghoulis schemes to bleed the German people, to reduce Europe to the status of a wretched beggar, to carve up the ruined continent into spheres of influence of the respective three giant powers." In the same article — and this is the sentence Rozanov's whole apparatus is built to prevent — "Roosevelt and Churchill have underwritten the territorial booty that the Kremlin grabbed as a result of its 1939 pact with Hitler." And in a passage that concedes Rozanov's central charge before Rozanov was old enough to make it, the same editorial noted that against insurgent German workers Churchill and Roosevelt would not hesitate to arm the Nazis, "with whom the American military authorities have been so brazenly collaborating in the occupied areas." The collaboration Rozanov documents in 1981 from the German archives was named in New York in March 1945 from the newspapers. What the writers of 1945 would not do was name it while exempting Moscow.

Felix Morrow's "'Big Three' Differences in Germany", published in June 1945 — the month after the Flensburg

arrests — read the occupation zones as Rozanov cannot: not as an anti-fascist condominium under strain, but as three bases held with a view to the next war. "Each of the Big Three cannot fail to operate in its own occupation zone on the perspective of eventual utilization of its German base against one or both of the others in World War III." That is the same fact Rozanov reports about the British zone, generalised.

And the mature reply is Mandel's book of 1986, which should be read against this one because it grants so much of it. One correction has to be carried in the open, since this series applies the same standard to its own tradition: Mandel dates the Secret Additional Protocol to 27 August 1939. It was signed on the night of 23 August 1939, and the error is his. It does not touch his account of 1944–45, which is the part that bears on Rozanov, and which — on the Ardennes, on the one-sided surrender in the West, on the emptiness of the Yalta-betrayal literature, on the German divisional balance at the start of 1945, 185 in the East against 147 in the West and Italy — largely confirms him.

How to read it

Read chapters two, four and seven as the work of a competent researcher with a real archive and a real thesis. The account of Sunrise, of the Ribbentrop memorandum, of the Bernadotte and Musy channels as diplomacy, and of the twenty-three days of the Doenitz government under British protection, is worth having in English and is not available in this compass anywhere else. The class analysis of German war-terminal diplomacy — the Freundeskreis, the "R" account, Wolff as the monopolies' man inside the SS, Speer as their minister — is the book's best idea and it is carried by evidence.

Then read the fifth chapter with the knowledge that the word Auschwitz is not in it, and read the Conclusion knowing that the whole book has been built so that its last pages can say that the men who negotiated at Ascona are the men now sitting across the table at Geneva. Both things are true of this book at once: it caught a real conspiracy against its ally, and it could not describe the largest crime committed by the government whose conspiracies it was cataloguing. It is not a book that lies about what it saw. It is a book that was permitted to look in one direction.

The Psychology of Phantasy

A Soviet monograph on how imagination actually works - new images, unforeseen solutions, the child's invented word - well read in Western creativity research and sharp about its limits.

Isaak Moiseevich Rozet

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

The title needs translating before the book can be read.

"Phantasy" here is not the fantastical, and has nothing to do with fairies or escapism; it is the Progress translator's stiff rendering of the Russian *fantaziya*, which means simply the imagination. I. M. Roset's subject is the creative act — the mental operation by which a person produces something that was not there before: a new image, an unforeseen solution, a metaphor, a scientific hypothesis, a child's invented word. Read the title as *The Psychology of Imagination* and the strangeness of the object comes into focus. This is a full-dress Soviet scientific monograph, published in Moscow for export in English, on the psychology of creative freedom — the faculty by which the mind refuses the given and makes the new. It was produced in a state that had built an entire apparatus to prevent exactly that, in art and letters, from happening in public. The book never notices the contradiction. Watching it not notice is one of the reasons to keep it in print.

First, its date, which is not the date on the spine. The English edition is 1984, but 1984 is only when Progress got the translation out. The text is older. Its bibliography — nearly three hundred items, the great majority of them Western — runs thick through the 1960s, thins in the early 1970s, and effectively stops: a single 1978 title (Luk's *Psikhologiya tvorchestva*), two of 1979, nothing after. Roset himself describes the Western "creative boom of the 1950s-70s" as already spent, its energy dissipated into a saturated market of "stock-in-trade recipes for stimulating creativity." This is a manuscript of the late 1970s in a 1984 jacket — a Brezhnev-era book, conceived in the years of stagnation, reaching English readers in the interregnum between Andropov's death and Gorbachev's arrival. Nothing in it dates from the world it was published into; there is no politics in it at all, no Congress, no five-year plan, no single Soviet name of the living. Its date shows only in two places: the age of its sources, and the Cold War geometry of its argument about where imagination is free and where it is not.

Who wrote it, and what was it for? Roset was a working academic psychologist, not an apparatus functionary. The internal evidence is plain: he published through Byelorussian and all-Union scientific channels — his earlier book *What Is Heuristics* came out in Minsk in 1969 — and his own list of papers, running from candidate's theses in 1963 through a string of psychological congresses into the mid-1970s, is the record of a genuine research career. He reads French, German and English psychology in the original and cites it copiously and, for the most part, fairly. The book was commissioned into Progress's respectable end: the export of real Soviet science, evidence to a Western scientific readership that Soviet psychology was a full participant in an international conversation rather than a closed ideological shop. On its own terms it makes that case. This is, by the standards of this series, a volume weighted heavily toward what can be rescued. Most of it is scholarship, and much of the scholarship is good.

The doctrine first, because it is the reason the book exists. Roset's thesis is materialist and rests on activity: imagination is not a special faculty, not a spark, not a visitation, but a form of mental work. His formal definition is deliberately wide — "we regard phantasy as any productive mental activity regardless of the sphere of its application" — and its point is polemical. It refuses to hand the creative act to any of the traditions that had made it a mystery. On one flank stands the idealist account, from Plato's divine inspiration through to Henri Bergson, whose *élan vital* Roset treats as the type-case of explaining creativity by an "extraordinary spontaneous creative power" that "controls all biological, psychological and historical processes" — which is to say, by naming the mystery grandly and stopping. On the other flank stands psychoanalysis, with its subconscious founts and its Jungian archetypes, which Roset files under the same error: a source of imagination placed beyond investigation and therefore beyond disproof. Against both he sets the materialist principle of cognition — "we draw our knowledge from the actual objective world around us" — and the corollary he takes from the empiricist tradition and from Soviet activity psychology alike: that the materials of any fantasy, however wild, are drawn from reality

and recombined. He opens his historical survey not with Plato but with Lucretius, approvingly: the Epicurean who explained the centaur as the accidental adhesion of the images of man and horse, "a complete, though extremely naive, theory of phantasy," and pointedly materialist in "objecting to idealist Plato who maintained that only deities were endowed with the ability to create."

What lifts the book above routine ideological psychology is that Roset does not simply denounce his idealist and Freudian opponents; he weighs them. Psychoanalysis, he notes pointedly, was the one great modern school that "never underestimated the significance of phantasy," when the behaviourists and the Gestalt theorists ignored it entirely — and he grants the reductionist tradition its due, crediting it with a real motive: a wish "to rely on concrete and real data rather than on semi-mystical deep-rooted forces." His quarrel with recombination is not that it is materialist but that it is not enough. The classical picture — the mind as a kaleidoscope of stored elements, shaken into fresh designs, Livingston Welch subtracting the gold from a watch and adding it to a mountain to arrive at "a golden mountain, an object that I have never seen" — Roset shows to be, for all its mechanical clarity, "experimentally unfounded speculation," unable to predict which combination a mind will actually reach or why the genuinely new should ever emerge from mere reshuffling.

But Roset is too good a psychologist to rest where much Soviet writing rested, on recombination alone. The larger half of his book is an argument that recombination — the mind as kaleidoscope, shaking known elements into new patterns — cannot be the whole story, because a kaleidoscope only rearranges and never genuinely surprises. Here is his own contribution, and it is distinctive enough to name. Roset proposes that productive thought turns on two inner mechanisms of evaluation. In the first, which he calls anaxiomatization, the mind devalues some rule, constraint or established item of information — quietly drops a requirement it had been holding as fixed — and in that loosening a path opens that the rule had closed. In the second, hyperaxiomatization, the mind over-values a result it has reached, fastening onto it. Creativity, on this account, is "active shifting of evaluations": the ordinary furniture of a problem is demoted and promoted until a new arrangement becomes visible. The theory is unusual in taking the errors of thought as its royal road — Roset builds it from what he calls "negative facts," the systematic ways subjects in his experiments got tasks wrong by silently relaxing the instructions, and he argues at the close that he has managed a synthesis earlier theories missed, "combining the recognition

of the objective laws of this process with the recognition of the subject's active role." Whether anaxiomatization is a real mechanism or a redescription is a question for psychologists; the terms have not entered the international literature. But the impulse is serious and the experimental work behind it is real, and a reader interested in the history of creativity research will find here a road not taken by the Western mainstream, argued with care.

The experiments that ground the theory have a homely ingenuity worth a moment. In one series Roset asked subjects to supply the opposite of a given word, on the pattern "day–night." Faced with a word that has no clean antonym — "forest" — they did not give up; they produced "desert" and "steppe" and "meadow" and "park," each opposed to forest along some single axis (no vegetation, a different vegetation, a man-made planting) while failing the strict instruction to find a true opposite. "Such answers reveal the subjects' wit," Roset notes, and the wit is the point: under the pressure of a task they could not literally solve, subjects quietly relaxed one constraint of the problem and solved the looser problem that remained — devaluing the demand for an exact opposite, which is anaxiomatization caught in the act. The error is not noise; it is the mechanism showing itself. It is a genuinely elegant way to make an invisible process visible, and it is Roset's own.

So the rescue is large and should be stated without hedging. Roset's command of the Western literature on creativity — Guilford, Torrance, Koestler, the Mednicks, Arnheim, Hadamard on mathematical invention, Lowes on Coleridge — is wide, current for its moment, and handled with respect rather than as a file of enemies. His central negative thesis, that the post-war "creativity" boom mostly redescribed old problems in new words and generated few genuinely new concepts, is a fair and even bracing judgement, and one plenty of Western psychologists came to independently. His insistence that imagination is continuous with thinking rather than a separate romantic faculty, and that it operates on abstract and verbal material and not only on pictures, is sound and well argued against Wundt. His experimental design — probing the intrinsic laws of a process through the shape of its failures — is genuinely ingenious. A reader who wants an intelligent, materialist, activity-based account of the creative act, sceptical of both mysticism and reductionism, will find one here. On the psychology, the book earns its place.

Which is what makes the other thing worth pointing to. This is a monograph about the freedom of the mind to break its own rules, written inside a state whose cultural machinery existed to stop minds from breaking the rules in public — and the

book's one sustained encounter with that fact is a chapter in which the suppression of creativity is described at length and located, without exception, in capitalism. The reflexivity is worth handling lightly, because this is a science book and not a political tract, and Roset is not a propagandist by temperament. But the tell is unmistakable once seen, and it sits in his own footnotes.

