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HISTORY

History of the USSR, Part III

The war and the four decades after it, by named specialists in the wartime economy and postwar agriculture under a serious historian of Stalingrad - and the only volume of the three whose text is as recent as its spine.

D. A. Kovalenko and others

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

For the first time in this three-volume history, the date on the spine is the date of the text. Part One carried 1981 and was a Khrushchev-era book of 1963. Part Two carried 1981 and was a mid-Brezhnev book of 1977. Part Three says "First printing 1977 / Second revised and enlarged edition 1982", and the enlargement is real: the Foreword records that "The 26th Congress of the CPSU, held on 23 February-3 March 1981 in Moscow, elaborated new tasks in the building of communism", the last chapter carries a section on that Congress, and the Chronological Summary runs into the spring of 1981, closing on a Soyuz launch in May. The book was assembled in the year Brezhnev died.

One apparent anomaly should be disposed of at once, because it looks like evidence of a later printing and is not. Several dates in the 1990s appear in a book printed in 1982. All of them are forward projections, and all of them are the same document: the Twenty-Sixth Congress adopted "Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR for 1981–1985 and for the Period Ending in 1990", and the book refers to it three times. The remaining instances are a Soviet–Finnish trade programme running to 1990 and a passage on planning data extending "up to 1990". There is no OCR corruption here and no hidden later edition. This is a 1982 text about a future that did not arrive.

Like its predecessors it is signed, though more loosely: "This variant of the volume was prepared by a group of authors, consisting of professors D. A. Kovalenko (Chief Editor), V. A. Kumanev, G. A. Kumanev, I. M. Volkov, I. S. Kremer, and G. D. Komkov; L. K. Bayeva, Cand. Sc. (Hist.), and researcher N. P. Zimarina." The editorial board is headed by A. M. Samsonov, a corresponding member of the Academy of Sciences and a serious historian of Stalingrad. G. A. Kumanev was a specialist in the wartime economy and evacuation; I. M. Volkov worked on postwar agriculture, including the famine of 1946–47 that this volume does not mention. The commission was legitimisation, but the people executing it were

not hacks, and the war chapter shows it.

What the war chapter gets right

Say the good part first, because the case against the book depends on it.

Chapter One is a hundred and forty pages on the Great Patriotic War and it is, at the level of operations and production, competent military history. The fronts are named and so are their commanders — Zhukov, Vasilevsky, Rokossovsky, Vatutin, Yermenko, Konev, Govorov, Meretskov, Chernyakhovsky, killed in East Prussia in February 1945. The economic mobilisation is set out with the numbers that made Soviet war-economy scholarship worth reading: German steel output rising from 22.5 million tons in 1939 to 31.8 million in 1941; the Soviet defence share of the state budget moving from 25.5 per cent in 1939 to 32.6 in 1940 to 43.4 in 1941; 1,200 evacuated enterprises brought back into production by the summer of 1942; the Donbas mines requiring 620 million cubic metres of water to be pumped out before coal could be cut again. The German intention is stated without softening: the invaders meant to "annihilate millions of Soviet people—primarily Communists and Soviet, trade union and Komsomol activists—and reduce the remainder to slavery."

And the human cost is recorded. "Over twenty million Soviet citizens lost their lives during the war. There was hardly a family that had not known the grief of losing someone who was dear to it." Of the occupation: "In the Ukraine alone over 4 million Soviet citizens and prisoners-of-war were slaughtered." A reader who takes nothing else from this book should take that, and should notice that the twenty-million figure was for decades the Soviet state's own understatement — the archival revision of the early 1990s put total Soviet war deaths nearer twenty-seven million.

The book also names, without embarrassment, the thing Western accounts of 1945 often lose: that the Red Army

opened the German camps. And in one place it turns the moral argument on the alliance. Of Hiroshima and Nagasaki: bombs dropped "without any military necessity", killing "many thousands of innocent people", "a senseless, cruel and barbarous crime against not only the Japanese people, but also mankind as a whole." Whatever else is true of this book, that judgement has worn better than most of what was written about those two mornings in 1945 in English.

How 1941 is explained, and what is missing from the explanation

Now the catastrophe. The book does not pretend it was a triumph, and it does not use the alibi that the Red Army had planned to retreat. It says the divisions were under strength, that formations were still being raised, that men called up on the eve of the war "had no time to receive adequate military training." And then it says this:

The preparation of the country's defences was also affected by the serious miscalculations made by J. V. Stalin in his assessment of the overall military and strategic situation and the possible timing of the German attack.

Stalin, it continues, "believed right till the last moment that it would be possible to ward off the impending war through diplomatic means"; "The troops in the western military districts were not put on standby alert in time"; the warning directive went out only on the evening of 21 June and did not reach many units. This is the Khrushchev-era judgement, kept alive under Brezhnev, and it is true as far as it goes. It is also the entire indictment. Every other cause is external: German industrial superiority, the resources of conquered Europe, surprise.

What is not there is the Red Army's own command. In June 1941 the Soviet officer corps was four years out from a slaughter that had removed three of five marshals, thirteen of fifteen army commanders, and the overwhelming majority of corps and divisional commanders. The book says nothing about it. Not a clause, not a euphemism.

The proof is in the index. Tukhachevsky appears once in this volume, on page 92. So do Uborevich, Yakir and Yegorov — the same page, the same sentence. That page is not in the war chapter. It is in Chapter Two, in a list of the dead being posthumously readmitted to the record after 1953:

The Party carried out a great deal of work to curb infringements of socialist legality. Thousands of honest and

innocent Party, Soviet, economic and Komsomol officials were rehabilitated. Among them were such prominent Party workers as A. S. Bubnov, N. A. Voznesensky, S. V. Kosior, N. V. Krylenko, A. A. Kuznetsov, P. P. Postyshev, M. I. Rodionov, Y. E. Rudzutak, V. Y. Chubar and R. I. Eikhe, the Komsomol leaders A. V. Kosarev and N. P. Chaplin, and the military leaders V. K. Blyukher, A. I. Yegorov, M. N. Tukhachevsky, I. P. Uborevich and I. E. Yakir.

Part Two's finding was that the names came back and the deaths went out: the marshals were praised as the founders of Soviet military science and then simply stopped appearing. Part Three completes the operation. Here the marshals exist only as names to be rehabilitated. They have no careers, no arrests, no trial, no executions and no bearing whatever on what happened to their army in June 1941. The word "rehabilitated" is asked to carry the whole event, and the reader who does not already know what it means will not learn it here. "Thousands", incidentally, is the book's figure. The Soviet Procuracy's own later accounting ran to hundreds of thousands, and the arrest totals of 1937–38 into the millions.

The reply was in print before the Wehrmacht reached Moscow. In Fourth International for December 1941, John G. Wright reconstructed from Pravda and Bolshevik the second, quieter purge of 1940–41 that stripped commissariat after commissariat — "The Kremlin's average during this period was approximately a Commissariat a day" — and noted that it "reached its peak in the months of April and May, i.e., on the very eve of Hitler's invasion." Forty years later Ernest Mandel put the long version of the same argument in *The Meaning of the Second World War* (1986). The purges, he wrote in "The Immediate Causes", "decapitated the Red Army, disorganised the defences of the country, delivered Poland and Europe to Hitler, and facilitated the Nazi attack on the USSR", while "The Red Army's complete lack of readiness in 1941 was the direct result of Stalin's disastrous misunderstanding of the political situation in Europe." In "Strategy" he is blunter: the unpreparedness "had been brought about largely by Stalin's criminal purge of the Red Army". Mandel also disposes of the retreat legend — "There is no substance whatsoever in such claims" — a legend this book, to its credit, does not use.

Mandel adds the piece the Soviet account structurally cannot contain: the secret protocol to the pact of August 1939, which partitioned Poland before the German invasion had begun. "Russian historiography continues to deny this", he writes, "by keeping silent." He is right about the silence and this volume maintains it. (Mandel's own text misdates the signature by four days; the protocol was signed on the night of 23 August 1939.

The series holds its own tradition to the standard it applies to Progress.)

It should be said that Mandel is not writing a prosecution brief. He credits the Soviet recovery to the same thing this book credits it to: the industrial base built by the planned economy, which allowed the USSR to absorb losses that destroyed Tsarism in 1917. On that, the Moscow historians and the Fourth International agree, and both are right. There is even a small convergence of anecdote: the book quotes Halder — printed here, through the scanner, as "General Franz Haider" — saying "Soviet Russia was just like a pane of glass: if you struck it once with your fist, it would shatter immediately", and Mandel records that the same officer expected the war won in four weeks.

The deportations

In 1943 and 1944 the Soviet state deported entire nations eastward: Karachays, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks, and — from 1941 — the Volga Germans. Hundreds of thousands died in transit and in the special settlements. This book narrates none of it.

What it gives is the reversal without the act:

The Party condemned distortions in the implementation of the nationalities policy that had been committed during the war years in respect of individual peoples, and restored national autonomy to the Balkars, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingushes and Karachays.

Read it slowly. Something called a "distortion" was "committed" — no agent, no verb of transport, no destination. Autonomy is "restored" to five peoples whose loss of it was never mentioned. And the peoples missing from the list are precisely those whose autonomy was not restored: the Crimean Tatars, deported wholesale in May 1944 and not permitted to return in any numbers until the very end of the Soviet Union, and the Volga Germans, whose republic was abolished in 1941 and never re-established. The list is not a summary. It is a boundary: the state records the wrongs it has undone and does not record the ones it is still doing.

This series found the identical construction in a 1968 volume. Finding it again in 1982, unaltered in wording and in logic, tells us it was not an editorial accident but a rule.

The Crimean Tatars do appear in this book, in a manner of speaking. The Chronological Summary for 19 February 1954

reads: "Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issues a decree transferring the Crimea Region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR." A peninsula changes republics; nobody asks who is no longer living on it. Tatars elsewhere are heroes — a Tatar among the eleven defenders of the hill at Stalingrad, the poet Musa Dzhahilil tortured to death in Spandau. Tatars are honoured and Crimean Tatars do not exist. And in the Conclusion the volume states that "the working class resolved the national question."

The Twentieth Congress without Khrushchev

Chapter Two contains this book's account of de-Stalinisation, and it is a remarkable piece of writing, chiefly for who is not in it.

The Congress is dated exactly — "held in Moscow on the 14–25 February 1956", 1,436 delegates — and its foreign-policy innovations are set out at length: peaceful coexistence, war no longer fatally inevitable, plural roads to socialism. Then, without transition, comes the criticism of the personality cult, and it arrives as pure abstraction. The Party was guided by "the well-known Marxist-Leninist propositions on the role of the masses, the Party and the individual in history and on the inadmissibility of the cult of an individual political leader, no matter how great his merits." The reader is told that criticism might be "seized upon by its enemies for anti-Soviet use" and that the Party proceeded anyway. The public reference point given is not the Congress session of 24–25 February at all but the Central Committee resolution of 30 June 1956, "On Overcoming the Personality Cult and Its Consequences". And the balance is struck: "The Party discerned two aspects in Stalin's activities: a positive aspect which it valued and a negative one which it criticised and condemned."

Nobody delivered this. Khrushchev is named three times in the entire volume: elected First Secretary in September 1953; removed in October 1964; and in the index, with two page references, neither in the pages covering the Twentieth Congress. Stalin's index entry gives eight pages, and none of them falls in that section either. A history published in Moscow in 1982 describes the criticism of the cult of Stalin's personality across ten pages in which, by its own index, Stalin is not discussed and Khrushchev is not present.

Nor is there a victim, a number, a camp or a trial. The Terror is personified in one man: "The exposure of the criminal activities of the political adventurer Lavrenty Beria was of great importance in this respect", he having "trumped up

numerous 'cases' against honest workers" and "blatantly infringed socialist legality", after which "the crimes of Beria and his accomplices were brought to light, and their deserved punishment was duly meted out." The Leningrad Affair is never named, though three of its dead — Voznesensky, Kuznetsov, Rodionov — stand in the rehabilitation list. The Doctors' Plot of 1953 is absent entirely: the words do not occur. The postwar campaigns in literature and music leave no mark on the culture chapter. The camps do not exist in this book except as German ones.

The Fourth International's assessment was published while the Congress's echo was still audible. M. Stein's "The End of the Stalin Cult: The Meaning of the 20th Congress" appeared in Fourth International, vol. 17 no. 2, Spring 1956. "The Twentieth Congress will be remembered as the congress that laid the Stalin cult to rest," he wrote, and identified whose interest that served: the cult was "built on the bones of the best of the revolutionary generation that founded the Soviet Union and at the expense of the Soviet working class", and "finally became insupportable even for the bureaucracy which was its sole beneficiary." Stein also pointed to something no Soviet text of 1982 could mention: the camp strikes of 1953 and 1954, at Vorkuta and elsewhere, which formed part of the pressure the bureaucracy was answering. Twenty-six years later, this volume's version of the same events has an agent — "the Party" — that acts on itself, alone, out of principle.

1956 and 1968

Hungary in October and November 1956 is disposed of in one paragraph. The events "were provoked by foreign reactionary circles and by counter-revolutionary elements within the country"; "The capital and several provincial towns were swept by a savage wave of white terror"; a Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Government under Kádár "requested help from the Soviet Union", and the Soviet government, "Discharging its internationalist duty", "helped the revolutionary forces of Hungary to put down the rising."

Two things are wrong with this beyond the framing. Kádár's government was constituted after the second Soviet intervention had begun, not before it, and the workers' councils that were the rising's central institution — the Greater Budapest Central Workers' Council, which called and sustained a general strike into December — are not mentioned. There were reprisals against Communists in Budapest, some of them lethal; the book's "white terror" makes them the substance of the events rather than an episode within them.

Peter Fryer, the Daily Worker's correspondent in Hungary, whose dispatches his paper refused to print and who resigned and published Hungarian Tragedy the same year, is the readiest English witness to what the councils were and what was done to them.

Czechoslovakia in 1968 gets more space and reads, oddly, more defensively. The book concedes that the January plenum's decisions "to improve Party and state leadership and to develop socialist democracy" were "perfectly justified", then explains that "Right-wing, revisionist elements acquired great influence in the central Party bodies and in the Government, as well as in the mass media", and that consequently "five Warsaw Treaty countries—the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR and Poland—sent their troops into Czechoslovakia on the 21 August 1968." The verdict is not offered in the authors' own voice: it is quoted from the Czechoslovak Central Committee plenum of December 1970, which called the entry of the troops "an act of internationalist solidarity". A body reconstituted after the occupation is cited to authorise the occupation.

The Fourth International's answer to that is dated 22 August 1968, the day after the tanks crossed, and was printed in Intercontinental Press, vol. 6 no. 28, 2 September 1968. "The United Secretariat of the Fourth International condemns the military occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the nations of the Warsaw Pact," it began, and identified what the Kremlin actually feared: not counter-revolution but "the first beginnings of workers democracy", and behind them "the incompatibility of its dictatorship, power and privileges with any form of workers democracy." On the pretext of an appeal by unnamed statesmen — which this volume, fourteen years on, no longer even attempts to repeat — the statement noted that their identity remained unrevealed forty-eight hours after the event. In the same issue Joseph Hansen described the emergency Fourteenth Congress of the Czechoslovak Communist Party, held on 21–22 August in a factory in the Prague suburbs, guarded by the people's militia, which condemned the invasion by an overwhelming majority. That congress is not in this book. Neither is Dubček's name. Ludvík Svoboda is here, once, as the commander of the 1st Czechoslovak Brigade in the fighting for Kiev in 1943 — and not as the President who was flown to Moscow in August 1968.

What the book is for, and where it stops

The last chapter is the Brezhnev settlement stated as history: developed socialism, the 1977 Constitution, the Peace

Programme, the Twenty-Sixth Congress. The 1964 removal of Khrushchev is rendered as a plenum condemning "subjectivism and voluntarism in government" — the ejection of a General Secretary as a matter of administrative principle. Afghanistan is present and current: "Upon the request of the Afghan Government, a limited Soviet military contingent was sent into the country and it helped the democratic regime combat counter-revolution." Poland appears once, obliquely, as a dangerous situation in late 1980 and early 1981 noted by the Congress; Solidarity is not named. The book was in press as martial law was declared in Warsaw.

That is where the trilogy ends, and the shape of it is worth stating plainly, because it is not the shape the slogans predict. Part One dropped the criminal charges against Trotsky and left him out of the Name Index while indexing two tsarist police chiefs. Part Two printed Lenin's Testament including the proposal to remove Stalin, and could not name the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet; it gave the machinery of dekulakisation in archival detail and reduced the famine of 1932–33 to a clause about "draught and crop failure". Part Three gives twenty million dead, names Stalin's miscalculation of June 1941, and cannot say what happened to the men who should have commanded the armies that met the attack. Three volumes, three decades of revision, one constant: the accusations were withdrawn, the arithmetic was published, and the erasures held.

There is real scholarship here, and a reader who wants the Soviet war economy, the evacuation of industry beyond the Urals, or the reconstruction of the Donbas will find it set out by people who knew the material. Read Chapter One beside Mandel's chapters on strategy and on the unfolding world battle, and read Wright's December 1941 piece for what the Fourth International could establish about the state of Soviet industry and administration from the Soviet press alone, while it was happening. Then go back to page 92, to the sentence in which five of the Red Army's commanders appear for the only time in a history of the war they did not live to fight, and consider what a history is for.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

In the Grip of Terror

Moscow's answer to the Reagan administration's claim of a Soviet terror network, argued mostly by quoting Americans - by a Central Committee official who would later serve as Gorbachev's press secretary.

Andrei Serafimovich Grachev

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

Most of the books in this series have to be argued with line by line. This one is largely correct, and that is what makes it worth reading closely.

In the Grip of Terror is a short book — a hundred and fifty pages — issued by Progress Publishers in 1982 in the series "Imperialism: Acts, Facts, and Records", and it has a single subject. In January 1981 the incoming Reagan administration announced that international terrorism would replace human rights as the central concern of American foreign policy, and that the Soviet Union was behind it. Alexander Haig said so within days of taking office. Claire Sterling's *The Terror Network* appeared two months later to supply the evidence. This book is Moscow's answer. It sets out to show that the charge is false, that the campaign is a cover for intervention, and that the terrorism actually being committed in the world is overwhelmingly the work of the far right and of states allied to the United States.

On the first three counts it is right, and it was right at the time on evidence any reader could check.

The author is worth knowing about. A. S. Grachev — Andrei Serafimovich Grachev, born in Moscow in 1941, a graduate of MGIMO — was not a hack. He worked in the International Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU from the mid-1970s, rising to deputy head, which is to say he wrote for the apparatus that managed the Soviet relationship with foreign Communist parties. That is exactly the readership this book is pitched at: it quotes *L'Humanité*, *L'Unità*, Georges Marchais, Gian Carlo Pajetta, Alfredo Reichlin and Gus Hall far more often than it quotes *Pravda*, and its arguments about the Red Brigades are the arguments the Italian party was making in its own press. It is an export product for the Western left. Nine years later the same man was Mikhail Gorbachev's press secretary, and it fell to him to speak for the Soviet presidency in its last weeks. He went on to write about that collapse for Western publishers. The apparatus that produced this book

contained the people who would dismantle the state it defends.

Say what is true in it, at length, because the bulk of it is.

The core claim — that the "Soviet terror network" was a fabrication — was correct, and Grachev makes the case largely by quoting Americans. He reproduces Haig telling *L'Express* that "International terrorism bothers us terribly. Be sure that in the immediate future it will be our No. 1 priority. We were restrained by the lack of reliable information. But it surely exists. We have to go out and search for and find it." He reports, citing *Le Monde* of March 1981, that the CIA had told members of Congress it had no tangible proof and was in "total discord" with Reagan and Haig. He notes that the new Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism under Jeremiah Denton adopted a definition of terrorism so wide that, as *The New York Times* observed, it "would also seem to include some wars of national liberation."

All of this held. William Casey commissioned a Special National Intelligence Estimate to prove the Soviet connection and was told by his own analysts that the draft could not support it; he was also advised, and pushed on anyway, that a great deal of what had impressed him in Sterling's book was material the Agency had itself planted abroad and was now reading back as independent confirmation. Melvin Goodman, who ran the CIA's Office of Soviet Affairs from 1976 to 1987, has said as much publicly. Grachev's flat assertion in 1982 that "Most of the facts cited in Sterling's book came from this source" was a guess that turned out to be close to the literal truth. He was also right about the State Department's February 1981 White Paper, *Communist Interference in El Salvador*, which he calls "a third-class, crude forgery". Its principal author, Jon Glassman, conceded to Jonathan Kwitny of the *Wall Street Journal* in June 1981 that parts of it were "misleading" and "over-embellished" and contained guesswork — four months before this book went to press.

