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HISTORY

Lenin: A Biography

The authorised Soviet life of Lenin, prepared by the Central Committee's own institute and published without an author's name - including its careful handling of the last writings, which by then could not be left out.

Dmitry Chasovennikov

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

The publishers' note to this volume is four lines long and tells you everything about its authority: "This translation has been made from the Russian text prepared by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism, CC CPSU." No author is named, because there is no author. This is the official life — two hundred thousand words, fourteen chapters, a name index of some three hundred entries, produced by the research institute attached to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and issued in English for the world. It represents the canonical Soviet Lenin in his most finished state: every sentence weighed, nothing left to accident.

The English printing is dated 1983, which places it in the brief Andropov interval between Brezhnev's death and the arrival of Gorbachev. The text is not an Andropov text. The copyright page carries no printing history, only the Soviet production code '014(01)-83', but the internal evidence dates the Russian original to the last Brezhnev year or two: the latest Party event it can cite is "the decisions of the 25th and 26th CPSU Congresses", the 26th having met in February and March 1981; the latest fact of any kind is that "367 translations of his works were made in various countries in 1981". Brezhnev is quoted twice, by name; Andropov does not occur, and neither does Gorbachev. This is a late-Brezhnev book in an Andropov-year jacket, and should be read as one.

Books like this are usually dismissed as hagiography and set aside. That is a mistake, and it is a mistake for a specific reason. This is not the 1938 Short Course. Stalin died thirty years before it was printed, the Twentieth Congress had happened, and the Institute was working under a set of constraints that had loosened in some places and tightened in others. The result is a document of unusual analytical value, because it is a book that must narrate the last two years of Lenin's life — 1922 to 1924 — in which Lenin's own writing turned against the apparatus that would canonise him. It cannot avoid those writings; by 1983 they were published in the Soviet Union and known everywhere. So it must handle them.

Watching precisely how it handles them, sentence by sentence, is worth more than any denunciation.

Start with the hardest case, the "Letter to the Congress" — the Testament. It is here. The book gives it a section, calls it by name, describes its dictation in intimate detail from the journal of Lenin's duty secretaries, and quotes it: "Comrade Stalin, having become General Secretary, has unlimited authority concentrated in his hands, and I am not sure whether he will always be capable of using that authority with sufficient caution." It then goes further than a reader might expect, and prints the proposal itself — that the comrades "think about a way of removing Stalin from that post and appointing another man in his stead who in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc.". That is on the page, in 1983, in a book prepared by the Central Committee's own institute. Credit where it is due: the post-1956 admission held, and it held in the export edition.

Now look at what has been taken out of the middle. The second of those quotations, the proposal to remove Stalin, is the second sentence of the postscript Lenin dictated on 4 January 1923. The first sentence of that postscript is missing. In Trotsky's translation it runs: "Stalin is too rude, and this fault, entirely supportable in relations among us Communists, becomes insupportable in the office of General Secretary." In Lenin's text the removal follows from the rudeness — the proposal begins "Therefore". The premise has been cut and the conclusion kept, and the word "rude" does not appear anywhere in this book, of Stalin or of anyone else. The Institute has printed the remedy and deleted the diagnosis, so that Lenin appears to have worried vaguely about a concentration of authority rather than to have made a concrete charge about a man's character. And having removed the reason, the book supplies a resolution. At the Thirteenth Congress in May 1924, we are told, the letter was read to the delegations, and "Bearing in mind the important role of Stalin in repulsing the Trotskyite attacks on Leninism and his authority in the Party and trusting that he would take into

account Lenin's critical remarks, the delegations expressed themselves in favour of Stalin retaining the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee." Lenin proposed; the Party, on mature reflection, declined. The dead man is overruled by a vote and the matter is closed.

The deletion is the more remarkable because Stalin himself did not attempt it. Pressed by the Opposition in 1927, he conceded the document from a public platform in Moscow, in a speech reprinted in *International Press Correspondence* on 17 November that year: "It is said that in the 'Testament' in question Lenin suggested to the party congress that it should deliberate on the question of replacing Stalin and appointing another comrade in his place as General Secretary of the party. This is perfectly true ... Yes, comrades, I am rude towards those who are rudely and disloyally destroying and disintegrating the party." The passage was reprinted, with the full text of the Testament, in *The New International* vol. II no. 1 (January 1935) — then still the magazine of the American Trotskyists, five years before the split that carried the title over to Max Shachtman. Stalin admitted the word from a platform and defended himself with it. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism, half a century later, took it out.

The book then does something stranger, and more revealing than it can have intended: it prints both halves of its own contradiction, in consecutive paragraphs, without noticing. First Krupskaya's minute of 18 May 1924, handing the notes over — "It was Vladimir Ilyich's express wish that these particular notes be submitted to the next Party Congress after his death." Then the Central Committee's decision of 21 May: "In accordance with Lenin's wish, the said documents shall be put before the Congress. They shall be read separately to the delegations with the provision that they are not to be reproduced." There it is — the mechanism of suppression, reproduced verbatim in the official biography as evidence of compliance. Lenin had asked that the notes be submitted to the Congress. They were read aloud, in separate rooms, and forbidden to be copied. The Institute quotes the order as though it were the fulfilment of the request, three lines after quoting the request.

Then there is Trotsky, and here the falsification is not an omission but an invention. "Lenin pointed to Trotsky's 'non-Bolshevism'," the book says, "mentioned his struggle against the Central Committee." Lenin's text says the opposite of what that sentence implies. What he wrote, in the same paragraph, was that "the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev was not, of course, accidental, but that it ought as little to be used against them as the non-Bolshevism of

Trotsky" — he raises the non-Bolshevik past precisely in order to rule it out of court. And the Testament's actual verdict on Trotsky — "personally, he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee" — is nowhere in this volume. The judgement does not occur in any form.

What makes this worth dwelling on is that it is not a new trick, and that it had already been caught in print, in English, a generation earlier. Writing as Ernest Germain, Ernest Mandel devoted a two-part article, "Thirty Questions and Thirty Answers about the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", to the Khrushchev-era official history of 1959, in *Fourth International* — the journal of the International Secretariat — nos. 10 and 11. (The archive holds no issue dates for that run and none should be invented; marxists.org files the piece under 1962. The material below is all from no. 11.) His fourteenth question asks whether the new history re-establishes the truth about the Testament, and answers: "In the 1938 Short Course, Lenin's Testament is completely passed over in silence. In the new History, it is quoted on pages 387-8, but in a singularly mutilated and falsified way." He then itemises the method. It "suppresses Lenin's opinion that Trotsky is 'the most gifted' member of the Central Committee." And: "According to the History, Lenin warned the party against Trotsky's 'non-Bolshevism'; in reality Lenin wrote that Trotsky's non-Bolshevik past must not be brought up any more than the errors committed by Zinoviev and Kamenev on the eve of the October Revolution." That is an exact description of a book published twenty-odd years later. Mandel's closing observation applies unchanged: the omissions "are all the more grotesque in that the Testament has been published in the USSR and each reader can realize, by comparing the two texts," how far the editors have gone.

The Georgian affair is a different order of problem, because it has not been mutilated. It has been removed. Search this biography of two hundred thousand words for the word "Georgia" and you find it once, at the back, in the name-index entry for Mikhail Tskhakaya, a Georgian Bolshevik of the pre-revolutionary generation who has nothing to do with the events of 1922. "Georgian" does not occur at all. There is no Georgian affair. There is no Tiflis, no Mdivani, no Makharadze, no Dzerzhinsky commission, no striking of a Georgian communist in the face, no Lenin dictating that he had failed the workers of Russia by not intervening soon enough, no note offering Trotsky the case for the defence. Trotsky set out the alignment in December 1932, in "On the Suppressed Testament of Lenin": the bureaucratic national policy "had already at that time provoked a keen opposition in Georgia, uniting against Stalin and his right hand man, Ordzhonikidze,

the flower of Georgian Bolshevism", and Lenin "got into private contact with the leaders of the Georgian opposition (Mdivani, Makharadze, etc.) against the faction of Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky." Of those five names this book carries three. Dzerzhinsky appears twice, both times honourably. Ordzhonikidze — spelled "Orjonikidze" here, which is why a search on the usual English form returns a misleading nil — appears eleven times, all of them before 1918, arranging Lenin's escape to Finland and refusing to hand him over for trial; his index entry gives his dates as 1886–1937 and closes on "several responsible Party and government posts", leaving the reader to notice, if they can, that it stops in the worst year of the Terror and to supply their own explanation.

And yet the letter provoked by the affair is here, at length. "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'" gets the better part of seven hundred words. Detached from the events that caused Lenin to dictate it, it becomes a meditation on fraternal friendship: the union must be maintained, centralism must be combined with republican sovereignty, equality must be factual and not merely formal. Great-Russian chauvinism is mentioned, but as a general danger, balanced in the next paragraph by "the danger of local nationalism, of national egoism" — which is exactly the equivalence Lenin wrote the letter to destroy. The section then closes with a sentence that should be read twice: "Acting on Lenin's instructions, the Communist Party has solved the national question in the best possible way." A document written in fury about the bullying of a small nation by a Russified apparatus has been converted into a testimonial for the apparatus. Nothing is falsified; a cause is simply amputated from its effect.

The same amputation is performed on Krupskaya, and more finely. The book records the evening of 15 December 1922 in detail, including the fact that "Krupskaya telephoned the Secretariat of the C.P.C. on Lenin's behalf and asked them to inform Stalin that Lenin would not be able to speak at the Congress of Soviets." It is her role as her husband's channel to the Secretariat in exactly these weeks that provoked what followed: Stalin's abuse of her down the telephone, her appeal to Kamenev, and Lenin's letter of 5 March 1923 demanding an apology on pain of breaking off relations. The Institute has the calls and the dictations and not one word of the sequel. It is not that the episode was unavailable to the Central Party Archives; it is that the book prints the first half of it and stops.

The fight over the foreign-trade monopoly survives, and it survives with a detail the Institute seems not to have registered. On 15 December 1922, we are told, Lenin dictated

a letter to Stalin opposing delay on the monopoly, and "He also dictated a letter to Trotsky about Trotsky's speech in support of the foreign trade monopoly at the coming Plenary Meeting." That is the Lenin–Trotsky bloc, stated as a fact of the calendar, in the same chapter that explains that Trotsky spent these months in "opportunist, splitting activity". No connection is drawn. A reader who knows what happened in December 1922 will see the whole of it in that one sentence; a reader who does not will pass over it. "Better Fewer, But Better" is present too, and is put to work: it becomes a text about administrative economy, about "reducing our state apparatus to the utmost degree of economy", and its function is to explain why the Twelfth Congress merged the Central Control Commission with the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection — a body that within a few years would be an instrument for policing the Party rather than the bureaucracy.

Two further silences are worth naming because of where they fall. The Tenth Congress "took place between March 8 and 16, 1921", and the book describes its business fully: the tax in kind, the trade unions, the resolution on Party unity. The Kronstadt rising is not mentioned. The rebellion was being stormed across the ice in exactly those days, and delegates left the Congress hall to take part in the assault; here the crisis of early 1921 is rendered as crop failure, fuel shortage, war-weariness, and "Kulak revolts" that "broke out in various parts of the country". The book is not, in general, shy of Kronstadt: it narrates the rising there in July 1906 against the tsar, and records that "Both risings, however, were brutally crushed." It has the phrase. It simply does not use it in 1921. The ban on factions, by contrast, is not merely present but celebrated, and is explicitly detached from the emergency that produced it: "Lenin's resolution on Party unity is a most important historical document. As the directive which the Party and all its bodies have followed in preserving the unity of its ranks, it played a cardinal role in the subsequent struggle against all anti-Party groups." Lenin proposed the ban as a temporary measure in a desperate spring. The Institute records it as permanent doctrine, and correctly so, since that is what it became — including for the men named in the Testament.

That last sentence is not rhetoric, and the place to check it is the name index, which is where this book keeps the things its narrative will not say. Read the entries end to end and a shape appears. Zinoviev, 1883–1936, "expelled in 1934 for factional activities". Kamenev, 1883–1936, "expelled from the Party in 1934 for anti-Party activities". Pyatakov, 1890–1937, expelled 1936. Sokolnikov, 1888–1939, expelled 1936. Bukharin, 1888–1938, expelled 1937. Khristian Rakovsky, 1873–1941, expelled 1938. In every case the entry closes on an expulsion,

and the dates close, one to three years later, on a death the entry does not explain. Alexander Shlyapnikov, who led the Workers' Opposition that this book condemns at length without naming a single member of it, is not even given an expulsion: he is "Chairman of the Central Committee of the All-Russia Metal-Workers' Union (1919–22)", and then 1937. The pattern is not the removal of names. The names are there, some of them warmly. Rakovsky — a Balkan socialist who opposed the war from Romania, later head of the Soviet Ukrainian government and Soviet ambassador in London and Paris, and after that a leader of the Left Opposition — appears in the narrative among the internationalists who resisted the collapse of the Second International, as "Kh. Rakovski in Rumania". The index knows him under the other transliteration, and knows that he died in 1941; he was shot that September. What has been removed is the ending, and a reader can reconstruct it only by noticing that they all stop between 1936 and 1941, and that a book which knows their dates to the year cannot say what the year means. Stalin's own entry says it obliquely and once, in a formula worth preserving as a specimen: he "played a prominent part in building socialism in the USSR, combating Trotskyists and right opportunists, and facilitating Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War (1941–45); at the same time committed theoretical and political errors and gross violation of socialist laws". "Gross violation of socialist laws" is where the Terror lives in this volume: in an alphabetical list, at the back, in the passive voice.

Something similar governs October. The Revolutionary Military Committee — the body that actually executed the insurrection — is named eight times: its creation by the Petrograd Soviet on 16 October, its continuous session on the second floor at Smolny, the workers placing themselves at its disposal, and its founding proclamation, quoted in full, announcing that "State power has passed into the hands of the organ of the Petrograd Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies—the Revolutionary Military Committee, which heads the Petrograd proletariat and the garrison." A member of it, K. A. Mekhonoshin, is quoted from his memoirs. The one thing never stated is who chaired it — and this is not squeamishness about chairmanships in general, since Zinoviev is later introduced without embarrassment as "Chairman of the Petrograd Soviet". The office is simply left vacant, and the space filled from Mekhonoshin, who supplies a commander: "Comrade Lenin was the true commander-in-chief of all the armed forces of the October revolution... Lenin can boldly be called our first Red marshal." It is fair to record, though, that a cruder falsification has been dropped. The Short Course of 1938 claimed a "Party Centre" headed by Stalin had directed

the insurrection — the legend Trotsky demolished in *The Stalin School of Falsification*, in the "Letter to the Bureau of Party History" that is chapter 4, by the simple observation that "Neither was Lenin a member of that committee." This book quotes the 16 October resolution calling for "support of the centre set up by the Central Committee for this purpose", and then says nothing about who was on it. The legend has been abandoned; the quotation is left standing with nobody in it.

A word is needed about the book's vocabulary, because it is conspicuous and because the obvious inference from it is wrong. Opportunism and its cognates occur 202 times here, about ten per ten thousand words against an average of 1.55 across the 195 Progress volumes in this catalogue — the third densest use in the collection. That figure proves nothing. Part of it is simply the subject: Lenin used the word constantly and meant something definite by it, and a life of Lenin inherits the usage. The rest is disposed of by measurement. The Fourth International's own Tenth World Congress documents, printed in *Intercontinental Press* vol. 12 no. 46, 23 December 1974, use the same family of words at 1.69 per ten thousand. On frequency the two traditions are indistinguishable, and nobody is entitled to convict anybody of ritualism by counting.

What can be tested is whether the charge is attached to an act that could be shown not to have happened, and whether the category could ever be turned on the speaker. On the first, this book divides at 1917. Before it, the usage is as concrete as anyone could ask. The collapse of the Second International is dated, costed and peopled: "On August 4, 1914, acting in contravention to the will of the International, the Social-Democratic group in Germany voted with the bourgeois-landowner majority in the Reichstag in favour of giving the Kaiser government war credits amounting to 5,000 million marks", after which Südekum, Scheidemann, Haase, Legien and Kautsky are named for it. The counter-example is given too — "Liebknecht, Lenin said, had set an example to all internationalists by voting in the Reichstag against war credits" — and so are the Serbian deputies who voted against. Every element of that is checkable, and any of it could be refuted by producing the division lists. After 1917 the same word stops doing that work. Trotsky's index entry calls him "ideologist and leader of the opportunist trend in the RSDLP": no act, no date, no organisation, nothing that could be false. This is where the book's other habit becomes relevant. The name "Trotsky" occurs sixty-one times, and he is in the wrong on every one of them; "Trotskyism", "Trotskyite" and "Trotskyist" account for twenty-one more, so that the man and the category are almost equally present. His slogans and positions are quoted repeatedly, in quotation marks — and the

footnotes reference no work by Trotsky at all — not one, in two hundred thousand words with several hundred citations to Lenin, to memoirs, to Party resolutions and to Marx. An opponent who is cited can be checked; an opponent who is only characterised cannot.

On the second question the answer is not peculiar to this volume. Across the whole Progress catalogue, ninety passages place the word within a line or two of "our Party" or "the CPSU", and in every one the Party is combating opportunism, never accused of it. The distinction this book maintains is precise, and worth stating exactly, because it is not a simple refusal to admit fault: individual leaders are recorded as wrong — Zinoviev and Kamenev in October, Stalin and Sverdlov voting against Lenin a fortnight later, the Party's practical workers underrating the co-operatives — but the category is never available for use against the Party, or against anyone who stayed inside it. Error is admitted; opportunism is what other people have. The nearest thing to an exception is a sentence about 1918 in which the counter-revolution hopes to undermine Soviet power "by using the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks and also opportunist elements in the Bolshevik Party itself" — where the Party is a body being infiltrated, not an agent that could be wrong. And the honest thing to record here is that the essentialising move is not the Institute's invention. The book quotes Lenin himself: "The whole struggle of our Party (and of the working-class movement in Europe generally)," he wrote, "must be directed against opportunism. The latter is not a current of opinion, not a tendency; it (opportunism) has now become the organised tool of the bourgeoisie within the working-class movement." (The scan prints "workingclass"; the hyphen is restored, and nothing else in these quotations is altered.) That is a definition designed to make argument unnecessary, and Lenin wrote it. What Lenin also did, constantly, was name the vote, the man and the date. The Institute kept the definition and dropped the practice.