In the chapter on the social factors of creativity, Roset assembles a long dossier — drawn almost entirely from Western psychologists writing about their own societies — on the forces that crush the creative person. Bourgeois education "turns out conformists"; leisure is passive and regimented to the same end; the whole of modern culture works "to adapt man to conventionalism"; scientific hierarchies resist new ideas from below and from outside; and the deepest obstacle is a society's "disposition for conventionalism and hostility toward the people who deviate from the established mode of thinking." He quotes Diderot's cynic on the newborn genius who must be "strangled to death." Every word of this is offered as a description of the West. And then, in a footnote, Roset guards the border explicitly. His Western sources, he complains, treat these pressures "as universal laws," when in fact "such an extrapolation of the peculiarities of the capitalist formation upon the other socio-political systems is not supported either by facts or logic." The suppression of the deviant mind is a property of capitalism; to imagine it could exist under socialism is an unwarranted extrapolation. He states this in 1984 — or rather writes it in the late 1970s — of the country of the Writers' Union, of Glavlit (the state censorship office), of samizdat (manuscripts self-copied and passed hand to hand because no press would print them), of the writers put on trial, expelled or driven abroad in the very decade his book surveys.

The mirror sharpens when Roset reaches the question of freedom directly. His Western authors, he notes, demand "psychological freedom" and "freedom of actions" for the creative person — and he faults them, correctly on his own logic, for stopping short: they "completely ignore not only the political freedom issue which may eventually create all the prerequisites for truly creative activity, but also the need to change the social system." It is exactly right. Political freedom is the precondition of creative freedom; a social order that polices thought will deform it. Roset writes the sentence as an indictment of the West and cannot turn it around. His own theory makes the failure legible. Anaxiomatization — the devaluing of an established rule so the new can appear — is precisely the mental act that Soviet cultural administration was built to forbid in art: the doctrine of socialist realism existed to

keep certain "established verities" beyond devaluation. Roset even names conservatism's method in his enemy's society without hearing the echo: reactionary social pressure, he writes, produces "a devaluation of original ideas ... and, at the same time, heightened evaluation of the established verities." That is a definition of a censor's office, and it does not know it is one.

The reply the tradition would make does not need manufacturing, because it was made — by this publisher's own founders and on this series' own shelves. The deepest Marxist statement on the imagination is not one Roset quotes. He cites Marx four times, on abstraction and on language and on imagination as "a great gift," and Lenin once, that imagination "is needed even in mathematics." But he passes over the passage that grounds his whole thesis better than any of them: in *Capital*, Volume I, on the labour process, where Marx distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees by this — that the architect "raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality." There is the materialist, activity-based theory of imagination in one sentence: imagination as the ideal moment of human labour, the plan before the deed, rooted in practice and answerable to it. Roset's book is a long empirical elaboration of that sentence, and it would have been strengthened, not weakened, by standing on it openly.

On the social question the reply is sharper still, and it is already written in the companion volumes. Georgi Plekhanov, whom the Soviet state canonised as the father of its own aesthetics and whose *Selected Philosophical Works* this series republishes, laid down in *Art and Social Life* (1912–13) the principle Roset's footnote denies: that political authority "always prefers the utilitarian view of art," the demand that art serve a purpose set for it, because it wants "to harness all ideologies to the service of the cause which it serves itself" — and that this demand for commanded art is most often the reflex of a "conservative and even reactionary" power. Plekhanov's own psychology of art holds that the artist thinks in images that arise unbidden; and an image that arises unbidden cannot be issued to order. To command it is to abolish it. The suppression of the deviant mind is not, as Roset's footnote insists, a peculiarity of the capitalist formation. It is the oldest habit of power, and the founder on Progress's shelf had already said so. The point is documented in this series' introductions to A. Zis's *Foundations of Marxist Aesthetics* (Progress, 1977) — which founds a compulsory creative method while noting that no one could say where Marx, Engels or Lenin ever prescribed it — and to Felix Kuznetsov's *Of Human Values* (Progress, 1980), written by the Moscow Writers' Union secretary who, twelve months before

his book on literary conscience appeared, had publicly branded an anthology of uncensored fiction "pornography of the spirit." The Fourth International recorded the machinery as it operated: Ernest Mandel, in "Purge of Soviet Culture" (Fourth International, vol. 10 no. 11, December 1949), catalogued the axioms then binding on Soviet writers — "There are no conflicts in a classless society" — and named the editors removed for letting Akhmatova voice "loneliness ... foreign to Soviet literature." That is anaxiomatization forbidden by decree: the devaluing of an official verity, made a punishable act.

None of this convicts Roset of bad faith, and the introduction should not pretend it does. He was a serious psychologist doing serious work on a real problem, and the parts of his book that stay inside the laboratory are the parts to keep. What the book cannot do is turn its own instrument on the society that produced it. It offers a theory of the free, rule-breaking, deviating imagination, and a diagnosis of the social forces that strangle it, and then rules by footnote that those forces stop at the Soviet frontier. The theory of creative freedom never once meets the standing constraints on creative freedom that surrounded its author as he wrote. Read it for the psychology, which is genuine. Read the footnote for what a science of imagination looks like when it is not permitted to imagine the one case nearest to hand.

Alternatives to Positivism

Popper, Carnap, Quine, Kuhn, Feyerabend and Lakatos read in their own editions and argued with page by page - a Soviet philosopher of science who cites Western sources twenty times more often than Soviet ones.

Igor Zinovievich Naletov

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

Karl Popper is named two hundred and seventy-six times in this book, and every time Naletov quotes him he quotes him from Popper. The Logic of Scientific Discovery in the Basic Books edition of 1959, with page numbers; Conjectures and Refutations, Harper and Row, 1963; The Poverty of Historicism, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1960; Objective Knowledge in both the Clarendon 1972 and the Oxford 1979 printings; "A Realist View of Logic, Physics and History" in the Plenum volume of 1970; The Self and Its Brain, written with John Eccles, in the Springer edition of 1977. Carnap is read in five separate works. Quine appears in Word and Object, From a Logical Point of View, and "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" cited to the Philosophical Review of 1951. Kuhn is quoted twice from the 1962 Structure of Scientific Revolutions with pages. Feyerabend's Against Method, Lakatos's contribution to Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Wittgenstein's Tractatus, Schlick's Allgemeine Erkenntnislehre in the Berlin German of 1925. Adorno is footnoted to Negative Dialektik, Suhrkamp Verlag, Frankfurt am Main, 1966, in German. Marcuse to Der eindimensionale Mensch, Luchterhand, Neuwied, 1967, in German. Roy Bhaskar's A Realist Theory of Science appears within a year or two of publication.

This series has been running a test on the Progress volumes: when a book attacks an opponent, does it quote him from his own pages, or does it characterise him and route the footnote through a Soviet intermediary? The test has produced hard results — an Institute history of the world working-class movement that cites Luxemburg's Gesammelte Werke sixteen times and no work by Trotsky once; a volume on the battle of ideas with a thousand footnotes and none to any Trotsky text. It has also inverted once, in Batalov's book on the New Left, where Marcuse is footnoted to his own editions thirty-four times against thirty-one references to Lenin.

Naletov inverts it again, and further. Of roughly a hundred and thirty-five source-bearing footnotes in this book, six go to

Soviet or Russian-language work — Ilyenkov, Narsky, Ambartsumyan, Lesevich, Rumer and Fet, and a Frolov–Yudin preface. Lenin is cited four times, from Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, the Hegel conspectus and one 1917 article. Everything else is Western, in the original, mostly in English and where necessary in German and French. Popper is cited to his own works more often than Lenin is cited at all.

So this is not a party-school manual with a bibliography attached, and the first thing to say about it is that it is a real book of philosophy. The second thing to say is that it has one silence, and that the silence is placed with unnerving precision.

The date, and what the book is for

The copyright page settles what usually takes hours. The Russian original and the English translation carry the same year and the same publisher: '© Издательство «Прогресс», 1984', then "English translation © Progress Publishers 1984". There is no Mysl' or Politizdat or Nauka edition standing behind this one. Progress commissioned the Russian text and issued it in English in the same year, which is unusual in this catalogue and tells you what the commission was. A book on Carnap and Quine had no domestic mass market; it was written to be read abroad, by the sort of Western reader who might actually own Word and Object.

The manuscript is older than the spine. Running the footnotes for their latest dates gives a bibliography that peaks in 1973 and 1977 (eight items each), thins after 1978, and ends. The most recent Western book cited anywhere is Roger Trigg's Reality at Risk of 1980. The only later item in the whole apparatus is the 1982 Progress English edition of Ilyenkov's Dialectics of the Abstract and the Concrete, which is what an English edition substitutes so that its reader can follow up the reference. There is nothing from 1981 and nothing from 1983. For a book about the philosophy of science, a field that moved fast in exactly those years, a bibliography closing in 1980 is strong evidence: this is a manuscript finished around 1980 or 1981 and published in 1984.

That dating makes the nil returns worth counting, because it fixes what was available to the author. The 26th Congress of the CPSU met in February 1981 and Brezhnev died in November 1982; both were within reach of a manuscript in revision. Neither appears. Nor does anything else. In 116,426 words, the words CPSU, Congress, Communist Party, imperialism, opportunism, revisionism, anti-communism and anti-Soviet occur zero times, and bourgeois occurs eight times. Against a corpus that uses opportunism- at 1.55 per ten thousand words and revisionism- at 1.17, Naletov uses the whole deviation vocabulary — opportunism, revisionism, sectarianism — not once, and dogmatism only four times, every one of them aimed at Popper or at positivism. Whatever this book was commissioned to do, it was not commissioned to perform loyalty. It is one of the least politically decorated volumes in the entire Progress list.

What holds up

Section 3 of this series' remit is to say plainly where a book's work is good, and here a good deal of it is.

Naletov's opening move is a concession, not an attack. The struggle against metaphysics, he writes, "had both positive and negative aspects", and the positive effect was its opposition to speculative and religious philosophy that "showed little interest in concrete problems of scientific cognition and practical life". Of logical positivism he says flatly: "There is no denying the fact that this school has helped science to get rid of fruitless speculations and dogmatism." He adds, with a candour rare in this catalogue, that he will not dwell on those merits because his interest is in the lessons of the school's failures — an admission that he is writing a polemic and knows it. He calls positivism "a tree planted for the benefit of science and intended to promote its greatness and glory — however bitter the fruit that was eventually born by it".

He states Popper's position correctly and says so. Popper's arguments against verificationism, he writes, "are serious enough, though not at all as original as he claims" — and the two he singles out are the right two: that observation is always preceded by theoretical assumptions, so knowledge does not begin from sense-data; and that Hume's problem of induction does not entail that theory is immune to observational refutation. He reproduces the demarcation argument faithfully, including Popper's own example of an unfalsifiable proposition, and grants Popper the point that there is no sharp line between science and metaphysics, that Copernicus drew on neo-Platonist sun-worship and that ancient atomism began

as myth. He gives Kuhn and Feyerabend on incommensurability at length and without caricature.

His criticism of Popper is then a real criticism, and it is one of our own tradition made independently. Falsification, in Naletov's account, makes refutation "the end in itself" and cannot describe how knowledge accumulates; Popper's model of science as an unbroken chain of revolutions is, in a phrase he plainly enjoyed, "a concept of 'permanent revolution in science'" that "does not reproduce the true course of science". George Novack reached the same verdict by a different road, in "Positivism and Marxism in Sociology", subtitled "Apropos of Professor Popper and His Methods" — chapter 11 of his *Understanding History: Marxist Essays*, and recorded by the ETOL index as having appeared in the *International Socialist Review* vol. 29 no. 4 (whole no. 187), July–August 1968. (The text we hold is the book-chapter page and carries no provenance line of its own, so that issue attribution rests on the index; the essay's own internal evidence, which treats the 1965 intervention in the Dominican Republic as recent, is consistent with it.) Popper "teaches that the essence of science consists, not so much in the verification of hypotheses, as in their falsification", Novack wrote, and "the timidity of his sceptical epistemology is evident in this lopsided conception of scientific lawfulness". Positivism "shies away from acknowledging this growth of positive knowledge about the world... It is badly named and should be more precisely termed 'negativism'." Two Marxists, one in Moscow and one in New York, neither citing the other, convict Popper of the same one-sidedness. That convergence is worth more to a reader than either verdict alone, and an introduction that suppressed it would be doing tribalism rather than criticism.