The Italian chapters are the strongest in the volume and they have aged best. Grachev sets out the sequence — Piazza Fontana in December 1969, the Italicus train in 1974, Brescia

in 1974, Bologna station on 2 August 1980 — and insists, against the grain of most Western reporting at the time, that the dominant violence in Italy was black rather than red, that it was aimed at massacre rather than assassination because massacre produces panic, and that it enjoyed protection inside the state. He names the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei for Bologna. He names Licio Gelli and the P2 lodge, whose exposure had brought down the Italian government in May 1981. He notes that Piazza Fontana was pinned on anarchists and that the man who attacked Prime Minister Rumor in 1974 "was proclaimed an 'anarchist'" though he was trained by officers tied to the neo-fascist Rosa dei Venti. He quotes *Newsweek* of 18 August 1980: "while the Rome government has mounted a well-publicised crackdown on left-wing terrorists, the neo-fascists have largely been left alone."

Every substantive element of that survived. Valerio Fioravanti and Francesca Mambro of the NAR were definitively sentenced to life for Bologna in November 1995, in the same judgement that upheld convictions against Gelli and against officers of the military intelligence service for obstructing the investigation. Piazza Fontana was established by later Italian investigations as the work of the neo-fascist Ordine Nuovo, after an anarchist, Giuseppe Pinelli, had died falling from a window of the Milan police headquarters during interrogation. Grachev even reprints, from the Italian weekly *L'Europeo* of November 1976, the claim that NATO had instructed each West European country to form clandestine anti-invasion networks and that "Since the invasion could only come from the Communists in the East, the most reliable people to repulse them are the fascists." In October 1990 Giulio Andreotti confirmed to the Italian parliament that such a network — Gladio — had existed. Andreotti denied it had any connection to terrorism, and that part remains disputed; but the existence of the structure, printed here in Moscow in 1982 and dismissed then as propaganda, was conceded by the Italian prime minister eight years later.

The same is true of most of chapter six. The figure of forty thousand killed in El Salvador between October 1979 and March 1982, attributed to the army and allied death squads, is close to what the UN Truth Commission would find in 1993, when it assigned some eighty-five per cent of the violations it documented to state forces and their allies. Ambassador Robert White really did testify in January 1981 that "the chief killers of El Salvadoreans are the government security forces", and he really did lose his post. The Church Committee material on Lumumba, quoted here at length and accurately, is quoted from the published report. Guatemala under Lucas García, Chile after 1973, the Phoenix programme in Vietnam, South

African raids into Angola: the numbers vary in reliability, some come from partisan commissions, but the picture is not invented, and a reader who comes to it expecting Soviet fantasy will be disappointed.

So the correction to be made is not to the facts. It is to the definition.

Grachev defines terrorism twice, and the two definitions between them cover the world without touching the Soviet Union. The first is Leninist and concerns method: individual terror is the recourse of a party cut off from the masses. He quotes Lenin — "The history of the Russian revolution shows that a party always resorts to individual terror when it does not enjoy the support of the masses" — and again, "without the working people all bombs are powerless, patently powerless." The second concerns the state, and is borrowed, with evident pleasure, from Haig himself: a terrorist government is any government which instigates, perpetrates or is involved in terrorist acts. Grachev then applies it to the United States, Israel, South Africa, Chile, Guatemala. What he never does is apply either definition to a state that calls itself socialist, because by construction neither can reach one. Revolutionary violence is "popular resistance to the violence of exploiters, aggressors and colonialists" — a different substance, not a different degree.

The load-bearing sentence comes near the end, in the section headed "Who Gains by the 'Hand of Moscow'?"

The USSR, as a democratic socialist state, rejects in principle the use of terror in international relations and all other forms of interference in the domestic affairs of other countries. The Soviet Union has been a principled opponent of the theory and practice of terrorism. Throughout their entire history, the activities of the CPSU and the Soviet state have not had any relation with terrorism and political violence.

Throughout their entire history. This is a book of some thirty-eight thousand words, published in Moscow, about terror. The word Stalin does not appear in it. Neither does Cheka, nor Yezhov, nor 1937, nor Kirov, nor Katyn, nor collectivisation, nor famine. The phrase "Red Terror" appears twice, both times meaning right-wing propaganda about Latin America. The word "concentration camp" appears — for Chile, and for Long Kesh. Nothing here is denied, because nothing here is mentioned. Khrushchev had told the Twentieth Congress in 1956 that the Party's own leadership had been destroyed by mass arrest, torture and execution; that admission

had been on the record for twenty-six years when this book was printed, and the sentence quoted above was still written, and printed in English, for foreign readers. The definition is doing the work that the argument cannot.

The silences elsewhere are just as precise. Poland gets two sentences: "Recently, Poland has been the subject of particular scrutiny by the CIA. The imperialist subversive services and their agents spare no effort in trying to destabilise the situation in the country." That is all. Martial law had been declared on 13 December 1981; Solidarność, a trade union of roughly ten million members, had been suspended and then banned; thousands of its members were interned. The book was still being written the following summer — it discusses the Israeli invasion of Lebanon of June 1982 — so this was not a matter of the printer's schedule. It is a choice, and it collides directly with the book's own conclusion, which argues that "It is the particular responsibility of the left-wing democratic forces to initiate the struggle against terrorism, as it is the working-class movement and the revolutionary parties of the working class which are resolutely and consistently defending democracy, civil and political rights and freedoms that are the first targets of terrorist attacks." In December 1981 the largest working-class movement in Europe was broken by a general acting for a ruling Communist party, and the book that says the above cannot see it. Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968 do not appear at all; Czechoslovakia's single mention in these pages is in a list of countries named in a 1951 US appropriations bill.

Afghanistan is treated at length, and here the method is not silence but inversion. The Soviet intervention of December 1979 appears once, in a subordinate clause — "Several months before the limited contingent of Soviet troops was moved into Afghanistan on the request of its government" — and the rest of the section, several pages long, is devoted to American, Chinese, Egyptian, Saudi and Pakistani arming of the mujahideen. Much of that account is accurate. It is also the whole of what the reader is given about a war in which the Soviet army was, at the moment of writing, the largest armed force in the country. It is instructive to set this beside Nikolai Yakovlev's *CIA Target: The USSR*, published by Progress in the same year and covered elsewhere in this series: Yakovlev's book does not mention Afghanistan at all, and it is entirely given over to the Soviet citizens the state was then prosecuting. Grachev's book does not name a single Soviet dissident — not Sakharov, not Orlov, not Shcharansky — and never uses the word Helsinki. Between them the two volumes cover the whole of Moscow's 1982 case against the West, and the file has been neatly divided.

There is one falsification of the ordinary kind, and it is aimed at us. Discussing the terrorist milieu of the 1970s, Grachev lists "various extreme right, semi-fascist as well as anarchist, Trotskyist and Maoist groupings". Later he writes: "Following Trotsky's famous statement that 'war is the mother of revolution', modern extremists consider violence and armed acts as the only means to fight for social progress." That sentence carries no footnote. It is the only substantive attribution in the book that does not — Lenin is cited scrupulously by volume and page, a dozen times over; so are Marx, Engels, the Comintern congresses of 1928 and 1935, Sterling, Arendt, Clutterbuck, the Church Committee. The reason is straightforward: the attribution will not bear a reference, and the substance is the reverse of the truth.

Trotsky wrote what is probably the sharpest Marxist attack on individual terrorism in the literature. "Why Marxists Oppose Individual Terrorism", published in the Austrian social-democratic journal *Der Kampf* in November 1911, argues that individual terror "is inadmissible precisely because it belittles the role of the masses in their own consciousness", that it turns "their eyes and hopes towards a great avenger and liberator who some day will come", and that if it is enough to arm oneself with a pistol, then the effort of building a class movement appears pointless. That is, almost word for word, the case Grachev makes against the Red Brigades a few pages after invoking Trotsky as their ancestor. He had the argument. He credited it to the wrong man, and abused the right one, because by 1982 the Soviet apparatus could not print the name except as an insult. Readers who want the anti-Stalinist left's position on terrorism should start there; nothing in seventy years of the tradition has departed from it.

That tradition also answered this book's subject as it happened, in print, and the record is easy to consult. Intercontinental Press, the weekly associated with the Fourth International, got to the counter-thesis before Sterling had published hers. On 1 December 1980 it carried "Ultrarightists in Europe Given License to Kill" by Christian Picquet, translated from the Paris fortnightly *Inprecor* of 30 October, which treats Bologna, the Munich Oktoberfest and the rue Copernic synagogue as one series — the same three bombings Grachev groups together — attributes them to the Armed Revolutionary Nuclei, the Hoffmann Military Sport Group and the European Nationalist Fascists, and states plainly under the heading "Network of Rightist Terrorism": "An international network of the far right certainly exists, no matter what they call themselves (European New Order, World Union of Nationalist Socialists, World Anti-Communist League, Aginter Press), and whether or not they have a centralized structure." On the impunity that is

Grachev's "right-eye blindness", Picquet is blunter than Grachev: "These men are especially dangerous since they have the benefit of total impunity." When Sterling's thesis reached its second stage — the claim that Bulgaria and the KGB were behind the shooting of the Pope — Margaret Jayko answered it in the same paper on 17 January 1983, noting that "the charges of Bulgarian guilt originated in a fantastic story by right-wing author Claire Sterling in Reader's Digest", that the evidence came from Mehmet Ali Agca, "a well-known member of the Turkish National Action Party, a fascist outfit", and that "transforming Agca from a fascist into a liberation fighter helps make the entire story of an international left-wing terrorist conspiracy a bit more plausible."

spent the previous December demonstrating the point in Warsaw.

But the difference is in Poland, and it is worth setting the two texts side by side. On 18 January 1982 the same paper led with David Frankel's "Imperialists campaign on Poland", written five weeks after martial law. Frankel makes Grachev's argument about the West without hesitation: "Over the past several weeks the U.S. ruling class and its allies have taken advantage of the declaration of martial law in Poland to launch an anticommunist propaganda and action campaign." He is scathing about the sanctions — "If the imperialists want to implement sanctions, let them cut off their aid to the butchers in El Salvador and to the murderous Khmer Rouge gangs in Kampuchea." And then he says the thing this book cannot: the imperialists "have been able to take advantage of the criminal attack against the Polish working class by the bureaucratic regime there to advance their propaganda campaign around the Soviet threat and to push forward their overall militarization drive." His conclusion is the sentence Grachev's whole method exists to prevent anyone from writing: "There can be no genuine support for the Polish working class that does not put opposition to the crimes of the Stalinist bureaucracy within the context of opposition to imperialist oppression and support for the struggle for socialism."

Read this book, then, for the two-thirds of it that is a competent and well-sourced indictment of the Reagan administration's terrorism campaign, of the Italian far right and the state that sheltered it, and of American policy in Central America and Southern Africa — an indictment that has stood up better than most Western journalism of the same year. Read the remaining third for what it shows about the machinery that produced it: a definition built so that the state commissioning the book falls outside it, a silence where Poland should be, an inversion where Afghanistan should be, and an unsourced sentence about Trotsky doing the work of a citation. Grachev was arguing, correctly, that the powerful call their victims terrorists. He was doing it on behalf of a government that had

PHILOSOPHY

One Is Not Born a Personality

A science reporter's portrait of the Vygotsky-Luria tradition and the people who carried it on - written as an elegy just after the founding generation died, and as the West began rediscovering them.

Karl Levitin

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

Open this book at almost any page and you find a scene rather than a doctrine. A journalist rides the bus from the Dubna nuclear centre and takes the long detour through Zagorsk, where deaf, dumb and blind children are learning to hold a spoon. An old neurologist thinks aloud about the brain while a tape recorder turns. A young teacher, about to take charge of a class, admits she is "even afraid," because "you can mould them into any kind of person." Escher's impossible staircases and reflecting spheres sit between the chapters. Karl Levitin was a science journalist, not a psychologist, and *One Is Not Born a Personality* is what a gifted reporter made of a decade spent among the people who built Soviet psychology. It is a warm, admiring, deliberately unsystematic portrait of a real and first-rate scientific tradition — and for once in this series the first thing to say about a Progress title is that the science in it is genuine, humane and, in places, permanent.

That has to be said plainly at the outset, because the reflex of a critical introduction is to hunt for the falsification, and here the usual quarry is largely absent. The book does not rewrite 1917, does not defend a purge, does not lie about a famine. What it does instead — and what makes it worth reading closely — is tell the truth about a group of scientists while keeping a careful, revealing silence about what the Soviet state did to them. To see that, we first have to be clear about what the book is and when it was really written.

What the book is, and when

The spine says 1982; the author's own note says otherwise. "From the Author" is signed "Karl Levitin, Moscow, 1980," and its occasion is the 1979 Tbilisi symposium on the unconscious, where Levitin felt "some very familiar and very necessary voices were conspicuously absent" — Alexander Luria and Alexei Leontiev had both died in the late 1970s. So this is a book of about 1979–80, issued in English translation in 1982, edited by the psychologist Vasili Davydov (himself

one of its subjects) and prefaced by Vladimir Zinchenko. It reads exactly like what it is: an elegy and a stock-taking, written just after the founding generation passed, at the moment the West was beginning to catch up.

That last point governs the whole commission. By 1980 Vygotsky was no longer an Eastern secret. *Mind in Society*, the Harvard selection of his writings, had appeared in 1978; the Western rediscovery was under way. Levitin's book is pitched squarely into that opening. Zinchenko says as much — "only now are people abroad beginning to assess them objectively and correctly" — and the book leans repeatedly on Western authority to make its case, quoting at length the Chicago philosopher Stephen Toulmin, who warns his own colleagues that if they let "our political attitudes toward the government of the USSR" distract them from the science, "it will then be we ourselves, not Vygotsky and Luria, who are the ideologues." That is a shrewd frame. It lets a Progress book present Soviet psychology to Western readers not as propaganda but as a discovery the West is belatedly, enviously making — which happens, in this case, to be substantially true. The export purpose is real; it is just unusually well served by honesty, because the underlying achievement could stand on its own feet.

The achievement, credited concretely

The tradition the book portrays is the cultural-historical school: Lev Vygotsky and, around and after him, Luria, Leontiev, Alexander Zaporozhets, Daniil Elkonin, Pyotr Galperin, Davydov — the "Kharkov school" of the 1930s and its Moscow continuation. Its founding idea is the one the title states. As Leontiev puts it in his interview, "one is not born a personality, one becomes a personality by socialisation and enculturation, by acquiring the habits, skills, and methods of handling tools. Personality is a product of social activity and its traits can be explained only in these terms." Against both the geneticist who reads character off the chromosomes and the idealist who finds the self already present in the newborn, the school held that the specifically human mind is built —

assembled in the child out of the tools, signs and relationships a culture hands it. This is not a slogan. It generated a research programme, and several parts of that programme have outlasted the state that funded them.

Vygotsky's own contribution is the durable core. His account of the higher mental functions — that memory, attention and thought become human only when the child masters an external cultural instrument (a word, a knot, a number) and gradually turns it inward — reoriented developmental psychology worldwide. So did the idea for which he is now best known everywhere, the zone of proximal development: the gap between what a child can do alone and what the same child can do with help, which Vygotsky argued was where teaching should aim and where the next stage of development is actually forming. Any teacher-training college in the world now teaches some version of it. The book does not use that phrase, but it shows the same instinct at work when Galperin describes the school's signature method as "the active and purposeful moulding of certain psychic qualities in a person" under controlled conditions — building a mental function on purpose, to see how it is made. Vygotsky died of tuberculosis on 11 June 1934, at thirty-seven, having given psychology, as the book fairly says, a little over ten years. The scale of what he left in that time is not exaggerated here.

Luria is the second pillar, and the book's portrait of him is its liveliest. Levitin catches him mid-thought on the brain, dismantling the old maps of fixed "centres" in favour of the idea that a complex act like writing is carried out by a whole dynamic system of cooperating regions, so that damage in different places disturbs it in different ways. This is the founding intuition of neuropsychology as a discipline, and Luria is one of its founders. The book gestures, too, at the human documents that made him famous in the West — the studies of wounded soldiers, the man with the shattered world, the mnemonist who could not forget — and at his early forensic work on affect and response that anticipated, and in his telling improved upon, the lie detector. Readers who come to Luria only through this affectionate sketch should know that his own books, *The Man with a Shattered World* and *The Mind of a Mnemonist*, are among the most humane things ever written about injured minds, and remain in print.

Then there is Zagorsk, and this is where the book earns its warmth outright. In the town's boarding school, following methods developed by Ivan Sokolyansky and carried forward by Luria's pupil Alexander Meshcheryakov, teachers undertook to build a full human mind in children who were born both deaf and blind — children sealed, in the book's

recurring image, under a "dark soundproof dome." The method was patient and materialist to the bone: begin from the child's remaining senses and its bodily needs, and teach it the human world through the human objects that meet those needs — the spoon, the comb, the chisel. "The workshops here are not just a place where they learn 'skills'," Levitin writes; "they are places where human personalities are moulded." And the claim is cashed out in fact. In 1977 four young people who had been deaf and blind from birth graduated from the psychology department of Moscow University. Leontiev, the department's dean, called the achievement a window "into the innermost depths of consciousness." One may resist the metaphysics and still recognise the thing itself as one of the genuine moral accomplishments of twentieth-century education. A theory of mind that could do that is not lip-service; it is a working proof. Toulmin's warning to sceptical Westerners lands with full force here — the references to Marx in this tradition, he says, "represent something more than ... political lip service," and Zagorsk is the evidence.

None of this needs rescuing in the ordinary sense of the word — it was never buried under falsification. It needs, rather, to be held up clearly, because the honest reader's next question is the one the book will not answer.

The narrow edge: forming the new man

Notice the verb that keeps returning: mould. The children are "moulded"; qualities are "moulded" in a person; the teacher can "mould them into any kind of person." In the Zagorsk context the word is exact and blameless — you really are building a mind that would not otherwise exist, and the child emerges not diminished but enlarged, able to type a letter and feel "what a pleasure it is." But the same young teacher completes her sentence: "you can mould them into any kind of person. And I will have to make them good citizens of our society." There, in one breath, the book crosses from a science of how minds are formed to a programme for what they should be formed into.

This is the tradition's genuine philosophical charter, and also its point of maximum political exposure. The thesis that one is not born a personality but becomes one through activity in the collective is, as science, true and fertile. It is also, read a half-turn further, the founding proposition of a state that claimed the right to form the new man — to treat the human being as raw material for its own project. The book poses the underlying question with real force: does a person "come to this world completely naked — inside and outside — and what

we later call soul is not born with him, but appears only when he comes in contact with the life which we have created for ourselves?" That is a profound and, to my mind, largely correct question. But "the life which we have created for ourselves" is doing enormous work in that sentence, and the book never asks who the "we" is, or what happens when the collective doing the moulding is not a free association of equals but a bureaucratic state with camps in it. The science is silent on that, as science may honestly be. The trouble is that the state was not silent; it had its own ideas about the new man, and it acted on them.

The scientists knew this better than the book lets on — because they had been on the receiving end. And here the silence becomes a finding.

The shadow the book keeps out

Read the preface's account of the school's early years and you get hardship without a perpetrator. Conditions were "hard," Zinchenko writes; there were "hunger and unfair judgements"; the science was forged "in the face of biased criticism." Handsome, vague words. What they decline to name is a specific act of the Soviet state. On 4 July 1936 the Central Committee issued its decree "On Pedological Distortions in the System of the People's Commissariats of Education," which abolished pedology — the child-study movement in which Vygotsky's developmental work was embedded — as a "pseudo-science," liquidated its institutions and pulled its books. Vygotsky had been dead two years and could not be arrested; his work could be, and was. His writings went effectively unpublished for the next two decades. That the book's own bibliography lists his *Selected Psychological Studies* as appearing in 1956 — twenty-two years after his death, and the year Khrushchev denounced Stalin — is the whole story told in a single date, if you know to read it. The book prints the date and omits the reason.

The same shadow falls across the others, more faintly. Luria's remarkable cross-cultural expeditions to Uzbekistan in 1931–32, testing how literacy and collectivisation reshaped perception and reasoning — described here as a thrilling adventure — produced findings that were politically unwelcome (they implied that peasants "backward" in reasoning could be so for cultural reasons the Revolution had not yet undone), and Luria did not publish them in full until 1974, near the end of his life. The Kharkov years themselves, when Leontiev, Luria and Zaporozhets decamped from Moscow to Ukraine at the turn of the 1930s, were in part a

strategic retreat from an increasingly dangerous ideological climate. The book presents this migration as intellectual adventure, which it also was. It does not present it as flight, which it partly was.

None of this is obscure or contested history, and the point of naming it is not to catch Levitin in a lie — he tells none — but to complete the picture his book leaves three-quarters drawn. The cultural-historical school was not the serene achievement of a state that nurtured its scientists. It was the achievement of scientists who did world-class work and survived the system that is here presenting them as its ornament. The theory that a person is formed by the society around him was developed by people whose own life's work was periodically un-formed by decree. That irony is the real subject the book circles and never lands on.