None of which should send the reader away. This book contains a great deal of real work, and the honest thing is to say where.

Some of the honesty is in exactly the places one would expect it to fail. On Brest-Litovsk, where three other volumes in this series confuse Trotsky's position with Bukharin's, this book gets it right: the Left Communists "called for a 'revolutionary war' against Germany", Trotsky "suggested declaring the war over, demobilising the army, but not signing any peace treaty", and the January vote is given as thirty-two for revolutionary war, sixteen for Trotsky's position — named in the text as

"neither peace nor war" — and fifteen for signing. Condemned, but described accurately. More striking still, the book records that when Lenin demanded the expulsion of Zinoviev and Kamenev in October 1917, "Most of the Central Committee members (Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov and others) who were present did not support Lenin's proposal." Stalin is named, in the Institute's own voice, on the wrong side of a vote against Lenin. Where the same admission is not made is March 1917: the opposition to the April Theses inside the Bolshevik Party has been removed entirely, its named opponents here are Plekhanov, Dan and Tsereteli, all of them outside, and we are told that "Lenin's position quickly won over leading Party workers and Party organisations." The Institute's own *International Working-Class Movement*, volume 3, published in the same year by the same body, concedes that Kamenev's March line was deeply erroneous and that Stalin's was mistaken. This book does not mention that there was a March line.

The early chapters are the best of it. The account of the Ulyanov family draws on genuine archival recovery and says so: "Recently discovered documents contain important information about V. I. Lenin's grandfather. N. V. Ulyanov. He came from a family of serf peasants in the Nizhegorodskaya gubernia and was himself a serf." That is a finding, and it is presented as one. The long emigration — 1900 to 1917, the years most Western biographies compress — is here reconstructed at a level of detail that remains hard to find in English anywhere else: the rooms in Secheron, the Richters in a house near the British Museum, the reading rooms in Berlin and Geneva and Copenhagen, the Party school at Longjumeau in the spring of 1911 and what became of its students, the arrest at Poronin and the cart back through the Galician villages. Whatever one thinks of the Institute's politics, its access to the Central Party Archives was real, and much of the chronology, the correspondence and the domestic texture in these chapters is sound and is not available in this fullness elsewhere.

The same is true of the final chapter's clinical narrative. The journal of Lenin's duty secretaries from November 1922 to March 1923 is quoted extensively and to powerful effect — Volodicheva noting that he "dictated quickly, but was obviously ill", and asked her what day it was; the doctors' resolution that he might dictate five to ten minutes daily, that "Visitors are forbidden", and that "neither his friends nor members of his family should tell Vladimir Ilyich any political news". That last instruction is quoted approvingly, as evidence of care. It is also the most sinister sentence in the book, and the Institute prints it without appearing to see why.

And the volume supplies, in good faith, the material for its own indictment. It records Lenin telling a few leading comrades in September 1918: "I note with deep dissatisfaction that my person is being glorified. This is annoying and harmful. All of us know that personalities have nothing to do with it." It records him forbidding a Lenin Museum in 1920 — "You can't imagine how unpleasant I find the constant promotion of my personality" — and asking a cameraman to "Take fewer pictures of me and more of those who are going to listen to me". A reader who has these passages and also has the preface, with its "guiding star to the working folk of all lands", does not need to be told what happened between 1920 and 1983.

For the reply, the archives are rich and specific, and much of it is Lenin's own generation answering in its own time. The Testament was printed complete, in English, in *The New International* vol. II no. 1 (January 1935), with the note that the leadership had refused by thirty votes to ten to have it read to the Thirteenth Congress. Trotsky's "On the Suppressed Testament of Lenin" (December 1932) is the fullest account of both the document and the Georgian crisis behind it, and his speech to the Twelfth Congress of April 1923, later printed as "Lenin's Struggle Against Bureaucracy" in the *International Socialist Review* vol. 26 no. 4 (whole no. 173, Fall 1965), is the contemporaneous argument itself. On the falsification of party history the standing text is *The Stalin School of Falsification* (1937). Mandel's "Thirty Questions" in *Fourth International* nos. 10 and 11 is the indispensable guide to reading books of this kind, and remains a working manual. His "Lenin's Heritage" in *Intercontinental Press* (vol. 8, no. 15, 20 April 1970) states the case in a sentence: "Lenin's last struggle was a desperate attempt to stop this perversion of his doctrine." On the Georgian affair, an editorial note in *Inprecor* No. 20 (27 February 1975) corrects a misdescription in circulation at the time and puts the alignment plainly: "Boudou Mdivani was a Georgian Bolshevik with whom Lenin and Trotsky made a bloc against the brutal national policies of Stalin and Ordjonikidze." Four years after this biography appeared, when Gorbachev's speech of 2 November 1987 reworked the Testament again, the United Secretariat of the Fourth International answered it in *International Viewpoint* No. 130 (November 1987) under the heading "Stalin's school of falsification", noting that it is Stalin "whom the Testament proposed should be removed from his post of general secretary", and that the speech "passes over the Testament's main judgement on Trotsky". That statement identifies Trotsky in its first line as "chair of its Revolutionary Military Committee" — the office this book leaves empty. For the scholarship, Daniel Bensaïd's "In defence of Communism" in

International Viewpoint No. 307 (January 1999) points where a reader of this volume should go next: to Lenin's "Last Testament" and the "Journal of Lenin's Secretaries" as read by Moshe Lewin in *Lenin's Last Struggle* — the same documents the Institute quotes here, read by someone under no obligation to reach a predetermined conclusion.

Read this book, then, for what it knows and for what it cannot say. Its Lenin is a man of iron will, boundless modesty and unflinching correctness, whose final six weeks of dictation produced "a single work setting forth in general outline the programme of the socialist transformation of Russia". The actual Lenin of those weeks was a partly paralysed man, forbidden political news by his doctors and stripped of allies, trying at five minutes a day to warn a Party that he had made against the man he had promoted, over a question — the crushing of a small nation by Russian officials — that he had come to think dishonoured everything he had done. The Institute of Marxism-Leninism possessed every document required to tell that story. It had them in its own archive, and it quotes from them on these pages. What it produced instead is the most polished monument ever built to a man who asked, twice and in writing, not to be monumentalised.

MARXISM

Lenin On the Intelligentsia

Ninety passages of Lenin on the intelligentsia - its vacillation, its indispensability, and how a revolutionary state should use people it did not trust. Every item an excerpt, which makes the editing itself the thing to read.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

This is a book almost entirely made of fragments, and it says so. Of the ninety-odd items in it, eighty-nine begin with the word *From*. The five that do not are two government decrees, two letters and one brief report of a speech. There is not a single complete article, pamphlet or address by Lenin between these covers. The foreword ends by telling you as much, in a sentence so flat that it reads as housekeeping: "This collection contains excerpts from Lenin's fundamental works, articles, speeches and reports, arranged in chronological order and supplemented with notes and a name-index."

So the question this volume poses is not the usual one. Nothing here has been rewritten; there is no evidence anywhere in these 63,000 words of a Lenin sentence doctored or a Lenin argument inverted. The Publishers' Note states plainly that "The translations are taken from the English edition of V. I. Lenin's Collected Works prepared by Progress Publishers, Moscow, except otherwise indicated," and where the sources can be checked against the Collected Works they check out. The question is what the scissors did — which sentence each excerpt begins at, which one it stops before, and what the compilers' own apparatus says about the men in it. On that evidence the volume turns out to be both more honest and more damning than a reader expecting simple censorship will predict.

First, the date, since the spine can mislead in this series. The copyright page reads "First printing 1983 / © Progress Publishers, 1983", with the imprint code 014(01)-83; the Russian title is *Ob intelligentsii*. The foreword carries its own line, "English translation © Progress Publishers, 1982". So this is a genuine early-1980s book and not a reprint of an older one — but its doctrinal furniture is late-Brezhnev, not Andropov. The latest source cited anywhere in it is *The CPSU in Resolutions*, vol. 3, Moscow 1970. The latest Party congress named is the Fourteenth, of 1925. The governing formula is "developed socialism", the phrase the Twenty-Seventh Congress would retire in 1986, and the constitutional warrant

is Article 19 of the 1977 Constitution, quoted in the foreword: "The social basis of the U.S.S.R. is the unbreakable alliance of the workers, peasants, and intelligentsia." Brezhnev is not named; neither is Andropov, nor Khrushchev, nor — in a Soviet book of 1983 about the intelligentsia — Stalin. The manuscript belongs to the years before the succession, and nothing in it registers that the succession had happened.

Two other things are unusual enough to note. The volume names its compilers on the title page — S. A. Fedyukin, D. Sc. (Hist.), and I. K. Eldarova — where most Progress anthologies hide behind an institute. And its Part II covers a subject the Soviet historical profession had, by 1983, spent thirty years working on seriously: the fate of the old specialists after October. That is a real field with real scholars in it, and the selection shows the hand of someone who knew it.

Take the credits first, because they are substantial and because the criticism that follows depends on them.

The volume prints, at full length and without softening, Lenin's letter to Maxim Gorky of 15 September 1919 — the harshest thing he ever wrote about intellectuals, and the passage every Western anthology reaches for. Gorky had protested at the arrests of Petrograd professors. Lenin's reply is here entire, including the sentence: the intellectual forces of the workers and peasants are growing "in the struggle to overthrow the bourgeoisie and its henchmen, the intellectual lackeys of capital, who imagine they are the brains of the nation. Actually, they are not the brains, but sh-." (The euphemism is not the compilers'. It is the Collected Works translator's, in vol. 44, p. 285, which is the source they cite and reproduce.) They print the taunt about Korolenko, the jeer at "the whining of rotting intellectuals", and Lenin's advice to Gorky to get out of that company before he goes under. A volume produced to demonstrate the Party's solicitude for the intelligentsia opens its 1919 section by printing the document that most embarrasses the claim. That is not what a crude propaganda operation does.

Second, and more important, the volume shows Lenin changing his mind, which is precisely the test an anthology on this subject exists to pass. On page 34 it prints the founding passage of *What Is To Be Done?* — "We have said that there could not have been Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers. It would have to be brought to them from without" — accurately and at length, including the acknowledgement that "the founders of modern scientific socialism, Marx and Engels, themselves belonged to the bourgeois intelligentsia." Thirty-five pages later it prints Lenin at the Third Congress of the RSDLP, on 20 April (3 May) 1905, arguing the other way: "It has been said here that the exponents of Social-Democratic ideas have been mainly intellectuals. That is not so. During the period of Economism the exponents of revolutionary ideas were workers, not intellectuals... In my writings for the press I have long urged that as many workers as possible should be placed on the committees. ... I should be strongly in favour of having eight workers to every two intellectuals on our committees." Three years separate the two. The compilers print both, in order, without commentary. A reader who wanted to argue that Lenin's 1902 formula was a polemical over-correction rather than a permanent doctrine will find the evidence for it in this book, supplied by the Institute that is supposed to be suppressing it.

Third, and best, the volume prints in full the most self-critical page Lenin ever wrote on this subject. In *The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government* (April 1918) he defends paying bourgeois experts very large salaries, and then refuses to dress it up:

Clearly, this measure is a compromise, a departure from the principles of the Paris Commune and of every proletarian power, which call for the reduction of all salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker... it is also a step backward on the part of our socialist Soviet state power, which from the very outset proclaimed and pursued the policy of reducing high salaries to the level of the wages of the average worker.

And then the sentence that ought to be printed on the flyleaf of every book in this series:

To conceal from the people the fact that the enlistment of bourgeois experts by means of extremely high salaries is a retreat from the principles of the Paris Commune would be sinking to the level of bourgeois politicians and deceiving the people.

The compilers printed that. They then produced a book whose apparatus does the opposite.

Because that is where the operation lives: not in the Lenin, but in the cuts and in the notes.

Consider "Party Organisation and Party Literature" (November 1905), the one Lenin text most often cited in the West as the charter of Soviet control over writers. It occupies six pages of *Collected Works* vol. 10, pp. 44–49. This volume prints from p. 48. What that page contains is the attack on the hypocrisy of bourgeois freedom of the press: "Are you free in relation to your bourgeois publisher, Mr. Writer, in relation to your bourgeois public, which demands that you provide it with pornography in frames and paintings, and prostitution as a 'supplement' to 'sacred' scenic art?" What the earlier pages contain is the argument the article is actually about — and it is missing in both directions. The phrase "a cog and a screw", by which Lenin described what party literature must become, does not occur anywhere in this book; nor does "Down with non-partisan writers!"; nor does the qualification that immediately follows them, that "literature is least of all subject to mechanical adjustment or levelling" and that "in this field greater scope must undoubtedly be allowed for personal initiative, individual inclination, thought and fantasy, form and content."

That is worth pausing on, because it is not the cut a propagandist would make. A whitewash would drop the cog and keep the fantasy. A hard-line volume would keep the cog. This volume keeps neither. What survives the excision is the part of the essay aimed outward, at the bourgeois press; what is excised is the whole of the difficult internal argument, in which Lenin was trying to say two things at once and knew it. The casualty is the same one the Institute's other Lenin anthologies produce: not Lenin the polemicist, who is preserved intact, but Lenin the man working something out. Across the volume the ellipsis appears 166 times.

Now the silence, which is the sharpest thing in the book, and which has to be stated exactly.

The volume runs chronologically to the end of Lenin's working life. Its 1922 items are dated 18 March, 27 March and 28 March; then nothing until 13 November; then 27 and 29 December. In the eight-month hole sits the episode that any serious account of Lenin and the intelligentsia has to reckon

with: the deportations. In August 1922 some two hundred philosophers, historians, economists, agronomists and writers were arrested and expelled from Soviet Russia, most of them sailing from Petrograd that autumn on the two German steamers that gave the affair its name.

Part of the gap has an innocent explanation and it must be given. Lenin suffered his first stroke on 25–26 May 1922 and did not return to work until October. He was not at his desk when the arrests were made. But the policy was set in motion before the stroke, in a document that is in the very edition this volume takes its texts from: Lenin's letter to F. E. Dzerzhinsky of 19 May 1922, headed "On the question of deporting the writers and professors helping the counter-revolution", printed in *Collected Works* vol. 45, pp. 555–56 — a Progress volume of 1976, seven years before this one. Lenin's instruction there is not that the deportations be reconsidered but that they be better prepared: "This needs more thorough preparation. Without it we shall make mistakes." He asks that Politburo members be put on the duty of reading the periodicals for candidates.

The compilers cite twenty-eight volumes of the *Collected Works* between vol. 1 and vol. 36, and they reach outside that run to vol. 44 for the Gorky letter. They do not cite vol. 45 once. This is therefore not an availability problem; it is a selection. And the shape of what remains makes it legible. In this whole book the name Dzerzhinsky occurs exactly once, in the editorial footnote attached to the Gorky letter, recording that on 11 September 1919 the Politburo "directed F. E. Dzerzhinsky, N. I. Bukharin and L. B. Kamenev to have their cases reconsidered" — Dzerzhinsky appearing solely as an instrument of clemency towards arrested intellectuals. The Cheka is never named. Nor is the GPU. Nor Glavlit, the censorship established in June 1922, in a book that prints Lenin on the press.

I want to be careful about what this does and does not prove. Lenin's polemical ferocity is not concealed here; the Gorky letter alone disproves that, and the compilers also print him telling the Mensheviks and SRs in 1919 that if they incite strikes they may "go to Georgia, go to Kolchak, or else you will go to prison. ... And that is what we shall do with them." The volume is not squeamish about repression in general. What it will not do is put its subject — the intelligentsia — and the specific act of 1922 in the same sentence. The one document from the gap that is squarely on the volume's own theme, and that Lenin wrote in full possession of his faculties, is the one that is not here.

The Name Index is where the compilers speak in their own voice, and it repays reading.

Lenin's 1909 article on Vekhi is generously excerpted, and it names the collection's authors: "Berdayev, Bulgakov, Herschensohn, Kistyakovsky, Struve, Frank and Izgoyev". Four of those seven — Berdyaev, Bulgakov, Frank and Izgoyev — were put out of Russia in 1922. The index gives each of them a dated entry. Berdyaev, "Nikolai Alexandrovich (1874–1948) — Russian idealist philosopher, mystic, Cadet". Bulgakov, "(1871–1944) — Russian economist, idealist philosopher, 'legal Marxist'". Frank, "(1877–1950) — Russian idealist philosopher and mystic". Izgoyev, "(b. 1872) — Russian writer, an ideologue of the Constitutional-Democratic Party". Three of the four have death years that fall abroad — Berdyaev at Clamart outside Paris, Bulgakov in Paris, Frank in London — and the compilers, who had to look those years up in order to print them, supply not one word about how any of these men came to be outside Russia. For Izgoyev, who died in Estonia in 1935, there is no death year at all.

Set beside that, one small item earlier in the same volume becomes very loud. In 1921 the Swedish Red Cross offered to take Academician Pavlov to Sweden to continue his work. The volume prints Lenin's reply in full: the Soviet government "finds itself obliged to turn down the request", because "The Soviet Republic has now entered a period of intensive economic development requiring the exertion of all the country's spiritual and creative forces." Two pages earlier it prints the Council of People's Commissars' decree of 24 January 1921 giving Pavlov a de luxe edition of his life's work, the property rights in it "in Russia and abroad", a double academic ration for himself and his wife, and their flat for life. That is the policy of 1921 towards a scientist who wanted to leave: he may not go, and he will be kept in comfort. The policy of 1922 towards philosophers who did not want to leave is not in the book.