The best passage in the book is Naletov's answer to the charge that dialectics is unfalsifiable. He puts the objection in his opponents' mouths without softening it, quoting Herbert Feigl — "who honestly confesses to having not read a single Soviet publication in philosophy over the past few years" — calling the transformation of quantity into quality "just as vague as the triad, or the 'negation of the negation'". Naletov's reply is that the law is not a licence to relate any quantity to any quality: it applies only "to the quantity of a given quality", within a determinate measure, and requires the analyst to specify the system under consideration first. He works it through with evaporating water and with electrons in an outer shell, and the point survives the examples: a dialectical law asserted without a specified reference system is indeed empty, and specifying it is what makes the assertion checkable. He then draws the conclusion his opponents said he could not draw. The laws of dialectics, he writes, "are not confirmable under any arbitrary

set of conditions. They are operative within quite definite epistemological limits and become senseless beyond them. In other words, they can be falsified in principle, if we come across a sufficiently large body of contradicting facts."

That is a Soviet philosopher in 1984 accepting Popper's criterion and submitting his own doctrine to it. It is a better answer than the Jesuit critic Gustav Wetter, whom he engages directly on the same page, gets credit for provoking, and it is more than most of the philosophy volumes in this series attempt.

The list of names

Now the silence.

Arguing that positivists blame Marxist philosophy for science's difficulties, Naletov prints an honour roll:

Among prominent natural scientists who made invaluable contribution to the theory and philosophy of science are such famous names as Albert Einstein, Wolfgang Pauli, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, Vladimir Bekhterev, Ivan Pavlov, Nikolai Vavilov, Ernst Bauer, Vladimir Fock, Dmitri Blokhintsev, and others.

Nikolai Ivanovich Vavilov was the founder of Soviet plant genetics and the first president of the Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences. He was arrested in August 1940, sentenced to death, had the sentence commuted, and died of starvation in Saratov prison in January 1943. He was the chief scientific opponent of Trofim Lysenko, and his arrest and death came in the course of Lysenko's rise. Lysenko's name does not appear in this book. Neither does Stalin's. Neither does Zhdanov's, or Deborin's, or Mitin's, or Prezent's. The years 1947 and 1948 are not mentioned.

Elsewhere Naletov credits the modern evolutionary synthesis to "S. Chetverikov, R. Fischer, S. Wright, and other scientists" (the book's spelling of R. A. Fisher). Sergei Chetverikov founded Russian population genetics; he was arrested in 1929, exiled from Moscow, and his school was broken up. So both Soviet geneticists Naletov names for praise are men the Soviet state removed from science.

A sibling introduction in this series found the identical shape in Fedoseyev's *Philosophy in the USSR* (1977), whose roll of honour names S. I. Vavilov, the physicist, the younger brother. Naletov goes one better and names N. I. Vavilov himself. He is not concealing the man. He is concealing what was done to

him.

And he cannot claim not to have known the subject was live, because he raises it. Two sentences after the honour roll, listing the charges positivists bring against Marxist philosophy, he writes:

The development of genetics, too, purports to have been hampered by ill-intentioned dialectics which, according to the positivist "historians" of science did not serve as a guide for scientific thought but acted as a brake on its progress.

The scare quotes around historians announce that the charge is about to be dismissed. It never is. Naletov answers the physics charges — it is not physics' fault that Mach and Poincaré misread their own results — and then makes exactly one concession:

it is not the fault of Marxist philosophy that some of its ill-starred representatives abused and denounced cybernetics as a bourgeois pseudo-science because they were unable to distinguish between its real scientific content and the misrepresentation of its discoveries in Western philosophical literature.

Cybernetics is conceded; genetics is raised and dropped. And the concession is built so that nothing survives it. The agents are "some of its ill-starred representatives" — individuals, unnamed, undated, unfortunate rather than culpable. There is no institution, no decree, no session, no journal. The paragraph then closes on a symmetry: "the fault lies both with natural scientists and philosophers." A state campaign that ended a science and killed the men who practised it is filed as a shared professional misunderstanding.

Our own tradition had already itemised what Naletov here divides into one admission and one evasion. George Novack, in *Intercontinental Press* vol. 14 no. 12, 29 March 1976 — eight years before this book and four before its manuscript closed — wrote:

The dismissal of the verified results of genetics; the misjudgment of Einstein's theory of relativity and its philosophical implications; the initial disparagement of cybernetics (information theory); the denial of the validity of formal logic within its limits; and the derogations of Freud's contributions to depth psychology and psychopathology... testify to the harm inflicted by Stalinist dogmatism and intellectual terrorism upon Soviet sciences and philosophy.

Five items. Naletov denies the second, concedes the third, states and abandons the first, and does not reach the fourth or fifth.

The full account was in print in this movement's press thirty-three years before Naletov wrote, and its authors did the reporting that his footnotes do not. R. H. Monroe and Joseph Hansen's two-part "The Lysenko Case" appeared in *Fourth International* vol. XII no. 1 (whole no. 108), January–February 1951, and vol. XII no. 2 (whole no. 109), March–April 1951. It opens: "The Stalinist outlawing of genetics in the Soviet Union in 1948 profoundly stirred the scientific world. The proscription of this important science and the liquidation of world famous Soviet geneticists had repercussions that have not yet died down." It names the victims — "Their opponents, headed by the famous N.I. Vavilov, were men who had come into prominence in the days of Lenin and Trotsky, when science was free in the Soviet Union" — records that Vavilov "had been arrested and condemned during the period of the Stalin-Hitler pact as a 'British spy'", quotes the Minister of Higher Education's implementing order, and reports that "Genetics was labelled a 'foreign' science, its leading representatives, 'bourgeois.'"

Two corrections belong in the open, because this series applies to its own tradition the standard it applies to Progress. Monroe and Hansen place Vavilov's death in "northeast Siberia in 1942"; he died in Saratov, in January 1943. And they list Chetverikov among those who "perished"; he was arrested and exiled in 1929, dismissed again after 1948, and died in 1959. Writing in 1951 from outside the country, with the Soviet record sealed, they got the shape of the thing right and some of its particulars wrong. Naletov, writing thirty-three years later in Moscow with both men's names in front of him, got the particulars right and left the shape out.

Where the apparatus thins

The Batalov finding was not that a Soviet author failed to cite, but that his citations thinned in one place and the placement was the point: Adorno named some sixty-seven times and never once quoted from a work of his own. The same test run on Naletov produces one clean result, and it is not Adorno — Adorno is here in German — but Jürgen Habermas.

Habermas is named seventeen times. Naletov gives several pages to his reconstruction of historical materialism: the replacement of productive forces by purpose-oriented rational action, the labour/interaction distinction, the charge that Marx's categories need a "second dimension". The exposition

is competent and it is answered at length. It carries no footnote at all — the longest unsourced stretch of substantive exposition in the book — and Habermas's name appears in no footnote anywhere in it. Meanwhile, in the same chapter, Adorno is quoted from *Negative Dialektik* and glossed through Narsky's article in *Filosofskiye nauki*, and Marcuse from *Der eindimensionale Mensch*.

So the question this series has learned to ask — not whether an author cites, but which opponents he reads and which he merely relays — has a sharp answer here. Every philosopher of science is read in the original. The one philosopher of society is characterised and rebutted from nothing. The apparatus is a map of where the author felt free.

The same map explains a smaller absence. Naletov cites *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* four times, devotes pages to Mach and Machism, and quotes the obscure Russian Machist V. V. Lesevich from a 1915 Moscow edition. Alexander Bogdanov, the principal target of Lenin's book, does not appear — and Bogdanov's *Tektology* is the Russian ancestor of the general systems theory that Naletov discusses in his own chapter on the integration of the sciences. Bertalanffy is likewise absent from that chapter. This is a smaller point than the genetics silence and should not be pressed as hard, but it runs the same way.

The category, and who it can be turned on

There is a version of the reflexivity test that this book would pass and that would tell us nothing. Naletov does admit error on his own side: philosophers "unable to distinguish" real cybernetics from its Western misrepresentation, and scientists who "proved incapable of solving important philosophical problems". The sharper form of the test asks something narrower — not whether error is admitted, but whether the category can ever turn inward.

Naletov states the objection himself, in his opponents' voice, and it has two halves:

Referring to the universality of the laws of dialectics, its opponents allege that dialectics can prove or confirm anything in the world, it can be used to justify any political act.

He answers the first half brilliantly, with the doctrine of measure and the concession that dialectics is falsifiable in principle. The second half he does not answer. He does not answer it anywhere in 116,000 words. It is raised in his own

sentence and abandoned, exactly as the genetics charge was — and the two are the same charge, since the political act that dialectics was used to justify is the one that killed the man he had just honoured.

The book's closing sentences are the position in miniature:

To be sure, the concrete embodiment of the principles of dialectics offered by one or another scientist in his works may lack the necessary flexibility, completeness or consistency. The blame for subjective weaknesses should not be laid at the door of dialectics itself.

Individuals may be inflexible. The doctrine is insulated in advance from anything ever done in its name. That is a conclusion which cannot be falsified in principle, in a book whose best pages argue that a philosophy which cannot be falsified in principle is not doing its work.

The reply

The answer from this tradition is not that a Marxist party should keep its philosophy to itself. Novack was explicit in the piece already quoted, subtitled "On the Right to Think Without Reprisals or Constraint":

It is perfectly in order for a Marxist party or a government guided by such a party to propagate the doctrines and method of dialectical materialism openly and consistently along with its program and proposals. Indeed, it is obligated to do so... But that is entirely different from adopting a state philosophy and then compelling everyone from the scholars and teachers in the universities to schoolchildren to pay obeisance to that viewpoint. That is as bad as enforcing a state religion.

And the consequence he predicted is the one this book quietly exhibits. Where a philosophy meets "no strong and serious open challenges to its positions and formulas, official thought grows dull, slothful, and unsure of itself. It inclines to evade the most burning, sensitive, and complicated questions of everyday life."

Naletov is not dull, and that is what makes him useful. Given Popper, Carnap, Quine and Kuhn — genuine adversaries, read in full, arguing back — he produces first-rate work. Given the one question in his own field that touched Soviet power, he evades it in a single subordinate clause and moves on. The difference between his pages on measure and his sentence on cybernetics is not a difference of talent. It is the difference

between the two subjects, and it is visible on the page.

Novack noted in 1976 that "in the past fifteen years, some of this burden has been lightened, though far from being lifted, in the Soviet Union." This book is what the lightened burden looked like: a Soviet philosopher free to read the West without permission and to submit dialectics to a falsifiability test, and not free to write the name Lysenko. Read it for the argument about measure, and for the demonstration that the citation test is a test and not a verdict. Read the silence for what it cost — and notice that the cost is legible only because Naletov was honest enough to print the honour roll and raise the charge, which a more careful man would have done neither.