The reply, and the root

The tradition this series writes from has no quarrel with the school's Marxism — on the contrary. The root the school claimed is a real one. When Leontiev grounds personality in "the system of social relations," and when the book quotes the school on human needs arising within "the totality of social relations," they are drawing directly on Marx's sixth thesis on Feuerbach, that the human essence "in its reality" is "the ensemble of the social relations." That is not decoration bolted onto the psychology; it is its foundation, and Toulmin is right that Western readers who assume otherwise flatter themselves. On this the school and the anti-Stalinist left agree entirely: the human being is social all the way down, made and not given.

The disagreement is about the other half of Marx, the half the book's title leaves implicit. If the person is formed through the collective, the emancipatory tradition always insisted on the end of that formation — a society, in the words of the Communist Manifesto, in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all." The individual is the aim, not the feedstock. A psychology of formation is humane exactly to the degree that the society doing the forming is one its members freely make; it curdles into something else when the "collective" is a euphemism for a state that forms people for its own ends and calls the result the new man. The book cannot resolve this tension because the science cannot — but a reader can hold the question open, and should. For the political half of the answer, Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936) is the standing reference in this series: written in the very years pedology was banned, it is the argument that by the 1930s the "collective" in whose name the Soviet person was to be formed was administered by a

privileged bureaucracy with interests of its own — which is precisely why the question of what the new man was to be formed into, and by whom, could not be safely asked inside the USSR, and why a great developmental psychology had to keep its silence to survive.

How to read it

So: read this book, and read it warmly. It is the best popular door into one of the twentieth century's genuinely great scientific traditions, written by a reporter with a real eye and real affection for his subjects, at the moment that tradition was passing into history and into the Western canon at once. The cultural-historical psychology is not a Soviet fabrication to be exposed; it is a Soviet achievement — arguably the Soviet achievement in the human sciences — and this series is glad to help carry it. Vygotsky on the making of mind, Luria on the wounded brain, Zagorsk on the deaf-blind child who learns to think: these are permanent, and they are here.

Read it, too, against its silences. When the teacher says she will "make them good citizens of our society," ask which society, formed by whom, and toward what. And when you reach the date 1956 beside Vygotsky's collected works, remember that the humane and hopeful science this book celebrates was, for twenty years, something the same state would not let its own citizens read. That the manuscripts survived — that, as the book quotes Bulgakov, "manuscripts don't burn" — is true, and moving, and not the same thing as saying the fire was never lit.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

CIA Target: The USSR

American covert action documented from American sources - and then turned on a dozen named Soviet dissidents, most of them in camps, exile or prison as the book went abroad. A prosecution exhibit, not an analysis.

Nikolai Yakovlev

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

Most of the books in this series argue about the dead. This one accuses the living.

CIA Target: The USSR is a study of American covert operations in which roughly a quarter of the text is given over to the personal histories, prison records, finances and alleged criminal associations of about a dozen named Soviet citizens. When Progress Publishers issued it in English in 1982, Yuri Orlov was serving seven years in a labour camp and Anatoly Shcharansky thirteen; Alexander Ginzburg had been expelled to the United States in a prisoner exchange and deprived of his citizenship; Tatyana Velikanova had been sentenced in August 1980; Andrei Sakharov had been seized in January 1980 and deposited without trial in Gorky, a city closed to foreigners. Of these people the book says, in its own words, that "Soviet courts exposed them as paid agents of the CIA, and thus justice prevailed." It is not a work of interpretation that a later generation may weigh against other interpretations. It is an exhibit in a prosecution, translated for export, and it has to be read as one.

The date on the spine is the translation's. Yakovlev says in his own Afterword what the book is: "That was why I wrote CIA Target—U.S.S.R., published in the Soviet Union in 1979." The Russian text came first, and the English one was then carried forward: its latest datable material is all from 1980 — Solzhenitsyn in Foreign Affairs in April, the American Society of Newspaper Editors' Bulletin of July–August, a letter to Literaturnaya Gazeta of 20 August, and the Moscow court's verdict on Tatyana Velikanova of 23 August. In 101,692 words the strings 1981 and 1982 do not occur once. This matters for what follows, because a silence is only a silence about something the author could have written. Nothing here can be argued from the absence of Reagan, of Solidarity or of the Polish martial law of December 1981; the manuscript closed before any of them. What can be argued from is everything that had already happened by the autumn of 1980.

Say first what is true in it, because a good deal is, and because the book's method depends on it.

The first four chapters are a survey of American covert action assembled almost entirely from American public sources, and the survey is broadly sound. Yakovlev quotes NSC 20/1 of August 1948 — the Policy Planning Staff paper drafted under George Kennan — on the aim of "keeping the Soviet Union politically, militarily, psychologically weak in comparison with the international forces outside of its control," and he quotes it accurately; his own reference note points the reader to Etzold and Gaddis's *Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–1950*, published by Columbia University Press in 1978, where anyone can check it. He is right that the Congress for Cultural Freedom and Encounter were covertly financed by the CIA, a fact that broke in 1966–67 and that he takes from Godfrey Hodgson rather than from any Soviet source: he quotes several pages of Hodgson's *America in Our Time* (1976), including the parenthesis "Both the congress and Encounter were later found to have been in receipt of secret funds from the Central Intelligence Agency" — and then adds a parenthesis of his own, initialled N.Y., to note that Daniel Bell's international seminars for the Congress were "naturally paid by the CIA". The companion volume in this series fails exactly there. Yelena Modrzinskaya's *Leninism and the Battle of Ideas* (Progress, 1972), a book whose whole authority rests on following the money — the Hoover Institution's funding traced to Standard Oil of New Jersey, Republic Steel and T. Mellon and Sons, the Ostforschung institutes worked through one by one — cites Encounter, 1963 no. 6, without comment, five years after the CIA subsidy was public. Yakovlev, working the same seam ten years later, does not make that mistake. He is right that Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe were CIA-funded until the arrangement was exposed in 1971 and unwound over the following two years. He is right that the Agency subsidised the publication of upwards of a thousand books before 1967, and he quotes the Chief of its Covert Action Staff on why: "one single book can significantly change the reader's attitude and action to an extent unmatched by the impact of any other

single medium." He is right that Richard Helms, having assured the public that "we too are honorable men," was convicted in November 1977 of failing to testify fully to Congress and fined two thousand dollars. He devotes several pages, and his best pages, to the case of Yuri Nosenko, the KGB officer who defected in 1964 and whom the CIA then held in a cell near Washington until October 1967 — "confined to a concrete cell, on a meager diet, without any contact with the outside world, and subjected to physical and chemical pressure to make him 'crack'". Yakovlev has no sympathy for the man — Nosenko is "the traitor", and "one might say that it served the traitor right" — but he presses on, and the question he asks is the right one: "The important point here is not his plight but the methods U.S. intelligence services use on their victims, even though the case cited was a mistake. How does procedure like that square with the vaunted 'rule of law' in the United States?" The officials "entrusted with upholding rule of law", he adds, "consider it their duty to overlook obvious legal violations when the intelligence services, above all the CIA, insist on it". Every element of that account is documented and true. And he is right that the Church and Pike inquiries were bounded exercises whose records were, as *The Progressive* put it in a passage he reproduces, "excessively censored."

None of this was secret knowledge in 1980 and none of it has been overturned since. A reader who expects the CIA's operations against the Soviet Union to be a Soviet invention will be corrected, and correctly. The general case — that the United States ran a sustained, well-funded, deniable campaign of political and psychological warfare against the USSR from 1947 onward, that it subsidised émigré organisations including the NTS, that it financed broadcasting and publishing while denying it, and that the American press and academy were more entangled with the enterprise than they cared to admit — is not a falsification. It is the reason the book was worth writing and is worth reading.

The falsification is what the general case is used to do.

Watch where the sourcing changes. Through the first four chapters Yakovlev cites Colby, Prouty, Rositzke, David Wise, Philip Agee, Gaddis, the Church Committee, *The Nation* — all checkable, all footnoted. In the long chapter called "The CIA in Psychological Warfare" the apparatus quietly falls away and is replaced by something else. The authorities become "witness I.", "witness F.", "witness G.", "witness H.", "witness S."; "a certain K., born in 1956, an ex-convict"; "a certain M., a truck driver"; and, most remarkably, an anonymous memoirist introduced as "One of the people who at that time got caught

in the web of the dissidents — let us call him X (he suffered greatly and is no longer among the living)." Several pages of character assassination are then quoted from X, who cannot be identified, questioned, or contradicted. Interspersed with these are documents that exist in exactly one place: investigation files and closed trial records. Yakovlev is a professional historian citing evidence no historian could obtain. The book does not explain how he got it. It does not need to.

What the evidence is made to prove is that the people the West called dissidents were criminals and mercenaries. The claim is stated as a general law near the middle of the book — "It is a law of Soviet history that anyone opposing the Soviet government inevitably turns to foreign anticommunists for help" — and then applied name by name.

Alexander Ginzburg receives the longest treatment. Yakovlev is correct that Ginzburg was sentenced in 1960 for taking a school examination under another man's name; he calls him "the swindler" and uses the episode to establish that everything afterwards was fraud. Ginzburg's five-year sentence in 1968, for compiling the White Book on the Sinyavsky–Daniel trial, is recast as punishment "for crimes committed on the instructions of the NTS." His administration of the Russian Social Fund, set up with Solzhenitsyn's royalties to support prisoners' families, becomes embezzlement: "The benefactor no doubt embezzled most of the 360,000 dollars." The words no doubt are the whole of the evidence offered. The witnesses, all initials, describe him distributing Parker pens, jeans and pornographic postcards to former Nazi auxiliaries and murderers in the camps. And Yuri Galanskov, who died in the Mordovian camps in November 1972 after an operation for a perforated ulcer, is turned against him: "an unbalanced and frail man, he followed Ginzburg's advice and refused medical assistance." A man dead in Soviet custody is thus made an argument against the man who was in custody with him.

Yuri Orlov is "a certain Orlov," appointed "champion of human rights number one" by Western intelligence. Of the Public Group to Promote Observance of the Helsinki Accords in the USSR, which Orlov founded in May 1976 and which the book elsewhere names correctly, Yakovlev writes: "Actually, the group as such never existed, but the letterhead was invented to lend more weight to various expressly anti-Soviet statements." Its reports were "slandorous fabrications," a finding attributed to the court that convicted him.

Shcharansky, whose 1978 conviction for treason rested on an accusation of espionage for the United States that the Carter administration publicly denied, is never given a section of his

own. He appears three times, always in a list, always as one of the "pawns" who "were caught red-handed." Vladimir Bukovsky recurs throughout as a criminal record rather than a person: "a hardened criminal", "the new star of anti-Sovietism", who behaved "like a true professional criminal", and whose name the émigré journal *Posev* is quoted linking to Vlasov's — a chain Yakovlev then takes over in his own voice. The one specific charge against him is a single unsourced clause: he "tried to set up terrorist 'teams of five'" and failed for want of five followers. Andrei Amalrik's name appears once, in a plural, inside X's account of literary salons — "all those Bukovskys, Osipovs, Khaustovs, Amalriks; putting it bluntly they were dropouts, conceited and pretentious idlers." The anthologies Ginzburg circulated with Andrei Sinyavsky in the 1950s (the book spells him Siniavsky) are dismissed for a "pornographic content—both literary and political smut" that, the reader is told, makes "it impossible to quote them." Tatyana Velikanova's private correspondence, seized and read into a verdict, is quoted at length. Mykola Rudenko and Oleksa Tykhy, tried together in 1977, are staged as comedy: the court, Yakovlev writes, was "amused" and "the audience burst out laughing" at Rudenko's denials. Tykhy died in custody in 1984. Elena Bonner, in a book that names her husband eighty-three times, is never named at all.

Above all there is Sakharov, to whom the final section is given. Here the book's technique is at its most instructive, because much of what it quotes is genuine. Sakharov did argue in *My Country and the World* that the West should apply "the strongest pressure"; he did oppose most-favoured-nation status for the USSR; he did write the passage regretting that the United States had not acted "more resolutely in the military and, especially, the political fields" in Vietnam; he did appeal on behalf of the elderly Rudolf Hess and against the extradition of the Brazinskas hijackers, and those positions were controversial among his own supporters. Yakovlev quotes them more or less fairly and could have built a hard political criticism on them. He does not. He builds an indictment. Sakharov is "the ambitious arranger of human affairs," a would-be "universal Caesar," a man who took foreign money — "he wanted foreign currency. And it was handed to him in 1975 under a 'respectable' cover — the Nobel Prize" — and who protected thieves and killers. "His 'humanism' isn't simply false. It is pathologically inhuman." "A spiritual outcast, provocateur Sakharov has long since put himself in the position of a traitor of his people and country."

One sentence in that section carries no footnote, no quotation and no source, and it is the one that matters: "He was delighted when the blood-stained Pinochet clique grabbed power in

Chile." Everywhere else in this book, where Sakharov's views are objectionable to the author, they are reproduced in his own words at length. Here they are not, because there were none to reproduce. The unsourced sentence is the tell, and it recurs: on the same page Sakharov is said to have "defended Zatikyan and his accomplices," the men convicted of the 1977 Moscow metro bombing. What Sakharov actually did was question the conduct of that trial and appeal for it to be held in the open. The book converts a demand for due process into complicity in murder — and it generalises the move, concluding that "It is only a small step from participation in Operation Human Rights to terrorism," and that the human rights campaign "tends to provide fertile breeding ground for terrorists."

That Pinochet sentence is also, and this is the striking part, the only place in the book where Chile occurs at all. Salvador Allende is not named in these 101,692 words; neither is Lumumba, nor Mossadegh. Guatemala occurs twice, both times inside quotations from William Colby; Iran occurs four times, as a name in a list — of Dropshot belligerents, of countries with CIA training camps, and in Colby's and Fletcher Prouty's enumerations of covert operations — and the 1953 coup is nowhere discussed. A Soviet study of the Central Intelligence Agency that has no chapter on Santiago, Tehran, Guatemala City or Léopoldville — that reaches Chile once, and then only to slander a physicist with it — has told the reader what it is about.

The distinction on which this volume turns is between the general claim and the particular accusation. The general claim — the CIA ran covert political warfare against the Soviet Union, on a large scale, with deniable funding, and lied about it — is true, and not every intermediate link is invented either: dissidents did give interviews to Western correspondents, manuscripts did reach the West and return by radio, and Radio Liberty was for two decades an American intelligence operation, as the book's own quotation from Harry Rositzke shows. The specific accusations built on top of all this — that these named individuals took the Agency's money and acted on its instructions — are supported by nothing a reader can check, and where they can be checked they fail. The general truth is the load-bearing structure; the individual accusations are what it was built to carry. Yakovlev's own euphemism for what happened to Sakharov is worth preserving: "The administrative action taken against him is designed to stop his subversive activities." He means an unsentenced man held under guard in a closed city for what turned out to be nearly seven years. Two paragraphs later: "Western propaganda is trying to concoct a 'Sakharov problem'. But there is no such problem."

Put that sentence next to the Nosenko chapter and the book comes apart in the reader's hands. There Yakovlev has a man confined without charge, without trial, without contact with the outside world, by a security service acting on an authorisation that the official said to have granted it flatly denied ever granting; and he asks, correctly, how such a procedure squares with the rule of law. Here he has a man confined without charge, without trial, in a city closed to foreigners, by a security service, and it is "administrative action" that "has been approved by the Soviet public" and "may benefit Sakharov, too". The cases are not identical — Nosenko was tortured and Sakharov was not — but the principle invoked against the Americans is the one suspended at home, within the covers of one book. That is the test worth applying to a volume like this, and it is not a test about vocabulary: can the category the author uses ever be turned on the side he is writing for? The USSR had an intelligence service, a Criminal Code with an Article 70, closed trials and men in camps. The book supplies all of those facts itself and never once lets them fall under a description it applies freely to Washington.

What the book is not doing while it does this is also worth a moment, because it is unusual for the series. The Progress catalogue's characteristic instrument is the deviation label — opportunism, revisionism, dogmatism, sectarianism — fixed to an opponent as an essence. Yakovlev barely reaches for it. Opportunist occurs once, inside a quotation from an American writer on brainwashing; sectarian once, and applied to the CIA. Revisionism occurs twenty times, and every one of them means the Cold War revisionist historians of the United States, William Appleman Williams above all — whom Yakovlev names, cites and praises, writing that they "have made a major contribution to the analysis of U.S. foreign policy motives". The catalogue's sharpest term of abuse is here a term of approval. What has taken its place is not a political vocabulary at all: criminal occurs forty-five times and traitor twenty-four, while working class does not occur once in 101,692 words, alongside three uses of "class struggle", three of "proletarian" and ten of Lenin's name. This is not a Marxist analysis of imperialism with a police annexe. It is a police argument with a scholarly frontispiece.

The silences are as exact as the accusations. This is a book devoted to explaining why Western opinion had turned against the Soviet Union, revised through 1980, and the word Afghanistan does not occur in it. That is not chronology: Yakovlev was working on the text through the year the invasion dominated East-West relations, he writes that "the West abruptly stepped up the anti-Soviet campaign in early

1980", and he relays, from an émigré report of his own newspaper article, the charge that Sakharov had called on "the Western countries to boycott the U.S.S.R. and keep up the arms race". He gives the boycott and withholds its cause. It does not mention Czechoslovakia in 1968 at all; the single appearance of Prague in the book is in the title of a wartime Vlasovite manifesto. Hungary in 1956 it does treat, as "The 1956 counterrevolutionary putsch" whose insurgents were "bandits" who "would never have dared take up arms" without Radio Free Europe. It nowhere disputes a single factual claim in *The Gulag Archipelago*: Solzhenitsyn is attacked for plagiarism, for admiring German militarism, for authoritarianism, for taking his title from a 1947 American magazine map — never for having got the camps wrong. On psychiatric confinement, the charge the Helsinki groups pressed hardest, the book has nothing to say. Pyotr Grigorenko does not appear in it; neither does Leonid Plyushch, released to the West in 1976 after the international campaign this book never mentions. Where the vocabulary of psychiatry does occur it belongs to the CIA: the OSS profile of Hitler, the "psychiatric profile" of Daniel Ellsberg, the burglary of his psychiatrist's office. The single exception is one clause about Velikanova's seized letters, which "highlight both her inner thoughts (possibly of interest to psychiatrists) and her practical work (clearly criminal in nature and therefore of interest to the court)." The book knows the association is available. It uses it as an aside against a defendant and never once as a subject. And one falsification about the West is worth noting because it is so easily checked: the deaths at Jonestown in November 1978 are ascribed to Americans who fled to Guyana seeking freedom and who, sensing "the tentacles of the secret services reaching out to them in the jungle," chose suicide over repatriation. More than nine hundred died there, a third of them children, and many were killed rather than self-killed. The book calls the cult's leader Jeff Jones.

Something should be said about the man who wrote it. Nikolai Nikolayevich Yakovlev (1927–1996) was a real historian, with some twenty books behind him including studies of Roosevelt and of Pearl Harbor, and co-author with Nikolai Sivachev of *Moscow State University of Russia and the United States*, published by the University of Chicago Press in 1979. The Afterword here is largely a defence of that earlier book against American reviewers who assumed it had been written to order. Yakovlev's reply is unambiguous: "These quotations point to the Western belief, shared even in academic circles, that Soviet scholars are merely puppets whose strings are pulled by some mysterious higher authorities. Nothing could be further from the truth. There are no strings." He wrote that in a volume whose central chapter reproduces closed investigation files. On

his own article attacking Sakharov he is equally firm: reprinting it here, he asks, "Gross slander? No, every word in it is true."

It was not, and the strings are visible in the book itself. No historian obtains a defendant's seized private correspondence, the transcript of a closed hearing, or an anonymous informant's character sketch of his neighbours by going to an archive; there is exactly one institution in the Soviet Union that held those papers, and it is the one that had arrested the people they concern. Yakovlev did not deny this afterwards. In the perestroika years he acknowledged that the KGB had supplied his material, and he withdrew what he had written about several of the people he named. That acknowledgement changes the standing of the volume without making the chapters on the CIA false. It makes the book something other than a book: a work of scholarship at the front and an organ of the security service at the back, with the credibility of the first part underwriting the second. That was the design.