The same instrument does something worse two pages earlier. Bukharin and Kamenev appear in this book only once each, at p. 227, inside Lenin's letter to Gorky, as the two men the Central Committee appointed "to check on the arrests of bourgeois intellectuals of the near-Cadet type and to release whoever possible". They are in this volume, in other words, exclusively as agents of mercy towards the intelligentsia. Their index entries read: Kamenev, "(1883–1936)... for his anti-Party activity was expelled from the Party"; Bukharin, "(1888–1938)... in 1937 for his anti-Party activity was expelled

from the Party". Both men were shot — Kamenev in August 1936 after the first Moscow trial, Bukharin in March 1938 after the third. The index prints the year of each death as a bare parenthesis and names the event that preceded it as an expulsion. That is not selection. It is a false statement of the record, in the compilers' own words, about the only two Bolsheviks the book shows doing the thing the book exists to praise.

Trotsky's entry is the third of the pattern: he is described as having "preached the impossibility of socialism being victorious in the USSR" — a doctrine he never held and which is nowhere quoted — and as "deported from the USSR" in 1929. Deported is the only appearance of the word in the volume. It is applied to the man the book quotes Lenin calling "Comrade Trotsky", and withheld from the two hundred.

This is the discriminator worth carrying away, and it is not about vocabulary. Error is admissible in these books. The volume freely records Bolsheviks being wrong: it prints Lenin conceding a retreat from the Paris Commune, prints him admitting that arrests of intellectuals produced "mistakes here, too", prints his complaint that the Party's own new members are "inexperienced and ignorant in matters of state administration". What never happens is that the classification turns inward. Nobody who stayed on the inside is ever put in the category the book reserves for the outside — and where the biography of an insider would require the category, the biography is falsified instead.

There was an answer, and it was written before the questions were asked.

On the pre-revolutionary argument — the substance of Part I — the best contemporaneous reply is Trotsky's "The Intelligentsia and Socialism", written in 1910, in the middle of the years the volume anthologises. It is not a polemic against Lenin; it is a review of Max Adler that reaches a harder conclusion than either man's slogans. Trotsky argues that the intellectual's dependence is not merely economic but occupational — that a doctor or a lawyer must "find music in his soul and in his voice which will accord with the feelings and habits" of the clients who pay him, whereas "Though it enslaves the muscles and exhausts the body, factory work is powerless to subject to itself the worker's mind." From that he draws the pessimistic conclusion that "it is harder to win the intelligentsia today than it was yesterday, and that it will be harder tomorrow than it is today" — and then the conclusion

that this book's whole Part II is a commentary on: that the intelligentsia will come over not before the transfer of power but after it, when confronted with "the inescapable fact of the transfer of the entire apparatus of society into new hands", and able to see that the new conditions "will open before them unlimited possibilities for the application of technical, organizational and scientific forces". That is, in 1910, an accurate forecast of the specialists policy of 1918–21 which this volume documents. It was written by the man its index calls an anti-Soviet deportee, and quoted approvingly by nobody in it.

On the post-revolutionary argument, the volume itself supplies the opening. It prints Lenin at the Eleventh Congress in March 1922 on the *Smena Vekh émigrés*, quoting Ustryalov at length and saying, in a passage that does the compilers credit: "I think that by being straightforward like this, Ustryalov is rendering us a great service." What the volume closes at 1923 cannot show is how the wager came out. Trotsky, addressing the Central Control Commission in 1927, read Ustryalov's later verdict into the record — Ustryalov calling for "a new impulse... a Neo-Nep", warning the Politburo against any compromise with the Opposition, and concluding: "That is why we are now ... definitely in favor of Stalin." Trotsky's point was that the class the Ustryalovs spoke for had made its choice, and that it had not chosen the Opposition. That exchange is reprinted in *The Stalin School of Falsification* (1937), ch. 9.

And on the foreword's final claim — that there has "taken final shape an alliance of the working classes and the intelligentsia", warranted by Article 19 — the answer is *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), which examined the identical formula in the identical place, the Stalin Constitution that Article 19 inherits. Trotsky's objection was not that the intelligentsia had failed to be integrated but that the category was doing concealment work: the official admission of a surviving difference between mental and physical labour, he wrote, "has the advantage that it permits a concealment of the income of the bureaucracy under the honorable title of 'intellectual' labor" (ch. 9). And against the tripartite constitutional formula itself: "The Soviet proletariat still exists as a class deeply distinct from the peasantry, the technical intelligentsia and the bureaucracy" (ch. 10). Nearly half a century later, Article 19 makes three of those four and drops the one Trotsky named.

Read this volume, then, for what it genuinely contains, which is a great deal. It is the fullest single collection in English of

Lenin on a question he returned to for nearly thirty years and did not settle: whether socialist consciousness comes to the workers from outside them, and what a workers' state owes to the educated men it inherits and cannot replace. It prints the 1902 answer and the 1905 correction; it prints the fury of 1919 and the decree of 1921 that gave Academician Pavlov his rations; it prints Lenin insisting that a retreat be called a retreat. It ends, deliberately, on the gentlest note available — the January 1923 diary page in which he says the schoolteacher "should be raised to a standard he has never achieved, and cannot achieve, in bourgeois society".

What it will not print is the letter of 19 May 1922 in the same edition's own volume 45; and what its index cannot bring itself to write, next to three dates of death in Paris and London, is the word deported, which it spends without hesitation on Trotsky. Lenin's rule, printed in this book in the excerpt from The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, is that concealing a retreat from the people is "deceiving the people". The compilers reproduced the rule and, in their apparatus, broke it. That is the reason this edition needs an introduction, and it is also the reason it is worth reprinting: the evidence against the apparatus is in the book, put there by the apparatus.

MARXISM

Lenin on language

Lenin on language in some 440 sourced extracts - the languages of the empire, whether a state needs an official tongue, political style, translation, and the notes where logic meets grammar.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

This is a book of fragments. Counting the source lines it prints beneath each passage — the form is "..., Vol. 30, p. 373" — the eight sections and the appendix carry some four hundred and forty of them across about eighty thousand words of Lenin. That is an average of well under two hundred words per extract: a sentence from a letter, a marginal note from the Hegel conspectus, a paragraph from a Duma speech, a telegram. The compilers, who sign the preface, are P. N. Denisov and N. A. Kondrashov. They state their method plainly and without evasion:

The translations are taken from the English edition of V. I. Lenin's Collected Works in 45 volumes prepared by Progress Publishers, Moscow, except where otherwise noted. Corrections have been made in accordance with the Fifth Russian Edition of the Collected Works.

That sentence is also the origin of a catalogue error. Progress is named here as the source of the translations, not as the publisher of this book. The only publisher's imprint recoverable from the volume is on its final leaf, where three forthcoming titles are advertised — Davydov, Kuzmenko, Markov — each under the heading RADUGA PUBLISHERS, two "Coming out in 1983" and one "Coming out in 1984". The Soviet imprint code in the front matter ends `~83`. So the date on the spine is right, and the house is very probably Raduga rather than Progress. The front matter of this scan is badly damaged and I would not stake much on the attribution; but a reader should know that the book never once calls itself a Progress book.

The stated audience is broad and academic: "It is recommended for linguists in all fields, specialists on literature, philosophy, history, sociology and social sciences, and also for everyone with an interest in these problems." This is an export volume for foreign philologists, and it should be read as one.

Before anything else, the thing that is not here.

Soviet linguistics has a history, and it is not an obscure one. From the late 1920s the discipline was dominated by the "Japhetic theory" of N. Y. Marr, who held among other things that language possesses a class character and belongs to the superstructure. Marr died in 1934 and his school ruled after him. On 20 June 1950 Pravda carried an article by Stalin, "Concerning Marxism in Linguistics", followed by further replies over July and August and collected as Marxism and Problems of Linguistics, which demolished Marr's doctrine by name — the class-character formula, Stalin wrote, had put linguistics "into a muddle" — and reversed the discipline's official position overnight. It is one of the very few occasions on which a General Secretary intervened directly and personally in a scientific field. Careers were destroyed in both directions: Marrists who had spent twenty years enforcing the theory, and the linguists they had displaced.

A 1983 Moscow anthology of Lenin on language sits downstream of that event. Here is what it says about it.

Marr: zero. Marrism: zero. Japhetic: zero. Meshchaninov: zero. Vinogradov: zero. Marxism and Problems of Linguistics: zero. The apparent two hits for "Marr" in a raw search are the words marriage and married; the project's own false-nil checker, run against this book, surfaces only Marx and Marxism as near-neighbours. The silence is real.

None of this can be excused as anachronism. The rule this series applies — that an absence counts only where the author had the fact and a reason to use it — protects a 1976 book from being convicted of not knowing about Reagan. It does not protect this one. The 1950 intervention was thirty-three years past, entirely public, published in English by Moscow itself, and squarely inside the subject. Denisov and Kondrashov are professional linguists writing a preface on the theoretical foundations of Marxist linguistics. They could not have been unaware of it. They wrote around it.

And they wrote around it with some care. The volume's Section III is headed "Language and the Class Struggle" — a title that reads, to anyone who knows the history, like the Marrist thesis Stalin killed. It is not. Its contents are entirely about Lenin's polemical practice: Mikhailovsky's "brilliant phrase combined with lack of substance", the ministers who said social when they meant socialist, the "worthless little rag" Svoboda, the hollow "protective" labour law announced "with a blare of trumpets". Language used in the class struggle, never language as a class phenomenon. The heading is heretical and the contents are not. That is not carelessness; it is navigation.

The preface's own framing sentence shows the same balance being held:

As we know, the teaching of the founders of scientific communism provides a theoretical and methodological basis for any branch of scientific knowledge. This also applies fully to linguistics.

That proposition is exactly the one which licensed Marrism, and then licensed its destruction. It is stated here as a truism, thirty-three years after it cost a discipline two of its generations, with no indication that anything had ever followed from it. Saussure, Baudouin de Courtenay and Durkheim are named in the preface without hostility — which under Marr would have been impossible — and the reader is given no way to know that this was ever in question.

There is a smaller marker of the same register. The preface states that "The theories of the Vienna logical positivists (Wittgenstein and others) with their exaggerated attention to language aroused Lenin's reasoned objections." Lenin died in January 1924. The Tractatus appeared in German in 1921; Schlick took the Vienna chair in 1922; the circle that took its name from the city cohered after Lenin's death and issued its manifesto in 1929. In the whole book Wittgenstein occurs exactly once — in that sentence — and never inside a Lenin extract. The claim is not a falsification of history so much as a habit: the preface reaches for an objection Lenin never made because the genre requires that he made all of them.

None of which makes this a worthless book, and on its central subject it is a good deal better than its preface.

Lenin on the national question and language is genuinely liberal material, and the volume prints a lot of it. Section IV runs to 22,500 words and it does not flinch from the awkward

parts. Sections 2 to 6 of "Critical Remarks on the National Question" are here, including "There are two national cultures in every national culture" and the whole demolition of cultural-national autonomy. So is the Norway–Sweden argument, where secession is credited with having strengthened the ties between the two peoples. So is "On the National Pride of the Great Russians".

Most importantly, the 1914 Proletarskaya Pravda article "Is a Compulsory Official Language Needed?" is printed complete and unabridged. I checked it word for word against the canonical text in Collected Works vol. 20, pp. 71–73: apart from scanner noise the two are identical, and nothing is cut. It is the sharpest thing Lenin wrote on the subject, and the volume gives all of it:

What we do not want is the element of coercion. We do not want to have people driven into paradise with a cudgel; for no matter how many fine phrases about "culture" you may utter, a compulsory official language involves coercion, the use of the cudgel.

The post-revolutionary material is no softer. The volume prints Lenin's concluding speech to the Eighth Congress in March 1919, complaining of Communists at the Commissariat of Education who say "that our schools are uniform schools, and therefore don't dare to teach in any language but Russian! In my opinion, such a Communist is a Great-Russian chauvinist" — followed by "Scratch some Communists and you will find Great-Russian chauvinists." It prints the Central Committee draft resolution on the Ukraine, which makes it "incumbent upon all Party members to use every means to help remove all barriers in the way of the free development of the Ukrainian language and culture", and requires them to "in every way counteract attempts at Russification". It prints the telegram to Stalin of 22 February 1920 on Ukrainian-language paperwork at army headquarters: "as far as language is concerned there must be every concession and the maximum of equality."

A Soviet reader of 1983 who read only Section IV would come away with an accurate and demanding picture of Lenin's position, and would have every ground on which to complain about the country he lived in. That is worth saying plainly. The constraint in this book does not attach to the topic. It attaches to whose voice is speaking — the extracts are free and the preface is not, which is a shape this series has met before.

There is exactly one place where the extracts themselves are cut, and it is the place you would predict.

The last item in Section IV, and the closing line of the section, is a single sentence:

Fourthly, the strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics of our union, and these rules must be checked with special care.

It is sourced to "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", Collected Works vol. 36, p. 610. That is Lenin's note dictated on 30 and 31 December 1922, at the end of his working life, and it is the document in which he broke with Stalin over Georgia. Nothing else from it appears in the book. There is no "Firstly", no "Secondly", no "Thirdly". There is no note explaining what the text is; the volume's notes apparatus, which glosses Volapük, the Ophen dialect of travelling pedlars, the Brünn Congress and the Beilis trial, has nothing whatever on Georgia, on 1922, or on the circumstances of this dictation.

Set against the canonical text, this is what the closing quotation mark removes. Immediately before:

Thirdly, exemplary punishment must be inflicted on Comrade Orjonikidze (I say this all the more regretfully as I am one of his personal friends and have worked with him abroad) and the investigation of all the material which Dzerzhinsky's commission has collected must be completed or started over again to correct the enormous mass of wrongs and biased judgments which it doubtlessly contains. The political responsibility for all this truly Great-Russian nationalist campaign must, of course, be laid on Stalin and Dzerzhinsky.

And immediately after — inside the very same paragraph, two sentences later:

There is no doubt that our apparatus being what it is, there is bound to be, on the pretext of unity in the railway service, unity in the fiscal service and so on, a mass of truly Russian abuses. [...] A detailed code will be required, and only the nationals living in the republic in question can draw it up at all successfully.

So the cut is not between documents. It is mid-paragraph, one sentence in. What goes is the reason for the rule (a mass of truly Russian abuses, coming from the apparatus itself), the identity of the rule-maker (the nationals of the republic, not Moscow), and the name of the man held politically responsible. What survives is a procedural instruction that could have been issued by any ministry.

This is the fifth instance the series has recorded of the same operation, and it is the tightest. In the others — Lukin stopping one sentence before Sholokhov's answer, Basmanov quoting Posadas without the clause that says Posadas is not in the Fourth International, Leibson closing the Fourth International's letter at "supports you", the four words of the 1916 disarmament polemic that became a book title — the cut falls at the turn of an argument. Here it falls at a proper noun.

A caution about method, because I nearly got this wrong in the other direction. Searching this text for Autonomisation returns zero, and I was ready to report the note as entirely absent. It is not absent; the scanner prints Aulononisation, with an l for the n. The whole finding above would have been inverted by a single character, and the corrected version — Moscow printed one sentence of the note and nothing else — is much more interesting than the flat silence I first thought I had found.

The same volume shows why the cut was necessary at exactly that point. Its name index runs to about a hundred and ten entries and annotates almost everyone: Cratylus, Renan, Radishchev, Scheidemann, Südekum, Sipyagin, Kokoshkin. Trotsky is there, given an essence and no act — "continued his struggle against the Soviet state and the CPSU, against the international communist movement". Bukharin, Pyatakov and Ryazanov are there, each with the year of his expulsion and none with the year of his death. Stalin's name occurs four times in the body of the book, as the addressee of Lenin's telegrams and letters. He has no entry in the name index at all. The alphabetical run goes Skaldin, Stolypin, Struve. This is the sharper form of the test: error is admissible in these books, the category is not, and here even the name is not — not because Stalin is unmentionable in 1983, but because any gloss on him in this particular volume would have had to touch the two things the volume exists to avoid.

Which brings us to the one sentence in the preface that is not evasion but assertion, and which the book's own contents refute.

He was opposed to the imposing by force of a single state language and consistently supported proletarian internationalism. After the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution the peoples acquired freedom of national and linguistic development in the Soviet Union. As a result of the fraternal collaboration of the socialist nations, Russian became, without any coercive measures, the second native language for the broad masses of the

national and autonomous republics and regions of the Soviet state, the language of international communication of the peoples of the Land of the Soviets.

The first clause is true, and the book proves it over twenty-two thousand words. The last is false, and it is false in a way that is documentable rather than arguable. On 13 March 1938 the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars issued a decree on the compulsory study of the Russian language in the schools of the national republics and regions. It made Russian a required subject from the first grade in every school in the USSR, and it remained in force for the rest of the Soviet period. Whatever else may be said for or against it, it was a coercive measure, and it is the measure that made Russian what the preface says it became without one. This is not a silence. It is a claim, and, as this series has found before, a claim is worth more to a critic than a silence, because it can be checked.

The record around it is worse than a single decree. Ukrainianisation was pursued through the 1920s and reversed at the turn of the 1930s, with the men who had carried it out destroyed. The deported nations — the Crimean Tatars, the Volga Germans, the Chechens and Ingush, the Kalmyks, the Karachai, the Meskhetians — lost not only their homelands but the institutional basis of their languages. A companion volume in this series, Semyonov's *Nations and Internationalism* (1979), printed the demographic trace of one of those deportations in a table and misread it, with the other deported peoples at zero. This book does not print the trace at all: Kalmyk occurs once, as the name of a Petersburg bookshop Lenin used; Crimean Tatar, Volga German, Meskhetian, Karachai, Chechen and Ingush are all at zero.

And Moscow knew the word for what it had been doing. In the spring of 1953, in the weeks after Stalin's death, the leadership publicly removed the first secretary of the Ukrainian party for, among other things, forcing Russian into western Ukrainian schools — an admission made in Moscow's own name, and one the preface of 1983 writes as though it had never occurred.

The reply exists, it is specific, and on the central point it is thirty years old.