HISTORY

World War II: Myths and the Realities

The case that the Eastern Front decided the war, argued in figures that still hold and supported by Western witnesses - by a professional military historian who later published records he could not use here.

Oleg A Rzheshesky

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

The central claim of this book is true, and it should be conceded at the outset, because everything else about the book depends on what is built on top of it.

Rzheshesky's case is that the Soviet-German front was the decisive theatre of the Second World War and that Western popular history has systematically shrunk it. He states it in figures: the Eastern front "tied down up to 70 per cent of Nazi Germany's divisions"; "Out of every four soldiers of the Hitler Wehrmacht an average of three were engaged in the fighting on the Eastern front and only one on the Western"; the Western allies destroyed 176 divisions, "or under one-third of the total of routed divisions of Nazi Germany and her allies"; and "German casualties on the Soviet-German front constituted more than 73 per cent of its total losses in the Second World War." These proportions are broadly right, and they are still right in the current literature. So is the accompanying claim about the American contribution — that lend-lease "amounted to only 4 per cent of Soviet wartime production" — in the aggregate, at least, and Rzheshesky supports it with Western witnesses rather than Soviet assertion. He quotes Harry Hopkins in Moscow in May 1945 saying that the Soviet defeat of Hitler "had been done by the heroism and blood of the Russian Army," and Alan Clark's judgement that Western aid was "marginal, not critical," and a Time-Life history conceding that in the winter of 1941–1942 "it was the Russians, and they alone, who bore the brunt of the German aggression."

A Western reader in 1984 who thought the war had been won at El Alamein and Normandy needed this book, or something like it. That the reader's own historiography had earned the correction is the strongest card Rzheshesky holds, and he plays it well.

He was, by the standards of the Progress list, a serious man. Oleg Aleksandrovich Rzheshesky was a professional military historian at the Academy of Sciences, a specialist in the

wartime alliance and in Western writing about the war; after 1991 he was among those who published Soviet diplomatic records of the Anglo-Soviet negotiations that could not have been printed while he wrote this. The scholarship on display here is not fake. He reads Andreas Hillgruber and Gerhard Weinberg in German and English, cites the British Cabinet papers in the Public Record Office by file number, uses Léon Noël's 1979 Warsaw memoir and André Beaufre's account of the 1939 military talks, quotes Alexander Werth, Telford Taylor, Michael Howard and Gabriel Kolko. He distinguishes between Western historians he considers honest and those he does not. Whatever else this book is, it was written by somebody who had read the other side.

What the commission was

The date on the spine is 1984, and the book announces its occasion in its last chapter and its conclusion. It quotes the CPSU Central Committee plenum of February 1984 from Pravda of 14 February. It lists what "The Reagan Administration which took office in 1981" has done: the MX, the neutron warheads for Lance, the Trident boats, the B-1, and "completed the testing of new nuclear-missile systems — Pershing-2 medium-range missiles and cruise missiles — and began deploying them in Europe." It reprints, at length, the 1949 American contingency plan Dropshot, stage by stage, down to the 300 atomic bombs in thirty days.

That is the commission. This is a book about 1939–1945 written for the euromissile crisis, published in English on the eve of the fortieth anniversary of victory, and aimed at the Western European peace movement, which in 1983–84 was the largest mass movement in Western Europe and the most important audience Soviet foreign policy had. Its argument is a syllogism: the Soviet Union bore the war; therefore the Soviet Union wants peace; therefore the "myth of a Soviet threat" is imperialist propaganda; therefore oppose the deployments. The first premise is true, and the book is honest about it in a way that makes the rest go down more easily. The final chapter is titled "The New Balance of Forces and the Myth of the Soviet

Threat." Afghanistan, where the Soviet army had then been fighting for four years, appears in this book only as a place Hitler wanted to capture after Barbarossa.

Where the collection omitted, the book must argue

The companion volume in this series, *Soviet Peace Efforts on the Eve of World War II*, falsified by terminus: it printed 350 documents and stopped on 1 September 1939, so that the Treaty of Non-Aggression of 23 August and its Secret Additional Protocol survived only at one remove, in a Japanese press report and a reassurance to the Chinese ambassador. A document collection can do that. A book whose entire declared subject is the correction of Western myths cannot. Rzheshhevsky has to reach the Pact, and he does.

Here is the whole of it. "In a situation which had taken such a menacing turn for the USSR the Soviet government decided to accept Germany's proposal to sign a non-aggression treaty." It was a "forced measure" which enabled the USSR "to gain almost two years of respite for strengthening its defences, and to split up the anti-Soviet front of the imperialist powers." That is the argument, and as far as it goes it is a real argument, made by non-Soviet historians too. What is not here is the date, the signatories, and the Protocol.

The word protocol does not occur in this book. Not once, in some ninety-two thousand words about the origins and conduct of the Second World War, written by a specialist, in the year 1984. It is not denounced as a forgery, which was the standard Soviet position and would at least have constituted an argument. It is not mentioned. The State Department had published the German copies in *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941* in 1948; Rzheshhevsky elsewhere shows himself perfectly willing to answer Western documentary publications he dislikes. Here he does not answer.

The gap is made conspicuous by what surrounds it. This book contains two set-piece denunciations of spheres-of-influence diplomacy. It reports that at the Berlin talks of November 1940 the Germans offered the USSR a share of the Axis programme, and that "the Soviet delegation firmly rejected the proposal of the Nazi leaders," refusing even "to discuss the Nazi programme of 'delineation of the spheres of influence'." And it devotes several pages to Churchill's percentages proposal of 9 October 1944, quoting the Soviet minute to show that "Churchill's contention that Stalin had consented to such a partition is far from truth." A book that twice makes the refusal to divide Europe into spheres the proof of Soviet good faith cannot mention the document by which Europe was divided

into spheres. So it does not.

The consequences follow. The Red Army's entry into Poland on 17 September 1939 is not narrated. In the section headed "Western Allies Betray Poland," the German invasion is described in detail down to the encirclement of Warsaw on 10 September, and then: "Early in October all combat operations on the territory of Poland ceased." The event is present only as an accusation to be rebutted — the West German official history is scolded for writing "about an alleged Germano-Soviet attack on Poland in September 1939," and Solidarity is accused of interpreting "the liberation of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine as Soviet annexation." What happened is given in a single sentence, and it is a sentence about restitution: "In 1939–1940, this historical injustice was corrected, and the people of Western Byelorussia, the Western Ukraine, Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina rejoined the peoples of the USSR."

The Winter War is handled in a footnote. "In November 1939, the reactionary government of Finland, prodded by the imperialist powers, initiated an armed conflict" — Finland is the aggressor; the Soviet attack of 30 November, the shelling at Mainila that preceded it, the puppet government installed at Terijoki, the expulsion of the USSR from the League of Nations on 14 December, and Soviet losses of something over 126,000 dead by the most-used Russian figures and higher by others, are absent. In the main text the war appears as an administrative act: "The signing of a peace treaty which ended the Finnish-Soviet armed conflict in 1940 strengthened the security of Leningrad and the northwestern borders of the USSR."

The Baltic states enter in the passive voice. The Supreme Soviet in August 1940 "acceded to the request of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to be admitted to the USSR," their peoples having found "salvation from capitalist oppression and fascist menace" in what the book calls voluntary accession. The ultimatums of June 1940, the single-list elections of July, the deportations of June 1941: absent. So is the word deportation altogether.

And then there is Katyn, where the book does not omit and does not evade, but argues at length, and is simply and knowingly wrong. Rzheshhevsky devotes a section of the chapter "Historians vs. History" to "the murder of 11,000 Polish army officers who had been massacred by the Nazis in the autumn of 1941, in Katyn Forest near Smolensk." The charge against the NKVD was "lifted bodily out of a forgery" put about by Goebbels in spring 1943 to split the alliance

before Kursk. He quotes the Soviet denial in Pravda of 16 April 1943, Stalin's letter to Churchill alleging "contact and collusion" between Berlin and the Sikorski government, sceptical questions from The Times of 28 April 1943, and at length the findings of the Burdenko commission as entered at Nuremberg: "the time of the shooting was autumn 1941"; the Germans used "a pistol shot in the nape of the neck." He notes that Alexander Werth reported the Poles "had been murdered with German bullets."

Every element of this is now known to be false, and the falsity was reconstructed from Soviet archives. The Politburo ordered the shooting of the Polish prisoners on 5 March 1940 on a memorandum from Beria; some 21,857 officers, police and officials were killed in the spring of 1940 at Katyn, Kalinin and Kharkov; Gorbachev acknowledged NKVD responsibility on 13 April 1990 and the execution order was published in 1992. Two things should be said about the section as it stands. First, the German ammunition proves nothing: German-manufactured pistol cartridges were widely available in the USSR, and the point was made against the Soviet case at the time. Second, and more telling for a scholar of Rzheshesky's competence, the Burdenko findings were indeed submitted at Nuremberg as Soviet exhibit USSR-54 — and the tribunal, having heard the evidence, left Katyn out of its judgment. He cites the volume. He does not mention the outcome.

What is absent altogether is as revealing. There is no Trotsky in this book, and no Trotsky in its name index. There is no purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937–38, in which three of the five Marshals of the Soviet Union did not survive; the words repression and unprepared do not appear. There is a table of the correlation of forces on 22 June 1941 and a chapter on "the factor of surprise," but no question is asked about why the surprise was possible, no mention of the warnings that were disregarded, and no mention of the TASS communiqué of 14 June 1941 dismissing rumours of war. The disaster of 1941 is attributed entirely to German numbers and German treachery. Stalin appears in these pages as a correspondent of Churchill and Roosevelt and as the man who annotated a report on German aircraft; he is never a cause of anything that went wrong. Nor is there any account of how the governments of liberated Eastern Europe were formed. The Warsaw Rising of August 1944 is not in the book.

Finally, the cost. "The Nazi invasion of the Soviet Union took a toll of more than 20 million people killed." That was the official figure from 1961 until the Gorbachev period; the state commission of the early 1990s put total Soviet war dead at

about 26.6 million, of whom perhaps 8.6 to 11.4 million were military, and the range is still argued. The book that most insists on the scale of Soviet sacrifice was understating it by a quarter, because the true figure implied questions about how the war had been conducted.

What is genuinely arguable

Not everything unwelcome here is falsification, and the distinction matters. On lend-lease the aggregate proportion is defensible; what the chapter avoids is composition. Roughly four hundred thousand American trucks and jeeps — a figure the book itself gives — meant that the Red Army of 1944 moved on Studebakers, and the same is true of aviation fuel, explosives, field radios, railway rolling stock and canned rations. A supply that is four per cent of everything can be decisive if it is the four per cent you cannot make. On the second front the book's complaint is legitimate: the Western allies did undertake a landing in 1942 and did not deliver it, Churchill did suspend the Arctic convoys in July 1942, and Harriman's memoirs are quoted accurately on Roosevelt's hope of keeping American ground forces off the continent. The delay is not in dispute. Whether it was deliberate is contested — and, as we shall see, one of the most hostile readers Rzheshesky could have had thought it was.