The reply this book needed was never a defence of the CIA, and the tradition from which this introduction is written never offered one. It answered on both counts at once, and the record is easy to consult. Intercontinental Press, the weekly associated with the Fourth International, covered every one of these trials as they happened. Marilyn Vogt reported Orlov's sentence on 29 May 1978 under the headline "Yuri Orlov Sentenced to Twelve-Year Term", noting that although TASS called the trial open, "the courtroom was closed to the public, as it had been filled in advance each day with fifty spectators handpicked by the authorities." On 24 July 1978 it ran her "Free Shcharansky, Ginzburg, Pyatkus!", recording that Shcharansky "was framed up by the Stalinist rulers on a charge of 'high treason in the form of espionage'", that Ginzburg had been given eight years in a strict-regime camp at Kaluga — the same sentence Yakovlev reports, described very differently — and that all three were tried "in courtrooms closed to the public, packed in advance with spectators handpicked by the Kremlin's police." That is not a difference of emphasis but a flat contradiction, and it can be adjudicated. Yakovlev's account turns on the openness of these proceedings — "the 1977 open trial of Rudenko and Tikhy in Druzhkovka", Ginzburg's "1978 open trial in Kaluga" — and the courtroom laughter he reports is evidence only if there was a public to laugh. One of the two accounts carries a named reporter's dateline from outside the courtroom door; the other rests on the same closed files as everything else in the chapter. The same issue carried the other half of the argument, reporting the storm that broke over Andrew Young when the American ambassador to the UN observed that there were political prisoners in United States

jails too, and noting that it was Cyrus Vance, "architect of the Pentagon's saturation-bombing program in Vietnam", who reprimanded him. Yakovlev cites that same Young episode, in a letter he reproduces, to prove Sakharov a hypocrite. Two papers reached one incident from opposite directions in the same season, and only one concluded that both sets of prisons were real.

Nor was this an uncritical solidarity. In the issue of 30 June 1980, six months after Sakharov was taken to Gorky, David Frankel devoted three pages to demolishing Sakharov's politics under the title "A Dead End for Soviet Dissidents: Andrei Sakharov Offers Advice on World Politics", not least his description of the United States as "the historically determined leader of the movement toward a pluralist and free society". Having said it, Frankel set out why the persecution was still indefensible: "The real target of the Stalinist bureaucracy is not the precapitalist views of a Sakharov. Their target is the Soviet workers and peasants, who might get the idea that if Sakharov can speak freely, perhaps they should have the right to speak out too." Repression, he added, "would merely help the imperialists to discredit the Soviet Union" — which is, among other things, an accurate forecast of the reception of the book you are holding. Earlier, on 22 November 1976, the same paper had translated a *Le Monde* editorial by the mathematician Michel Broué, secretary of the Mathematicians Committee that had won Leonid Plyushch's release, and the psychiatrist Gaston Ferdière, of the Committee against the Special Psychiatric Hospitals in the USSR and chairman of the Health Workers Committee on Chile. It was written for a Paris rally that paired three prisoners in the Soviet bloc, Bukovsky among them, with three victims of the Latin American dictatorships: "Six Political Prisoners East and West". Every element Yakovlev's book leaves out is in that one byline — Plyushch, the psychiatric hospitals, Chile — and they are in it because the people who signed it were campaigning on all of them at once. That is the symmetry this book exists to prevent anyone from drawing.

Read that way the book remains valuable, and not only negatively: the chapters on the OSS, on NSC 20/1 and 20/4, and on the CIA's relations with the American universities and the émigré right are competent work on real documents. But its subject is finally not the CIA. Its subject is a small number of Soviet citizens whom the state had decided to destroy, and wished, for reasons of foreign policy, to have destroyed in English as well as Russian. The evidence against them was supplied by the organisation that had arrested them. The historian who arranged it said afterwards that he had defamed them. Nothing since has given anyone a reason to doubt him.

SOVIET SOCIETY

Soviet Legislation on Children's Rights

Ninety Soviet statutes and decrees on childhood - family law, schooling, welfare, adolescent labour - compiled by two jurists as Moscow's answer, in statute rather than argument, to the International Year of the Child.

Vera Nikolaevna Tolkunova

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

This is not a book with an argument; it is a book of laws.

Soviet Legislation on Children's Rights is a compilation — some ninety statutes, codes, decrees and ministerial orders, given in extract and arranged under six headings: general enactments, the child within the family, the protection of childhood, the right to education and upbringing, social security, and labour privileges for adolescents. It was compiled by two jurists of the Soviet academy, Professor V. N. Tolkunova (Sections I and VI) and E. G. Azarova (Sections II–V), translated by Jane Sayer, and issued by Progress in Moscow. Between the codes sits a short introduction over Tolkunova's name, and it tells you at once what the collection is for. "The year 1979 was the twentieth anniversary of the UN Declaration of the Right of the Child," it opens, and the book presents itself as the Soviet Union's contribution to the conversation the International Year of the Child of 1979 had opened: here is what one state has actually legislated, laid out for the world to inspect.

Date the object before reading it. The spine says 1982, and for once the spine is close to honest: the latest instrument in the collection is the resolution "On Measures for Increasing State Assistance to Families with Children" of 22 January 1981, and the education decrees speak of the Eleventh Five-Year Plan, which ran from 1981. This is a late-Brezhnev book — its author died in November 1982 — assembled in the twilight of "developed socialism," the doctrine the 1977 Constitution had enshrined and which opens the volume: "In the USSR a developed socialist society has been built." It belongs to a particular moment in the Cold War of paper. Helsinki had made human rights a field of superpower competition in 1975; Western governments and a growing dissident movement pressed the Soviet Union on its record; and the International Year of the Child gave Moscow a stage on which to answer not with rebuttal but with statute. The book is soft power in legal dress — an export document, addressed past the specialist to the sympathetic foreign reader and the non-aligned world, and it wears its international frame openly,

invoking the UN, the 1959 Declaration, the Women's International Democratic Federation, and the 700 delegates from 135 countries who came to the 1979 "World Conference for a Peaceful and Secure Future for All Children" in Moscow. Its implicit claim is large: that Soviet law is the international children's-rights ideal already made real. "In the socialist countries," the introduction says of that Declaration, "the principles ... are implemented in practice."

The doctrine that organises the whole is simply stated, and the book states it in a single sentence: "The primary guarantee of children's rights is the humanism and democratism of the Soviet legislation on the rights and protection of children." The guarantor of childhood is the socialist state. Where a liberal constitution tends to shield the child, and the family, from the state, this collection makes the state the active provider, financier and supervisor of childhood at every point — and the introduction's register is frankly proprietary and tender at once: "Children are the future of mankind and are more valuable than anything else in the world. All adults are responsible for what happens to them." The Constitution of 1977, with which the collection opens, sets out the entitlements as positive rights guaranteed by state performance: the right to education "ensured by free provision of all forms of education ... the free issue of school textbooks; by the opportunity to attend a school where teaching is in the native language" (Article 45); the right to health protection, including "special care for the health of the rising generation" (Article 42); the protection of the family by the state (Article 53). The remaining five sections are the machinery beneath those promises.

Much of what that machinery delivered was real, and a reader told otherwise would be badly misled. This is the point at which honesty about the book earns the right to be hard on it later. The Soviet Union had, by 1982, built a genuine welfare architecture for children, and the collection documents its legal skeleton accurately. Education to the end of secondary school was compulsory and free, in a country that within living memory had been largely illiterate; textbooks were provided without charge, a reform the collection dates to a resolution of 24 November 1977. The introduction's figures — over 150,000

general schools, creches and kindergartens with 80 per cent of the cost borne by the state, some 22 million children a year in Pioneer and holiday camps, free issue of textbooks, subsidised or free places for low-income families — describe a system that, whatever its coercions, did lift the material floor under childhood for tens of millions. The public-health provisions establish a paediatric network, sanatoria for tubercular and chronically ill children, and free medical care as a matter of right. The social-security sections codify pensions for the loss of a breadwinner, allowances to large and single-parent families, and full state maintenance of orphans. The labour sections carry protections — a prohibition on employing anyone under eighteen in listed dangerous trades, shortened hours for working adolescents, mandatory rest — that many wealthier states reached later or not at all. The maternity and infant provisions — paid leave, allowances on the birth of a child, a network of infants' homes and creches — were, for their time, genuinely advanced, and the collection's insistence that most of the cost fell on the state rather than the family was substantially true. And the collapse of the mass child homelessness that had scarred the 1920s was a real achievement of exactly this kind of institution-building. None of this is nothing. It is the substance on which the book's claim rests, and it should be credited plainly before the claim is tested.

The test is the one this series applies to every volume: not how warm the language is, nor how real the achievements, but whether the law on the page describes the practice, and whether the categories the book wields can ever be turned on the state that wrote them. On both counts a book of laws is unusually revealing, because the machinery of coercion is not hidden in it — it is printed, in the same neutral register as the benefits, a few pages away.

Begin with the state's power over the child where it collides with the family. The collection presents the family and the state as partners in upbringing, but it is candid about who is senior. The Constitution obliges citizens "to concern themselves with the upbringing of children ... and to raise them as worthy members of socialist society" (Article 66) — the goal of child-rearing is defined by the state, and the family is deputised to reach it. The family law spells out the sanction. A court may deprive parents of their rights not only for cruelty or neglect but where they have "exerted a harmful influence on them by their immoral, anti-social behaviour" — an elastic ground, its content supplied by whoever administers it. And beyond deprivation lies a further, quieter power, set down in the RSFSR family code and easy to read past: "A court may order that a child be taken away and placed in the care of

trusteeship and guardianship agencies, even if the parents have not been deprived of their parental rights, on the grounds that the child would be in danger if it remained with the persons in whose care it had been." The child may be removed from parents who have done nothing to forfeit their rights, on a finding of "danger" the statute does not define. In a state that had built the whole apparatus of upbringing around the formation of a particular kind of citizen, the question of what counted as a harmful influence, or a danger, was never going to be answered only by a child's welfare.

It was not. The plainest instance sits inside this very collection, though the book does not see it as one. Section IV prints the resolution "On Measures to Further Develop the Economy and Culture of the Peoples of the North" of 21 April 1967, and among its provisions is the authority to accept, "at full state expense, in boarding schools, residential sections of schools ... the children of all citizens of the rural population of these regions and localities not residing where the given educational establishments are located." That single clause is the legal skeleton of the internat system — the residential schools into which the children of the small indigenous peoples of the Soviet North, and of scattered rural districts generally, were gathered for the greater part of the year, often hundreds of kilometres from families who were themselves being settled off the land. The sibling volume in this series, Vladimir Uvachan's *The Peoples of the North and Their Road to Socialism* (Progress, 1975) — written, remarkably, by an Evenk raised in that very system — presents the boarding school as pure benefaction, "opened to correspond with national customs, particularly the nomadic way of life," and records with pride that by 1970 some 24,000 indigenous children lived in such schools at state expense. What the system became — the routine removal of children from their parents and their land, and above all the attrition of the native languages it was built to serve — indigenous northerners would later describe as the great wound of the Soviet century. This collection prints the guarantee and the machine in the same book. Article 45 of the Constitution promises "the opportunity to attend a school where teaching is in the native language"; the education law repeats it, giving parents "the right to choose for their children a school with an appropriate language of tuition." And the boarding-school apparatus that Section IV goes on to authorise is precisely the instrument through which, for the northern peoples, that right was hollowed out — the children boarded away from the language, and instruction consolidated in Russian. The right on paper and the practice that emptied it are bound between the same covers.

Then there are the silences, and for a book of children's law two are deafening. The first is the children of the Terror. When the Soviet state shot or imprisoned "enemies of the people" on a mass scale in 1937–38, it had a policy for their children too: NKVD Operational Order No. 00486 of 15 August 1937 provided for the arrest of the wives of "traitors to the motherland" and the disposal of their children, who were placed — their surnames sometimes changed — in a network of orphanages run by the security organs, while adolescents judged old enough were themselves sent to camps. Children were born and died in the camp system. This is not contested history; it is the documented record of the state whose children's law this book compiles, and it lies within the lifetime of the compilers. A collection that reaches back to cite an instruction of the People's Commissariat for Education of 1944 on the property rights of children's-home inmates has no room for the reason so many of those homes were full. The second silence is nearer the book's own date. Article 19's ground of "immoral, anti-social behaviour" was used, in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, to strip parental rights from religious dissenters — Baptists, Pentecostals and others — on the reasoning that raising a child in an unregistered faith was itself a harmful influence; children were removed to state care to be brought up correctly. The punitive use of psychiatry against dissent, and the pressure it placed on their families, belongs to the same account. None of this appears. The collection is not falsifying a record here so much as declining to hold up the mirror: the very powers it codifies in the language of protection were, in the hands of the same state, instruments against the parents it disapproved of.

Behind all of it stands the book's frankest premise, which it states without embarrassment because it does not regard it as a problem: the child is the object of the state's formation of a new kind of human being. The education law lists among the "basic principles of public education" the "unity of instruction and communist education," and the vocational statutes make the goal explicit — "the cultivation in pupils of a Marxist-Leninist world outlook ... Soviet patriotism, a communist attitude to labour." Upbringing here is not the neutral nurture of a person who will choose her own ends; it is the production of a citizen to a specification the state has written. That is a coherent philosophy of childhood, and it is the opposite of the liberal one the book borrows its vocabulary from when it invokes the UN Declaration. The tension is never acknowledged, because acknowledging it would require the book to admit that the rights of the child and the communist upbringing of the child are not always the same thing, and may sometimes be at war. A right held against the state is one kind of thing; a child raised to the state's specification is another;

and this collection uses the first vocabulary to describe the second arrangement.

The answer to this book was written, from within the revolutionary-Marxist tradition, nearly half a century before it — and it answers precisely the doctrine of the serene, guaranteeing state. In *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), in the chapter "Family, Youth and Culture," Trotsky traced what the Soviet state had already done to the emancipatory family law of the revolution's first years. October, he wrote, "honestly fulfilled its obligations in relation to woman," giving her legal equality and attempting, through creches, kindergartens and communal provision, "a real liberation from the thousand-year-old fetters." But "society proved too poor and little cultured"; the plans outran the resources, and by the mid-1930s the state was in retreat — restoring the family not as a hearth but as an instrument of order, "the need of the bureaucracy for a stable hierarchy of relations, and for the disciplining of youth by means of 40,000,000 points of support for authority and power." The right to abortion, "one of her most important civil, political and cultural rights," was withdrawn by the law of 27 June 1936. And on children specifically Trotsky recorded what the optimists would not: that "the resolution on the liquidation of homeless and uncared-for children is being weakly carried out," that the *besprizornye* — the abandoned children of the great social crisis — were "the most unmistakable and most tragic symptom of the difficult situation of the mother." He drew the exact conclusion this 1982 collection is built to forestall: "The mere fact of the furious criminal measures that have been adopted against homeless children is enough to suggest that the socialist legislation in defense of women and children is nothing but crass hypocrisy." He would not rest there — he refused, equally, the reading that the fine laws were mere fraud, insisting on "the broadness and boldness of the social plan." But he named the thing this book cannot: that a magnanimous law and a coercive practice can inhabit the same state, and that the gap between them is not an accident of poverty soon to be filled but a fact about who holds the power. Trotsky wrote in 1936, before the Terror's orphanages and before the internaty; he cannot be cited as a witness to those. What he supplies is the method — the refusal to read a code as a description of a society — and it is the method this collection most needs and most lacks.

Soviet Legislation on Children's Rights should therefore be read for both of the things it is. It is a genuine record of a genuine welfare state for children: compulsory free schooling and free textbooks, a paediatric health service, subsidised child care, maintenance for orphans and large families, real

protections for young workers, and the end of the mass homelessness of the 1920s — achievements a serious reader should not let the book's other failures obscure. And it is a monument to what a state built on the formation of the new man could not say about its own power over the young: that the same statute which promised schooling in the mother tongue authorised the boarding schools that took the mother tongue away; that the same courts empowered to protect a child from "danger" could remove it from parents whose only offence was their faith; that the orphanages whose inmates' property the book so carefully protects had been filled, in part, by the state's own terror. The law on the page is real. So is everything the page leaves out. The distance between them is the subject this book of laws was compiled precisely in order not to have.

INTERNATIONALISM

Socialist Internationalism: Theory and Practice of International Relations of a New Type

Seven socialist states jointly define the law governing their own relations - sovereignty, obligation, integration - and restate the Brezhnev Doctrine on the same page as its formal denial. Romania declined to take part.

S. Anghelov

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

Two sentences, consecutive, in the third chapter of this book:

Marxist-Leninists reject the concept of "limited sovereignty", being firm advocates of full sovereignty for each socialist state as well as the freedom for each to determine its own path of development and adopt its own ways and means in the building of socialism. But at the same time, Marxist-Leninists are united in their conviction that the decisions of one fraternal state should not be detrimental to socialism both within its own borders and within the world socialist system as a whole or to the international communist movement in its struggle for the victory of the new social system.

The first sentence repudiates the doctrine. The second restates it. A state has full sovereignty and freedom to choose its own path, provided its choices are not judged detrimental to socialism inside its own borders — a proviso that returns the entire content of sovereignty to whoever does the judging. The chapter then names the judge, quoting the formula adopted at the Moscow meeting of communist and workers' parties in 1969: "the defence of socialism is an internationalist duty of Communists." That sentence was written into the international movement's documents the year after the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia, and it is what the Western press called the Brezhnev Doctrine. The phrase "Brezhnev Doctrine" does not appear in this book. The doctrine does, twice over, on the same page as its formal denial.

What the book is

Socialist Internationalism: Theory and Practice of International Socialist Relations is not a monograph but a treaty in book form. It carries no single author. An editorial board of eleven names represents seven countries — Bulgaria, Hungary, the

German Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Poland, Czechoslovakia and the USSR — under the general editorship of S. Anghelov of the Bulgarian People's Republic, who also wrote the introduction. Roughly thirty contributors are listed section by section: A. P. Butenko and Yu. S. Novopashin for the Soviet side, F. Prikryl and J. Kulhanek for Czechoslovakia, J. Krüger for the GDR, J. Ladosz and W. Iskra for Poland, A. Széchy for Hungary. It was translated from the Russian by Barry Jones and issued by Progress in Moscow in 1982.

Romania is not on the editorial board. Romania appears in the text — as an agrarian country that built socialism, as an oil exporter, as a projected site for a Soviet-built nuclear station, as a growth index — but the Socialist Republic of Romania supplied no author and no editor to a collective volume on socialist internationalism produced by its own alliance. Romania was the Warsaw Pact member that refused to take part in the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and condemned it. The reader is not told this. The arithmetic is nevertheless present in the book's own key sentence about the invasion, which speaks of "the allied troops of five socialist countries" in a pact of seven.

The date on the spine is 1982; the text closes in 1979. There is no reference anywhere to the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU of February 1981 — the Twenty-Fifth, of 1976, is the governing authority throughout, and 1976 is by a wide margin the year most often cited. The latest datable events are the declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Political Consultative Committee of 23 November 1978 and the Chinese attack on Vietnam in February 1979. The years 1980, 1981 and 1982 do not occur in this book at all, in some 118,000 words. Three years of history separate the manuscript from the English edition, and they are precisely the three years in which the subject of the book was decided.

The intervention

The book handles Czechoslovakia three times, in three registers, and the registers are worth separating.

In the chapter on the national question it is an administrative correction: "Measures to correct this deformation were taken under the complicated circumstances that arose from the political crisis that took place in Czechoslovakia in 1968–1969, when enemies of the new system, opportunists, gambled on the mistakes that had been allowed in the past." The federation of Czech and Slovak republics is described as the outcome, "with the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia acting as a single guiding political force in the country." No troops appear. In the chapter on ideology it is a lesson in insufficient ideological work — "insufficient attention to consolidating the Marxist world outlook among the masses led to distorted assessments of social development and helped cause the socio-political crisis of 1968" — and the authority cited for this reading is Gustáv Husák, the man the occupation installed.

Only in the chapter on political cooperation is the military fact admitted, and there the book quotes rather than speaks:

In 1968 international imperialism supported an attack against the socialist system in Czechoslovakia. The defence of the socialist gains of the working people in that country became the key issue in the multilateral political cooperation of the Warsaw Treaty states. In fulfilment of their internationalist duty these states rendered the Czechoslovak people invaluable aid in destroying the aggressive plans of imperialist reaction and internal counter-revolution. "The action taken by the allied troops of five socialist countries in Czechoslovakia was an act of international solidarity, which accorded with the common interests of the Czechoslovak working people ... This internationalist act saved the lives of thousands of people, ensured the internal and external conditions for peaceful labour, strengthened the western borders of the socialist camp and destroyed the hopes of imperialist circles for revising the results of the Second World War."

The source given in the footnote is The Lessons of the Crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and in Czechoslovak Society After the 3rd Congress of the CPCz, Moscow, 1971. That document was the normalisation regime's official self-condemnation, adopted by a party purged of roughly half a million members after the invasion, in a country under occupation. The invasion is thus justified in the voice of the party the invasion created, and the sentence a reader is asked to accept as testimony from the invaded is testimony

procured by the invader. It is the oldest device in the literature and the book uses it without a blush.

Nothing that happened in Czechoslovakia in 1968 survives in this account. There is no Action Programme, no abolition of censorship, no Dubček, no fourteenth congress of the CPCz which met in a factory in the Prague suburbs on 21–22 August under the guns of the occupying army and condemned the invasion by an overwhelming majority. What survives is a category. Elsewhere the book sets the events in a sequence: "Nationalism, as events in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968 have shown, remains a powerful weapon in the hands of the forces of counter-revolution." Two attempts by workers and communists in socialist countries to alter the way their societies were governed become two illustrations of a single failing, and the classification is complete before any evidence is heard.