Michel Pablo's "The Post-Stalin 'New Course'" appeared in *Fourth International* vol. XIV no. 2 (whole no. 121). The issue is printed as March–April 1953, but that date is unreliable — its articles discuss events of the following summer, and this one reports the removal of the Ukrainian first secretary

Melnikov, so it was written in mid-1953 at the earliest. Pablo records that Melnikov "was accused of having tried to 'Russify' the Ukraine and especially the western areas (belonging to Poland) for one thing, by the compulsory introduction of the Russian language into the schools", and that the Lithuanian party leadership was censured for "like extremes of 'Russification'". The charge in the 1983 preface — that Russian spread without coercive measures — was contradicted, in public, by the Soviet leadership itself, and reported at the time in the *Fourth International's* own press.

There is a second contemporaneous witness on the linguistics question, and honesty requires that it be labelled. Albert Glotzer, writing as Albert Gates in *The New International* vol. XIX no. 3 (whole no. 159), May–June 1953, is writing for Max Shachtman's *Independent Socialist League* — the other side of the 1940 split, not this series' own tradition, and not the *Fourth International*. With that said, his account of the 1950 intervention is the one this book cannot give. Stalin, he writes, "had never until the very last years of his life shown any interest or accomplishment in the field of linguistics or philology, or science"; the interventions "in these fields, as in philology, literature and science were the result not of any compelling political need" but of a man who "believed he could do it by decree".

And on language rights the closest reply in date is the best. Five years before this anthology appeared, *Intercontinental Press* published Marilyn Vogt's "Moscow Forced to Back Down: Protests Over Language Rights in Georgia and Armenia" — vol. 16 no. 19, 15 May 1978, dated from the masthead. In April 1978 Moscow attempted to drop from the new constitutions of the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijani republics the clauses guaranteeing the indigenous language as the republic's official language. Hundreds of students and faculty marched through Tbilisi carrying placards demanding their "native language", and the clause was restored in all three. The Georgian party first secretary, Eduard Shevardnadze, went out to the demonstration, conceded the point, and then added:

Again we have to tell our native people and our youth that equal with our esteem for the native language, equal with studying the native language, if we want to aspire to the light, if we want to take possession of sciences and keep in touch with current world civilization, it is necessary to respect and study the wonderful and rich language of the Russian people!

The same article carries the Armenian Helsinki Monitoring

Group's account: "On the average," they state, "every year in Yerevan [capital of the Armenian republic] one Armenian school is closed and in its place a Russian school is opened."

And Vogt's article quotes Lenin's December 1922 note — quotes the sentence this anthology prints, and the sentence this anthology stops before:

"The strictest rules must be introduced on the use of the national language in the non-Russian republics of our union. . . . There is no doubt that our apparatus being what it is, there is bound to be, on the pretext of unity . . . a mass of truly Russian abuses."

That is the whole case in one juxtaposition. Five years before Moscow printed one sentence of that paragraph in a book about Lenin and language, a weekly in New York printed the sentence and its sequel and used them against Moscow. And, as Vogt notes, the Georgian oppositionist Zviad Gamsakhurdia had already made the same use of the same article in an open letter to the Georgian Writers' Union in April 1976 — for which he was arrested the following year.

Two honest limits on that reply. First, our holdings on this subject are thin outside one window: sweeping 413 Intercontinental Press issues — 1972, 1973 and every year from 1978 to the paper's close in August 1986 — every hit on Russification and Soviet language policy falls in 1978 and 1979, and there is nothing at all from 1980 onward. International Viewpoint's coverage begins later still. That is a fact about what we hold, not a verdict on the book. Second, on Marr and the 1950 intervention specifically, our own tradition's press is nearly as quiet as the anthology: the Shachtmanite passage above is the only sustained treatment I could find in nearly nineteen million words, and Fourth International, publishing continuously through 1950, appears not to have treated it as a subject at all.

Read this, then, as a book with a good deal more integrity in its body than in its front matter.

Denisov and Kondrashov assembled four hundred and forty fragments of Lenin, printed his most inconvenient article on language rights entire, let him call Communists Great-Russian chauvinists on the floor of a party congress, and let him demand every concession to Ukrainian in the Red Army's paperwork. Whatever the compilers privately thought, they put that material in front of Soviet and foreign linguists in 1983, and it is more useful now than most of what the house was

publishing that year.

What they could not do was print the paragraph in which Lenin names who the chauvinist was, or the word Marr, or a name-index entry for Stalin, or a preface that did not end its account of Soviet language policy with the words without any coercive measures. The volume is not a forgery. It is an accurate anthology with four small holes in it, and every one of the four is in the same place.

PHILOSOPHY

Myth, Philosophy, Avant-gardism

Spengler, Nietzsche, the Frankfurt School, surrealism and the counterculture read as one long nihilist revolt - by the specialist the Soviet Academy sent against Adorno and Marcuse, who had actually read them.

Yuri Davydov

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

This is not a Progress book. The title page reads "RADUGA PUBLISHERS MOSCOW", the reader's card asks that "Raduga Publishers would be glad to have your opinion of this book, its translation and design", and the six times the words "Progress Publishers" occur in it are all footnotes citing Progress editions of Marx, Engels and Dostoevsky. Raduga was the Soviet state's literary export house, and it gave this one a proper production: translated from the Russian by Laura Beraha and Alex Miller, designed by Sergei Getta. The spine says 1983 and the front matter bears it out — the latest quotation-edition in the notes is a Progress Karamazov Brothers of 1982 — but the book was written earlier and reads like it. Its author, Yuri Davydov, tells you in the first paragraphs that its two themes grew "all the more acute as I read about the Maoist cultural revolution in China on the one hand and the New Left movement in the West on the other," and the most recent Western source he leans on is Daniel Bell's *The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism* (1976). It is a book of about 1980, arriving in English in 1983: the counterculture examined in the past tense, at fifteen years' distance, by a man who watched it happen and disapproved.

And unlike most of the volumes in this series, it is the work of a real specialist writing on his own subject. Davydov lists his own books in the "Note from the Author", and the list is a career: *Art and the Elite* (1966), *The October Revolution and the Arts: Tolstoy, Blok, Mayakovsky, Eisenstein* (1967), *Art as a Sociological Phenomenon* (1968), then a second series aimed squarely at the West — *The Aesthetics of Nihilism: Art and the New Left* (1975), *A Critique of the Socio-Philosophical Views of the Frankfurt School* (1977), *Neo-Marxism and Problems in the Sociology of Culture* (1980), *The Sociology of the Counter-Culture* (1980). This was the man the Soviet Academy sent against Adorno, Marcuse and the New Left, and he had read them. The subject of *Myth, Philosophy, Avant-Gardism* is the intellectual history of the twentieth-century avant-garde as a "nihilistic" revolt: Spengler's *Decline of the West*, Nietzsche's death of God, the

Frankfurt School's aesthetics, surrealism, the "committed literature" debate, left-wing Freudianism, the LSD counterculture, and what Davydov, borrowing Lionel Trilling's phrase, calls "the adversary culture."

Because so much of this series turns on a single test — when a Soviet author names a Western opponent scores of times, does he ever cite a work of his, or only characterise him from Soviet secondary sources? — it has to be said at once that Davydov passes it, and passes it more emphatically than anyone yet examined. Adorno is named 155 times, and the bibliography cites him across seven German volumes: *Minima Moralia*, *Klangfiguren*, *Noten zur Literatur III*, *Jargon der Eigentlichkeit*, *Kritik*, the *Philosophie der neuen Musik* (Tübingen, 1949), a 1969 *Spiegel* interview. Benjamin is there in the German original — *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* — and Davydov summarises its argument fairly, that in mechanical reproduction a painting "lost its aura, a kind of mystic radiation, like the golden halo round the heads of the saints on the icons," and was "ultimately demystified." Marcuse's *Versuch über die Befreiung* is quoted from the Frankfurt edition by page; Sartre's existentialism and Breton's *Manifestes du surréalisme* are read in French; Bell in English. The pattern the series keeps meeting is inverted here. In an earlier volume, Batalov's *The Philosophy of Revolt*, Adorno was named some sixty-seven times and never once cited to a work of his own — every footnote ran through a Soviet middleman, and one of the middlemen the checkers named was Davydov himself. Here is the source. The relay in that book is the original in this one, and it should be credited plainly: on the Western material, this is scholarship, not ventriloquism.

It is also, in places, real criticism, and the honest course is to say where. The line Davydov draws — from Nietzsche's "self-overcoming", which he calls "one if not the most insidious of the forms of nihilistic personal and cultural disintegration", through Spengler's cultural pessimism to the counterculture's cult of ecstasy — is a genuine piece of intellectual history, and the terrain is one Marxists have every reason to hold. The reactionary politics latent in some

avant-garde irrationalism is not a Soviet invention: Davydov is right that the roll of "falsifiers of the socialist ideal" runs through "Sorel, Mussolini, Spengler and Hitler", right that D'Annunzio was "that philosopher of Fascism and the avant-garde to boot", and right that a "death-of-man" slogan should trouble anyone who remembers "the nightmare of Fascist barbarism". His engagement with the Dialectic of Enlightenment — with myth and Entzauberung, disenchantment, as reciprocal rather than opposed — is serious, and it is why the word myth stands first in his title. When he turns on the New Left's erotic politics and asks, in a chapter title, whether what is on offer is a "politicisation of eroticism" or a "sexualisation of politics", he is pressing on a real weakness in Marcuse and Norman O. Brown, and he is not alone on his own side in pressing it. The Fourth International reached a neighbouring verdict from the opposite bank: its Ninth World Congress, in 1969, wrote that "the ideologies of Fanon, Marcuse, and Sweezy are only adaptations to this kind of mentality, which is objectively petty bourgeois even if it is inspired by the sincerest revolutionary motives" (Intercontinental Press, vol. 7 no. 26, 1969). An introduction that convicted Davydov merely for judging Marcuse petty-bourgeois would be convicting him of a judgement the anti-Stalinist left had already published. That is not the charge.

The charge is what he does with the diagnosis, and where he stops. Davydov's governing move is to fold the entire Western revolt — Adorno and the flower children, Sartre and the surrealists, Enzensberger and the acid tests — into a single "anti-culture wave", and then to set that wave beside fascism as its twin: "the new leftist movement of the 1960s was an act of retribution, much like the many anti-culture waves (such as Fascism) visited upon this twentieth century of ours." He is too intelligent to make the equation crude — he calls the wave "both inevitable ... and glaringly unjust" — but the amalgam is the engine of the book. The New Left and fascism become two expressions of one nihilism, and the effect, as always with an amalgam, is that the specific political content of each is dissolved into a shared essence that no evidence can touch. It is worth noticing which figures the essence requires him to leave out. The two clearest cases of an avant-garde that actually marched into fascism — Marinetti, who wrote the Futurist manifestos and then the fascist ones, and Ernst Jünger — do not appear in the book at all. The avant-garde-to-fascism argument, which is the strongest one available to him, is gestured at through Sorel and D'Annunzio and never made, because the book's fire is trained almost entirely leftward, on the Marxists and quasi-Marxists of the West. Fascism is in the book as a term of comparison for the New Left, not as a subject in its own right.

And then there is the silence that a specialist in this field cannot have kept by accident. Myth, Philosophy, Avant-Gardism is a book about avant-gardism that does not discuss the avant-garde. Not the one that matters most to its own argument, at any rate. The Russian avant-garde — the movement the October Revolution released and the Soviet state then destroyed — is simply not here. Malevich: zero. Tatlin: zero. Rodchenko: zero. Kandinsky: zero. Meyerhold: zero. LEF: zero. There is no Russian Constructivism (the single occurrence of the word is about German expressionist music) and no Russian Formalism (the seven "formalist" hits are all the ordinary adjective, applied to Western abstraction and twelve-tone music; Shklovsky and OPOYAZ are nowhere). Futurism appears once, and it is the generic European kind. Eisenstein is named three times and every one is in the front matter, never in the body. This is not a gap a foreign reader would notice and not one Davydov could have failed to notice, because he is the author of a book called *The October Revolution and the Arts*: Tolstoy, Blok, Mayakovsky, Eisenstein. He wrote the study of the Soviet avant-garde and then wrote a general history of avant-gardism from which it is absent.

Mayakovsky is the exception that proves how the exclusion works. He occurs three times: once in the "Note from the Author", where Davydov lists his own earlier title; once in the Name Index, keyed only to that page; and exactly once in the argument — where a line of his, the "whirlwind" that runs "from thought to trigger", is produced as "Mayakovsky's poetic image of petty bourgeois violence", an illustration of the anarchist ecstasy Davydov is condemning in Enzensberger and the bohemian revolutionaries of the 1960s. The greatest poet the Russian revolutionary avant-garde produced enters the book once, as a specimen of the disease. It is a small thing, but the volume's own jacket copy completes it: advertising Davydov's back catalogue, it renders the 1967 title as "Tolstoy. Blok. Eisenstein" and drops Mayakovsky's name from it altogether. That is very probably a Raduga copywriter's compression rather than a policy; but a book that can only place Mayakovsky as an image of petty-bourgeois violence, appearing beside a jacket that edits him out of a title he was in, is a fair emblem of the whole.

The reason the Russian avant-garde could not be discussed is not obscure, and it is the same reason the two most important Marxist theorists of exactly Davydov's questions are also missing. Georg Lukács does not appear in this book: not once, under any spelling, in a hundred and four thousand words. Nor does Ernst Bloch. This is extraordinary on its face. Lukács was the twentieth century's major Marxist theorist of realism

against modernism; his *Die Zerstörung der Vernunft* is a Marxist genealogy of German irrationalism from Schelling through Nietzsche to fascism — Davydov's precise subject and nearly his precise thesis — and *Wider den missverstandenen Realismus* is a frontal assault on Kafka, Beckett and the modernist cult of Angst, which are Davydov's targets to the letter. Bloch was Lukács's antagonist in the Expressionism debate of the 1930s and the author of *Das Prinzip Hoffnung*, the great Marxist book on utopia, in a volume whose second half is titled "From the End of Utopia to the Beginning of Anti-Utopia." Davydov conducts the entire argument in a vocabulary these two men forged, against the writers they chose, and names neither. The disqualification is political and it is datable: Lukács joined Imre Nagy's government in October 1956 and went into exile with it when it fell; Bloch left the German Democratic Republic for the West in 1961. Both were Marxists who broke with the bloc, and a Marxist who breaks with the bloc becomes, for a book like this, not an interlocutor to be answered but a name that cannot be set in type. The companion volume in this series, Suchkov's *A History of Realism* (1973), has the identical hole — Lukács absent from a book built on his architecture — and the two silences together are a finding about the operation, not about either author's reading. They had read him. They were not permitted to have.

The single mention of Trotsky belongs to the same machinery. It occurs where Davydov describes the left-wing Freudians' attempt "to make libido turn the wheels of world revolution", and adds that this was "an effort supported by Trotsky", by way of the surrealists' claim on Breton. The reference is to the Manifesto for an Independent Revolutionary Art, which Breton and Trotsky wrote together in Mexico in 1938. But that manifesto argued for nothing of the kind. Its demand was the total independence of art from both party and state, and it was drafted in the same weeks as Trotsky's letter to *Partisan Review*, "Art and Politics in Our Epoch" (18 June 1938), which states the principle without ornament: "Art, like science, not only does not seek orders, but by its very essence, cannot tolerate them", and "a truly revolutionary party is neither able nor willing to take upon itself the task of 'leading' and even less of commanding art, either before or after the conquest of power." Davydov has taken a defence of artistic freedom and re-described it as an incitement to erotic revolution — the one move that lets the argument for freedom be filed under the nihilism the book exists to condemn. It is worth adding, because a tradition that holds this house to the evidence must hold itself to it, that Trotsky in the same 1938 essay overreached badly, writing that it was "impossible to read Soviet verse and prose without physical disgust"; that verdict

does not survive the century's Russian poetry and it should be quoted with its excess showing. But his first principle stands against Davydov's whole book. Where Davydov derives art's crisis from nihilism and completes the cure with cultural guardianship, Trotsky derives art from need and unrest — "a protest against reality, either conscious or unconscious, active or passive, optimistic or pessimistic, always forms part of a really creative piece of work" — and refuses the guardianship on principle.

There is a deeper irony still, and it is the reply this book most needs. Davydov's diagnosis of the avant-garde as a recurring, essentially bohemian revolt was Trotsky's too. In the same 1938 essay Trotsky ran through the cycle — "classicism, romanticism, realism, naturalism, symbolism, impressionism, cubism, futurism" — as a succession of bohemian revolts each absorbed in turn by the academy, and he judged the political adventurism of the artistic left as sceptically as Davydov does. The difference is not in the diagnosis but in what each man will let the state do about it. Trotsky's *Literature and Revolution* (1923) — written by a member of the Politburo, published in Moscow, and then removed so thoroughly from Soviet intellectual life that Davydov could write the history of avant-gardism sixty years later without acknowledging that it existed — engaged the Russian Futurists directly and critically, as living opponents to be argued with, precisely because it refused to hand the argument to the police. That book is the one Myth, Philosophy, Avant-Gardism is shadowing and cannot name, on the subject it is most qualified to discuss and least free to touch.

What, then, is this volume? It is the most sophisticated attack on Western modernism the Soviet export list produced, and it does not need to be answered by pretending it is stupid. Davydov read the Frankfurt School in German, saw real weaknesses in the New Left, and wrote an intellectual history that a serious reader can learn from and argue with. The cost of the enterprise is not measured in what he got wrong about Adorno; it is measured in what a specialist of his equipment was obliged to leave outside the covers. A history of avant-gardism with no Malevich, no Tatlin, no Meyerhold, no LEF; with Mayakovsky admitted once as an emblem of the violence to be deplored; with Lukács and Bloch, the two Marxists whose questions the book is asking, struck out for the crime of having left; and with Trotsky present in a single clause that inverts what he actually said about the freedom of art. The book is called Myth, Philosophy, Avant-Gardism. Read it for its command of the Western material, which is real; read it, above all, for the shape of the avant-garde it cannot bring itself to describe — the one its own state made in 1917

and had shot, silenced or driven into exile by 1940 — because that shape, traced entirely by its absences, is the truest thing the book contains.

INTERNATIONALISM

The International Working-Class Movement: Problems of History and Theory, Volume 3

1905 to February 1917 in 296,000 words by forty named historians - the mass strike debate, Basel, the collapse of August 1914, Zimmerwald and the wartime splits. The fullest account of the Second International's crisis in English.