The book against the tradition it exists to exclude

Two years after this book appeared in English, Verso published Ernest Mandel's *The Meaning of the Second World War* (1986). Mandel was the best-known Marxist economist in Western Europe and a leader of the Fourth International — that is, of the movement Soviet historiography had spent fifty years insisting did not exist except as a police fiction. His book is short, argued from the same Western literature Rzheshesky read, and it is the closest thing there is to a controlled experiment: the same war, the same decade, the same intended audience of the European left, written from the tradition Stalinism suppressed. Read side by side with *Myths and the Realities* it does something more useful than refute it. It concedes Rzheshesky's case where the evidence supports it, and convicts him precisely where he is silent.

Take the silence first, because Mandel names the technique. In chapter 2, "The Immediate Causes" (pp. 22–34), he sets out the Pact in a single paragraph that begins by granting the Soviet government its defence. "Considering the wavering (to say the least) of the French and British governments over military collaboration in the event of a German aggression against

Poland, the Soviet government had every right to ensure its immediate safety in case of a German conquest of that country." That is Rzheshesky's own argument, put by a Trotskyist, without sarcasm. And then: "But the Hitler-Stalin pact contained a secret protocol which, even before that conquest had commenced, implemented a fourth partition of Poland. Therewith Stalin gave the green light to Hitler's aggression, temporarily saving the Third Reich from the nightmare of a prolonged war on two fronts. Russian historiography continues to deny this — by keeping silent about the secret protocol." (Mandel's next clause misdates the document to 27 August 1939; it was signed on the 23rd, and the slip is his, not his source's.) He adds: "Likewise, it draws a veil over Stalin's formal opposition to the survival of any Polish state."

The sentence is worth reading twice, because it is a description of a method rather than a complaint about a conclusion. Denial by keeping silent. It is what Rzheshesky does, and it is not the same thing as the older Soviet line, which called the protocol a forgery and could at least be argued with. Mandel, writing in Brussels with no access to Soviet archives, was able to say in 1986 what the archives confirmed in 1992 — and he did not need the archives, because the shape of the omission was itself the evidence. That is the standard against which this book must be read. It was met, in public, by a contemporary, in a book on the same shelf.

The same paragraph closes on the consequence Rzheshesky cannot admit: "The consequences of this cynical realpolitik for the Polish people's attitude towards the USSR remain disastrous to this day." Chapter 10, "The Opening Gambit in Europe" (pp. 99–105), spells out what "the liberation of Western Byelorussia and the Western Ukraine" looked like from the other side of the Bug: "Stalin too lent a helping hand by cutting off the retreat road for the Polish army when it finally decided to withdraw, and by occupying the Polish Ukraine, thereby adding fuel to Polish anti-Russian sentiment." Mandel's judgement of the calculation is one line: "In these circumstances, Stalin preferred to ally himself with the likely victor rather than with the probable victim." And in chapter 17, "The Aftermath" (pp. 159–168), the territories Rzheshesky says "rejoined the peoples of the USSR" by the correction of a historical injustice are described flatly as "recognition of what had been obtained through the Hitler-Stalin pact: the Baltic States, the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia as well as Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina."

Chapter 2 also supplies the missing chapter of Rzheshesky's 1941. Where this book explains the catastrophe of 22 June by

German numbers and German treachery, Mandel writes that Stalin's purges and diplomacy "decapitated the Red Army, disorganised the defences of the country, delivered Poland and Europe to Hitler, and facilitated the Nazi attack on the USSR," and that "the Red Army's complete lack of readiness in 1941 was the direct result of Stalin's disastrous misunderstanding of the political situation in Europe and of Hitler's — i.e. German imperialism's — intentions in the coming war." Chapter 5, "Strategy" (pp. 55–65), attributes the state of the armed forces to "Stalin's criminal purge of the Red Army, which compounded the effects of the bureaucratic mismanagement of the economy and society," and disposes of the retrospective claim that the retreats of 1941–42 had been a plan: "At the end of the war crude attempts were made to present the Red Army's defeats of 1941–42 as the products of a strategy of calculated retreat, deliberately drawing the Wehrmacht into the Russian interior only to destroy it in a series of counteroffensives. There is no substance whatsoever in such claims." Rzheshesky does not make that particular claim. He makes the deeper one — that there is no question here to answer.

On the spheres of influence, Mandel simply reports what Rzheshesky denies. Chapter 16, "The Outcome" (pp. 150–158): "At the Moscow Conference of October 1944 Churchill proposed to Stalin that the Soviet bureaucracy and British imperialism enjoy equal influence there: 50%–50%" — Yugoslavia — and Greece was the case where the bargain held, "despite Stalin's compliance with Churchill's demand that it be completely assigned to the British sphere of influence." Nor is the Warsaw Rising missing from Mandel, as it is from this book. Chapter 15, "The Final Onslaught" (pp. 139–149), gives the rising its causes, its two miscalculations and its outcome, and one sentence on the Soviet decision: "And Stalin blocked all help to Warsaw, letting the Germans do the dirty work of liquidating the Armija Krajowa he would otherwise have had to do himself."

Now the other side of the ledger, which matters more than it may look. On the claim Rzheshesky exists to make, Mandel is not merely in agreement but more emphatic. The whole post-war settlement, he writes in chapter 16, was not made at the conference table: the division of Europe "was clearly contrary to long-term interests of British and American imperialism. Yet it was an inevitable result of the Soviet Union bearing the brunt of the war against Hitler." He treats the standard Western complaint that Eisenhower and Montgomery handed Germans to "Soviet totalitarianism" in three words — "This is pure demagoguery" — and answers it with the fact that a large German army was fighting in the West to the last, citing

Diana Shaver Clemens for 185 German divisions on the Eastern front at the beginning of 1945 against 147 in the West and Italy. That figure is less lopsided than Rzheshesky's three-in-four, and it is drawn from the very end of the war, when the proportion had swung furthest west; the two are not in conflict, and neither historian is inventing.

On the second front Mandel goes past Rzheshesky rather than short of him. Chapter 11, "The Unfolding World Battle" (pp. 106–112), makes the delay a deliberate policy and says so in terms no Progress editor would have dared print in reverse: Britain and America offered material aid "to ensure that the USSR would bear the brunt of German aggression without collapsing under it," and "the delay in the opening of the Second Front, real difficulties notwithstanding, was motivated by this long-term objective: to let Germany and the Soviet Union exhaust one another." The Western allies "could choose when and where to engage Germany, and their choice was governed more by political, than military, considerations. The Soviet Union, by contrast, enjoyed no such luxury." And on lend-lease, the phrase is "the Soviet people paying in blood for the relatively modest food and military hardware aid programme from the West." Chapter 12, "Towards the Climax" (pp. 113–121), on Molotov's fruitless journeys of 1942: "it was made clear to Molotov that the Red Army must fight alone — or go under — at Stalingrad."

Mandel also credits the thing a Cold War reader was least willing to credit. The Soviet Union recovered after 1942, he writes in chapter 5, "because the tremendous increase in its industrial potential and productive reserve created by the October Revolution and the planned economy" made recovery possible — and he draws the contrast with the collapse of Tsarist Russia in the First World War.

So the tradition that convicts the silence concedes the substance, and concedes it harder. That is the reason to read the two books together, and it disposes of the defence this book was written to invite: that the omissions are the price of telling a truth the West would not hear. They were not the price. Mandel told the truth about the Eastern front and the second front and the planned economy without omitting anything, and he had no state behind him, no archive, and no print run of this size.

The reply that was made at the time

Trotsky wrote against the Pact within weeks of its signature, most fully in "The USSR in War" of 25 September 1939, and the Fourth International argued the question in public through

the crisis it caused in its own ranks. Forty-five years later the argument was still being made where this book was aimed.

Chapter Four of *Myths and the Realities* addresses the Western peace movement. That movement's own press answered it. International Viewpoint no. 79 of July 1985 carried Jacqueline Allio's report on the European Nuclear Disarmament conventions and the reception given there to "the very 'official' Soviet Committee for Peace," whose attempts to win the conference round "were a dismal failure, particularly since the authorities in the 'socialist' countries had refused to allow independent peace movement supporters visas to come to the convention." Enquiries about peace activists imprisoned in the East were met with the answer that "They are hooligans." The same piece quotes the Hungarian dissident János Kis warning the convention against any bargain in which "the western peace movement would be prepared to leave the eastern part of this continent to its fate," and East German activists insisting that the aim was "to establish contact between the equal rights and the peace movements in East and West Europe." Disarmament, that is, was not the property of the state that had suffered most.

On Katyn the answer came from the people the book accuses. International Viewpoint no. 83 of September 1985 reported the rotating hunger strike led by Anna Walentynowicz, the Lenin Shipyard worker whose sacking had touched off the Gdańsk strike of August 1980, in the church at Biezanów near Kraków, and the demonstration of 22 July 1985 at which the strikers "paid homage to the thousands of Polish soldiers killed in Katyn by the Soviet political police at the beginning of the Second World War." That was printed in the year this book was circulating in English, by the movement this book calls "the ideological mentors of the Polish counter-revolution."

The admissions came from Moscow soon enough, and this series has traced them elsewhere: the Soviet press conceding by 1988 that the Pact was a crime, the Congress of People's Deputies condemning the protocols on 24 December 1989, Gorbachev on Katyn in April 1990.

How to read it

Read the second and third chapters for what they are: a competent military historian's account of the Eastern front, with figures that hold, aimed at a Western readership that had genuinely been taught a lopsided war. Read the survey of Western historiography as an unusually well-informed guide to what one side of the Cold War was reading on the other. And then read Chapter One, and the Katyn section of Chapter Four,

as an object lesson in a specific technique: not lying about the numbers, which were the author's professional competence and were correct, but placing them where they will do the work of the things that cannot be said.

The distance between the two is the measure of what the apparatus cost a man who could count. Rzheshovsky lived to see the archives opened, and worked in them. The book he was commissioned to write in 1984 is the one printed here.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Political Consciousness in the USA

Five Soviet Americanists map the whole spectrum of American political thought - liberals, conservatives, the right radicals, the left - from Arbatov's institute, just after Reagan took the presidency.

Yu. A. Zamoshkin and E. Ya. Batalov

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

Political Consciousness in the USA is a Soviet anatomy of the American mind — an attempt to map, type by type, the whole spectrum of how Americans think about power, and to explain how that thinking is produced, held together and, at its upper reaches, managed. It is the work of the USSR Academy of Sciences' Institute of US and Canadian Studies, the Moscow institute that Georgi Arbatov built into the Soviet Union's most sophisticated window on the United States; Arbatov's own name stands in the index, and his *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations* (Progress, 1973) is cited in the opening pages. The book carries two general editors, Yu. A. Zamoshkin and E. Ya. Batalov, and five authors who divide the chapters between them: Batalov takes the Introduction, the methodological first chapter, the long chapter on the American left and the Conclusion; B. V. Mikhaylov the liberals, A. Yu. Melvil the conservatives, S. M. Plekhanov the right radicals, and Zamoshkin the closing chapter on the socio-psychological machinery behind the whole. These are not apparatus functionaries filling a template. They are professional Americanists — Melville would go on to a long career as one of post-Soviet Russia's leading academic political scientists — and it shows on every page.