The alliance you may not leave

The most exact question to put to a theory of relations between socialist states is whether a socialist state may end them. The book answers by accident, in a single flat sentence about Albania: "Albania has also ceased to participate in the work of the CMEA and withdrew from the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The country no longer maintains diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and pursues what is essentially an anti-Soviet policy." A member left the alliance. The fact is recorded as a symptom of hostility and no question of right arises. Neither Albania's departure nor China's is treated as bearing on the theory; both are treated as evidence about Albania and China.

The contrast within the book is sharper than anything a critic could construct. Discussing the drafting of the 1977 Soviet Constitution, the authors report with evident satisfaction that during the public discussion "a complete rejection was made of all suggestions to introduce into the Constitution the concept of a single Soviet nation, do away with the Union and autonomous republics or limit the sovereignty of the former by depriving them of the right of secession from the USSR." Lenin is quoted at length on "complete freedom to secede" as the precondition of any genuine union. The right of exit is defended as fundamental for the constituent republics of the Soviet Union, where it was a dead letter, and is not so much denied as never conceived for the sovereign states of the Warsaw Treaty, where it was the whole question.

The point had been made, in almost these words, fourteen years before this book appeared in English. The United

Secretariat of the Fourth International issued a statement on 22 August 1968, forty-eight hours after the tanks crossed the border; it was printed in *Intercontinental Press*, vol. 6 no. 28, 2 September 1968, pp. 692–693, under the heading "End the Soviet Occupation of Czechoslovakia!" It reads in part: "The Soviet constitution affirms the right of national minorities to separate even from the USSR, if they so desire, but the Czechoslovak people have been denied the right to choose their own Communist leadership." The same statement disposed of the pretext with which this book still operates: "The truth is that the 'counterrevolutionary danger' cited by the Kremlin did not exist." And it identified the motive as fear of contagion — the fear that the beginnings of workers' democracy in Czechoslovakia "stimulated the struggle of the young vanguard, intellectuals and workers in Poland, Hungary, East Germany and above all the Soviet Union itself."

Poland, and Afghanistan

That prediction is the reason the dating of this book matters so much.

Poland occurs twenty-four times. It is a country of Ukrainian, Byelorussian, Russian and Lithuanian minority schools; a coal exporter ("coal from Poland, oil from Romania and bauxite from Hungary"); a projected site for Soviet-built nuclear capacity; a line in a table of national income growth; one of the states practising multi-candidate elections. The adjective "Polish" occurs five times, always attached to a people or a language. Gdańsk, Solidarność, Wałęsa, martial law and the Polish United Workers' Party do not occur. Neither does the year 1980.

The word "solidarity" occurs one hundred and twenty-seven times. It is one of the book's two or three governing terms — Chapter III section 2 is titled "Comradely Mutual Assistance and Solidarity — the Essence of International Relations of a New Type" — and not once does it refer to the ten million people who by 1981 had joined an organisation of that name in a socialist country. Every strike in the book is a strike in a capitalist country; the strike statistics run to 1978 and stop.

This is the ordinary consequence of a three-year translation lag, and by itself it would prove only that *Progress* was slow. What makes it a finding is the sentence the book does contain, sitting in the chapter on the world socialist system: "Marxist-Leninists have never concealed the fact that they are ready to give a decisive rebuff at any moment to any attempts to export counter-revolution." A reader who bought this volume in 1982, in the year after 13 December 1981, held a

book that could not name what had happened in Poland and had already authorised it. As with the Kronstadt–Hungary–Czechoslovakia sequence in the companion *Progress* volume *Problems of the Communist Movement*, nothing needed to be added. The category was installed and waiting.

Afghanistan appears once. Not as a war; not as a country in which the Soviet army had been fighting since December 1979 and would fight for another seven years. It appears in a comparison of electrification, as one of seven states whose combined population of 210 million produced a third of the electricity of Soviet Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Meanwhile the chapter on peaceful coexistence lists among the aims of the Warsaw Treaty states their efforts "to do away with military bases on foreign territory throughout the world and bring about the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of other states and to the creation of peace zones in various parts of the world." The demand is addressed to imperialism. There were Soviet garrisons in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, the GDR, Mongolia and Afghanistan when it was printed.

Three states that said no

A theory of relations between socialist states has to account for the socialist states that refused those relations. By 1979 there were three: China, Yugoslavia and Albania. The book's handling of each is instructive.

China gets a great deal of space and all of it is polemic. Maoism is "a reactionary nationalist ideology veiled in Marxist terminology"; the Chinese leadership practises "great-Han chauvinism", territorial claims, subversion through overseas Chinese, and "The indignation of all progressive mankind was aroused when Peking unleashed an aggressive war against Vietnam in 1979." The verdict on the war is defensible — the Chinese attack of February 1979 was an act of aggression against a socialist state, and it wrecked whatever remained of the claim that socialist states do not make war on one another. But the book cannot use its own finding. That two socialist states had fought a war, and that a third had shelled a fourth on the Ussuri in 1969, is evidence that the possession of nationalised property does not by itself produce internationalist foreign policy. The authors instead reach for a moral explanation — nationalism was tolerated, chauvinism grew — which leaves the theory untouched and requires no revision of anything.

Yugoslavia is the more revealing case, because it is handled by omission. It appears seven times: as a country that built

socialism from an agrarian base, as a multinational state, as a non-member of the CMEA that has developed cooperation with it. The expulsion of the Yugoslav party from the Cominform in 1948, the economic blockade, the show trials of "Titoists" across Eastern Europe, the entire founding episode of the problem this book exists to solve — none of it is here. Tito's name never appears. The first and greatest test of socialist internationalism as an inter-state doctrine has been removed from the record, and with it the fact that the Soviet leadership was subsequently obliged to admit it had been wrong.

What is real in the book

It would be a poor introduction that left the reader with the impression that everything between these covers is fabrication, because the central subject is genuine and part of the material record is accurate.

The theoretical problem is real, and it is one Marxism had barely begun to address before 1917. Marx and Engels theorised the international unity of workers within capitalism; they did not theorise the relations between post-capitalist states, having expected few enough of them and expected those to arrive nearly at once in the advanced countries. What obligations one workers' state owes another; whether unequal development between them produces exploitation; whether trade between planned economies can be conducted on other than world-market terms; what an alliance of states with the same property forms and different national histories should look like — these are not invented questions, and this book is one of the few sustained attempts to put them in order. Its distinction between the general laws of socialist construction and their necessarily varied national forms is a real distinction, and its insistence that a form "of socialism, though highly suitable for one particular country, may be quite unsuitable for another" is a real concession, however completely it is withdrawn in practice.

The material relationships were also real, and hostile accounts have often understated them. Soviet aid built power stations in Bulgaria, the GDR and Czechoslovakia and was building one in Hungary; "Up to 1976 1,500 enterprises and complexes had been built with Soviet economic and technical aid in the socialist countries"; in Bulgaria those enterprises accounted for the whole of the country's pig iron, copper, zinc, phosphate fertiliser and calcined soda output. The Orenburg gas development and the Druzhba pipeline, "by which the Soviet Union supplies the European socialist countries with millions of tonnes of oil", are named correctly. After 1973 that oil

moved on a five-year moving-average formula that priced it well below the world market, and the transfer to the smaller Comecon economies through the second half of the 1970s was substantial. The levelling-up of national income between the more and less developed members, which the book reports, did occur. This was not a purely extractive empire, whatever it was, and an account which cannot say so will not be believed about anything else.

The book also records, without appearing to notice what it is recording, the retreat from Comintern centralism. It quotes the 1969 Moscow meeting: "As there is no leading centre of the international communist movement, voluntary coordination of the actions of Parties in order effectively to carry out the tasks before them acquires increased importance." That is a real change from 1928 or 1948, and it was forced on Moscow by exactly the events the book will not discuss.

Where the reply is

For Czechoslovakia, the statement of 22 August 1968 cited above, and Joseph Hansen's "A Political Disaster for the Kremlin" printed alongside it in the same issue of Intercontinental Press, which noted the emergency congress of the CPCz meeting in an industrial plant in the Prague area, the delegates entering "with the workers on the midnight and 6 a.m. shifts."

For Poland, the Fourth International's statement "Polish Workers Confront the Bureaucracy" (Intercontinental Press, vol. 18 no. 40, 27 October 1980), adopted 25 September 1980, which itemised what the August strikes had won: "the right to organizations of its own, the right to strike, the partial lifting of censorship, access to the mass media, greater religious freedom, the liberation of political prisoners persecuted for their solidarity with the strikers". Then "Defend the Political Revolution in Poland!" (vol. 19 no. 18, 18 May 1981), issued 3 April 1981 as the manoeuvres began. Then, after 13 December, "Solidarity with the Polish workers" (vol. 20 no. 1, 18 January 1982), issued 17 December 1981, which set out what the coup was for: "suspension and destruction of the independent trade union controlled by the workers themselves; elimination of the right to strike; abolition of the free and uncensored working-class press ... and the proclamation of martial law."

On Afghanistan the honest thing to say is that the reply was divided. The United Secretariat's meeting of 26–29 January 1980 produced three documents, printed together in Intercontinental Press, vol. 18 no. 8, 3 March 1980. The

majority declined to call for withdrawal, arguing that "The withdrawal of the Soviet troops would in no way assure any freedom for the Afghan nationalities to decide their own course." One minority went further towards Moscow. The other minority stated the position that has worn best: "Without a doubt, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is being carried out in gross violation of the right of peoples to self-determination ... it is imperative that the Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan immediately and that the Kremlin recognize the right of self-determination for the people of this country." A tradition that prints its own disagreements in full, in its own press, in the month they occur, is doing something this book was structurally incapable of doing.

That, finally, is what Socialist Internationalism is for a modern reader. It is not a bad book about Poland or Afghanistan; it is a book in which those subjects cannot arise, because the concepts were fixed before the events and no event was permitted to test them. Its authors — three dozen academics in seven countries, several of whom had watched their own parties broken in 1956 or 1968 — were writing under a constraint that shows in every chapter: they could describe the pipelines and the power stations honestly, because those were facts about production, and they could not describe a single relation of political power inside the community they were theorising. The word they use one hundred and twenty-seven times is the word that, two years before this edition reached the English-speaking world, ten million Polish workers had taken for themselves. Nothing in the theory could accommodate that, and so the theory met it, as it had met Prague, with tanks and a footnote.

SOVIET SOCIETY

The Right of the Accused to Defence in the USSR

What a Soviet defence lawyer could actually do, worked through from the procedure codes of all fifteen republics and several hundred Supreme Court rulings - a genuine technical monograph, written to be read by lawyers abroad.

Yuri Stetsovsky

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

This is a technical monograph, and the first thing to say about it is that it is a real one. Yuri Stetsovsky's subject is the narrowest and most testable question in Soviet public law — what a defence lawyer may actually do, and when — and he works it through with the apparatus of a practitioner: articles of the Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure of 1958, the criminal procedure codes of the fifteen republics where they diverge, and several hundred rulings of the USSR and RSFSR Supreme Courts cited by volume and page in the official gazettes. Unlike many Progress titles, it is not a reprint dressed in a later date. It cites the USSR Law on the Bar of 30 November 1979, the RSFSR Regulations on the Bar of 20 November 1980, and a decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 18 May 1981 on compensation for wrongful prosecution. The text is of 1981 or 1982 and argues from the law as it then stood.

The commission is stated in the opening lines, and stated fairly. "Unfortunately, readers' information about Soviet law is often incomplete, and at times even distorted," Stetsovsky writes. "The purpose of this book is to help the reader understand the right of the accused to defence in the USSR." The frame throughout is the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, quoted repeatedly and, on the whole, accurately. This is a book written to be read abroad, by lawyers, as a reply.

It deserves to be read that way — which means holding it to the standard it sets for itself. Stetsovsky sets a high one. "The principle of guaranteeing the accused's right to defence," he writes, "does not depend on the character of the charge, or on the personality of the accused, or on the persuasiveness of the evidence gathered against him." That is the correct principle and it is the sentence on which the book must be judged.

Begin with what holds up, because a good deal does.

The account of ordinary criminal defence is substantially accurate and in places genuinely valuable, since much of it is

not available in English elsewhere. Counsel is mandatory — and his absence is unconditional grounds for quashing a conviction — in the cases of minors, of the deaf, mute and blind, of persons who cannot defend themselves through physical or mental handicap, of those who do not speak the language of the proceedings, and of anyone facing the death penalty. Legal aid is genuinely cheap and in defined circumstances free: the manager of a legal advice bureau, the presidium of a college of barristers, and equally the investigator, procurator or court may release a citizen wholly or partly from paying, and where the state body does so the advocate is paid by the state. On access to the file, the rule as Stetsovsky states it is unambiguous — "All the materials of the case must be presented to the defender without exception" — and he adds that no time limit on counsel's study of the file is permissible, that the investigation period must be extended rather than counsel hurried, and that a barrister instructed on the morning of the trial must be granted an adjournment. He quotes the Supreme Court: "the accused's right to defence cannot be considered secured if his counsel has not been afforded sufficient time to study the case."

Nor is the book a simple advertisement. It records the Plenum of the USSR Supreme Court throwing out a bribery conviction because the testimony of the convicted men "had been obtained as a result of the investigator's improper methods." It notes that Soviet criminal law punishes coercion to give evidence, knowingly unlawful arrest, and the knowing prosecution of an innocent person. It carries, at length, a case from the Kalinin region in which a woman convicted of murdering her husband was finally cleared: her barrister raised the matter with the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Court during his public reception hours, two successive protests were entered, and the Criminal Bench eventually held that she had acted in lawful self-defence when, having been beaten with a metal file, she picked up the fallen file and struck back. That is a real story about a real profession, and readers who imagine Soviet defence advocacy as pure theatre should sit with it. So should they sit with Stetsovsky's insistence that counsel may never abandon a client, may never act to his detriment, and is

bound by professional secrecy that neither investigator nor court may pierce.

One small credit is owed against the companion volume in this series. Vladimir Terebilov's *The Soviet Court* (1973), written by the sitting Minister of Justice, told its readers that "in December 1948, the Soviet Union signed and later ratified the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" — an impossibility, since the Declaration is a General Assembly resolution, and a falsehood twice over, since the USSR abstained on it. Stetsovsky does not repeat the error. He reaches the Declaration correctly, through the Final Act's undertaking to act in accordance with it, and quotes Article 11 as it stands: everyone charged with an offence has the right to be presumed innocent "until proved guilty according to law in a public trial at which he has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence." He is the better lawyer. That is exactly why the omissions cost him more.

Now the omissions.

In some ninety-seven thousand words on the right of the accused to defence in the USSR, the name Stalin does not appear. Neither does Vyshinsky — Andrei Vyshinsky, Procurator-General from 1935, prosecutor of the Moscow trials, and the author of the doctrine of evidence that made them work. The words purge and terror do not occur in any political sense; the single use of "repression" is the phrase "penal repression" in a passage about the burden of proof. The year 1937 does not appear anywhere in the book. Neither does 1938, except inside the title of a legal digest covering 1938–1978. The Moscow trials are not mentioned, in any form, at any point.

This is not the same silence as Terebilov's, and it is worse. Terebilov was writing a general survey of the courts, and the Terror was one episode among the many he passed over. Stetsovsky is writing specifically and only about the defence — and the show trials of 1936, 1937 and 1938 are the defining event in the history of criminal defence in the Soviet Union. In the first two of them the accused had no defence counsel at all. In the third, such counsel as appeared for three of the medical defendants did not contest the prosecution case. A book that asks what the defence may do, and never mentions the proceedings in which the defence was abolished, has excused itself from its own question.

The Left Opposition put the point at the time, and put it as a point about counsel. Writing on 18 December 1936, between the first and second Moscow trials, Trotsky attacked the

Western jurists who had certified the proceedings as fair, and fixed on their argument that men who asked for their own execution could not have been coerced: "They asked for death themselves, then. They 'freely' renounced counsel for the defense. What sinister hypocrisy! What shame!" That sentence, from *The Moscow "Confessions"*, is the exact objection Stetsovsky's book exists to answer and does not answer.

There is a second, sharper coincidence. Stetsovsky's constitutional foundation for the right to defence before 1958 is Article 111 of the 1936 Constitution, and he tells us that where the criminal procedure legislation was silent the courts applied it directly: "Before 1959–1961, for example, many points about the accused's right to defence had not been regulated in detail in the legislation on criminal procedure, and Article 111 of the 1936 Constitution of the USSR was directly applied in the conduct of concrete criminal cases." The Stalin Constitution was adopted in December 1936 — four months after the first Moscow trial and one month before the second. Trotsky had already reviewed it, from the announcements, in April of that year, and observed of the drafting that "the 'most democratic constitution in the world' is being elaborated and introduced in a manner that is not entirely democratic," which was a mild way of noting that no one had been shown the text. Stetsovsky cites Article 111 for the proposition that the constitutional right to defence was operative and enforced. He does not mention the years in which it was not.

Then there is Krylenko. The Terebilov volume's most eloquent passage was a short biography of Nikolai Krylenko, People's Commissar of Justice, that ran through his career and stopped at his eighty books, without recording that he was arrested in January 1938 and shot on 29 July that year. Stetsovsky reaches him too, from a different direction and just as briefly. Discussing whether it is proper for advocates to be paid by their clients, he quotes the Fourth All-Russia Congress of Soviet Justice Workers of January 1922, where "the Chairman of the Supreme Tribunal under the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, N. V. Krylenko," said: "we cannot change people, we cannot force a defendant not to pay his counsel to defend him to the best of his ability. It is being asked why we put the Bar in better financial conditions than judges and procurators, but I would like to see an accused person who would pay me for accusing him. We have to allow for the situation in which we live."

It is a good remark, dry and practical, by a man arguing that the defence should be properly resourced. Stetsovsky cites it approvingly and moves on to the decree of 26 May 1922. Nine

years after Terebilov and by a different author, the same jurist is quoted with respect on the same subject, and the same fact about him is unsayable. Nothing in either book allows a reader to learn that a People's Commissar of Justice was shot.

The book's institutional history has the same shape. It traces the Bar from the decrees of 1918 to the Regulations on the College of Defenders of 1922 and the Fundamentals of the Judicial System of 1924 — and then goes straight to 1958 and 1979. The Statute on the Bar of 1939, which reorganised the profession, is absent, along with the decade it belongs to.

That accounts for the past. The present is handled by a subtler method: not silence but placement.

The Criminal Code articles under which Soviet political defendants were actually tried were Article 70 of the RSFSR Code — anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda — and Article 190-1, dissemination of deliberate fabrications defaming the Soviet state and social system. Neither number appears in this book. The phrase "anti-Soviet agitation" appears exactly twice, both times in the same sentence, and that sentence is not Stetsovsky's. It is in the reprinted text of the Fundamentals of Criminal Procedure at the back of the volume, in Article 28, which allocates investigative jurisdiction: preliminary investigation is carried out by investigators of the Procurator's Office, of the agencies of the interior, "and by investigators of the security services" in cases under the Law on Criminal Liability for State Crimes — high treason, espionage, terrorist acts, sabotage, wrecking, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda," involvement in "an anti-Soviet organisation," and the rest. Stetsovsky's own two hundred and thirty pages of commentary never return to that list. In his prose, the KGB investigates nothing; a footnote in the Introduction says only that a "smaller number still" of cases go to "investigators of the state security agencies."

Article 190-1 is invisible for a reason the book's own framework cannot accommodate. It sat outside the state-crimes chapter, was not KGB-reserved, and was tried in ordinary courts by ordinary judges — which is precisely what made it useful, and precisely what a study organised around procedural categories will fail to see. A jurisdiction can be political without being formally exceptional.

The state-secrets rule is where the two halves meet, and here Stetsovsky is more informative than Terebilov and therefore more damaging to his own case. Terebilov had said only that trials could be closed to protect state secrets and that "exceptions in Soviet law are minimal." Stetsovsky specifies the machinery: "Under the law the court is obliged to refuse an

open session in order to protect information constituting a state secret. The list of such information is established by the USSR Council of Ministers." So the executive defines the category, the security service investigates the offences that fall into it, and the definition is what closes the courtroom. Stetsovsky adds that "it is seldom necessary to hold the whole of a court examination behind closed doors" and that once the sensitive circumstances have been investigated "obstacles to the public's access to the courtroom disappear." Every worked example he gives of a properly closed hearing concerns a sexual offence or a juvenile.