S. S. Khromov and others

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

The third of the seven volumes is the longest book in this series — some 296,000 words — and it covers twelve years: from the Russian revolution of 1905 to the February revolution of 1917, stopping deliberately a few weeks short of Lenin's return to the Finland Station. It is the work of about forty named historians of the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement, with an editorial board of five under S. S. Khromov, statistics prepared by a team of four, and above them substantially the same General Editorial Committee that signed Volume One: B. N. Ponomarev as chairman, T. T. Timofeyev and A. I. Sobolev as his deputies, with P. N. Fedoseyev and V. V. Zagladin among its twenty members. Ponomarev writes no introduction here. He does not need to. His introduction to Volume One is cited in this volume's own first footnote, and the commission it set out there — a history "interpreting the past in the interest of the present and future", in Ponomarev's words in Volume One — governs everything that follows.

Get the date right before anything else. The spine says 1983; the copyright page carries a Russian line, mangled in the scan, for Izdatelstvo "Mysl", 1978, and beneath it the English translation copyright, Progress Publishers 1983. The internal evidence agrees with the Russian date exactly. The most recent datable source the book cites is Brezhnev's Our Course: Peace and Socialism (Novosti, 1978), quoted twice; before that, the CPSU Central Committee resolution on the seventieth anniversary of 1905, in Kommunist No. 2 for 1975. There is one bibliographic imprint reading 1984, in a footnote to a Rütten und Loening volume on the impact of 1905 on Germany; the same line prints "DeutsMand" for Deutschland, and the year is scanner damage, not evidence. (I could not establish which digit it corrupts.) A handful of Lenin references carry 1980 Progress printings — those belong to the English apparatus, not to the text. So: a Russian book finished

in 1978, at the last confident moment of détente, reaching English readers in 1983, the year of the Euromissile deployments and the shooting down of KAL 007. The book knows nothing of that, and it is fairer to it to say so than to pretend otherwise.

Now the thing that makes this volume unlike any other book in the catalogue.

A word doing the work of an argument

The word opportunism and its cognates occur 383 times here — 12.9 times per 10,000 words. Across the 195 Progress titles in this collection the pooled rate is 1.55, the median 0.17, and 76 of the books never use the word at all. Volume Three is the densest user in the entire catalogue, just ahead of The World Communist Movement (1973) and well clear of the 1939 History of the CPSU(B). Around it sit reformism (246), centrism (126), revisionism (119) and conciliators (60): roughly one term of political disqualification every three hundred words, for some seven hundred pages. The book's own jacket copy names the genre — it promises "an account of their fight against the opportunists" — and its master binary appears as a fixed phrase, "revolutionary and opportunist", thirty-five times, once as a chapter title.

The gradient within this series is the striking part, because the publisher, the institute and the editorial committee are held constant:

volume	period	words	opportunis-	per 10,000	Trotsky
1	(1880) to 1870	292,294	42	1.44	3
2	(1881) 1871–1904	273,262	199	7.28	6
3	(1883) 1905–1917	296,581	383	12.91	29

The vocabulary of deviation multiplies ninefold as the narrative approaches the split that produced the state which commissioned the book.

The honest objection has to be put first, because it is a strong one. Much of that rise is simply the subject. Between 1905 and 1917 the argument about revisionism, reformism and the collapse of 4 August 1914 was the content of the international movement's history, and Lenin, whom this book quotes on almost every page, used the word constantly. A historian of those years who did not use it often would be writing badly. The frequency alone proves nothing, and a companion study in this project which tried to argue from frequency to ritual has since retracted that step, on the good ground that Lenin scores no better on the same measure than the Progress volumes do.

So the test has to be finer. Not how often the word is used, but what it is used instead of — and whether the book has a different vocabulary available when it wants one.

It does, and it uses it constantly. Rosa Luxemburg is told, in the chapter on the national question, that she and others "were inclined to underestimate the nations' right to self-determination as a principle in the programmes of the proletarian parties of oppressor nations"; her argument is then stated fairly, in three clauses, and answered. Radek is said to have opposed the proletariat's revolutionary struggle to the struggle for self-determination; Pyatakov, Bosh and Bukharin are charged with "imperialist economism" and with holding "erroneous, primitive ideas"; Bukharin's Imperialism and the World Economy is nonetheless cited three times, always through Lenin's approving preface. In March 1917, the book says, "Pravda published deeply erroneous articles by L. B. Kamenev which expressed his personal views". And — this is genuinely notable in a Soviet volume of 1978 — "Stalin also advanced a view in Pravda which was mistaken and hampered the revolutionary education of the masses."

Mistaken. Erroneous. Inclined to underestimate. Failed to see. The book has a precise and serviceable language for a comrade's error, and it applies that language to Luxemburg, to Radek, to Bukharin, to Kamenev and to Stalin himself.

Trotsky gets none of it. His position on the character of the Russian revolution is "a clearly adventurist action plan"; his "impressive-sounding but empty 'ultra-revolutionary' phrases actually led to adventurism and impotent outbursts"; "Trotsky's course was typical of centrism in Russia"; and the verdict, in the volume's opening chapter:

The Bolsheviks resolutely came out against Trotsky's eclectic concept, exposing it as a dangerous variety of opportunism.

The label is not tracking the content of the error. Luxemburg's

disagreement with Lenin over self-determination was at least as wide as Trotsky's over the peasantry, and she is inside the family. The label tracks membership: it marks the line of descent from which the CPSU of 1978 claimed to come, and the one person placed outside it. That is what the word is doing in this book that an argument would otherwise have to do.

Quotation marks with nothing behind them

The paragraph that condemns Trotsky's theory does so in these terms:

Marx's idea of uninterrupted revolution was grossly distorted by Trotsky, who set forth a clearly adventurist action plan. According to it, Russia's only revolutionary force was the proletariat, which was capable of immediately forming a government of "labour democracy" and of beginning to restructure the country on socialist lines ("without the tsar, and with a labour government").

Note the quotation marks. They contain a doctrine, and they are sourced to nothing. The only references anywhere near the passage are to Lenin — Two Tactics of Social-Democracy in the Democratic Revolution and "The Aim of the Proletarian Struggle in Our Revolution". This is not an accident of one page. In a book that cites Luxemburg's *Gesammelte Werke* sixteen times, Kautsky's own writings nine times, the revisionists' *Sozialistische Monatshefte* fourteen times and *Die Neue Zeit* twenty-four times, that opens the proceedings of the Stuttgart congress and the protocols of the Jena party congress — a book whose notes say "Collected Works" 558 times — no work by Trotsky is cited once. The name appears in the index at twelve pages; it never appears in a footnote except inside the title of an article by Lenin.

Readers of the companion introductions in this series will recognise the shape. Two foreign-policy volumes were found to derive the doctrine of peaceful coexistence from Lenin across nearly two hundred thousand words without the phrase ever once appearing inside a quotation from him; the pedigree was asserted in the author's voice. Here the same move runs in reverse: a doctrine is put inside quotation marks, attributed to a named man, and never taken from anything he wrote.

It also gets the attribution wrong, and the error is checkable. The phrases in those brackets are Parvus's, not Trotsky's. Parvus wrote the introduction to Trotsky's 1905 pamphlet, and the formula about a workers' government without a tsar is his. Trotsky spent much of his later life distinguishing his own position from it. In "Three Conceptions of the Russian

Revolution" (Summer 1939) he sets out exactly where they parted: Parvus, he writes, foresaw not the growing over of the democratic into the socialist revolution but merely "a regime of workers' democracy of the Australian type, where on the basis of a farmers' system there arose for the first time a labor government which did not go beyond the framework of a bourgeois regime." And then, flatly: "This conclusion was not shared by me." The theory, he adds in the same passage, "has usually been linked with the names of 'Parvus and Trotsky.' This was only partially correct." An Academy of Sciences volume of 1978 puts Parvus's formulation inside quotation marks in Trotsky's mouth, and builds the charge of denying the peasantry on top of it.

That charge is the other half, and it is answerable from the text the book will not name. "Permanent revolution" appears exactly once in 296,000 words, in scare quotes, inside a subordinate clause of the sentence that condemns it — "for all its outward 'leftism' and formal references to the Marxist idea of uninterrupted ('permanent') revolution". The theory is never stated. Chapter V of Results and Prospects, written in 1906 and titled "The Proletariat in Power and the Peasantry", is about nothing else. Of representatives of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in a revolutionary government it says: "They can and should be in the government: a sound policy will compel the proletariat to call to power the influential leaders of the urban petty-bourgeoisie, of the intellectuals and of the peasantry." "The proletariat in power will stand before the peasants as the class which has emancipated it." "Nothing remains for the peasantry to do but to rally to the regime of workers' democracy." And when Trotsky reduced the theory to twelve numbered propositions in 1930, the third reads: "Without an alliance of the proletariat with the peasantry the tasks of the democratic revolution cannot be solved, nor even seriously posed."

One may think all of that wrong — that the peasantry would not in fact rally, that the formula collapses the distinction it claims to preserve. Lenin thought a version of it wrong for a decade and said so in print. But "Trotsky thereby denied the revolutionary role of the peasantry" is not an answer to those sentences; it is a statement that they were never read. The same holds for the charge of "skipping" stages. The Permanent Revolution devotes a short chapter to it, and its argument is not that stages may be skipped at will but the opposite: "Every attempt to skip over real, that is, objectively conditioned stages in the development of the masses, is political adventurism." The word the book uses against him is the word he uses in his own defence.

Two silences, and one concession worth more than either

The first Soviet in history gets a full and rather good page. The book reports that 562 deputies were elected to the St. Petersburg Soviet from 147 factories, 34 workshops and 16 trade unions, that it represented no fewer than 250,000 workers, that 351 deputies were metalworkers and 65 per cent were members of the RSDLP. It tells you that Lenin, back from emigration on 8 (21) November 1905, "guided the activity of the Bolshevik group in the St. Petersburg Soviet of Workers' Deputies." It does not tell you who chaired it. The name Khrustalev-Nosar does not occur in the book at all, and Trotsky, who succeeded him in the chair, is absent from the entire 1905 narrative except as a theory to be refuted. The Zimmerwald conference of September 1915 is likewise given four careful pages, its manifesto quoted and criticised at length, and the book never says who drafted it (Trotsky did); he appears there only as part of "the so-called Zimmerwald Centre, represented primarily by Grimm, Trotsky and Roland-Holst."

Against that, set something the volume does that most of its shelfmates do not. Its account of the Bolsheviks in March 1917 concedes, in its own voice, that the party's leadership in Petrograd got the line wrong before Lenin arrived: that the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee "failed" to advance the slogan of all power to the Soviets, that Kamenev's Pravda articles were "deeply erroneous", and that Stalin's call for "pressure" on the Provisional Government "was mistaken". This is a real concession, it is printed in a Brezhnev-era Academy volume, and it should be credited.

It should also be dated. The stenographic record of the all-Russian party conference of late March 1917, at which Stalin argued that "in so far as the Provisional Government fortifies the steps of the revolution, to that extent we must support it", was suppressed for a decade and published by Trotsky in 1937, in *The Stalin School of Falsification*. His foreword to the Russian edition says why he printed it: the minutes "are vivid but far from flattering. That is precisely why they are hidden from the party to this very day. This document is printed here for the first time and is thereby preserved from certain destruction." The Institute of the International Working-Class Movement reached the same conclusion forty-one years later, in one subordinate clause, and without a source.

What is not a finding here

Volume Three does not mention the Moscow Trials, the Left Opposition, "socialism in one country", the Popular Front, the Third Period, "social fascism", the POUM, Spain, Kronstadt 1921 or the Comintern's dissolution. None of that is a finding, and it would be dishonest to bank it as one. The book ends in March 1917; every item on that list postdates its last page by years or decades, and a volume covering 1905–17 has no more business discussing the Popular Front than Volume One had discussing 1937. Ernst Thälmann appears twice — once, correctly, as leader of the Hamburg transport workers before 1914. Kronstadt appears five times, always as the 1906 mutiny or the 1917 defection of the Baltic Fleet. That is chronology, not evidence.

Two further tests this series has been applying to Progress volumes also come back empty here, and for the same structural reason. "Peaceful coexistence" occurs nowhere in the book, so there is no doctrine being sourced to Lenin without quoting him. Brest-Litovsk occurs once, in passing, so the amalgam that three foreign-policy volumes commit — putting Bukharin's revolutionary-war position in Trotsky's mouth — cannot arise. Both are absences of opportunity, not of intention. And an expectation I was given, that a 1983 volume would be answerable from the 1930s Trotskyist press for the first time in this series, does not survive contact with the book: nothing in it falls after March 1917, so the contemporaneous reply has to come from Trotsky's own 1906 and 1930 texts and from the Fourth International's retrospective writing, not from the Kirov or Spanish material.

The absence that does count is a smaller one. Julius Martov, co-founder of Iskra and leader of the Menshevik-Internationalists who opposed the war from 1914, appears twice in 296,000 words: once as a co-editor of a liquidationist history, and once inside the title of a Lenin article. A book which devotes chapters to the Zimmerwald movement and to the crisis of the Second International has effectively no room for the man who led the Russian left opposition to the war outside the Bolshevik party.

The book underneath

Set the Russian chapters aside and a different book appears, and a reader told only about the polemics would be badly served.

Chapter 8, on the working class in the colonial and dependent countries, is the best thing in the volume and among the best things in this whole series. Its North African section works from Gabriel Baer's *Studies in the Social History of Modern*

Egypt (Chicago, 1969), Charles-Robert Ageron on the Algerian Muslims (PUF, 1968), Charles Stewart's *The Economy of Morocco* (Harvard, 1964), French agricultural handbooks of 1914 and 1929, and Soviet monographs, and it does something a lazier book would not: it looks at the European workers in Algeria and Tunisia and finds them stratified rather than uniformly privileged. Their wages were higher than Arab workers' and still "as a rule, even below the official subsistence minimum"; some were becoming a labour aristocracy and some were not; and it was the ones who did not who started the strikes and the unions. That is a real historical argument with an edge on it. The account of Arab agricultural labourers — a kilogram of bread a day, two litres of olive oil a month, sleeping in the open, the rais skimming the wage, "legitimate" deductions of 7 to 13 per cent in Egypt — is documented, specific and unsentimental.

The Latin American section is comparably good on Luis Emilio Recabarren, the Chilean printer elected to Congress in 1906 — "the first time that a worker had become a member of parliament in Latin America" — and follows him through the Democratic Party, *El Despertar de los Trabajadores* and the founding of the Socialist Labour Party in 1912 without flattening him into a proto-Bolshevik. The chapters on Germany and Austria-Hungary quarry the party congress protocols and *Sozialistische Monatshefte* directly, which means the revisionists are quoted saying what they actually said. The account of 4 August 1914 is accurate and unflinching about the size of the internal opposition: fourteen Social-Democrat deputies opposed the war credits in caucus, "could not bring themselves to break away from the Party's Board and the faction's majority and voted in favour", and Liebknecht broke ranks alone in December. The final historiographical chapter engages G. D. H. Cole and Julius Braunthal by name rather than gesturing at "bourgeois falsifiers". Details are cared for: an Ivanovo factory owner in 1905 complaining that a "duocracy" was in evidence in his city; the last appeal of the Presnya fighting squads — "Generation after generation in all countries will learn staunchness from the Presnya experience."

The theory of opportunism the book offers is also, on its own terms, a real one and not an epithet. "The social base of the growing opportunism was the petty bourgeoisie, the labour aristocracy and the labour bureaucracy," it says, and it names the mechanism: concessions won by struggle, plus "the imperialists' bribing of the upper crust of the working class", plus the specific conditions of a long peaceful expansion. That is Lenin's chain, stated correctly. It is even applied with some discrimination — at Stuttgart in 1907, "Unlike these rightists,

Jaures, Vaillant and even Vandervelde argued for the need to carry out special anti-militarist activities and to take most effective mass anti-war action." The book can give credit to men it is about to condemn. It simply cannot do it for one of them.

Where the reply is

For the theory the book attacks and never states: Results and Prospects (1906), chapters IV–V, and The Permanent Revolution (1930), especially chapter 6, "On the Skipping of Historical Stages", and the twelve postulates of chapter 10. For the specific question of Parvus, Trotsky's "Three Conceptions of the Russian Revolution" (1939). For the March 1917 conference, The Stalin School of Falsification (1937), chapters 14 and 15, which print the record the Institute paraphrases.

But the text worth putting beside this volume is not a polemic at all. In July–August 1947, Fourth International carried an essay on Trotsky by Ernest Germain — Ernest Mandel — which does exactly what Volume Three refuses to do. It criticises Lenin: "There is in Lenin, in his writings of 1905, in his ideas before 1917 on the nature of the Russian revolution, a reticence to leave the realm of the immediate, to push to its end the concept of the proletariat as the motivating force of the revolution." It quotes Trotsky against hagiography — "Only incurable philistines imagine Lenin as a saint who never made a mistake." And on the August Bloc of 1912, which is the one substantial charge Volume Three brings that a serious reader would want tested, it concedes the point outright: Trotsky "remained too attached to the 'traditional' and inadequate organizational forms of Western social democracy", and "That is why he permitted himself to embark on the notorious 'August bloc,' which was entirely hostile to his political concepts."

That is the difference between the two traditions on this ground, and it is not a difference about facts. Both agree there was an August Bloc; both think it was a mistake. One of them can say so about its own founder in print, in its own theoretical journal, seven years after his murder. The other cannot name the chairman of the first Soviet.

A footnote on the archive, since this series tries to give readers somewhere to go. The plainest statement that Trotsky chaired the St Petersburg Soviet in 1905 and the Petrograd Soviet in 1917 that I could find in the contemporaneous press is Max Shachtman's, in The New International for August 1941 — but by that date the magazine was the organ of Shachtman's Workers Party, which had split from the Fourth International

the previous year over the class character of the USSR, and it should not be cited as this tradition's own voice. The fact is not in dispute between them. Only in Moscow was it in dispute.