Date the text, not the spine. The English edition is Progress Publishers' of 1984, and here the imprint is close to honest: the manuscript closed around 1982–83. Its horizon is the arrival of the Reagan administration "at the threshold of the 1980s," the 1980 election in which "some neoconservatives supported Republican Ronald Reagan, not Democrat Jimmy Carter," and "the state of affairs in the '70s and early '80s." It does not reach the crisis year of 1983 — the Strategic Defense Initiative, the Euromissile deployments, the destruction of KAL 007, the Able Archer scare — and one should not read those absences as findings, since the book's subject is the interior of American ideology and not the arms race. But its mood is the mood of the second Cold War all the same: the Conclusion frames its own moment as one of "attempts to turn the country rightward, to inhibit the process of detente," a book written in Moscow at

the coldest point of the decade about the ideological weather in the country across the ocean.

What was it for? Not, this time, the sympathetic Western reader the series has learned to stop assuming by default. This is a scholarly monograph in the ISKAN manner, aimed at Soviet specialists and cadre who needed a reliable, fine-grained account of how the adversary's population actually thought — and, in the Marxist frame the book never abandons, of how that thinking is engineered. The aim, Batalov writes in the Introduction, is to "critically analyze the spectrum of non-Marxist forms of political consciousness," treating it "as an integral dynamic system whose elements have complex interconnections." The result is genuinely ambitious: a taxonomy running from liberal-technocratic and liberal-reformist consciousness through the traditionalist, libertarian and neoconservative right, out to the radical-propertarian Birchists and radical racists, and across to the radical-democratic, rebellious and romantic currents of the New Left. Whatever else this book is, it is a serious piece of intellectual cartography.

The institution behind it is worth pausing on, because it sets the irony that governs everything below. The Institute of US and Canadian Studies was the Soviet establishment's premier producer of expertise on the enemy, and its director, Georgi Arbatov, was simultaneously a Central Committee member and one of the architects of the Soviet Union's own foreign-policy propaganda. The book the authors cite of his in their opening pages — *The War of Ideas in Contemporary International Relations* — is a study of, in its own subtitle, "the imperialist doctrine, methods and organization of foreign political propaganda." An institute that theorised how the adversary manages minds was itself a working organ of the Soviet state's management of minds; the men who mapped the American manufacture of consent worked inside the Soviet one. None of this is hidden in the text — it simply cannot be seen from where the text stands, and that blind spot is the most interesting thing about the book.

The doctrine, and where it is sharp

The organising thesis is orthodox and stated without embarrassment: political consciousness in a class society is not a free market of ideas but a structured field shaped, in the last analysis, by the relations of production and, at its commanding heights, by the class that owns them. The American peculiarity the authors keep returning to is the dominant class's unusual success at manufacturing consent. What distinguishes the United States, they argue, is "the ability of the dominant class, making use of the peculiar historical development of the USA," to create in social consciousness a "zone of common interest" broader than any in France or Italy — a "zone" whose concrete emblem is the "American dream" that "influences the consciousness of all classes." The mechanism by which this happened in the nineteenth century is named precisely: "Conditioned by market fetishism, mass consciousness assimilated the idea that exploitation, inequality and injustice" between social groups "were impossible under the laws of equivalent exchange, provided the exchange itself was carried out according to market rules." This is false consciousness in the strict sense — a real social relation misrecognised as a natural law — and the book's account of how *laissez-faire* ideology, once a progressive weapon against feudal regulation, hardened into "a smoke-screen of 'great principles'" masking "the actual power of the economic magnates" is one of the better short Marxist histories of American liberalism in English.

And when the book turns from ideology-in-general to the deliberate management of opinion, it can be very sharp indeed. Its single most penetrating stroke falls on the neoconservatives, then newly ascendant "among the ruling elite." Batalov's colleagues catch in Kristol and his circle exactly the trait a defender of elite rule most wants to hide: "Neoconservatism is unable to hide the fact that it regards the masses as an object of purposeful manipulation." Its whole posture, they write, is spoiled for mass appeal by an "elitist-manipulative orientation" — a governing stratum that "feel[s] that a partition exists between them and the rest of the populace, which are merely objects of their ventures." That is a real and durable observation about the technocratic managerialism of the American right, and it was made before the word "spin" had entered the language. The Conclusion generalises it into a verdict on the whole constitutional machine that few American radicals would dispute: "the US political mechanism is so shaped as to enable the well organized and wealthy minority to hold down or even paralyze the policy that is supported by the majority." A reader who has followed the fate of majority preferences on health care or gun

regulation in the decades since will not find that sentence dated.

The book is at its most useful, in fact, precisely where it draws on the American critical tradition rather than around it. Its typology of the New Left is built out of close, quoted engagement with the very writers the American radical canon rests on — Herbert Marcuse's "one-dimensional" man and the "Great Refusal," Theodore Roszak on technocracy, Charles Reich's *Greening of America*, and, standing behind the whole enterprise, the sociology of C. Wright Mills, whose name recurs in the index. When the authors write that the rebel radical sees "the permanent 'quiet' suppression of the individual and the cultivation of the 'one-dimensional' conformist by the state jointly with the corporations through the consumer mechanism," they are reporting the American New Left accurately and sympathetically, in its own terms. The chapters on the far right are better still, because there the Marxist lens and the evidence point the same way: the long anatomy of the John Birch Society's conspiracy theory, of Robert Welch and Gary Allen and the "invisible government" literature, of the radical-racist descent from the Klan through Francis Parker Yockey's *Imperium*, is documented from the primary sources and remains a serviceable guide to the American paranoid style. Where this book does research, believe it.

The mirror it will not hold up

And here the series' recurring irony arrives in its sharpest form yet. This is a forensic study of managed political consciousness — of censorship of the real by "great principles," of a "zone of common interest" manufactured to blur class lines, of an elite that treats the masses "as an object of purposeful manipulation," of political machinery "so shaped" that an organised minority can override the majority. It was produced, in 1984, by the ideological apparatus of the state that ran the most comprehensive machinery of consciousness-management in human history: a single-candidate ballot, a censorship office (Glavlit) that vetted every printed word, a monopoly of the press and the airwaves, and an agitation-and-propaganda department that reached from the Politburo down to the factory wall-newspaper. Every instrument the book forges to expose Madison Avenue and the neoconservative "partition" between the managers and the managed fits the hand that made it. The category "elitist-manipulative orientation" describes the nomenklatura with a precision its authors could not, on pain of their careers, apply at home. The verdict that a "well organized and wealthy

minority" can "paralyze the policy that is supported by the majority" is a fair description of a one-party state in which no policy was ever put to the majority at all.

The book even hands us the mirror and looks away from it. In the chapter on the far right, S. M. Plekhanov describes with contempt the internal life of American right-radical movements: their "bureaucratic centralism," their "strict ideological orthodoxy," the "sects as organizations of leaders, functionaries and activist cadres" in which "the activity of the masses is precisely regulated and directed from above" and "inner-party democracy is strictly proscribed." He means it as an indictment of Birchite authoritarianism. Every clause of it is a clinical description of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union under which he was writing. The one form of political consciousness the book never puts on the dissecting table — never treats as a structured, socially produced, potentially self-deceiving object — is the Marxist-Leninist one from which it writes. That vantage is exempted by construction. The typology is candid enough to admit the gap: it concedes that its own scheme "overlooks, for instance, the socialist tradition in American political ideology." What it cannot say is that the socialism it means is the American New Left it has just anatomised, and that the socialism it speaks from — the official doctrine of the Soviet party — is the one consciousness in the book that is permitted to be simply true.

This is not a private discovery of the present series. The Fourth International's founder built the whole method the book uses, and then did the thing the book refuses: he turned it around. In *Their Morals and Ours* (1938) Trotsky set out the doctrine of engineered consciousness in three sentences that the ISKAN authors could have taken as their epigraph — "The ruling class forces its ends upon society and habituates it into considering all those means which contradict its ends as immoral. That is the chief function of official morality." And then the decisive addition, the one this book cannot make: "Such a regime could not have endured for even a week through force alone. It needs the cement of morality." A ruling class rules by manufactured consent because terror alone is too expensive — that is the theory of ideology the Moscow authors apply to America. Trotsky applied it, in the same breath, to the Soviet bureaucracy, "a symmetrical complement in its own genre to fascism," a new privileged stratum that "is forced to resort to mendacity and frame-up in the struggle against the representatives of the revolution."

He had already shown, two years earlier, what that looked like in practice. *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) is the standing answer in this series to any Soviet account of Soviet society,

and its chapters on the press and the 1936 Constitution read as the negative of the book in your hands. Where *Political Consciousness in the USA* exposes how the American ruling class conceals real relations behind "great principles," Trotsky wrote of his own state that "everywhere and all the time — in the press, in speeches, in statistics, in the novels of its litterateurs, in the verses of its poets, and, finally, in the text of the new constitution — it painstakingly conceals the real relations both in town and country with abstractions from the socialist dictionary. That is why the official ideology is all so lifeless, talentless and false" (ch. 9). Where the ISKAN authors deplore the American right's regulation of "the activity of the masses... from above," Trotsky described the Stalinist press as a "continuation of the fierce advance-censorship whose chains are held by the Secretariat of a Central Committee whom nobody has elected" (ch. 10). And where the book charts the manufacture of American consent, Trotsky had already named its Soviet form exactly — the discussion of the "most democratic constitution in the world" that "reduced itself to sending resolutions of gratitude to Stalin," the guarantee of assembly that meant only "the obligation of certain groups of the population to appear at meetings summoned by the authorities for the adoption of resolutions prepared in advance" (ch. 10). That is the manufacture of consent as a state monopoly, and it was in print, in the tradition this introduction is written from, half a century before ISKAN turned the same searchlight on the country across the ocean and declined to swing it home.

There is a quieter falsification worth naming, because it is done by the shape of the categories rather than by any single claim. The book's most striking editorial decision is how it disposes of the American left. It grants coherent, historically serious "traditions" to liberalism and to conservatism, but when it reaches the radicals it dissolves them into a series of psychological types — the "radical-rebellious," the "radical-romantic," the "radical-propertarian" — organised around temperament, disappointment and the "artificiality of the wants imposed on people," rather than around any political programme the authors are prepared to take at face value. The New Left is read, sympathetically but decisively, as a mood: a revolt of the déclassé intellectual against technocracy, forever pinning its hopes on "outsiders" and never on the working class it "declares 'integrated in the system.'" This is not nothing — much of it is acute — but it is also a way of denying American socialism the standing of a politics. The book concedes the manoeuvre almost openly, admitting that its typology "overlooks, for instance, the socialist tradition in American political ideology, which is more than a century old." The organised socialist and communist currents of

American history — Debs, the old Socialist Party, the very tradition this introduction is written from — are absent not because the authors are ignorant of them but because the only socialism their frame can fully credit is the one headquartered in Moscow. Every other radicalism is a symptom; theirs alone is a science.

What survives

None of this makes the book worthless — the opposite. Because it is real scholarship, its findings about the United States mostly stand on their own feet, independent of the state that commissioned them, and several of them the American radical tradition would sign without alteration. The account of laissez-faire ideology congealing from a progressive weapon into a mask for monopoly; the diagnosis of the neoconservatives' contempt for the very public they claim to speak for; the observation that the constitutional machine is built to blunt majorities; the sober, sourced portrait of the John Birch Society and the neo-Nazi fringe — these are contributions, and a reader wanting to understand how the American right talked to itself at the dawn of the Reagan years will learn from them. The book's engagement with Mills, Marcuse, Reich, Roszak, Domhoff, Kolko and the rest is a genuine encounter with the sharpest American self-criticism, not a caricature of it. On the test this series applies hardest — does the author quote the people he judges, in the original, or only characterise them? — *Political Consciousness in the USA* passes with room to spare. Its footnotes are dense with *The Public Interest*, *Commentary*, *Newsweek* and the Birchite press, read closely and cited by page.