The same doubleness runs through his account of when counsel arrives. Stetsovsky states the general rule honestly, and the appendix states it again in the words of Article 22: "A defender is permitted to take part in a case from the moment the accused is informed of the conclusion of the preliminary investigation and the whole file of the case is presented to him for his information. A defender may be admitted to a case by order of the procurator from the moment the charge is laid." Outside the mandatory categories, then, an accused person has no lawyer for the whole of the investigation — months, in a serious case — unless the procurator chooses to admit one. Stetsovsky is candid that this is discretionary, and he lists the grounds on which the discretion is generously exercised: the complexity of the case, a protracted period in custody, a case returned for further investigation, an accused who is insufficiently literate or of advanced age. The one consideration he does not raise is that the official who decides whether the accused may have a lawyer during the investigation is the official conducting the prosecution, and that in a case the state wishes to control he will decide against.

Only one criminal case in the entire book is named and dated. It is not a Soviet one. Illustrating the accused's right to receive letters in custody, Stetsovsky writes: "During the preliminary investigation of the case of the American pilot Powers for espionage, for example, Powers received letters from his relatives." A footnote adds that the U-2 was shot down on 1 May 1960, and then: "This case was heard in open court on 17–19 August 1960, and the Military Bench of the USSR Supreme Court found Powers guilty of espionage." The single state-security proceeding the book is willing to describe is the one the Soviet state staged for the world's press, with an American defendant, foreign correspondents in the hall, and an outcome fixed in advance. It is offered as evidence of how open such cases are.

Finally, the Bar itself. Stetsovsky argues at length that colleges of barristers are self-managing social organisations, not state

bodies, and much of the argument is sound — members are admitted, not appointed; they sign no employment contract; their pay comes from clients and not the treasury; they receive none of the guaranteed wage, hours or leave that Soviet employees enjoy, and pay for their own holidays and social insurance. But he also records, without comment, the two facts that qualify it. A barrister "may be expelled from a college by the presidium... when he has committed offences incompatible with membership." And where a decision of a college's general meeting or presidium does not comply with legislation, "the USSR Ministry of Justice suspends its operation." A profession whose governing body can expel a member on an open-textured ground, and whose governing body's decisions the Ministry of Justice can stay, is independent within limits the book declines to trace.

The book rests its case on the Helsinki Final Act. The Moscow Helsinki Group, formed in 1976 to monitor Soviet compliance with that Act, had by the time of writing been dismantled — Yuri Orlov, Alexander Ginzburg and Anatoly Shcharansky were all imprisoned by 1978, and named as such in the letter Charter 77 and the Polish committee KOR addressed to their counterparts across Eastern Europe, reprinted in Intercontinental Press on 25 June 1979. The group announced its own dissolution in September 1982, the year this volume appeared. And the most prominent legal event of the years in which Stetsovsky was writing was one his subject cannot reach at all: in January 1980 Andrei Sakharov, a member of the Academy of Sciences, was stripped of his honours and removed to Gorky by administrative act, without charge, trial, court or counsel. Intercontinental Press of 4 February 1980 carried David Russell's report of it, arguing that the exile was "an attack against the interests of all workers and other citizens of the Soviet Union," that the bureaucracy's aim was to warn "every single Soviet citizen that no expression of differences with the government will be tolerated," and — against the Cold War use being made of the case in Washington — that Carter's Olympic boycott was itself "an act of hostility not only against the Soviet government, but also against the Soviet workers." That is the tradition's position, and it is the one this edition is published from: the defence of Soviet legality against the Soviet bureaucracy, not against the October Revolution.

So the finding is not that Soviet criminal defence was a fiction. It plainly was not. Free or nearly free representation was available to ordinary people across a vast country for divorce, housing, theft and manslaughter, and this book is a competent guide to how it worked. Stetsovsky writes as a lawyer on the defence's side, pressing at the edges of his own system —

arguing for wider access to the file, longer preparation, more consistent appointment of counsel. He is not a propagandist, and the book is not a lie.

It is something more particular. A parallel jurisdiction existed: offences the book never numbers, investigated by a service it names once in a footnote, heard behind a closure whose scope was set by the Council of Ministers, before defendants whom no advocate could reach until the prosecution had finished with them. Stetsovsky supplies every component of that description and never assembles it. Read him for the law of the Soviet defence, which he knew as well as anyone alive. Read the gaps for the cases in which that law did not run — and remember his own rule, that the right to defence "does not depend on the character of the charge, or on the personality of the accused." He wrote the standard. He was not free to apply it.

The State and Nations in the USSR

The Soviet answer to the national question at its sixtieth anniversary - Finnish independence, the Ukrainian manifesto, the treaties of 1920-22, and the alphabets designed for languages that had never been written down.

Victor Shevtsov

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

For once the date on the spine is the date of the book.

Victor Shevtsov's *The State and Nations in the USSR* was written for a specific occasion and says so in its first line: "Nineteen eighty-two is the year of the 60th anniversary of the foundation of the USSR, an integral, federal, multinational Soviet state." It opens by quoting the CPSU Central Committee resolution issued for that anniversary, and the internal evidence agrees — the statistical series run to 1979 and 1980, the 1979 census is the freshest data in the book, and nothing later appears. This is an anniversary commission, produced in the last year of Leonid Brezhnev's life, translated by Lenina Ilitskaya and put into English for readers abroad. Its job was to demonstrate that the national question, which every other multinational state in the world was visibly failing to solve, had been solved here sixty years ago.

That commission is worth taking seriously, because the claim was not absurd on its face. The Bolshevik record on the national question in 1917–23 was the most advanced of any state of its era, and this book, in its middle chapters, sets out a good deal of that record accurately. It reports the recognition of Finnish independence, and quotes the Finnish Social-Democrat Reinhold Svento to the effect that "The Bolsheviks, led by Lenin, were the only ones to give unqualified recognition to Finland's state sovereignty." It reports the manifesto of 4 December 1917 addressed to the Ukrainian people, affirming their right to secede from Russia entirely. It is precise about the sequence of treaties between the independent Soviet republics in 1920–22, and precise about the congresses of soviets that ratified the Union in December 1922. Its chapter on cultural development contains a genuinely remarkable story, told with justified pride: that before the revolution "merely twenty of the 130 peoples of what is now the Soviet Union had more or less developed systems of writing," that literacy among people aged nine and over in 1926 stood at 3.7 per cent in Tajikistan and 10.6 per cent in Uzbekistan, and that the state then set about designing alphabets for languages that had none. "It was an effort

unexampled in the history of culture," the book says, and on that narrow point it is close to right. Nothing in the critique that follows requires denying it.

The book is also, on one matter, franker than most Progress titles of its decade. It describes the "autonomisation" crisis of 1922 as a real dispute with real sides. It names the commission that drafted the plan — "Kuibyshev, Myasnikov, Ordzhonikidze and Stalin". It states that the group pressing for the independent republics to enter the RSFSR as autonomous republics "included among others Stalin, Manuilsky, Myasnikov and Kamenev". It says that carrying out that plan "would mean, in practical terms, a substantial limitation of the sovereign rights of independent Soviet republics and create conditions for displaying great-Russian chauvinism". And it concludes, in a sentence no Soviet textbook of 1952 would have printed: "In the specific historical circumstances, however, in which the USSR was formed, great-power chauvinism was the greater evil." Readers who come to this volume expecting the Short Course will not find it. Shevtsov is a jurist writing a constitutional treatise, and within the limits of what could be printed he is trying to be accurate.

The limits are where the interest lies.

The document it cites and does not quote

The book names, correctly, the source that decides the question. It cites Lenin's notes dictated at the end of December 1922 "under the common heading 'The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'". It even quotes from them. What it quotes is this:

"... we must maintain and strengthen the union of socialist republics. Of this there can be no doubt. This measure is necessary for us and it is necessary for the world communist proletariat in its struggle against the world bourgeoisie and its defence against bourgeois intrigues".

That is the first of the three or four things Lenin said in that memorandum, and it is the only one the book reproduces. The

others are these. Lenin wrote that Ordzhonikidze had gone "to the extreme of applying physical violence" against a Georgian communist — he had struck him — and proposed exemplary punishment. He attributed the crisis to "Stalin's haste and his infatuation with pure administration, together with his spite against the notorious 'nationalist-socialism'". He insisted that "It is, of course, necessary to hold Stalin and Dzerzhinsky responsible for all this out-and-out Great-Russian nationalistic campaign," and that "A distinction must necessarily be made between the nationalism of an oppressor nation and that of an oppressed nation." And he wrote the sentence that this entire volume exists to disprove:

"It is quite natural that in such circumstances the 'freedom to secede from the union' by which we justify ourselves will be a mere scrap of paper, unable to defend the non-Russians from the onslaught of that really Russian man, the Great-Russian chauvinist, in substance a rascal and a tyrant, such as the typical Russian bureaucrat is."

The book quotes the memorandum three times and does not go near that passage. It also softens the one concrete proposal Lenin made. Lenin's text says that the next Congress of Soviets might have to "retain the union of Soviet socialist republics only for military and diplomatic affairs, and in all other respects restore full independence to the individual People's Commissariats". Shevtsov renders this as: "As for the other areas of state political activity, Lenin considered that, given certain conditions, the question of transferring the relevant functions to Union republics might be presented for discussion at the next Congress of Soviets." A proposal to strip the centre back to two commissariats has become an item that might come up.

The same operation is performed on the people. The book identifies "The second group (Mdivani, Makhar[a]dze, Rakovsky and others)" as one of the "two fundamentally fallacious deviations on the national question" that the Party had to overcome. Budu Mdivani and Filipp Makharadze were the leaders of the Georgian Bolsheviks whom Ordzhonikidze was suppressing, and they were the people Lenin sided with. Trotsky, whose account of these weeks was written in December 1932 and published as "On the Suppressed Testament of Lenin", records that on 5 March 1923 Lenin "for the first time openly joined forces with the irreconcilable Georgian enemies of Stalin, informing them in a special note that he was backing their cause 'with all my heart' and was preparing for them documents against Stalin, Ordzhonikidze and Dzerzhinsky", and adds: "'With all my heart' — this expression was not a frequent one with Lenin." Mdivani was

shot in 1937. Christian Rakovsky, the third name in the book's parenthesis, was a founder of the Ukrainian Soviet republic and had been its head of government; he was condemned at the third Moscow trial in March 1938 and shot in 1941. It was Rakovsky who supplied, years before either killing, the sentence Trotsky quotes in the same essay as the last word on the subject: "To the national question, as to all other questions, the bureaucracy makes its approach from the point of view of convenience of administration and regulation."

The book cannot say that Lenin lost this fight. It has to say instead that "the plenary meetings of the CC RCP(B) in October and December 1922 fully confirmed Lenin's principles" — that the crisis was a drafting disagreement, resolved correctly, in 1922, sixty years ago, and closed.

What Article 72 is worth

The right of secession is affirmed here more often than in any other volume in this series. It appears a dozen times. It is called "a major legal expression of the voluntary character of republics' membership of the federal union", and it is attached to its constitutional address: "the right freely to secede from the USSR (Article 72 of the USSR Constitution)".

Nowhere in seventy-two thousand words is there a description of how a republic would do it. No procedure, no initiating body, no threshold, no referendum, no arbitrating court. This is not an oversight of the book's; there was nothing to describe. The USSR passed no law setting out a procedure for secession under Article 72 until April 1990, sixty-eight years into the federation's life and eighteen months before it dissolved.

What makes the omission legible rather than merely absent is that the book raises the objection itself. Chapter VI reports, in order to dismiss it, that "bourgeois writers often see the proof of the absence of legal guarantees of Soviet federation also in the fact that the Constitution does not establish any procedure whereby a republic could protect its rights in case of conflict with the federal government, as the Soviet judicial system does not include any constitutional court to which a republic could go for protection from excessive encroachments of the centre." The answer given is not a procedure. It is a definition: "As a complex politico-legal attribute of the state, implying the supremacy of state authority, sovereignty may not be divided, transferred or circumscribed. Therefore, the sovereignty of Union republics, too, is full and indivisible." The objection was that there is no remedy. The reply is that there can be no injury.

And then, two paragraphs later, the book concedes the substance while denying the form. The 1977 Constitution, it says, "should be characterised by a redistribution of terms of reference between the USSR and Union republics, which tends to strengthen centralism in the administration of the whole country and extend the competence of federal bodies in certain fields." Read that against Lenin's scrap of paper and the sixty years between them are accounted for.

The gap in the enumeration

This series has learned to read Soviet lists. The 1968 Progress volume Soviet Socialist Democracy enumerated twenty Autonomous Republics and, without a word of explanation, silently reinstated three — Kalmyk, Kabardinian-Balkar, Checheno-Ingush — that had been abolished in 1943–44 when the peoples who named them were deported wholesale to Central Asia and Siberia, and silently omitted two, the Crimean and the Volga German, that were never restored. A book on Soviet democracy might plead that the nationalities were not its subject. This one has no such defence. It is a book about nations.

The test returns the same result, and worse.

The words deportation and resettlement do not occur in this text in that sense. The year 1944 does not occur at all. There is no Volga German Autonomous Republic anywhere in the book — the phrase does not appear — and no Crimean Autonomous Republic. "Crimea" occurs four times: twice in the context of 1918–19, and once in a list of the alphabets in use before the revolution, where we are told that "The Karaites, Crimean, Caucasian, Central Asian and East European Jews used the Hebrew alphabet." The Crimean Tatars, deported in May 1944, are not in this book. Neither are the Meskhetian Turks.

The peoples who were deported and later restored appear, but only in the past tense of the 1920s. Chapter III lists "the Chuvash, Kalmyk, Mari, Votyak, Karachai-Circassian, Kabardin-Balkar and some other autonomous regions" among the formations of 1920–23, and then explains that "In the course of Soviet national-state development many autonomous regions (the Buryat, Kabardin-Balkar, Karelian, Kalmyk, Kirghiz, Komi, Mari, Mordovian, Tuva, Udmurt, and others) were reorganised into autonomous republics." One smooth developmental curve, region to republic, with nothing in between. The Kalmyk and Kabardino-Balkar autonomies were abolished by decree in 1943 and 1944 and restored in 1957; the Karachai autonomy likewise. The verb the book supplies

for those years is "reorganised".

The single most telling passage is not a list at all. Chapter VIII, arguing that the spread of Russian is voluntary and that Western talk of Russification is a falsification, offers a piece of survey evidence: "The significance of Russian as international language is evidenced also by the figures obtained on the Chechen-Ingush ASSR." A table follows, showing what proportion of that republic's population preferred to read, listen and write in Russian. The Chechens and Ingush were deported en masse in February 1944 and spent thirteen years in Kazakhstan and Central Asia before the republic was restored in 1957. Whatever those percentages measure, they measure that too. The book chose, out of every republic in the Union, the one where the linguistic evidence is most contaminated by a history it will not name, and presented it as proof of free choice.

There is also a quieter gap. "Such is, briefly, the history of the formation of all the fifteen Soviet socialist republics and their joining together in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," Chapter V concludes. There were sixteen. The Karelo-Finnish SSR was a Union republic from 1940 until 1956, when it was demoted to an autonomous republic within the Russian Federation — a Union republic unmade by a decision of the centre, which is a difficult fact for a chapter arguing that Union republics are sovereign states. Karelia appears in this book only among the autonomous regions that became autonomous republics. Sixteen went down to fifteen and the arithmetic is not mentioned.

Two more silences, and one confession

The Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian republics entered the Union in 1940. The book's account is pure legal formalism: the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, "after hearing the declarations of the authorised commissions of the diets of Lithuania and Latvia and the authorised commission of the State Assembly of Estonia, enacted the laws on admitting" them. Moldavia is handled the same way — Bessarabia was "reunified", the Supreme Soviet was "guided by the principle of free development of peoples". There is no Nazi–Soviet Pact in this book, no Secret Additional Protocol, no Soviet ultimatums of June 1940, no Red Army. Ernest Mandel, in *The Meaning of the Second World War* (Verso, 1986), states the matter in a single clause when describing Stalin's wartime diplomacy: what Moscow sought from Churchill was recognition of "what had been obtained through the Hitler-Stalin pact: the Baltic States, the Western Ukraine and Western Byelorussia as well

as Bessarabia and the Northern Bukovina" (ch. 17, "The Aftermath", pp. 169ff). Mandel's own text elsewhere misdates the signature of the Secret Additional Protocol by four days; it was signed on the night of 23 August 1939.

The word famine does not appear in this volume. Neither does collectivisation. A book that devotes a chapter to the economic co-operation of nations and another to their social development, and that returns repeatedly to the Ukraine as the second republic of the Union, contains no reference to 1932–33. Historians continue to disagree about the death toll in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and about intent — the range in the serious literature is wide and the argument is live — but no serious account puts the losses below the millions, and no account of Soviet national relations that omits them is an account. Mandel, in the same book, names the combination directly: in "the Baltic republics and the Ukraine... national oppression had been combined with the large-scale terror and famine of the collectivization period" (ch. 3, "The Social Forces", pp. 35–46).

And then, in the middle of the chapter on culture, the book confesses. Discussing the switch of the Soviet Turkic and Caucasian languages from the Arabic script to Latin in the 1920s and from Latin to Cyrillic at the end of the 1930s, it offers this explanation of the second change: "In these circumstances, intellectuals in many ethnic republics considered it desirable to go over to the Russian script. As a result, in 1937–1940, the peoples of Central Asia, the Volga area, the North Caucasus, and Azerbaijan adopted the Russian alphabet." The years 1937 to 1940 are the years of the Yezhovshchina and its aftermath, when the national intelligentsias of exactly those republics were being arrested and shot, and the alphabet decrees were issued republic by republic from the centre. The book then supplies, without appearing to notice, the real reason: "Besides, this essentially uniform alphabet proved more convenient for the centralised methodological direction of linguistic development in an integral multinational state like the Soviet Union." Centralised methodological direction of linguistic development. That is the sentence, and the book wrote it about itself.

What to keep

A reader told that this volume is worthless would be misled. Chapters IV and V are a usable, document-based narrative of how the Soviet republics were constituted and how the treaty of December 1922 was assembled, with dates, congresses and texts that can be checked. Chapter VII's fiscal data — the proportions of republican budgets funded by deductions from

all-Union taxes and revenues, running from 41.9 per cent in the RSFSR to 100 per cent in two republics in 1976 — is real evidence about real transfers, and the industrialisation of Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Soviet North was not a fiction. The description of the Soviet of Nationalities, with thirty-two deputies from each Union republic regardless of size, eleven from each autonomous republic, five from each autonomous region and one from each autonomous area, is an accurate account of an institutional design that other federations might learn from, whatever that chamber actually did. And Chapter I's polemic against reducing nationhood to blood, soul and consanguinity is a serious argument, made against named Western authors who are quoted at length and answered. That the argument is being used as cover does not make it a bad argument.

The point is not that the doctrine set out here is false. It is that the doctrine is true and the book is describing a country in which it had ceased to operate. Self-determination up to and including secession was real Bolshevik policy; the korenizatsiya of the 1920s did create written languages and national institutions where none had existed; Lenin's last political fight was over precisely this and he fought it against the man who would rule for thirty years. What the book cannot say is that he lost, that the federation became a formality administered from Moscow, and that his warning about the scrap of paper was vindicated in the most literal way available — by the physical removal of entire nations from their territories in the 1940s, by autonomies abolished and restored at the centre's convenience, and by a right of secession that had no procedure attached to it for sixty-eight years.

The anti-Stalinist left said all of this while it was happening. Writing in *Fourth International* in 1952, thirty years before this book and five years before the Chechens and Ingush were allowed home, George Clarke set the whole sequence down in three sentences: "Stalin's record on the national question leaves no doubt on this score. Lenin on his deathbed broke off all personal relations with Stalin for his brutal treatment of the Georgian people. Subsequently there have been constant purges in the Ukraine; Volga Germans, peoples of the Baltic and the Caucasus have been bodily uprooted from their homes and lands." (*Fourth International*, vol. XIII, no. 6, November–December 1952.)

Read Shevtsov for what he is: a competent constitutional lawyer setting out, in the sixtieth year and with real learning, the most complete official statement in English of how the Soviet Union described its own federation — nine years before the republics used a right the book said they had, by means the

book could not describe, and dissolved it.

PHILOSOPHY

Dialectical Materialism and the History of Philosophy

What it means to write the history of philosophy rather than catalogue opinions - persistence and replacement of problems, the handling of doctrines judged false - by an Academician working in the one field where real scholarship was still allowed.

Theodore Oizerman

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

This is a book about how to write the history of philosophy.

That sounds like a narrow subject and in Moscow in the 1970s it was not narrow at all, because the history of philosophy was one of the few places in Soviet intellectual life where genuine scholarship was still possible. The reason was simple and slightly shameful: the material was dead and foreign. Kant had no faction. Fichte could not be rehabilitated or unrehabilitated. A Soviet philosopher who wanted to think in public about method, evidence, development and the relation of a doctrine to its age could do it on German idealism, and could not do it on anything nearer home. This volume is the record of a serious mind working inside that permission. It is worth asking what the permission was worth, and what it cost.