The boundary

Volume One's introduction in this series ended by suggesting that its own years — 1500 to 1870, where no faction had a stake and no one had been shot for a wrong answer — were the only ones in which these historians could do their job properly, and that this was why Ponomarev had to write the introduction himself. Volume Three tests that and refines it. The constraint is not chronological. Within this single book, at a single moment, the section on Tunisian agricultural labour is free and the section on the Petersburg Soviet is not; a Chilean printer of 1906 can be described as he was, and the chairman of the first workers' council in history cannot be named. What determines which is not the date but the distance from the party's own genealogy.

That is worth knowing precisely because it means the book is usable. Read chapters 5, 7 and 8 — the trade unions, the mass movement country by country, the colonial world — as the serious comparative labour history they are, and read them with the confidence that these authors were good at their trade. Then read chapters 1, 3, 4 and 12 knowing that a name has been removed from them, that the doctrine attributed to that name is quoted from a man who did not hold it, and that in a book with several hundred footnotes the accused is the one figure whose own words were never opened.

Quotations from the Progress text are given as printed, except that obvious scanning damage has been corrected silently: the volume renders Lenin's 1909 letter to Zinoviev as "Trotsky behaves like a despicable careerist and factionalism", where the last word is factionalist, and prints "Gentrism" for Centrism and "Roland-Hoist" for Roland-Holst.

SOVIET SOCIETY

The Psychology of Management of Labour Collectives

Soviet management psychology for the factory director - moods, authority, meetings, incentives, discipline - the clearest English statement of what the USSR's "science of management" actually taught its bosses.

Aleksei Mikhailovich Stolyarenko

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

A. Stolyarenko's The Psychology of Management of Labour Collectives is a handbook for the socialist boss. It teaches the Soviet manager how to read the moods of his workforce, how to build his standing among the people he directs, how to run a meeting, resolve a quarrel, and raise output without leaning too hard on threats. It is, in other words, the Soviet counterpart to the Western literature of industrial and organisational psychology — the same genre of advice book that filled American management shelves after the Second World War, translated into the vocabulary of Marxism-Leninism and printed for export by Progress. It is also, read against the country that produced it, one of the more quietly revealing documents in this catalogue, because everything it recommends assumes a thing the Soviet worker did not have.

When the book was written, and what it was for

For once the date on the spine is close to the date of the text. The English translation carries 1983, and the internal evidence agrees: the book's supreme political authority is the 26th Congress of the CPSU, which met in February 1981, and it treats "the 25th and 26th congresses" together as the last word on economic management. It speaks throughout the language of "developed" or "mature socialism" — the late-Brezhnev doctrine that the Soviet Union had left its improvised, transitional phase behind and settled into a stable, lasting order. Its footnote citations run out around 1977–78. This is a book of the very end of the Brezhnev years — composed as the old leader was dying (he died in November 1982) and issued in English in the first year of his successors' interregnum.

Its author gives us almost nothing about himself; the volume carries no biographical apparatus beyond the name. What the

book makes plain is the world he wrote from: the Soviet "science of management" (*nauka upravleniya*), a fashionable applied discipline of the 1970s that borrowed systems theory, cybernetics and social psychology and bent them to the running of the socialist enterprise. Stolyarenko writes as a practitioner of that discipline for an audience of *rukovoditeli* — executives, directors, heads of departments — and, on the export side, for the foreign reader curious about how the other superpower proposed to manage people.

The commission behind the book is legible in its historical moment. The Soviet economy of the early 1980s was slowing to a crawl. The extensive growth of the postwar decades — more workers, more plants, more steel — had exhausted itself, and the regime's answer, repeated at congress after congress, was that future growth would have to come from efficiency: from better organisation, tighter discipline, and fuller use of "the human factor." A whole vogue grew up around the "moral-psychological climate" (*moral'no-psikhologicheskii klimat*) of the workplace — the idea that the mood, cohesion and morale of a work team were measurable assets that a trained manager could cultivate for output. This book is a product of that vogue. It arrives, too, in the same years as the USSR's 1983 Law on Work Collectives, the regime's attempt to give the labour collective a statutory shape. Stolyarenko is writing to arm the socialist manager for the productivity battle the plan had assigned him.

The doctrine: management without antagonism

The book's frame is set out in its long first chapter, and it is worth stating precisely, because the whole structure rests on a single proposition. Management, for Stolyarenko, has a class nature. Under capitalism it is inherently double: the manager both coordinates production and, as the owner's agent, drives the exploited to work "against their own basic interests, for the exploiter." The greater the gulf between worker and owner, the more of management becomes naked supervision. Socialism,

having abolished private ownership of the means of production, is said to abolish that gulf — and with it the coercive half of management. What remains is pure coordination, exercised in a setting where manager and managed want the same thing.

Stolyarenko states this repeatedly and without hedging. "The essence of Soviet management," he writes, "does not lie in coercing some individuals to obey others but in organising meaningful joint productive work based on mutual understanding and common interest." Under the principle of "democratic centralism" applied to the enterprise, he argues, "the contrast is eliminated between the goals of the upper and lower echelons which exists in other social systems." This is the harmony-of-interests premise, and it is the load-bearing wall of the book. Because the Soviet worker owns the enterprise in common with every other citizen, the manager who directs him is not an antagonist but a fellow-owner with a coordinating job to do; the interests of the two cannot, in principle, diverge.

From that premise the practical doctrine follows. Because interests coincide, the socialist manager's task is chiefly educational and psychological rather than coercive. He is to cultivate the "moral and psychological climate," to nurture the cohesion of the collective, to run "socialist emulation" — the organised competition between workers and brigades that was meant to substitute, under socialism, for the spur of the market. He is to understand motivation, and here Stolyarenko is careful to say that once a worker's material needs are decently met, it is "spiritual" or social needs — recognition, creative scope, good relations, the respect of the collective — that come to drive behaviour. Personnel leave jobs, he notes, not usually over pay but over "dissatisfaction with the socio-psychological climate in the collective, lack of opportunity for applying their creative abilities... lack of rapport with the manager."

On leadership he offers a typology of styles: the directive (which he glosses as "imperative, administrative, and authoritarian"), the liberal (minimal intervention, reliance on self-management), and the collective (a blend of the two, and the recommended one). A reader who knows the Western literature will recognise this instantly as the authoritarian / democratic / laissez-faire triad that the social psychologist Kurt Lewin and his collaborators established in their famous experiments of the late 1930s — the same three-way scheme, relabelled and given a socialist gloss. And on the manager's standing Stolyarenko draws his sharpest distinction. Authority — legal power, the command that comes attached to the office — is one thing; prestige — the "psychological, inner, and

sincere recognition of the executive's merits by the subordinates" — is another and higher thing. Power, he writes, "is a legal category, prestige, a socio-psychological one": the office can exact "subordination by coercion," but prestige "is obeyed voluntarily." The good socialist manager governs by prestige, won "in joint work," not by the power his post confers. It is a genuinely humane emphasis, and it is the emotional centre of the book.

The tell

Now set the doctrine beside the country. The trouble with a psychology of managing workers built on the coincidence of interests is that it has to be imported into a system in which the workers being managed had no independent means of asserting an interest of their own at all. They had no union that was theirs — the Soviet trade unions were arms of the state and the enterprise, charged with raising output as much as defending their members. They had no legal right to strike. They had no say in appointing the manager who directed them; he was named from above, through the apparatus, and answered upward to the ministry and the Party, not downward to the collective. "The collective" that Stolyarenko's manager is forever cultivating is a body managed from above, not one that manages anything. The book is a manual for governing people who have been relieved of every instrument by which they might have registered a divergent interest — and it then declares, as its founding axiom, that no divergent interest exists.

The mechanism at the heart of Soviet enterprise governance was *edinonachalie* — "one-man management," the doctrine, in force since the early 1920s, that a single appointed director held undivided authority over the plant and bore personal responsibility for it. It is the thing Stolyarenko's whole discussion of the "executive's personality" is about; his manager is the one-man boss, the man of whom he writes that "the executive personifies and implements power." Yet the book never names the doctrine, never sets it beside its talk of self-management and the initiative of the masses, and so never has to explain how undivided personal command squares with a workplace supposedly free of the subordination of some to others. The word "prestige" does the concealing work: the manager's power is real and one-man, but the book asks us to attend only to the affection he ought to earn while wielding it.

The book is at its most inadvertently candid where it turns on its Western rivals. Stolyarenko devotes a careful section to the "human relations" school — Elton Mayo, Roethlisberger, the Hawthorne experiments — the very Western tradition his own

book most closely resembles. His verdict is severe. The human-relations doctrine, he writes, sought only to "camouflage class contradictions by humane declarations"; where the classical managers "preferred the stick," its supporters "relied more on the carrot." Its cardinal sin is that its psychological techniques try to make "the hired worker regard the employer's interests as the worker's own, work with enthusiasm in the name of goals alien to him, and feel gratitude and loyalty to the employer for the opportunity for self-expression and self-assertion." That is an exact and damning description — of Stolyarenko's own project. His book, too, is a set of psychological techniques for making the worker regard the enterprise's targets as his own and work at them with enthusiasm and gratitude. The only difference he can point to is the founding axiom: under socialism the goals are not alien, because the workers own everything in common. Strike out that axiom and the two books are the same book. Everything therefore rests on the axiom — and the axiom was being refuted, in the plainest possible way, next door.

For while Stolyarenko was writing, the workers of Poland had just spent sixteen months demonstrating that a working class inside a "socialist" state could discover an interest sharply opposed to its managers and its Party, and could organise around it. Solidarity — the independent, self-governing trade union born in the Gdańsk shipyard strike of August 1980 — grew to something near ten million members before it was crushed under martial law in December 1981. It was the single largest working-class self-organisation in the history of the Soviet bloc, and its entire existence was a practical proof that the harmony of interests was a doctrine and not a fact: that where the state monopolised the union, the strike and the appointment of managers, workers experienced their bosses precisely as an opposed power, and would build their own institutions the instant the lid lifted. A Soviet book of 1983 on the psychology of managing the labour collective is, whatever its intentions, a book written in the shadow of Gdańsk, and its serene assumption that manager and worker cannot be antagonists reads very differently for having been printed in the year after the tanks went in.

The reply already in print

The anti-Stalinist left had answered this argument almost half a century before Stolyarenko made it, and answered it on exactly the ground he chose — the relation between the worker and the man who runs his factory. In *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), Trotsky described what the transfer of industry to the state had actually done to the worker's position. "The transfer

of the factories to the state," he wrote, "changed the situation of the worker only juridically." In practice the new state had "resorted to the old methods of pressure upon the muscles and nerves of the worker"; management had become "superbureaucratic"; and — the sentence that Stolyarenko's entire book is built to deny — "the workers lost all influence whatever upon the management of the factory." The worker, Trotsky concluded, does not experience the coincidence of interests the doctrine promises: "In the bureaucracy he sees the manager, in the state, the employer."

On the unions the answer is as direct. Stolyarenko's picture assumes trade unions that fuse the collective with its management in a common purpose. Trotsky had already named what such unions were. Reading the Stalin Constitution of 1936, he saw that the "social organizations" it enumerated — the unions among them — had been reduced to "subordinate branches of the bureaucratic firm." A union that is a branch of the firm cannot represent the collective against the firm; that is what Poland's workers understood in 1980, and what the doctrine could not admit.

There is even a small, exact answer to Stolyarenko's chapter on the manager's relations with his subordinates — his counsel of tact, respect and the "science of not inflicting hurt." Trotsky quotes a Moscow factory director boasting in *Pravda* of his enterprise's cultured tone: a mechanic telephones — "What is your order, sir, check the furnace immediately or wait?" — and the director records that the worker addresses him in the deferential second-person plural while he answers in the second-person singular used to inferiors. Trotsky's comment is that this "disgraceful dialogue," printed as something normal, revived precisely the servility that a popular pre-revolutionary demand had sought to abolish — the use of the familiar form by bosses to their subordinates. Stolyarenko's whole apparatus of manager-worker etiquette is an attempt to manage, psychologically, the strains of a hierarchy that his doctrine says does not exist; Trotsky had shown, forty-seven years earlier, that the hierarchy was real and that its manners gave it away.

The reader who wants this argument at length will find it in *The Revolution Betrayed*, above all chapter 9, "What is the Soviet Union?", and in the two siblings of this volume already in the series — L. B. Moskvina's *The Working Class and Its Allies* (1980) and Timur Timofeyev's *Workers in Society* (1981). Both of those books perform the same revealing manoeuvre as this one, and it is worth naming because it recurs across the catalogue: when they write of the capitalist worker, his vitality is proved by the strike, the wildcat stoppage, the

union independent of the state; when they turn to the socialist worker, all of that vanishes, replaced by "emulation," "cohesion" and a healthy climate. The strike is the sign of health abroad and unmentionable at home. Stolyarenko's version is milder only because his genre is narrower: a manual does not have to praise foreign strikes. But the asymmetry is the same, and it points at the same buried fact — that the socialist worker had been relieved of the weapons the doctrine celebrated in his Western brother.

worker, the sentence is an aspiration dressed as a description. But it is a real aspiration, and a decent one, and it belongs to the better tradition inside Soviet life — the strand that kept insisting, against all the evidence the same system supplied, that management ought to rest on the freely given respect of the managed. The tragedy the book cannot see is that it was describing the one thing its own state had made structurally impossible: a manager the collective could have refused.

What is worth keeping

None of this makes the book worthless, and the series does its readers no service by pretending it is. Strip away the founding axiom and a good deal of *The Psychology of Management of Labour Collectives* is competent applied psychology that would not be out of place in any management library of its decade — which is, of course, part of the point, since much of it came from there.

Stolyarenko's survey of Western management theory in the first chapter is genuinely informed. He has read Taylor and Fayol, March and Simon, the Hawthorne studies, the "situational" leadership theory of Fred Fiedler, the systems and "empirical" schools of Drucker and the rest, and he characterises them accurately before he condemns them; a student could learn the shape of twentieth-century organisational thought from his account. His treatment of engineering psychology and ergonomics — the fit between the worker, the machine and the workplace — is sober and practical. His chapter on managerial decision-making, and his long, concrete advice on how to chair a working meeting so that a collective genuinely pools its knowledge rather than deferring to the chair, is the kind of thing that is useful in any workplace under any system; so is his catalogue of the ways a manager can poison a team by favouritism, by "false prestige," by criticism used to settle scores. His insistence that a workforce neglected — where "interpersonal relations are neglected" — will show it in instability, low attainment, high turnover and a "tense" climate is simply true, and observed with some care.

And there is one register in which the book is better than the system it serves. When Stolyarenko condemns what he calls "quasi-collective leadership" — the boss who consults for show and decides alone — he writes that under developed socialism such conduct "is regarded as tyranny and abuse of power incompatible with the requirements imposed on a Soviet leader, causing the people to resist these management practices." Set against the actual powerlessness of the Soviet

The Strategy of Transnational Corporations

The multinational corporation anatomised by a Soviet economist who argued with his colleagues by name - profit rates, transfer pricing, intra-firm trade - as Moscow backed the UN codes of conduct.

Aleksandr Zakharovich Astapovich

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

The copyright page of this book has been mangled by the scanner, but two lines survive it intact. One reads, in Cyrillic, "© Издательство «Наука», 1978". The other reads "English translation of the revised Russian text © Progress Publishers 1983". So the spine is five years out. This is a book of 1978, published by Nauka — the press of the Academy of Sciences, not the Institute of Marxism-Leninism — and reworked for English readers at the turn of 1982–83.

The reworking was real but uneven, and the unevenness is the most interesting thing about the volume. Astapovich refreshed his tables on the capitalist core all the way up to the last possible moment: the corporate rankings come from Fortune of May and August 1982, the research-and-development league table from Business Week of 5 July 1982, the United States balance-of-payments series from the Survey of Current Business of August 1982, and the profit-rate table in Chapter One runs to 1981. But the chapter on the developing countries — Chapter Six, the longest and the best in the book — still rests on a UNCTAD paper prepared for the Manila session of May 1979 and on the UN's Transnational Corporations in World Development: A Re-Examination of March 1978. One half of the book was brought up to the summer of 1982. The other half was not. Hold that thought; it will turn out to matter more than anything else here.

Who wrote it. A. Z. Astapovich was a working economist of the Academy of Sciences system, not an apparatus functionary, and the company he keeps in his footnotes places him precisely: he argues with Soviet colleagues by name — Belous on the mass versus the rate of profit, P. Khvoinik on whether intra-firm exchange can be called trade at all, Yu. Shishkov on regional differentials in the rate of profit, I. D. Ivanov on the definition of a multinational. This was the Soviet international-economics milieu of the détente decade, and it did serious work. The commission behind the book is legible too. In the second half of the 1970s the Soviet Union had taken up a position inside the United Nations argument over

transnational corporations, alongside the Group of 77 and behind the New International Economic Order. The book's closing pages are given over to the two draft codes of conduct then under negotiation — one on transnationals, one on the transfer of technology — and to the demand that they be legally binding rather than voluntary. That is what the book is for. It is ammunition for a diplomatic campaign.

What holds

A great deal, and it should be said at length.

Astapovich's central empirical claim is that the transnational corporation's decisive innovation is not size but the internalisation of exchange: that a growing share of world trade is not trade at all but administered transfer between units of one firm, at prices the firm sets. He gets the scale roughly right — up to 60 per cent of capitalist-world exports passing through the transnationals, intra-firm transfers covering "up to a third of world trade turnover" — and he gets the mechanism exactly right. The chapter on financial policy in Chapter Two is the sharpest thing in the book. He shows that between 1950 and 1981 United States companies increased their foreign direct investment by \$216 billion of which only \$57 billion was actually exported from the United States, \$122 billion being reinvested profit; that over the same period American foreign affiliates sent about \$220 billion home and received only \$80 billion; that profit flows had been reoriented towards finance subsidiaries in favourable tax jurisdictions; and that a firm can shift value simply by changing the base year on which it values a subsidiary's assets. He notes, almost in passing, that many transnationals own foreign affiliates whose activities are recorded nowhere at all. He offers a back-of-envelope estimate that a ten per cent uplift on the roughly \$65 billion of goods then moving between American parents and their overseas units would generate more than their annual dividends, with a footnote observing that mark-ups above 100 per cent are not rare, so ten per cent is a floor.