The trouble was never the instrument. It was, as the sibling volumes in this series keep finding, the fixed direction of the searchlight. ISKAN's Americanists — the same school, and in Batalov's case the same author, who elsewhere in this catalogue dissect the American two-party system, American political science and the "philosophy of revolt" with equal skill — built a superb tool for seeing how a ruling class shapes a nation's mind. They were forbidden, absolutely, from turning it on the ruling class that employed them. Read *Political Consciousness in the USA* for what it sees, which is a great deal; and read it, as its authors could not, all the way round.

Problems of Common Security

The architects of Soviet arms-control policy - Arbatov, Primakov, Petrovsky, Falin - writing under their own names for the Western peace movement, in the winter the Euromissile talks collapsed.

V. S. Shaposhnikov

Introduction to the 1984 Edition

This is a book with a date stamped through every chapter, and for once the date on the spine is the right one. The preface quotes Konstantin Chernenko from Pravda of 3 March 1984, a fortnight after he became General Secretary. It describes the Soviet counter-deployment of missiles taken "at the end of 1983". It names the American invasion of Grenada, which happened in October of that year, and the "focus of evil" — Ronald Reagan's phrase for the Soviet Union, from March 1983 — as a fresh insult. Twenty-six specialists wrote the twenty-six chapters, and they closed their manuscripts into the most dangerous winter of the second Cold War: the winter in which the Euromissile talks in Geneva collapsed, the intermediate-range weapons went into their silos on both sides, and the two general staffs came nearer to a launch on false warning than the public would learn for years. The book was assembled to be read in exactly that emergency, and it should be read now as a document of it.

It is not the work of a single scholar. The title page credits the Scientific Research Council on Peace and Disarmament and the Soviet Peace Fund, and the editorial board is a roster of the Soviet foreign-policy establishment: Georgi Arbatov, who ran the Institute for the USA and Canada and briefed general secretaries; Yevgeny Primakov; Vladimir Petrovsky, later a deputy foreign minister; Valentin Falin, of the Central Committee's international department; Oleg Bykov of the world-economy institute. V. S. Shaposhnikov signs as general editor and writes the preface. These are not peace campaigners who wandered into print. They are the men who manufactured Soviet arms-control policy, writing under their own names, in English, for export. The volume is a diplomatic instrument dressed as a scholarly symposium, and its intended reader is the Western peace movement — the millions who filled the squares of Bonn, London and Amsterdam in the autumn of 1983 to stop the Pershings. The book wants their trust, and much of it deserves a hearing.

It is worth being precise about the emergency the book was

written into, because the whole design of the volume answers to it. The Geneva talks on intermediate-range weapons — the "Euromissiles" the book keeps naming — had run since 1981 and collapsed in November 1983, when the Soviet delegation walked out in protest at the arrival of the first Pershing IIs in West Germany; the parallel strategic talks were suspended days later, and for the first time in over a decade the two sides were negotiating about nothing at all. Yuri Andropov, who had presided over that rupture, died in February 1984 as the book went to press, and Chernenko, a dying man himself, inherited it. Behind the diplomatic wreckage lay something the public did not yet know: in the same weeks, during NATO's Able Archer command exercise, elements of the Soviet leadership had briefly read the West's war-game as possible preparation for a real first strike. It was, on the evidence assembled since, the closest the world came to nuclear war between the Cuban crisis and the end of the Cold War. A book that speaks, in its preface, of "a period of highly dangerous international developments" and of the world being pushed "closer and closer to the edge of the abyss" was not exaggerating for effect. Its authors believed the danger, and on that belief the honest half of the book rests.

The organising word is in the title. "Common security" was not a Soviet coinage. It came from the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues chaired by Olof Palme, the Swedish social democrat, whose 1982 report *Common Security: A Programme for Disarmament* argued that in the nuclear age states could no longer be secure against each other but only with each other. It was the vocabulary of détente's attempted revival, neutral in origin, and the book reaches for it explicitly. "There are some people in the West," one contributor writes, "whose thinking brings them very close to the idea of collective security," and he quotes Palme directly: "We face common dangers and thus must also promote our security in common." To borrow Palme's frame was a shrewd move. It let a Soviet book speak the language of Western social democracy and Western science — Jonathan Schell's *The Fate of the Earth*, the Russell–Einstein Manifesto and the Pugwash conferences are all cited approvingly in the

first chapter — rather than the language of the Twenty-Sixth Congress. The question this introduction has to press is how much of Palme's mutuality survives contact with the apparatus that adopted it.

Begin by crediting what is sound, because a good deal of it is. The book's central factual claim — that a full nuclear exchange would end civilisation and possibly life on earth — was true, and in 1984 it needed saying against a US administration that had normalised talk of "limited" and "protracted" nuclear war. The opening chapter's summary of blast, fallout and the then-new hypothesis of nuclear winter is accurate popular science. The case against first-strike weapons is real: the book is right that the Pershing II and ground-launched cruise missiles arriving in Europe were, in its words, "a classic first-strike weapon", accurate and fast enough to threaten Soviet command posts in minutes, and that such weapons are destabilising precisely because they reward whoever shoots first. Its warning against the militarisation of space came months after Reagan's March 1983 "Star Wars" speech and reads, forty years on, as prescient rather than paranoid. Its chapter on the neutron bomb — Reagan authorised full production on 6 August 1981, "the 36th anniversary of the Hiroshima tragedy", the book notes with justified bitterness — makes an argument the anti-nuclear movement made in the same words. And its economic case is one Marxists and non-Marxists could share: quoting Marx, that arms spending is "the direct equivalent of a nation throwing part of its capital into the water", it sets hundreds of billions of military dollars against hunger, disease and illiteracy. On the arms race as such, on the folly of counterforce, on the waste, the book is largely rational, and a reader who wants the intelligent Soviet case against Reagan's military build-up will find it here, competently made. That much is not propaganda. It is the part of the argument that could be turned in any direction — and that is exactly why the book takes such care that it never turns homeward.

One rescue deserves to be made without qualification, because on it the book was right and its opponents were wrong. The chapter on chemical weapons rebuts the "yellow rain" affair — the US State Department's charge, pressed by Alexander Haig in a 1982 report to Congress "entitled 'Chemical Warfare in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan'", that the Soviet Union was supplying mycotoxin weapons used against tribespeople in Laos and against the Afghan resistance. The book replies that "in December 1982, the United Nations published a document which fully exposed as groundless Washington's slanderous allegations that Soviet-made poisonous substances have been used in Southeast Asia and Afghanistan." It happens that the

subsequent scientific record moved decisively the book's way: the "yellow rain" samples were later shown by Western analysts to be, in large part, the droppings of wild honeybees, and the charge is now generally regarded as a Cold War error. A reader who wants a demonstration that the Soviet side was sometimes the one telling the truth about an atrocity story will find one here. It is a useful corrective to the reflex that treats every Soviet denial as a lie — and it makes the volume's evasions elsewhere harder to excuse, not easier, because it shows the authors could tell a fabricated accusation from a real one when they chose to look.

The care shows first in the treatment of the SS-20. This was the Soviet missile whose deployment from 1977 triggered NATO's 1979 decision to answer with Pershings and cruise — the hinge of the whole crisis. The book handles it with a single arithmetical gesture, repeated in several chapters: "While installing two SS-20 missiles the USSR has been simultaneously dismantling three SS-4 and SS-5 missiles." Two in, three out: a reduction, plainly. The trouble is the unit. The SS-4 and SS-5 carried one warhead each; the SS-20 carried three, independently targetable. Counted in launchers the deployment shrank; counted in deliverable warheads — the only measure of what could actually strike a city — it roughly doubled Soviet intermediate-range firepower even as the missiles retired. The book knows the difference perfectly well. It uses warhead counts freely when they favour its side, insisting that "NATO countries possess 1.5 times more warheads carried by medium-range missiles than the Soviet Union", and it accuses the United States of having pioneered the MIRV. But on the one system where the warhead count would convict its own government of an escalation, it counts launchers and falls silent on warheads. The asymmetry is not an oversight. It is the method.

Around that gesture the book builds a general rule, stated most plainly in the chapter on strategic arms: "it is the USA that was the first to deploy new types and systems of weapons, while the Soviet Union acted only in response usually about some five years later." As history this is often true — the United States did lead at most rungs of the nuclear ladder — and as an alibi it is total. If every Soviet weapon is by definition a "response", then no Soviet weapon can ever be an initiative, and the whole subject of Soviet militarism disappears by construction. A chapter actually titled "Myth of the Soviet Military Threat" completes the manoeuvre: the threat is a "myth", the fears "unjustified", the Western demand for openness about Soviet forces made "chiefly for propaganda purposes". The reader is left with an arms race that has only one driver and one direction, in which the socialist side

possesses weapons but never agency. That is not analysis; it is the erasure of half the map.

The method's real test, though, is Afghanistan, because in 1984 the Soviet Union was in the fifth year of a war of its own. The book was written while the Fortieth Army was bombing villages in the Panjshir, while millions of Afghans were becoming refugees in Pakistan, while a counter-insurgency with no end in sight was grinding on at the USSR's southern border. A volume about the threat to peace, war crimes and militarism could hardly avoid it, and it does not. "Afghanistan" appears more than thirty times. What is remarkable is the angle of every appearance. The Soviet forces are always "a limited contingent of Soviet troops", introduced "at the request of the Afghan government and in conformity with international legal standards". They were sent "to defend the Afghan revolution in December 1979 at the request of the country's government". The book quotes the Soviet leadership of 25 April 1983 — "We do not seek anything for ourselves there. We have responded to the friendly neighbouring country's request for help" — and names Babrak Karmal, the man Soviet special forces installed after storming the palace and killing his predecessor, as the "legitimate government" doing the requesting. Everywhere else Afghanistan is a stick in Washington's hand: the pretext by which the United States sabotaged an Indian Ocean peace zone, the cover for CIA arms to "terrorist bands". The one thing that never appears in these thirty mentions is the war itself — the occupation, the bombing, the refugees, the fact that a large neighbouring country was resisting the Red Army by force and would go on doing so for five more years. A book that measures every American intervention against "the definition of aggression adopted by the United Nations" never once holds that definition up to its own government's tanks in Kabul. This is "common security" preached by a state waging a colonial war, and preaching it in the very years the war was at its height.

The same wiring runs through the book's silences. Its Part Three contains chapters titled "War Propaganda Is a Threat to Peace" and "Crimes Against Peace and Humanity", and it was written in the immediate aftermath of the single most inflammatory episode of the war scare: the destruction of Korean Air Lines flight 007 by a Soviet interceptor on 1 September 1983, with 269 people aboard, an event the West made into the centrepiece of exactly the "psychological warfare" the book denounces. On that episode the book is wholly silent. One can see why — the Soviet line was denial and justification, hard to fit into a volume about crimes against peace — but the silence is itself the finding. The category "crime against peace" is built so that it can only point outward.