A word on the name first, since the catalogue is inconsistent. "Theodore Oizerman" on this spine and "T. I. Oizerman" on The Main Trends in Philosophy are the same man: Teodor Ilyich Oizerman (1914–2017), a front-line veteran of the war, a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences and eventually a full Academician. Two of his other books are in this series, and this one is best read alongside them: The Making of the Marxist Philosophy (Progress, 1981) and The Main Trends in Philosophy (Progress, 1988). He himself names two more of his monographs in his opening pages, Problems of the History of Philosophy (Moscow 1969, English 1973) and Major Trends in Philosophy (Moscow 1971), and says the present book is meant to supplement them.

The date

The spine says 1982 and the text is older. There is no copyright line for the Russian original in the file, so the dating has to be done from the inside, and the inside is unusually decisive.

The book's one and only political citation is to Leonid Brezhnev, and the bibliography sources it to Documents and

Resolutions. XXVth Congress of the CPSU, published in 1976. The Twenty-Sixth Congress met in February 1981. A Soviet philosophy book going to press in 1981 or 1982 quotes the newest Congress; that is what the citation is for. This one does not know about it. The most recent item anywhere in the bibliography is from 1977. The latest date mentioned in the text is a German translation of his own earlier book published in 1979, which the author records as already out. Put those three facts together and the Russian text was finished around 1979 and certainly before February 1981. What you are holding is a book of the late Brezhnev years — the stagnation at its deepest, four years before Gorbachev — dressed in a 1982 jacket.

That matters for what follows, because the excuses available to a 1988 book are not available here. Nothing was loosening. Nothing was about to.

Unlike its two companions in this series, this volume is not a reprint of an older book wearing a new date. There is no earlier-edition statement and no printing history in the front matter, and Oizerman presents it as a fresh collection written to supplement his 1969 and 1971 monographs. The lag here is a translation lag of about three years, not the nineteen-year lag of The Making of the Marxist Philosophy.

Two corrections to the companion volumes, offered in the open because the series ought to hold itself to the standard it applies to Progress. First: the introduction to The Main Trends in Philosophy dates that text "firmly to the second half of the 1980s" and concludes that it "cannot predate 1986" — right as far as it goes, since the 1988 book does cite the 1986 Party Programme and a 1986 Progress volume of the Collected Works. But it has no ancestor in that account, and it has one. In the opening pages of the book you are now holding, Oizerman lists his own monographs and names Major Trends in Philosophy (Moscow, 1971); the Russian title on the 1988 copyright page is the same. The 1988 English is a revised edition of a book first published in Russian in 1971. That does not overturn the earlier judgement; it sharpens it. When that

piece observed that the 1988 volume "took no liberty a 1978 book could not have taken", the reason was that its core was a book of 1971.

Second, and more substantially: that introduction reads the absence of any Soviet philosophical history from the 1988 book as a choice made in 1988, "when the archives were opening", and calls omission "the more conspicuous choice of the two" at that date. The evidence from the other two volumes will not support the timing. The same omission runs through the 1962 first edition of *The Making of the Marxist Philosophy*, through its mid-1970s revision, and through this book of 1979. It is not a glasnost-era decision; it is a habit of forty years. That makes the silence a larger finding and a smaller accusation — less a calculation about what 1988 would tolerate, more the settled reflex of a man who had never in his working life written a sentence about where he was standing.

What is genuinely good, and it is a lot

The first section, "Problems of Method in the History of Philosophy", contains the best thing in the book: a long, close and technically competent engagement with a school of French and Italian metaphilosophy that most English-speaking readers have never heard of. Martial Gueroult is Oizerman's principal opponent, cited thirty-four times, and Oizerman identifies the school accurately — "Gueroult's supporters and followers include Henri Gouhier, Paul Ricoeur, F. Brunner, Franco Lombard! and V. Goldschmidt," the last two names damaged in scanning, Franco Lombardi and Victor Goldschmidt. He has read them in French. He quotes Fernand Brunner's demand that "the object of a historical study must remain an object, and that quality is guaranteed by the impartiality of the historian," and Brunner quoting the nineteenth-century historian Edmond Scherer: "To understand a philosophy we must be alien to it and able, as it were, to regard it from the outside." He reports their charges against Hegel fairly before answering them — Gueroult's line that Hegel's history of philosophy "abolishes the fact it claims to substantiate", Brunner's that it is a "despotic solution of the issue of philosophical diversity", Goldschmidt's that it is imperialist. He then makes the observation that gives him his opening: the phrase "philosophy of the history of philosophy" was Hegel's own, and the school that has adopted it never says so, because their doctrine is the reverse of his.

That is real scholarship, done from primary sources, on a debate that was live in Paris and not in Moscow. It is also,

quietly, an act of nerve. The whole argument depends on treating a set of contemporary bourgeois professors as people with a position worth reconstructing at length.

The chapters on the idealists are better still, and they are not what a reader coming to a Soviet philosophy book expects. Oizerman does not convict Hegel. He rescues him, at length and with obvious pleasure. He quotes Herzen — "Hegelian philosophy," the Russian revolutionary said, "is the algebra of revolution, it emancipates man, exceptionally and completely destroys the Christian world, the world of myths that have outlived themselves" — and then argues the case himself. He notices what Hegel found interesting: "Above all he is interested in the living, in what has come and will pass; it is ever emerging, and Hegel describes this state as unrest." He quotes Hegel on contradiction as the condition of life — "Something is therefore vital only if it contains a contradiction, and it is precisely the power which is capable of containing and withstanding it" — and on truth: "Truth," says Hegel, "is a noble word and a still nobler cause." He credits Hegel with destroying the metaphysical concept of immutable truth, and against those "of our contemporaries who believe that no social transformations are capable of overcoming the inevitable disharmony of human existence" he sets Hegel's flat line: "Should an idea be too good to exist, it is the fault of the ideal itself."

The Kant is careful and the Fichte is better than careful — a 175-mention treatment of a philosopher who was, and largely remains, underserved in English. The essay "Philosophy and Everyday Consciousness" is the most original piece in the collection and the least doctrinal: an argument that the standard philosophical contempt for ordinary belief misses the "necessary organic connection" between the two, illustrated with proverbs, with what people take for granted about interest on savings, and with Marx's demonstration that vulgar political economy is everyday bourgeois consciousness raised to the dignity of theory.

The engagement with living Western philosophy is by name and from the texts: Jean Hyppolite's *Essays on Marx and Hegel* quoted directly, Karl Löwith, Erwin Metzke, Jacques D'Hondt cited approvingly, Lev Shestov quoted at length on Kant and treated as worth answering. Even the concession to the enemy is there, borrowed from P. N. Fedoseyev and endorsed: "some bourgeois philosophers work fruitfully in the field of formal logic, developing semiotics (including semantics and pragmatics). It would be unfair to disregard their achievements in that field; one should carefully examine all that is valuable here."

Anyone told that Soviet philosophy was uniformly worthless will learn nothing from that description, and it is not true. This book is evidence against it.

Partisanship, and the sentence at the centre of it

Now the other side. The methodological argument of the book turns on *partiinost'* — party-mindedness, rendered throughout as "partisanship" — and Oizerman states it more baldly here than in the 1988 volume.

The argument as such is defensible and parts of it are true. Brunner and Scherer want the historian to stand outside all philosophies; Oizerman replies that there is no outside, that the claim to occupy one is itself a philosophical position, and that a historian of philosophy is inevitably a philosopher. "Partisanship in science — and in philosophy — is not a personal but a social position and must naturally be free from any subjective preferences." From which: "The much-vaunted nonpartisanship is, not surprisingly, revealed as pseudo-nonpartisanship — in other words, disguised bourgeois partisanship." As a sociology of knowledge that is arguable and has been argued, in that form, by people with no state behind them at all.

But look what the argument is resting on. A page earlier, at the hinge of the case, Oizerman produces his authority: "According to Leonid Brezhnev, 'There is no room for neutralism or compromise in the struggle between the two ideologies.'"

That is the whole problem in one line, and it is worse than the 1988 book's closing quotation from the Party Programme, which at least came after the argument was over. Here the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is a step in an epistemological proof about how to write the history of philosophy. The methodological objection to Gueroult is settled by a man who had never read Gueroult. Oizerman does not notice; the sentence is set down in the same register as the quotations from Engels and Lenin, as though it were the same kind of thing.

The names that are missing, and the names that are all right

The house sweep for this series turns up, in 99,288 words: Deborin — nil. Zhdanov — nil. Alexandrov — nil. Yudin — nil. Stalin — nil. Lysenko, Bukharin, Trotsky, Plekhanov — nil, nil, nil, nil. "Menshevizing idealism" — nil. Pod

znamenem marksizma — nil. The years 1931 and 1947 — nil and nil. The Soviet Union is named twice in the entire volume: once in a single clause noting that "The victory of socialism radically changed everyday consciousness," and once in the publisher's address on the last page.

The 1947 absence is the one that counts, because of what 1947 was. In June of that year Andrei Zhdanov intervened personally in a philosophical conference in Moscow, and the occasion of the intervention was a book on the history of philosophy: G. F. Alexandrov's history of Western European philosophy. Alexandrov ran the Central Committee's agitation and propaganda apparatus — he was one of the people who had conducted the purge of the intelligentsia — and the charge against him was that he had been too respectful of the West. Ernest Mandel, writing as Ernest Germain, reported it in *Fourth International* in December 1949: Alexandrov was "severely taken to task for having shown a servile adulation toward Western European thought" in his book on the history of philosophy. The year before, Raya Dunayevskaya had noted in the same journal that "no Soviet philosopher missed the significance of Zhdanov's appearance at their conference in June 1947."

That is the founding event of the discipline this book belongs to. It is the reason a Soviet historian of Western philosophy in 1979 knew exactly how much respect he could pay Kant, and knew that the limit was not a scholarly question. And the offence for which Alexandrov was destroyed is, in substance, the thing this book does on almost every page: read Western idealists closely, quote them at length, credit them with insight. Oizerman had travelled a long way from 1947 and the distance is to his credit. He will not say who cleared the road, or what it cost, or that there was a road.

Then there is the shape of the silence, which is more revealing than its extent. The book cites thirteen living or recently living Soviet philosophers, and every single one of them is right. Fedoseyev "is perfectly justified"; Konstantinov "rightly observes"; Kedrov "stresses quite rightly"; L. F. Ilyichev "aptly remarks"; M. A. Kissel "is right to say"; V. F. Asmus "is right", twice, and "aptly remarks" once more; V. I. Shinkaruk "observes"; Ilyenkov "is right to say"; Bogomolov "has substantially and scientifically analyzed" his subject. There is not one Soviet philosopher in this book with whom Oizerman records a disagreement.

The people in that list did not have interchangeable histories. E. V. Ilyenkov was the most creative Soviet philosopher of his generation and spent his career under institutional pressure; he

died by his own hand in 1979, about when this manuscript was being finished. B. M. Kedrov was removed from the editorship of *Voprosy filosofii* in 1949 in the campaign against "cosmopolitanism". And M. B. Mitin — quoted here on Hegel, at length, respectfully, as "the Soviet philosopher M. B. Mitin" — was one of the young men who in 1930–31 denounced Debordin's school as "Menshevizing idealism", helped to break the philosophical establishment on the Party's behalf and inherited what was left of it. In this book Mitin and Ilyenkov are the same kind of object: an authority, correctly cited, in agreement.

Read across the three Oizerman volumes in this series, that pairing turns into a sequence. In *The Making of the Marxist Philosophy*, whose Russian first edition is of 1962 and whose revision dates from the mid-1970s, Mitin is cited approvingly and Debordin does not appear at all. Here in 1979 the position is identical: Mitin present as an authority, Debordin absent — nil occurrences in 99,288 words. Only in *The Main Trends in Philosophy*, translated in 1988, does Debordin finally appear, and then as an ordinary source on Leibniz, a footnote away from Mitin, with nothing between them. Across twenty-six years and three books, the accuser is continuously citable and the accused becomes citable last and silently. That is not one author's oversight. It is the shape of a rehabilitation conducted without an admission.

The same volume shows the harder case. *The Making of the Marxist Philosophy* cites David Ryazanov seven times as a scholarly authority — the founder of the Marx-Engels Institute, the man who first put the 1844 Manuscripts into print — and twice disagrees with him courteously, without a word about his removal in 1931 or his execution in 1938. The present book does not cite Ryazanov at all, so it commits the smaller version of the offence: it does not use him. A discipline that can quote a shot man on Leibniz and not say he was shot has made a settlement with itself, and the settlement is the discipline.

And when Oizerman does disagree with a Marxist, the disagreement goes into the passive voice with the name removed. Twice, exactly twice. "Some authors, even Marxists, are often mistaken in their interpretation of Hegel's critique of formal logic." And, more remarkably: "it would be an obvious departure from the principle of historicism (and from its concomitant, the principle of the partisanship of philosophy) to assert — as it is sometimes done — that the history of philosophy is the history of dialectical and historical materialism."

That second sentence is the most interesting thing Oizerman writes. The formula he is rejecting — that the history of philosophy just is the history of dialectical and historical materialism — is not a stray error by an anonymous colleague. It is the doctrine the discipline was reorganised around after 1947, the standard against which Alexandrov's book was condemned for finding too much in Kant and Hegel. George Novack described it from outside in 1973 as the reduction of the subject to "a straight and narrow road of materialist development" running from the Milesians "to the mastermind in the Kremlin". Oizerman is repudiating that settlement, in print, in a book whose whole purpose is to argue that the idealists are worth reading. He simply will not say whose formula it is. He attributes it to nobody, dates it to no year, and moves on in the next clause. The argument is made and the history that produced it is deleted.

That is the price of the licence, and it is exact. He was allowed to be a scholar about Hegel on condition that he was not a historian about Moscow. He kept the bargain, and the bargain hollowed out the book's own thesis — because a man arguing that philosophy is always the philosophy of a social position, and that nobody stands outside, has written close to three hundred pages that never once locate the author's own position, or the position of anyone he cites, in the Soviet Union.

The reply

Nobody in the anti-Stalinist tradition ever reviewed Oizerman; a search of the English *Biulleten' Oppozitsii*, the ETOL run of Fourth International 1940–1956, the collected English Trotsky, all 763 Intercontinental Press issue PDFs from 1968 to 1986 and the International Viewpoint archive returns his name nowhere. But the argument of this book was answered, in print, by name and in detail, three years before he finished writing it.

On 29 March 1976 Intercontinental Press published "Freedom for Philosophy: On the Right to Think Without Reprisals or Constraint", by George Novack, running five pages. It is the reply, and it is close enough to be uncanny.

Novack begins by conceding Oizerman's premise. Not grudgingly — flatly, as a Marxist commonplace: "there is no shade of philosophy without class bias and political implications and effects." He grants the next step too: "It is perfectly in order for a Marxist party or a government guided by such a party to propagate the doctrines and method of dialectical materialism openly and consistently along with its

program and proposals," and adds that it is obliged to. Everything Oizerman argues against Brunner and Gueroult, Novack has already agreed to. Then he draws the line Oizerman never draws: "But that is entirely different from adopting a state philosophy and then compelling everyone from the scholars and teachers in the universities to schoolchildren to pay obeisance to that viewpoint. That is as bad as enforcing a state religion."

What follows is a description of the consequences, and it reads as a diagnosis of the book you are holding. "A philosophic standpoint or system that is imposed by official compulsion upon the minds of a people takes on the traits of a religion: blind faith, hypocrisy, discrepancy between theory and practice, dogmatism, and the withering of critical thought." And then the sentence that explains the citation apparatus, the thirteen unanimous colleagues and the two nameless dissenters: "When it encounters no strong and serious open challenges to its positions and formulas, official thought grows dull, slothful, and unsure of itself." Against it he sets the standard: "A living and effective philosophy must earn and win conviction by the force of its arguments rather than by arguments of force."

Novack was not speculating from a distance. The 1976 article surveys the actual state of the field: Kolakowski stripped of his Warsaw chair, Adam Schaff expelled from the Polish Central Committee in 1968, Karel Kosík removed from the philosophy faculty at Charles University after 1969 and writing to Sartre that he felt "buried alive", the eight Praxis professors dismissed by the Serbian legislature in 1975. He is careful about the USSR specifically, and his verdict is neither triumphal nor dismissive: "In the past fifteen years, some of this burden has been lightened, though far from being lifted," and yet "Soviet philosophers are far from enjoying freedom of expression even within the framework of the Marxist world outlook." That last clause is exactly the condition of this book — free within the framework, and the framework is the problem.

The direct hit on 1947 is in an earlier Novack piece, "Facts Are Stubborn Things", in *Intercontinental Press* of 23 July 1973. There he writes that Stalin's "Red Professors" screened out of the history of philosophy the contributions that did not conform to official criteria, and then: "In 1947, at Stalin's behest, his watchdog on the cultural front, Zhdanov, indicted the History of West European Philosophy by the unlucky G.F. Alexandrov, who saw something good in the works of Kant, Hegel and Fourier." Seeing something good in the works of Kant and Hegel is, more or less exactly, what Oizerman spends

99,288 words doing. That is why the missing year matters. The reader is entitled to know that the thing being done in front of him had once been a punishable offence, and this book will not say so. (Ernest Mandel had reported the same episode from Europe in 1949, in *Fourth International*: Alexandrov taken to task for "servile adulation toward Western European thought".)

Behind both articles stands Novack's own history of philosophy. In 1942, while the Socialist Workers Party was being prosecuted under the Smith Act, he gave nine lectures, published in revised form as *An Introduction to the Logic of Marxism* (5th ed., Pathfinder, 1971), running from Aristotle through Hegel to Marx — the same arc as this book and many of the same protagonists. On the philosophy proper the comparison does not embarrass Oizerman; he is much the better-read man, and Novack is a lecturer working largely from Engels. But the two defend Hegel against the same charge. Novack is answering Burnham, who called Hegel "the century-dead arch-muddler of human thought", and Dewey, who told Novack to his face that in logic Hegel was a "dead dog"; Oizerman is answering Hyppolite, Löwith and Metzke. Lecture VII states Oizerman's own conclusion three decades early: "Those critics who identify Marxism with Hegelianism not only lack dialectics; they even violate the rules of formal logic."

The difference is that Novack's history has room in it for what happens to philosophers. His first lecture opens on the professors who "invoked the traditional authority of Aristotle and finally the power of the Index and the Inquisition against Galileo to force him to recant his views" — "These servants of official authority sought to silence the arguments, ban the books, terrorise and even kill their scientific opponents." His third holds that "formal logic goes hand in hand with religion and dogmatism". These are not ornaments; they are load-bearing, and they are why 1947 can be named without changing register. Oizerman's method has no such place, and so nothing goes there.

Novack in Lecture IV writes that "Academics have tried to tame Hegel, to emasculate and mutilate his thought, to transform him into a harmless icon, as they do with all dead revolutionists, including Marx." He meant American professors. Oizerman was, by title, an Academician, and he did not tame Hegel; the Hegel chapters here are alive. What he tamed was the history he was standing in.

How to read it

As a book about German idealism, this is honest work by a

real scholar, and the Hegel and Fichte chapters will repay a reader who has no interest whatever in the Soviet Union. As a book about method it is self-refuting in an instructive way, and the instruction is available to anyone who reads the *partiinost'* argument and the Brezhnev citation on consecutive pages. As a document, it is a precise measurement of how much intellectual freedom the late Brezhnev years extended to a first-rate mind, and of exactly where the wall stood.

Oizerman quotes Kant, approvingly, on what an age owes itself: "Our age is truly an age of critique to which everything must bow. Religion, because of its holiness, and law, because of its greatness, want to be outside the realm of that critique. But in that case they understandably rouse suspicion and can no longer count on the genuine respect with which reason treats only something that can withstand its free and open trial."

He printed that in Moscow in 1979 and applied it to the Church and to Prussian law. There was another institution that wanted to be outside the realm of the critique, and it is the one that published him.

Trade Among Capitalist Countries

Trade war among the capitalist powers in the 1970s - the GATT rounds, non-tariff barriers, the multinationals, the return of protection - by a Soviet economist who measures everything except his own half of the world market.

Pavel Ignatevich Khvoynik

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

There is a boundary drawn early in this book, in a single quiet sentence of the preface, and once you have seen it you cannot read the rest of the volume without it. P. Khvoynik has set out to anatomise trade among the capitalist states — the rivalry of the United States, Western Europe and Japan, the tariff bargaining of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the rise of the transnational corporation, the collision of free-trade rhetoric and protectionist practice, the whole disordered commerce of the Western world in the wreckage of the oil shocks. It is a careful, statistically literate, professionally cautious survey, and on a great deal of it he is right. But he tells the reader at the outset what he will not look at: "a study of East-West trade, which is one of the major dynamic elements of world economic relations, lies outside the scope of this book." The economist who will measure every current running through the capitalist half of the world market stops precisely at the shoreline where his own half begins. That decision is not a footnote. It is the argument.