None of that is polemic. It is a description of base erosion and

profit shifting written thirty years before the OECD gave the practice a name and a work programme, and it has aged better than almost anything else printed by Progress in the 1980s.

The evidence in Chapter Six is stronger still, because it is specific. In Latin America, he reports, roughly half of all exports and forty per cent of imports move as intra-firm sales, "bypassing the market"; three-quarters of manufacturing transnationals there make general use of transfer pricing; their declared export prices run 40 to 62 per cent below those of local firms while their affiliates' import prices run 60 to 132 per cent above, across petrochemicals, electronics, pharmaceuticals, rubber and motors. The single most arresting figure is Colombian: "The official and actual levels of foreign-affiliate profitability in the pharmaceutical industry in Colombia were respectively 6.7 and 79.1 per cent." Declared profit was 3.4 per cent of actual income; inflated import prices carried 82.6 per cent of it. That figure is not Astapovich's own — it comes, as his reference makes clear, from the Greek economist Constantine Vaitsos's 1974 Oxford study of intercountry income distribution and transnational enterprise, the work that founded the entire transfer-pricing literature — but he read it, understood what it meant, and put it at the centre of his argument at a time when most Western economics was still treating the multinational as a neutral efficiency-improving institution.

He is equally concrete on restrictive business practice. Over ninety per cent of technology contracts in Mexico, Peru and Chile, and over seventy per cent in Bolivia, Colombia and Ecuador, carried clauses restricting the export of goods made with the licensed technology; contracts routinely bundled compulsory purchase of patents and trademarks unrelated to the transfer. He reports the Saudi government's complaint that Western electrical manufacturers, operating through the International Electrical Association and its "H Procedure" of 1973, were charging Saudi Arabia between 200 and 400 per cent more than developed-country buyers. And he gives the Brazilian case, which is the one readers remember: nine leading Western monopolies "tried to suppress the local electrical engineering industry through a collusive agreement. They cut their prices, stretched out delivery schedules and supplied defective materials causing accidents." The sabotage fund, he notes, was financed by a levy of two per cent on the contract price of goods sold. That comes from Richard Newfarmer's UNCTAD study, and it is accurately transmitted.

Then there is a body of work almost nobody expects to find in a Progress title: a detailed, sourced account of industrial relations inside American subsidiaries in Britain. Astapovich

traces the export of American labour practice — measured daywork, the fixed-term collective agreement, the productivity agreement — through Esso, Vauxhall, Chrysler at Rootes, International Harvester and Otis, and cites the Office of Manpower Economics figure that by 1972 some nine per cent of British workers were on measured daywork, but thirty per cent in motors, where American investment was heaviest. He reconstructs the Ford of Britain dispute of February 1969 clause by clause: the eight per cent rise, the increase in holiday pay from £5 to £25, the new lay-off payments, and the penalty provisions that stripped those payments from anyone taking part in "unconstitutional" action; the four-week strike called by the shop stewards; and the second agreement, in which the penalties survived in collective rather than individual form, so that the union itself became the policing agency. He is right about the significance, and right about the sequel: the state, which could ordinarily lean on a British company, could not lean on Ford. His sources here — Kujawa on the automotive industry, Steuer and Gennard at the LSE, the Commission on Industrial Relations, evidence to United States Senate committees — are real, checkable, and Western. This is not agitprop. It is research.

On wages he is careful with a subject that invites carelessness. He gives the ILO's 1975 assembly-plant comparisons — electronics workers in Hong Kong at \$0.27 an hour against \$3.12 in the United States, a ratio near twelve to one — alongside the American Tariff Commission's finding that labour productivity in electronics assembly in developing countries ran at about ninety-two per cent of the American level, and sometimes at parity. Cheap labour, in other words, was not less productive labour. He notes that eighty per cent of the workers in Mexico's "electronics belt" were women between sixteen and twenty-four. Read alongside the debate about export-processing zones that was then beginning in the West, this is a solid piece of work.

What is not there

Now the harder half, and it has to be approached through the dating problem set out at the start.

Search this book for the Third World debt crisis and you will not find it. The word "debt" occurs twice. Once it is a line in a table of financial outflows from the developing countries, sourced to a UN document of 14 May 1979, showing debt and interest repayment rising from \$24.2 billion to \$35.2 billion. The second occurrence concerns General Electric's loans to AEG-Telefunken. There is no analysis of sovereign borrowing, no discussion of the recycling of petrodollars through the

commercial banks, no mention of the International Monetary Fund at all, and no mention of Mexico.

Mexico suspended payments on 20 August 1982 — the same month whose *Fortune* and *Survey of Current Business* Astapovich was consulting to update his corporate tables. Within a fortnight Intercontinental Press had the story on its cover: Will Reissner, "Economy plunges into crisis: United States uses collapse of peso to force concessions", in the issue of 6 September 1982, laying out the second devaluation of the year, the freezing of \$12 billion in dollar accounts, Finance Minister Silva Herzog's meetings with over a hundred banks, and the fact that some major American banks had the equivalent of up to ninety per cent of their equity out on loan to Mexico. Three months before that, Ernest Mandel had already published the structural version in *International Viewpoint* no. 8 of June 1982, under the title "The second postwar world recession". Mandel identified the substitute markets that had sustained the previous cycle — OPEC, "the so-called socialist ones, as well as a series of semicolonial countries" — and wrote flatly that "These markets were largely financed by loans." He then named what was coming: "the crisis of the capitalist world economy is coinciding with the emergence of the inherent crisis of the economies of the postcapitalist countries."

Astapovich's book, revised in the same season, sees none of it. This is not a failure of information; the man was reading American business weeklies within weeks of publication. It is a failure of framework. His subject is the corporation, and the corporation was not the instrument through which the periphery was drained after 1979. The bank was. A theory that locates imperialist extraction in transfer prices, restrictive licensing clauses and repatriated dividends will produce, as this book does, an accurate and detailed account of one channel while the other opens up beneath it. Mandel, whose *Late Capitalism* (1975) had covered much the same ground on multinationals, could see the second channel because his object was the accumulation cycle of the world economy rather than the strategy of a firm.

Two other absences are worth naming precisely. Chile appears three times in this book, always as a data point on credit allocation or computer assembly. Allende does not appear; nor does 1973; nor does ITT's role in it, though ITT appears seven times as a corporation. Astapovich cites the 1973 hearings of the Subcommittee on International Trade of the Senate Finance Committee — twice, on wage differentials — but not the hearings held the same year by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee's Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations

under Frank Church, which published ITT's own internal documents on Chile and produced the most damaging evidence any Western institution had ever placed on the record about a transnational corporation and a foreign government. A Soviet book on transnational corporations and neocolonialism, published in 1983, which does not use the Church subcommittee, has left its best ammunition in the magazine. OPEC, likewise, appears not once, in a book with a chapter on raw-material dependence written across the decade of the two oil shocks.

The comparison the book cannot make

Now the silence that governs the rest.

The socialist world appears in this book three times, and only in three registers. It is a competitive stimulus: "Economic competition with socialism persistently compels modern capitalism to make more efficient use of the latest technological discoveries." It is a benefactor: the socialist countries gave "varied economic, scientific and technological help" to the newly independent states, and "Relations between the socialist community and the developing world have always been marked by the equal and mutually beneficial nature of their economic cooperation." And it is a diplomatic bloc at the United Nations, voting for binding codes of conduct.

That is all. Comecon does not appear in this book. Neither does the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance under any name, nor Eastern Europe, nor East-West trade, nor détente, nor a single Comecon joint enterprise, nor the transferable rouble, nor Soviet arms exports, nor Poland. Chapter Five is titled "Relations between TNCs and the State", and it does not contain the Siberian gas pipeline. In June 1982, while this text was being finalised, the Reagan administration extended its pipeline sanctions to the foreign subsidiaries and licensees of American firms, and Dresser, Caterpillar, John Brown, AEG-Kanis and Nuovo Pignone found themselves ordered by Washington to break contracts signed under French, British, West German and Italian law. It was the purest test case in the whole history of the subject: a state attempting to command transnational corporations across borders, with the Soviet Union on the other side of the deal, and the European states siding with the corporations against the American government. Astapovich's own chapter is about exactly this problem. He does not mention it.

The reason he cannot is that once the socialist economies enter the frame, the analytical instrument he has built begins to swing round. Consider what the instrument measures.

Intra-firm transfers at administered prices that bypass the market. A single planning centre allocating output between countries according to its own priorities rather than theirs. Systematic wage differentials between workers integrated into one division of labour. Restrictive conditions attached to the transfer of technology. Long-term dependence of a junior partner on a dominant partner's plant and specifications.

Every one of those describes Comecon after the Complex Programme for Socialist Economic Integration of 1971. Intra-bloc prices were not market prices; they were set by formula on lagged world averages, which after 1973 meant Soviet oil moved east below the world price and East European manufactures moved west above it. Whether that flow constituted a subsidy from Moscow or a tribute to it was argued at the time and is argued still — the well-known calculation by Marrese and Vanous, published in 1983, put the implicit transfer in the satellites' favour and remains contested — but nobody on either side of that argument thought the prices were arrived at by exchange between equals. Astapovich has written a whole book about administered pricing inside an integrated multi-country enterprise and has not applied one paragraph of it to the multi-country enterprise he lived in.

Nor to its debts. The socialist countries' hard-currency borrowing from Western banks was one of the largest single components of the lending boom of the 1970s; Poland had already gone to its creditors for rescheduling in 1981, and martial law was declared in December of that year. Mandel, in June 1982, put the socialist bloc on the same list as OPEC and the semicolonial countries as a debt-financed substitute market for capitalist exports. Astapovich, revising his book in the same months, records neither the borrowing nor the crisis it produced in the country where the largest independent workers' movement in the world had just been suppressed — and this in a volume whose Chapter Four is a passionate account of workers' international solidarity against employers, complete with a survey of trade-union combines in the motor industry. There is a sentence in that chapter about how transnationals use wage differentials to buy off a layer of workers: "Thanks to their selective employment and wage policy they create a social bulwark of opportunism and reaction." One is entitled to ask what the author thought a privileged administrative stratum, allocating scarce goods within a bloc it dominates, creates.

The method for asking that question had existed since 1936. Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* is not a book about corporations, but its first chapter is an exercise in exactly

Astapovich's kind of arithmetic, turned inward: iron and steel output per worker in the best Soviet foundry at a third of the American average, "a ratio of 1 to 5, or worse" on the national figures, 5,000 tons a year per quarry worker in the United States against 500 in the Soviet Union. Trotsky insisted that "the living standard of the masses can be defined, at least in rough figures, only by dividing the products by the number of consumers", and then did the division — railway kilometres, merchant tonnage, automobiles per thousand — until the Soviet Union stood beside Denmark and Spain. And in the appendix on "Socialism in One Country" he named the underlying condition that Astapovich's book takes as settled: "If a bourgeoisie cannot peacefully grow into a socialist democracy, it is likewise true that a socialist state cannot peacefully merge with a world capitalist system." A book arguing for legally binding UN codes of conduct as the road to the democratisation of world economic relations is, whatever else it is, an argument that the merger can be managed.

How to read it

Read Chapter Two's section on financial policy and the whole of Chapter Six as economics. They are good, they are sourced almost entirely from Western and UN material a reader can check, and on transfer pricing, technology dependence and restrictive business practice they were right earlier than most of the Western profession. If you want one Progress title that a working economist could cite today without apology alongside Menshikov's *Millionaires and Managers* — which this volume succeeds, moving the question from who owns the corporation to what the corporation does across frontiers — it is this one.

Read Chapter Five knowing that the great contemporary case is missing from it, and Chapter Six knowing that its financial data stop in 1979 while the rest of the book runs to August 1982.

And read the whole against the analysis it could not contain. Mandel's "The second postwar world recession", *International Viewpoint* no. 8, June 1982, is the same world seen whole, four months before this book went to press, and it is the place to start; his *Late Capitalism* (1975) is the long version of the argument about multinationals and the long wave. The debt crisis as it broke is in *Intercontinental Press* from September 1982 onward — Reissner's Mexico piece of 6 September 1982 is the moment of impact — and the Fourth International's accounting of what the decade of debt did to Latin America runs through *International Viewpoint* for the rest of the 1980s. For the method Astapovich was not permitted to point homeward, *The Revolution Betrayed* is still where it starts.

The instrument in this book is a good one. As with its predecessor in this series, the interesting question is not whether it works. It is what its maker was not allowed to measure with it.

HISTORY

History in the Making

Stalin's interpreter at Tehran and Molotov's in Berlin - a man who shook Hitler's hand in 1940 and sat alone with Stalin and Roosevelt in 1943, remembering both at close range.

Valentin Berezhkov

Introduction to the 1983 Edition

Some memoirs are valuable for what their author saw, and a few for what he was forbidden to say; this one is remarkable because it is both at once, and because the same man performs both offices. In November 1940 a young engineer-turned-interpreter named Valentin Berezhkov sat at Adolf Hitler's conference table in the Reich Chancellery in Berlin, close enough to shake the Führer's hand and record that "his palm was cold and moist to the touch, and his feverish eyes seemed to bore through you like gimlets." Three years later he sat between Stalin and Cordell Hull in the Kremlin, and then alone with Stalin and Roosevelt at Tehran, turning one man's Russian into another man's English while the shape of the post-war world was settled over his shoulder. Almost no one alive had been in those particular rooms. That is the rescue this book performs, and it is a real one. But the same author, writing in 1983, also had to stand at the door of a room the Soviet state insisted did not exist — and he did his duty there too, denying under his own eyewitness authority a document we now know was signed. Read for the rooms he describes, *History in the Making* is first-hand testimony of the rarest kind. Read for the room he bars, it is a small masterclass in what a Soviet diplomatic memoir of the pre-glasnost years was required to forget.

Berezhkov was not a soldier or a Party theoretician but an interpreter, which turns out to be the most useful vantage in the building. An engineer by training with good German and English, he served in the Soviet Trade Delegation in Berlin, then translated for Anastas Mikoyan's commercial talks, and in November 1940 was attached to Molotov's delegation to Berlin as one of two Russian interpreters. From there his career runs straight through the high diplomacy of the war. He was in the German capital when the invasion came on 22 June 1941, was interned and repatriated through Turkey, and returned to Moscow to serve as one of the two men — Vladimir Pavlov was the other — who interpreted for Stalin and Molotov with the Western Allies. He rendered Stalin's words to Hull at the Moscow Conference of October 1943; at

Tehran that winter he handled, by his own account, the entire private conversation between Stalin and Roosevelt with no one else present, Roosevelt having deliberately left his own interpreter behind. Yalta and Potsdam he reconstructs rather than remembers — by 1945 other interpreters had taken his place at the summit table — but the wartime alliance is narrated by a man who was, for its decisive years, physically in the room. When he describes Ribbentrop drawing a folded sheet of proposals from his tunic, or the air-raid siren that drove the whole German delegation into a bunker, he is describing what he watched happen a metre away.

Establish the date of the text before weighing it. The spine reads 1983 and the copyright page carries Progress Publishers, Moscow, in that year, translated from the Russian *Tak delalas' istoriya*. The latest event the book reaches for is a speech by Zbigniew Brzezinski to American newspaper editors in April 1980, which means the Russian was written around 1981–82 and the English issued in 1983 — the very end of the Brezhnev era, running into the brief Andropov interval, and squarely before Gorbachev, glasnost (openness) and the reckonings they permitted. This dating matters, because the book's governing purpose belongs to that exact moment. *History in the Making* is not, at bottom, a war memoir. It is a détente document, written as détente died. Its closing chapter, "Prospects for Peaceful Coexistence," argues that because the USSR and the United States cooperated against Hitler despite "the fundamental ideological differences between the two main partners," they can cooperate again; the Soviet Union, it says, remains "guided by the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence between states with differing social systems." The whole apparatus of the book — the Big Three at their friendliest, the shared toasts, the experience of cooperation between two systems — is marshalled to make a single argument to a Western readership at the opening of the second Cold War: it worked before, it can work again. The commission is a plea for the alliance's spirit, addressed across the wreckage of SALT and the invasion of Afghanistan to the people who were about to elect Ronald Reagan.

That purpose is honourable enough on its face, and parts of the

book serve it honestly. But it requires the author to present the Soviet state of 1939–41 as an unambiguous force for peace, betrayed by Western appeasers — and there the memoir meets the one set of facts it cannot admit, and does not.

The room that did not exist

On the night of 23 August 1939 in Moscow, Vyacheslav Molotov and Joachim von Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression. To it was attached a Secret Additional Protocol dividing Eastern Europe into "spheres of influence": Finland, Estonia and Latvia to the Soviet sphere, with Lithuania added by a further secret protocol of 28 September; Poland partitioned along the line of the Narew, Vistula and San; the Soviet interest in Bessarabia noted and Germany's disinterest recorded. This is not a matter of interpretation. The German originals were photographed from the captured Foreign Office files at the end of the war, produced at the Nuremberg tribunal, and published by the United States State Department in 1948 as part of *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939–1941*. The map of the following two years — the Red Army's entry into eastern Poland on 17 September 1939, the absorption of the three Baltic republics in 1940, the taking of Bessarabia — followed the protocol's lines almost exactly. The Soviet government denied the document's existence or authenticity for fifty years, until the Congress of People's Deputies, on the report of a commission chaired by Alexander Yakovlev, formally acknowledged and condemned it in December 1989.

In 1983 that admission was six years away, and Berezhkov writes on the near side of it. His treatment of the pact runs through the whole first movement of the book, and it is a careful, practised defence: collective security had failed because Britain and France would not deal seriously with Moscow; the pact bought time; it was, as the questions of "the younger generation who have insufficient knowledge of the facts" are told, a regrettable necessity forced on a peace-loving state. He quotes Stalin's own formula — "A non-aggression pact is a pact of peace between two states" — and, crucially, Stalin's assurance that this particular pact "did not jeopardize, either directly or indirectly, the territorial integrity, independence and honour of the peace-loving state." The territorial integrity of whom, exactly, the passage does not ask. It cannot, because the answer is Poland, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Romania, and the instrument that jeopardised them is the protocol whose existence the book must deny.