The pedigree for all this is claimed from Lenin, and here the book joins a pattern this series has found in every Soviet foreign-policy volume it has examined. Twice the argument is anchored in a Lenin who "formulated" the principle of peaceful coexistence. Yet when a chapter comes to quote him in support — "Lenin stressed that socialism has a stake in peace because 'a better order of things cannot be created merely with the aid of war and bloodshed'" — the words inside the quotation marks say nothing about coexistence at all. The doctrine is asserted in the author's own voice, and in a school textbook the book approvingly cites ("the principle of peaceful coexistence established by Lenin"), while the actual Lenin quotations are about something else. Lenin's own slogan, the one the book does quote exactly, points the other way: "disarmament is the ideal of socialism" — an ideal, a thing belonging to the socialist future, which in Lenin's mouth carried no promise that a capitalist world could be disarmed by negotiation before it was overthrown. The pedigree is genuine as decoration and hollow as argument, and it is hollow in the same place every time.

The tradition from which this series is written answered these arguments as they were made, and it answered them without for a moment softening the case against Reagan's missiles. That is the point worth insisting on, because the lazy version of an anti-Stalinist critique would simply mirror the Cold War and treat a Soviet peace book as pure disinformation. The Fourth International did nothing of the kind. Its sections marched in the same demonstrations, against the same Pershings, and its press denounced NATO's deployment in terms as sharp as anything in this volume. What it refused was the bureaucracy's ownership of the cause. Trotsky had set out the structural critique in 1936, in the chapter of *The Revolution Betrayed* titled "Foreign Policy and the Army", and it reads like an advance review of this book. "Foreign policy," he wrote, "is everywhere and always a continuation of domestic policy," and the domestic policy of the Soviet ruling stratum had become the defence of its own position — so its diplomacy became the defence of the international status quo, dressed in the language of peace. The Communist International, he charged, "deceives the workers with slogans like 'collective security' and 'disarmament', and thus becomes in reality a political agent of the imperialists among the working classes"; the deepest damage of the bureaucracy's foreign policy lay in its "new religion of inaction". One need not accept Trotsky's harshest formulation — the 1980s Fourth International plainly did think a nuclear-armed world worth disarming — to see what he identified: a state that offers the defence of borders and the stability of blocs, and calls it socialism's peace policy. The book's own words confirm the

diagnosis without meaning to. Its authors describe Soviet policy as the pursuit of "regional stability" and "rough military parity" — the vocabulary of a satisfied power managing a status quo, not of the world revolution the same authors are obliged to invoke.

On Afghanistan the reply is on the record and it is exact. The United Secretariat of the Fourth International issued a declaration, printed in Intercontinental Press on 3 March 1980, that took neither side offered by the superpowers. It refused Washington's crusade and the mujahideen it armed; and it wrote that "the Soviet bureaucracy did not send its forces into Afghanistan in order to support the mass mobilization" but was "concerned, above all, with protecting its own power and interests", and concluded: "it is imperative that the Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan immediately and that the Kremlin recognize the right of self-determination for the people of this country." A French section's paper put the prognosis more bluntly two years later, in the same weekly: "What will go rotten in Afghanistan is the Soviet army." Set that beside the book's "limited contingent... at the request of the Afghan government", and the difference between the two traditions is laid out in full. One could name the war and demand its end while opposing the imperialist intervention around it. The other could denounce every intervention on earth except the one its own troops were fighting.

There is a further reason the book courts the Western movement so warmly, and it bears on how the movement should have read it. Part Three is generous in its praise of the Western peace campaigns — the "unprecedentedly massive anti-war movement", the "World Assembly for Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War, which gathered in Prague in June 1983" — and generous for a purpose. A movement that shut down NATO's deployment while leaving Soviet forces untouched was, from the standpoint of Soviet diplomacy, an unmixed asset, and the book's enthusiasm is proportional to that usefulness. What it never grants the movement is the independence that would let it point in both directions at once — to demand, in the same breath, no Pershings in Germany and no tanks in Kabul. The Western movement's own best sections understood the trap. The largest of them refused to become an auxiliary of either general staff, and the smaller revolutionary current from which this series is written spent the decade arguing, inside those movements, that a peace campaign owned by one of the nuclear-armed states was worth exactly as much as its willingness to criticise that state — which, in this book, is nil. Trotsky had named the mechanism half a century earlier: a "disarmament", he wrote in the same chapter, offered "while imperialist antagonisms survive, is the

most pernicious of fictions" when it asks the workers of the world to trust the peace policy of any state rather than their own strength. One may think, as the 1980s Fourth International did, that the nuclear danger made mass disarmament agitation necessary and right, and still hold that the danger is not lessened by handing the leadership of it to a foreign ministry.

So the book is two things at once, and an honest introduction has to hold both. It is a real and often intelligent argument against nuclear annihilation, made by serious people who understood the machinery they were describing and who were, on the physics and the economics and the madness of first-strike doctrine, largely right. And it is a machine for pointing that argument in one direction only — a peace book produced by the foreign-policy apparatus of a state that had built its every analytical instrument so that none could ever turn homeward, and that was at that moment five years into a war it could not name. The genuine case and the disqualifying evasion are not in separate chapters; they are in the same sentences, the missile that shrinks by the launcher and grows by the warhead, the definition of aggression held up to everyone but the holder. Read the book for the case it makes. Then read it for the war that is missing from it, and for the quiet, systematic labour by which twenty-six able men made sure their own state could invoke the security of all mankind while denying it to the country across its southern border.

PHILOSOPHY

Materialism and Empirio-Criticism

Lenin's 1908 attack on the Machist philosophy fashionable among his own comrades - written as a factional weapon, and later installed as the official philosophy of a sixth of the earth.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Introduction to This Edition

Of all Lenin's books, this is the one that travelled furthest from what it was to what it was made to mean. He wrote it in 1908, in the grey years after the defeat of the 1905 revolution, and he wrote it in anger at his own comrades. A group of talented Bolsheviks — Alexander Bogdanov above all, with Anatoly Lunacharsky and Vladimir Bazarov — had grown enchanted with the most fashionable philosophy of the day, the "empirio-criticism" of the physicist Ernst Mach and the philosopher Richard Avenarius (a positivism that dissolved the material world into bundles of sensation). Lenin thought this a betrayal of the materialist foundations of Marxism, and he set out to demolish it. What he produced was a factional weapon aimed at particular men in a particular quarrel. What the Soviet state made of it, a generation later, was the official philosophy of a sixth of the earth.

Take the book first on its own terms, because it has real force. Lenin's target is the idea that the world is only what we perceive of it — that, as the slogan of the day had it, physics had shown "matter has disappeared." Against this he insists on a world that exists independently of any mind that observes it, and he gives the definition that would be recited by Soviet students for eighty years: "Matter is a philosophical category denoting the objective reality which is given to man by his sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them." Knowledge, on this view, is a reflection — a copy — of a reality that does not depend on us. And when he turns to the crisis in the physics of his own moment, the disappearance of the solid Newtonian atom into fields and electrons, he is at his best: the crisis, he argues, is not the death of matter but the death of one picture of it, and science will keep going deeper without end. "The electron," he writes, "is as inexhaustible as the atom." That single phrase — knowledge as bottomless, never closed — is the most valuable sentence in the book, and, as we shall see, the one its later custodians most thoroughly betrayed.

But the book has a second argument running beneath the first, and it is the one that mattered for what came after. Lenin does not treat the quarrel with Mach as a disagreement that reasonable people might have. He treats every philosophy as the servant of a class. "Behind the epistemological scholasticism of empirio-criticism," he writes, "one must not fail to see the struggle of parties in philosophy, a struggle which in the last analysis reflects the tendencies and ideology of the antagonistic classes in modern society." There are, in the end, only two camps — materialism and idealism — and idealism, however it dresses itself, leads back to religion, to what he calls, borrowing Dietzgen's phrase, the "graduated flunkies of clericalism or fideism" (fideism being the doctrine that truth rests on faith rather than reason). This is the principle later canonised as *partiinost'* — party-mindedness in philosophy: the claim that there is no neutral ground, that every position is objectively partisan, and that the task of the Marxist is to identify which class a philosophy serves. As an insight it has a point: ideas are not innocent of the interests they carry. As a rule of judgement it is a loaded gun, because it lets a doctrine be condemned for the camp it allegedly belongs to rather than refuted for what it says.

This is the tension an honest reader must hold. Lenin's anti-relativism — his insistence that there is a real world and a real truth about it, not reducible to whatever we find convenient to believe — is a genuine and durable contribution, and the century that followed, with its fashions for treating all knowledge as mere construction, has not made it less needed. Yet the epistemology he defends is cruder than the cause deserves. The "copy, photograph, reflect" theory of knowledge is a flat, almost pre-dialectical realism: the mind as a mirror, ideas as snapshots of things. It was on exactly this ground that the book drew its sharpest criticism from within the revolutionary left — the Dutch council-communist Anton Pannekoek, in his *Lenin as Philosopher* (1938), argued that Lenin's materialism was the mechanical, middle-class materialism of the natural sciences rather than the historical materialism of Marx, and that its very crudeness fitted it to become a state creed. Whatever one makes of that verdict, the

polemical method of the book — sorting thinkers into the friends and the agents of reaction, and reading a man's epistemology off his politics — is a habit that would prove terribly convenient to people with the power to enforce it.

Which brings us to the edition in your hands, and to what was done with the text. This translation, by Abraham Fineberg, is taken from Volume 14 of Lenin's Collected Works, published by Progress Publishers in Moscow in 1972. By 1972 Materialism and Empirio-Criticism was no longer a polemic; it was Scripture. It had become the foundation stone of diamat — dialectical materialism, the compulsory philosophy of the Soviet state, taught in every institute, examined in every discipline. The reflection theory was presented not as Lenin's contested position in a 1908 argument but as the settled Marxist theory of knowledge; *partiinost'* was presented not as a polemicist's weapon but as a principle of method. The Soviet editorial apparatus around this volume — the introductions, the notes of the Institute of Marxism-Leninism — frames the book exactly so: as the definitive refutation of a "reactionary philosophy," its occasion safely historical, its doctrine permanently binding. What the framing cannot say is what the doctrine was used to do.

For *partiinost'* in philosophy became, in the hands of the state, precisely the licence its logic invited. A weapon forged in 1908 to win a faction fight against Bogdanov was, by the 1930s, the instrument for enforcing a single official philosophy and for condemning any deviation from it as service to the class enemy. The philosopher Abram Deborin's school was denounced and broken; Stalin's Dialectical and Historical Materialism of 1938 fixed the catechism; and the principle that a doctrine could be judged by the camp it served was turned loose on science itself — on genetics, where Lysenko's fraud was protected as the "materialist" biology and Mendelian inheritance damned as idealist reaction; on relativity, on quantum mechanics, on cybernetics, each in its turn arraigned before the tribunal of party philosophy. Here is the bitterest irony the book contains. Lenin had written that the electron is as inexhaustible as the atom — that knowledge has no final floor, that inquiry never closes. The state that made his book holy used it to close inquiry: to draw a line around what a materialist was permitted to think and to treat the crossing of that line as a crime. The text that celebrated the bottomlessness of knowledge became the charter of an official orthodoxy that forbade the very openness it praised.

Read as what it was — a brilliant, overbearing, deeply occasional polemic by a revolutionary who believed the reality of the world was worth fighting for — the book rewards the

reader still, above all in its refusal to let the truth about nature be dissolved into fashion. Read as what it was made into — the closed philosophy of a closed state — it is a warning about what happens when the claim that every idea serves a class is handed to those with the power to decide which class, and to act on the answer. Both readings are in these pages. The first is Lenin's. The second is the apparatus's, and it is the reason the book needs an introduction at all.