And deny it the book does, in the open, in the author's own

voice, in the single most revealing passage in three hundred pages. Berezhkov recalls that in April 1980 Brzezinski, then Carter's national security adviser, had spoken of "a secret protocol in a draft agreement between the Soviet Union and the Axis powers" as evidence of long-standing Russian designs on the Persian Gulf. Berezhkov, who happened to be in Washington, wrote to the *Washington Post* to refute him. As "an eye-witness of those far-off events," he testifies that the Soviet delegation refused Hitler's proposals outright and that "there had been no agreements or secret protocols signed by the Soviet government." He calls the charge a "blatant attempt to falsify history," and when the paper declines to print his letter he draws the moral: "Anti-Soviet insinuations can always find space in the American newspapers, but for the restoration of historical truth there is no room."

It is worth being precise here, because the passage is more damning under precision, not less. Brzezinski's specific reference was to the Berlin negotiations of November 1940 — the four-power talks Berezhkov himself interpreted, at which Ribbentrop urged the USSR to join the Axis and carve up "the British estate," and to which the Soviet side replied on 25 November with counter-demands that Germany never answered. On the narrow point, Berezhkov is not lying: no agreement was signed in November 1940; the Soviet delegation did decline Hitler's grand design; his eyewitness account of that refusal is accurate and valuable. But he does not confine his denial to November 1940. He widens it, in the same breath, into a blanket — "no agreements or secret protocols signed by the Soviet government" — and that blanket is cut to cover August 1939 as well. The rhetorical machinery is exquisite and it is worth naming: a true and defensible denial about one meeting is used to smuggle in a false and indefensible denial about another. The eyewitness deploys the authority of what he really saw in Berlin to vouch for something he was not present at in Moscow and which had, in fact, occurred. This is not the passive silence of a man who leaves a subject alone. It is an active testimony to a negative, sworn by a witness, in a matter where the document existed. It is the load-bearing wall of the book's whole account of 1939–41, and it was false when it was written.

Around that central denial the smaller silences arrange themselves. The seizure of eastern Poland in September 1939 appears only as "the reunification of the Western Ukraine with the Soviet Ukraine and Western Byelorussia with Soviet Byelorussia" — a homecoming, not an invasion, with the Wehrmacht (the German armed forces) that had entered from the west three weeks earlier nowhere in the frame. When the Polish frontier is argued out at length in the chapters on Tehran

and Yalta, the moving of the border is justified by the Curzon Line and by a 1939 settlement made "in accordance with the will of the people living in these regions as expressed in a plebiscite conducted on a broad democratic basis" — a plebiscite conducted, in fact, under Red Army occupation. The three Baltic republics are described as having entered the Soviet Union in 1940 "at the express will of their peoples." Each of these is the official formula of its day, and each is the visible cladding over the protocol beneath.

One silence is total, and it is the one that matters most for the book's own subject, because Berezhkov's later chapters turn on the breakdown of trust between Moscow and the Poles. In the spring of 1940 — the same season the pact's map was being filled in — the NKVD shot some 22,000 Polish officers, officials and prisoners at Katyn and other sites, on a proposal from Beria approved by the Politburo on 5 March 1940. The Germans discovered the graves and announced them in April 1943; Moscow used the London Poles' appeal for a Red Cross investigation as the pretext to break relations, and blamed the Germans for the killings until the Soviet government itself admitted NKVD responsibility in 1990. The word Katyn does not appear in this book. The only "graves" in its pages are the German war graves whose whereabouts Ambassador Schulenburg keeps asking about — for intelligence purposes, Berezhkov shrewdly notes — in the tense months before Barbarossa. A diplomat's memoir that spends chapters on the poisoned relations between the Soviet command and the Polish government-in-exile, and never once names the massacre that poisoned them, is not telling the story incompletely. It is telling a different story, from which the decisive fact has been surgically removed.

There is a further irony the author cannot have intended. Berezhkov reaches confidently for captured German records when they indict Hitler: he cites Halder's diary, Directive No. 18, "the secret archives of the German government" and "the documents of the Nuremberg trials" to prove that Hitler was plotting eastward even as he signed the pact. He is right to. But the same Nuremberg record, the same captured German archive, contains the photographed secret protocol. The book trusts that archive absolutely on one page and denies its most inconvenient contents on another. The evidentiary standard is not a standard at all; it is a filter, admitting what convicts the enemy and excluding what implicates the state that published the book.

What the witness genuinely saw

None of this is a reason to throw the book away, and a reader

told to would be poorly served, because the eyewitness core is exactly as good as its subject is rare. Strip out the enforced account of 1939 and what remains is one of the very few first-hand records of Soviet high diplomacy written by a man who was physically present at its central scenes, and who could write.

The Berlin chapters are the jewel. Berezhkov's Hitler is observed, not editorialised: the theatrical entrance through an arch of SS men, the small figure "hardly noticeable" in the vast office, the long fluent monologue delivered "like that of an actor who knew his lines well," the cold moist palm and the boring eyes. His Göring is a corpulent peacock in silver-thread fabric with rings on every finger; his Ribbentrop a man who reads out plans for dividing the British Empire and then, when the sirens wail, hustles his guests down to a bunker. And it is in that bunker that the memoir gives us its finest moment, one no institute history could invent because it happened and Berezhkov was there to hear it. Ribbentrop resumes his talk of spheres of influence, insisting Britain is finished — and Molotov cuts in: "If England is finished, why are we sitting in this shelter? And who is dropping bombs so close that we can hear them even from here?" The British bombs that fell on Berlin that night, driving the architects of the New Order into their cellar while they discussed the carve-up of a supposedly beaten enemy, are the kind of detail that only a witness brings back. The book is full of them.

The wartime chapters carry the same authority whenever Berezhkov is reporting what he personally handled: the mechanics of Lend-Lease and the convoy suspensions, the long argument over the second front, the texture of the Moscow Conference and of Tehran — Stalin's manner across a table, the drafting of telegrams checked and corrected in Stalin's own hand, the private Roosevelt conversation he interpreted alone and was terrified of muffing. On the technique of summit interpreting itself, and on the personalities as they struck a sharp-eyed young man in the room, the book is a genuine primary source, and historians of the alliance have mined it as one. Where Berezhkov reconstructs from documents — Yalta, Potsdam, the percentages Churchill scrawled in the Kremlin — he is a competent narrator working from the record like anyone else, and no better; where he remembers, he is close to irreplaceable. The reader who wants to know how the diplomacy of the Grand Alliance actually felt from the Soviet side of the table will find more here than in a shelf of the official histories this series also reprints. That is the rescue, and it is worth the reader's time.

The reply the tradition wrote at the time

The judgement the memoir is built to prevent had already been written, in the days the pact was signed, by the tradition this series speaks from. When Ribbentrop's plane landed in Moscow in August 1939, the exiled Trotsky — with one year left to live before Stalin's assassin reached him — read the event with a clarity the passage of time has only confirmed. In a statement to the British press dated 2 September 1939, as German troops poured into Poland, he fixed the sequence the Soviet censorship would spend half a century blurring: "the Stalinist parliament ratified the German-Soviet pact on the very day that Germany invaded Poland." It was the pact, he argued — the "particular percussion" — that fired the starting gun, and he understood already that this was the fact the Kremlin would most want erased. "No power," he wrote, "can erase this from the annals of history." It is hard to imagine a sentence that sits more exactly across Berezhkov's letter to the Washington Post: one man insisting in 1939 that the record cannot be erased, another insisting in 1980 that there was no record to erase.

Nor did the Fourth International flinch from the second half of the truth, the half about territory that the "reunification" and "plebiscite" formulas exist to hide. Writing on 25 September 1939, as the Red Army completed its share of Poland, Trotsky named the arrangement for what it was — "a military alliance with Hitler" through which the Kremlin gained "the possibility of occupying Poland" — and drew the conclusion that no Progress volume could: "We were and remain against seizures of new territories by the Kremlin." This was not hindsight. It was published within weeks of the events Berezhkov spent his career translating into the language of legitimacy, by the movement his own state's textbooks denounced as fascist agents. The anti-Stalinist left did not need the archives opened in 1989 or the confession of 1990 to see the shape of the thing. It saw it in real time, said so, and paid for saying so.

That is the case for republishing *History in the Making* precisely as it stands. Its Berlin scenes and its account of the wartime alliance are a real contribution to the history of the twentieth century, made by an observant, literate man who was genuinely present. Its treatment of 1939–41 is a real contribution to a different history — the history of what a Soviet state at the end of the Brezhnev years required an honest and gifted servant to affirm, in his own name, against the documentary record. The one thing the book cannot give the reader is the means to tell its two halves apart, because it presents the eyewitness Berlin of 1940 and the sworn-blind Moscow of 1939 in the same steady, plausible, first-person

voice. Bring the other voice to it — the one that wrote in September 1939 that no power can erase this from the annals of history — and the seam becomes visible. Read the rooms Berezhkov describes for the truth he carried out of them. Read the room he denies for the truth he was made to leave behind. The denial is as historic as anything he witnessed; it simply belongs to a history he was not allowed to write.

MARXISM

The Right to Be Lazy

Written in a Paris gaol in 1883 against the right to work - Lafargue's assault on the manufactured work ethic, by the man whose disciples provoked Marx's remark that he was not a Marxist.

Paul Lafargue

Publisher's Introduction

This book has been introduced before, by a man better qualified to do it than we are, and the introduction was never printed.

In 1971 Sam Gordon sat down to write a preface for an English selection of Paul Lafargue's essays, built around *The Right to Be Lazy*. Gordon was then sixty-one. He had joined the Communist League of America after hearing James P. Cannon speak on internationalism; he had been in Germany before Hitler took power, and his reports there were part of the raw material of Trotsky's writings on Germany, many of which he translated; he had been emergency secretary of the Fourth International at the special conference held in New York in May 1940, when the International's European centre had been overrun. He wrote his introduction. The selection was never published. Gordon died in 1982, and the piece surfaced only afterwards, in the first issue of *Revolutionary History*, with a one-line editorial note recording that the book it was written for had not appeared.

We begin there because it tells you most of what you need to know about this pamphlet's strange career. *The Right to Be Lazy* is the most famous thing Lafargue wrote, and one of the most quoted texts in the history of socialism. It has also been, for a century, oddly homeless: too funny for the theoretical journals, too heretical for the labour movement's official catechisms, too obviously right to be forgotten. It keeps being rediscovered, and the rediscoveries keep not quite arriving.

Lafargue wrote it as a run of articles in the French workers' weekly *L'Égalité* in 1880, and gave it its finished shape, with the preface printed here, in 1883, while serving a sentence in the Sainte-Pélagie gaol in Paris for agitating among workers. Its target is named in its subtitle: the *droit au travail*, the right to work, the demand the revolutionaries of 1848 had carved on their banners. Against it Lafargue set the right to idleness, and he meant it. He was no bohemian outsider. Born in Santiago de Cuba of mixed Caribbean, Creole and French descent, he

became with Jules Guesde a founder of the Parti Ouvrier, the first organised Marxist party in France; he married Laura, Marx's second daughter; and he and Laura ended their lives together in 1911, on the reasoning that they had given what they could and would not outlive their usefulness. It was of Lafargue's French disciples that Marx made his weary remark that, whatever else was certain, he himself was not a Marxist.

What the book gets right, it gets right very early. Its real subject is not laziness at all but the manufacture of the work ethic, the way the compulsion to labour has been dressed by priests, professors and newspaper moralists as a law of nature and a duty of the soul. Lafargue opens on the diagnosis:

A strange delusion possesses the working classes of the nations where capitalist civilisation holds its sway.

The delusion is

the love of work, the furious passion for work, pushed even to the exhaustion of the vital force of the individual and his progeny,

and the trick that sustains it is a moral one. He catches the arch-conservative Thiers in an unguarded moment recommending the clergy as a tool of government precisely because religion teaches man that he is here below to suffer, and from that confession builds his case: that

the priests, the economists and the moralists have cast a sacred halo over work.

This is a genuinely Marxist argument, applied to the one place socialists of his day were least likely to look, the dignity of labour itself. And the economics behind the joke is serious. The same machines that could shorten every working life are used to lengthen it, throwing some into overwork and others onto the street, and then flooding a world of impoverished producers with goods they cannot buy. The machine, Lafargue writes, might have been

the saviour of humanity, the god who shall redeem man

from the sordidae artes and from working for hire, the god who shall give him leisure and liberty,

and has been made an instrument of misery instead. His remedy is deliberately outrageous:

a brazen law forbidding any man to work more than three hours a day.

The three hours are a provocation, not a plan. But the thought behind them runs straight into Marx's own: that the measure of a free society is how little compulsory labour it demands, and that machinery ought to buy leisure rather than sell more toil.

Sam Gordon's unprinted introduction is the best short defence of that argument the movement produced, and it is worth rescuing because of when it was written. Gordon was answering 1971, not 1883. He pointed out that Lafargue's slashing attacks on capitalist hypocrisy about the sacredness of toil were still apropos, and that they read almost as a direct riposte to the hand-wringing of the press over the "man-hours wantonly lost" to strikes, alongside its complete silence about the greater number lost to industrial accident and illness. He noted what the three-hour day had meant when it was proposed: a time when women and children, let alone men, worked more than ten hours a day and often more than seventy hours a week. He saw in the automation of the "third industrial revolution" the realisation of Lafargue's forecast, and in the guaranteed income the concrete form the right might take. And he read the youth revolt of his own decade as a warning rather than a symptom: the bell, he wrote, is tolling for wage slavery.

Gordon was not alone in reaching for the book in those years. In January 1970 Quatrième Internationale, the theoretical organ of the Fourth International's leadership, logged Maspero's post-1968 reissue of *Le droit à la paresse* on its books-received page, between Pierre Jalée on imperialism and Arghiri Emmanuel on unequal exchange. By 1972 the Ligue Communiste in France had gone further and named a front organisation after it: the training camps it ran for young workers in Paris that year were held, as a historian of the group records, under cover of an association called *Le Droit à la Paresse*, created by the Ligue. The title had become an organisational joke and an organisational programme at once. It is a fair measure of the book's peculiar authority that a Leninist party building cadre schools chose to do it under Lafargue's banner rather than Lenin's.

Now say where the pamphlet falls short, because it does. Its worst pages romanticise so-called primitive peoples as innocents unspoiled by civilisation, a nineteenth-century

sentimentality resting on bad anthropology. Its language of vital force and progeny drifts toward the crude biologism that disfigured much socialism of the 1880s. And there is an unclarity at its heart: Lafargue often writes as though the enemy were work as such, so that emancipation would mean simply less of it, where Marx's quarrel was with alienated labour, work owned and commanded by another, and his hope was less that free people would work little than that their work would cease to be a curse.

The German party understood the provocation and did not enjoy it. As Iring Fetscher observes in the fullest modern edition of Lafargue's cultural writings, the book unleashed a storm of protest among his German party friends, whose socialism was of the ascetic, disciplined, barrack-room type, and to whom his insistence that the aim of emancipation was a happy and satisfying life looked like hedonism. Fetscher's reply is the right one: that this was wholly in the sense of Marx, since one fights the capitalist relations of production for the sake of a better life. The Lafargues' own suicide note, explaining that ageing would strip away the joy of existence bit by bit, is the same argument carried to a conclusion most of us would not follow.

The tradition that later claimed Lafargue also knew his limits. When Christian Rakovsky rose at the Russian party's Twelfth Congress in 1923 to warn against Great-Russian chauvinism, he reached for a letter Marx had written to Engels in April 1866, in which Marx recounted, with evident pleasure, that the English had laughed when he began his speech by observing that "our friend Lafargue" and the others who had finished with nationalities had addressed the meeting in French, a language incomprehensible to nine-tenths of those present. Rakovsky's point was that the abolition of nations in theory tends to mean their absorption by one's own in practice. He was telling the Bolsheviks that the prejudice they were indulging in 1923 was the prejudice Lafargue had indulged sixty years earlier. Lafargue is a founder of Marxism as an ism, with the vigour and the crudeness that go with building a catechism, and the movement always knew it.

Which brings us to the silence. Why did the state that turned Marxism into an official religion, and reprinted Lafargue's more decorous essays, never give his most famous book an edition of its own?

Because the Soviet Union under Stalin built the most work-worshipping order in modern history, and in that world *The Right to Be Lazy* was close to unpublishable. This was the country of Stakhanovism, of socialist emulation, of the shock

worker and the production target and the labour book that followed a worker from job to job; whose 1936 Constitution enthroned the Apostle Paul's line about him who does not work neither shall he eat, borrowed by the Bolsheviks to aim at the expropriated rich and refitted as a disciplinary rule for the workers themselves; and where between 1938 and 1940 lateness and absence were made criminal offences. A funny little book demanding the right to be lazy was not a classic to be annotated there. Its absence from the Moscow catalogue is the most eloquent review it ever received.

Two qualifications, because this series insists on them. The productivism was not invented by Stalin from nothing: in the civil war years, with industry in ruins and the working class that made the revolution scattered or dead, Trotsky defended the militarisation of labour and Lenin turned the Apostle's text against the propertied. Those were emergency measures in a besieged country, and it falsifies history to read them as the free choice of a healthy socialism. But there is all the difference in the world between emergency and apotheosis, and what the bureaucracy did was to take the grim necessity of a ruined economy and enthrone it as a permanent moral cult, then use the cult as a whip against the workers in whose name it ruled.

So the book lives, because both of the things it attacks are still with us: the capitalism of the hustle and the always-answered phone, which preaches self-fulfilment through overwork while the promised leisure of automation recedes; and the memory of a socialism that mistook maximum output for liberation, and that an ecological crisis has now shown to have been chasing the wrong god. Lafargue's question keeps its edge, and it is Marx's question too. What is all this labour for? Sam Gordon ended his unprinted introduction by saying he was sure a new generation of workers and students would feel the same joy in discovering Lafargue that his own generation had felt in the thirties. He was writing for a book that never came out. This is, at long last, that book.