What the book is, and when it was written. The spine reads 1982, and Progress issued the English translation, from the Russian, that year; the volume is credited to P. Khvoynik and to no institution, and I will not invent one for him. But the text is not a stale reprint dressed in a fresh jacket, the recurring trap of this series. It reads its own date. Its evidence runs hard into the early 1980s — the Tokyo Round of GATT, the recessions of the mid- and late 1970s, "a new economic decline in the early 1980s" — and it quotes the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party, which met in February 1981, as a live event. Its own summary of the moment is that world capitalism "is experiencing its third economic recession in a decade." This is a manuscript completed in 1981, an early-1980s book about an early-1980s crisis, and it should be read as a document of that exact moment: the post-oil-shock decade, when the long postwar boom had visibly ended, inflation and unemployment had arrived together, the Bretton Woods monetary order had collapsed, and Western

governments were reaching, one after another, for the tariff.

Who wrote it, and for whom? The book announces its own audience with unusual frankness. "This study is not a textbook," Khvoynik writes; it is addressed to "relatively well-informed readers" abroad, some of whom "may not share his view of the world," and it makes a deliberate effort, he says, to rely on "definitions that are frequently employed in Western economic literature." This is not a cadre manual for a party school and not a primer for the curious; it is written to be argued with by economists who read the same GATT and United Nations statistics he does. He goes further, and it is worth recording, disclaiming the very charge these volumes usually earn: the author "does not propose to renounce his right to defend his own ideological conceptions," but this "does not imply a refusal to engage in scientifically grounded polemics," and he "will greatly welcome opinions of opponents and colleagues from Western countries that are based on analytical arguments." A Soviet economist inviting his adversaries to check his figures is not the posture of a propagandist, and for long stretches the book earns the claim. Its cited Soviet sources — M. M. Maksimova on Soviet–Western economic cooperation, and the other trade specialists listed in its preface — place it in the milieu of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO), the same establishment that produced the sibling volumes in this catalogue on the world capitalist economy. What it was for, in the détente years, was respectability: a demonstration that Soviet political economy could meet Western trade economics on its own statistical ground and hold its own. On the technical ground, it very largely does.

It matters to hold that moment in view, because the book is an intervention in it. The decade Khvoynik was writing at the close of had broken the certainties of Western economics from the outside in. The first oil shock of 1973–74 had quadrupled the price of crude and tipped the capitalist world into its deepest recession since the 1930s; the second, after the Iranian revolution of 1979, had done it again; the fixed exchange rates

of the Bretton Woods system, which had underwritten the postwar boom, had collapsed between 1971 and 1973; and by 1981–82 the American Federal Reserve's war on inflation had driven interest rates and unemployment to postwar records across the West. To a Soviet economist this looked like vindication delivered on schedule — the "general crisis" arriving on cue — and much of the book's confidence is the confidence of a man who believes the facts have finally come over to his side. That the same years were quietly draining the confidence out of his own economy is the possibility the book is built not to raise.

The doctrine it exists to serve should be stated exactly, because Khvoynik states it exactly. Two Leninist theses organise the book. The first is the "general crisis of capitalism" — not this or that recession, but a single terminal decline. "It was noted at the 26th CPSU Congress," Khvoynik writes, "that recent years were marked by a further aggravation of the general crisis of capitalism." The second, and the one that does the real work in a book about trade, is the thesis of inter-imperialist rivalry: that the unity of the capitalist powers is always temporary and their competition always reasserts itself, so that no combination of capitalist states can ever settle into a stable, planned whole. Khvoynik draws the thesis straight from its source. Against those who imagined that the giant corporation and the trading bloc might smooth the antagonisms away, he cites the Congress: "the interimperialist contradictions are growing more acute, the scramble for markets and for sources of raw materials and energy is more frantic. Japanese and Western European monopolies compete ever more successfully with US capital, and in the US domestic market too." And he reaches back to Lenin's quarrel with Karl Kautsky — Kautsky had speculated that capitalism might evolve toward a single peaceful cartel of the powers, an "ultra-imperialism" — to insist that "monopoly under capitalism can never completely, and for a very long period of time, eliminate competition in the world market." Capitalist integration is a fraud that must break down; rivalry is the law. That is the doctrine the book is built to prove.

Now the credit, and it is due at length, because a reader told the whole book is worthless learns nothing from it. Where Khvoynik describes the actual structure of capitalist trade in his decade, he is often precise and almost always worth reading. His central map is the one Western trade economists were themselves drawing: the "triangle" of the United States, the European Common Market and Japan, "whose rivalries define the major centres of contradictions in world capitalist trade." He tracks the relative decline of American commercial primacy with real figures — West Germany overtaking the

United States as an exporter in the early 1970s, Japan passing France in 1968 and Britain in 1971 to become the capitalist world's second economic power. He watches the European Economic Community (EEC) thicken into a bloc: the share of trade EEC members did with each other rising from 34.5 per cent of their exports in 1960 to 50.1 per cent in 1970 and 52.6 per cent in 1973. His account of the transnational corporation is structural, not decorative — he estimates that international monopolies already controlled close to three-fifths of capitalist world trade and that nearly a third of international commodity exchange had become intra-firm transfers "essentially of a non-market character," a genuinely important observation about how much "trade" had ceased to be trade in any market sense. He is good, too, on the financial machinery inside the corporation, citing with only mild dissent the banker's maxim that "in a global context, the free movement of funds is the bloodstream of the corporations," and documenting how firms shifted profits across borders to dodge devaluations. And his chapters on trade policy are the strongest in the book. He follows the Kennedy Round tariff cuts and the stalling of the Tokyo Round; he documents the "trade wars" of the period, down to the "Chicken War" between the United States and the Common Market; he is sharp on GATT as an instrument the rich built for themselves, quoting the Western press's own name for it, a "rich men's club." He is careful, against his own polemical interest, not to overstate the case — noting that it "would be an oversimplification" to conclude from the trade wars that liberalisation "has collapsed," and warning that the low tariff averages of the 1970s hide "extremely harsh duties" on particular goods, so that, in the words of a GATT official he quotes, "an overall summary of the situation camouflages the high tariffs which remain." Crucially, he reads his opponents in the original — Galbraith on the corporation, the Dutch economist Jan Tinbergen on the Common Market's discriminatory tariffs, and the Western financial press turning on the EEC as "a tight little protectionist club, instead of the free-trade champion it once claimed to be." This is what honest work under constraint looks like on the economics of the West, and the sourcing is generally good enough to follow up. Mine it for exactly that.

And yet the book keeps documenting, against itself, the opposite of what its doctrine requires — and this is the first of its two reflexive faults. The inter-imperialist-rivalry thesis predicts fragmentation: capitalist unity must dissolve back into conflict. But the phenomenon Khvoynik spends most of his pages measuring is integration — the deepening, thickening, institutionalising of exactly the capitalist unity the doctrine says cannot last. Postwar trade grew, on his own figures, some twenty-two-fold. The EEC did not fly apart; it enlarged, and its

internal trade rose toward and past half of its members' commerce. Tariff liberalisation, he is honest enough to write, "already appears to be irreversible in the long run, for it has developed as far as has the process of internationalization of economic life on which it rests." The postwar capitalist world was not fragmenting under the weight of its contradictions; it was knitting itself together into the interdependent trading system we now take for granted. Khvoinik sees this clearly — he has the data in front of him — and he resolves the tension the only way the doctrine allows: by asserting that the integration is real but "does not overcome" the underlying antagonism, that liberalisation "generally intensifies rather than alleviates interimperialist differences." The trouble is that this move cannot be wrong. Whatever the powers do — quarrel, and it confirms the rivalry thesis; cooperate, and the cooperation is declared a mere truce that "does not overcome" the rivalry underneath. A law that is confirmed equally by conflict and by its absence has stopped being a finding about the world and become a fixed point of belief. The same closure runs through the general-crisis schema. Even the Party document Khvoinik quotes feels the strain: the Twenty-Fifth Congress conceded that "it is farthest from the Communists' minds to predict an 'automatic collapse' of capitalism. It still has considerable reserves. Yet the developments of recent years forcefully confirm that capitalism is a society without a future." A system with "considerable reserves" that has been in its "general crisis" since 1917, transforming the productive forces of half the planet as it dies, is a system whose obituary needs at least re-dating. The crisis is asserted as a law of history and then illustrated by whatever happens.

The second reflexive fault is the boundary we began with, and it is the deeper one. Return to the excluded subject: East-West trade, "one of the major dynamic elements of world economic relations," ruled outside the scope of the book. The stated reason is that it deserves separate study, and in a narrow sense that is fair. But look at what the exclusion accomplishes. The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance — the CMEA, or Comecon, the trading community of the Soviet bloc — is the one large economic grouping in the world whose trade performance this book about world trade never has to measure. Every instrument Khvoinik has sharpened — the analysis of trade shares, of stagnation and dynamism, of a bloc's internal cohesion, of the drift toward protectionist autarky (self-sufficiency, an economy walled off from the world market) — is available to be turned eastward, and none of it is. This is not Khvoinik's personal evasion; it is the house rule of the whole series, and its sibling volumes let us watch it operate. V. V. Rymalov's *The World Capitalist Economy* (Progress, 1982), written in the same institute in the same year,

diagnoses Western stagflation exactly while presenting CMEA as "the most dynamically developing economic community in the world" — published, as its own introduction notes, in the terminal stagnation of the Brezhnev years. G. Chernikov's *The Crisis of Capitalism and the Condition of the Working People* (Progress, 1980) reserves the entire vocabulary of crisis, shortage and stagnation for the West. Irina Osadchaya's *Keynesianism Today* (Progress, 1983) anatomises the collapse of Western economic policy while insisting that genuine planning "cannot be practised in the capitalist countries." Same house, same instruments, the same silence drawn in the same place. The general crisis is a law that only ever points one way across the map.

And here the answer is not merely old but eerily exact, because a founder of the Soviet state had already named this precise prohibition — the refusal to measure the socialist economy against the world market — as the characteristic lie of the bureaucracy. In *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), Trotsky argued that the real strength of the Soviet economy could be established only in one way: by comparing it, on the world market, with the capitalism it claimed to be overtaking. "The strength of the Soviet structure," he wrote, "is measured in the last analysis by the productivity of labor. And that, under a market economy, expresses itself in production costs and prices. The difference between domestic prices and prices in the world market is one of the chief means of measuring this correlation of forces." And then the sentence that could serve as an epigraph to Khvoinik's excluded chapter: "The Soviet statisticians, however, are forbidden even to approach that question." Elsewhere in the same book Trotsky put the material fact behind the prohibition with brutal economy — "For the world market the ruble does not exist." That is the buried reason East-West trade "lies outside the scope of this book." It is the one comparison the doctrine cannot survive, the point where the socialist economy would have to submit to the same measure Khvoinik applies so ably to everyone else, and it is fenced off in a single preface sentence half a century after Trotsky predicted it would have to be. Khvoinik's exclusion is not a scholar's modest division of labour; it is the old prohibition, still holding.

The reply from Khvoinik's own decade rested on the same foundation. The Fourth International's economist, Ernest Mandel, was writing full-length Marxist analyses of exactly Khvoinik's subject in exactly these years — *Late Capitalism* (1972; English, 1975) and *The Second Slump* (1978) — and reaching many of the same conclusions Khvoinik reaches about the West: that the postwar boom was over, that the crisis was structural rather than a passing dip in the cycle, that the

recessions of the 1970s were moments of a longer downturn. But Mandel's framework did what Khvoinik's could not: it treated the world market as a single unit and the socialist economies as proper objects of economic analysis, subject to their own contradictions of scarcity and bureaucratic mismanagement, rather than as the serene daylight against which the capitalist night is measured. That is the whole distance between the two Marxisms. Khvoinik and Mandel studied one world economy, in the same years, with overlapping tools — and only one of them was permitted to point his tools in every direction. Trotsky's larger insight in *The Revolution Betrayed* was that the world division of labour is primary: no national economy, planned or not, stands outside the world market, and the pretence that the socialist bloc constituted a self-sufficient world apart was a fiction that the ruble's non-existence on that market exposed. Khvoinik's book, which measures the capitalist half of that single world with such care and refuses even to glance at the seam where the two halves meet, is the fiction made into a table of contents.

So the verdict divides, and the division is the reason to reprint the book. As a survey of trade among the capitalist powers in the early 1980s — the American–European–Japanese triangle, the mechanics of GATT and the tariff rounds, the discriminatory tariff of the Common Market, the rise of intra-firm trade inside the transnational corporations, the tug of war between liberalisation and the returning protectionism of the slump — this is a competent, well-documented, frequently shrewd book, and its author reads the Western economists he criticises rather than relaying them at second hand. Read it for that and it repays the reading. But read it as a document of its moment and it records something its author did not intend: a Soviet economist given a first-rate instrument for measuring the trade of nations, and permitted to measure every nation on the map but his own. The rivalry he insists must fragment the capitalist world was, on his own figures, integrating it; and the one trading bloc he was forbidden to weigh on the world market was the one standing behind his chair. Trotsky named the prohibition in 1936. Khvoinik was still observing it in 1982, in a single sentence of a preface, and the decade that followed — the CMEA's unravelling, the ruble's collision with the world market it had been told did not want it — turned that sentence into the truest thing the book contains.

The World Capitalist Economy: Structural changes

The end of the postwar boom analysed from Moscow - the oil shocks, stagflation, the multinationals, the collapse of the old division of labour - in an edition revised forward to 1982 rather than reprinted stale.

Viktor Vladimirovich Rymalov

Introduction to the 1982 Edition

This is a serious book, and it should be said at the outset, because most of what follows will complicate the compliment. V. V. Rymalov set out to describe the structural transformation of the capitalist world economy across the postwar decades — the exhaustion of the long boom, the recessions of 1974–75 and 1979–82, chronic inflation, the oil shocks, the breakdown of the old international division of labour, the rise of the transnational corporation, the widening gulf between the industrial centres and the primary-commodity producers. On a good deal of this he is right, and he is right where the mainstream economics of his day was wrong. A reader who comes to *The World Capitalist Economy* expecting a crude tract predicting capitalism's imminent collapse will be surprised by how much careful, quantitative, professionally cautious work is actually here. The trouble with the book is not that its author cannot see a crisis. It is which economy he is permitted to see one in.

What the book is, and when it was written. The spine says 1982 and the imprint code ('016(01)-82') confirms Progress issued the English translation, by H. Campbell Creighton, that year. But the text has a slightly longer history, and Rymalov tells us so himself: "The Russian original appeared in 1978. In the present English edition the author has tried to continue analysis of the problems and trends studied, employing the latest data available to him." This is the opposite of the usual Progress lag, in which a glasnost jacket covers a Brezhnev-era manuscript. Here the English edition was revised forward: it carries the 1981 UNCTAD report, the Twenty-Sixth Congress of the CPSU (February 1981), OPEC receipts for "the early 80s," and forecasts running to 1990. The book reads its real date. It is an early-1980s text, and — this will matter — it was completed at the exact moment the Soviet economy was entering the stagnation that would define the last Brezhnev years. Rymalov was a Soviet specialist on the world economy and on decolonisation; the book leans on the collective work of the Academy of Sciences' Institute of World Economics and International Relations (IMEMO) and cites his own Russian

monographs on the break-up of the colonial system. Beyond that the volume gives him no title, and I will not invent one.

Credit where it is due — and it is due at length. The strongest chapters are the empirical ones, and their strength is that they are built on the statistical apparatus of the international organisations rather than on assertion. Rymalov's sources are the UN's Multinational Corporations in World Development (1973), successive UNCTAD reports, ILO labour-force projections, the Economic Report of the President. When he argues that the postwar terms of trade moved secularly against the primary-commodity producers — "the secular trend in prices of primary commodities relative to prices of manufactured goods was downward from the latter part of the nineteenth century" — he is on the terrain later associated with Prebisch and Singer, and he documents it. His account of the transnational corporation, of intra-firm trade, of the "increasing internationalisation of production," is recognisably the same phenomenon Western scholarship was then beginning to name, and he treats it as structural rather than incidental.

Most striking, he diagnoses the stagflation of the 1970s precisely — without the word. Rymalov never writes "stagflation" (the term does not occur), but he states the mechanism exactly: "The measures that bourgeois governments take against inflation foster stagnation of production and growth of unemployment; what they do to contain the critical drop in production lends still greater momentum to inflation." That is the policy trap of the decade in one sentence, and it was a sentence most Keynesian economists could not yet bring themselves to write. He quotes the bourgeois economists against themselves to make the point — Galbraith on the causes of the 1974–75 crisis, Herman Kahn conceding at the end of 1974 that "we could be on the threshold" of an epochal transition. And he is honest enough to refuse the catastrophist conclusion his own frame invites. Reviewing the growth figures, he warns that "it would be wrong ... to conclude ... that we must expect protracted stagnation or complete obstruction of [capitalism's] productive forces," and projects that even on pessimistic assumptions capitalist output would stand some 80 per cent above its 1970

level by 1990. A Progress author declining to predict the breakdown of capitalism is worth noticing. On the economics of the West, this is honest work done under constraint, and a reader learns from it.

The vocabulary is the first tell. Notice, though, how Rymalov diagnoses the crisis. His categories are the Soviet ones: "the general crisis of capitalism" (seventeen times), "state-monopoly capitalism" (sixteen), the anarchy of production, overproduction, the cyclic alternation of boom and stagnation. What is missing is the analytic vocabulary that Western Marxists were developing for the very same events. There is no "falling rate of profit" turned on the actual data — the rate of profit appears once, and only inside a quotation from Engels on the law of its tendency to fall, never applied to the postwar numbers. There is no "long wave" and no mention of Kondratieff — an absence that is itself a fact, since long-wave theory was heterodox in the USSR and its author, N. D. Kondratiev, had been shot in 1938. There is no "Bretton Woods," no "Eurodollar," no "stagflation." The financial and monetary machinery of the crisis — the collapse of the dollar-gold standard in 1971, the recycling of petrodollars, the debt build-up — is genuinely thin here, mentioned only glancingly as "international financial" problems. Rymalov sees the crisis clearly; he sees it through a categorial apparatus that could describe its results but was ill-equipped to anatomise its mechanisms.

The citation test, which usually convicts these books of relaying their opponents at second hand, half-inverts here. Rymalov does read some Western economists in the original: Galbraith is quoted from an interview, Kahn from a 1974 statement, and the apologists of "post-industrial society" — Bell, Brzezinski, Galbraith's "new industrial society" — are named and engaged, if only to be dismissed. To that extent he does not merely relay. But look at where the apparatus thins, because the silence is the finding. The book covers, in detail, exactly the ground that the dependency and world-systems school was then ploughing — unequal terms of trade, the structural subordination of the raw-material producers, the international division of labour as a mechanism of exploitation. And André Gunder Frank, Samir Amin, Arghiri Emmanuel and the very concept of "unequal exchange" are absent — not mangled by the scanner, but genuinely nowhere in 108,000 words. The word "dependency" occurs sixty times, and every one of them is the ordinary Soviet usage — the dependence of the developing countries on imperialism — never the theory of that name. A Soviet economist writing on the North–South divide in 1978–82 who never once engages the Marxist theorists of that divide is telling you something

about the boundaries of permitted conversation.

The sharpest instance is the one the book most needed and most conspicuously lacks. Ernest Mandel — the Fourth International's economist — does not appear. *Late Capitalism* (1972; English, Verso, 1975) and *The Second Slump* (1978) were the full-length Marxist analyses of precisely Rymalov's subject: the exhaustion of the postwar expansion and the return of generalised recession. Mandel's name occurs zero times; *Late Capitalism* zero times. This is not a criticism of Rymalov's manners. It is a measure of the wall between the two Marxisms. The Fourth International's economist and the IMEMO economist were studying the same world economy, in the same years, and reaching overlapping conclusions about its structural crisis — and the Soviet author was institutionally unable to acknowledge that the analysis existed.

The convergence is worth stating plainly, because it is the real point. In *Intercontinental Press* of 7 July 1975 — the same weeks Rymalov was watching the 1974–75 slump — Mandel described "the generalized recession of the international capitalist economy, which started at the beginning of autumn 1974." Seven years later, in the issue of 28 June 1982, contemporaneous with Rymalov's English edition, Mandel's "The second postwar world recession" set out the whole structure: "The long-term economic depression in which the world capitalist economy has sunk since 1967–68 is expressed primarily by a long-term decline in the average profit rate ... The business cycle continues throughout the long wave of depression, just as it did during the long wave of expansion. We have gone through periods of economic recovery (1971–72, 1976–78) after phases of recession, as in 1970, or 1974–75 and 1980–82." Set that beside Rymalov and the agreement is real: both hold that the postwar boom is over, that the crisis is structural and not conjunctural, that the recessions are moments of a longer downturn. The Marxist diagnosis of the 1970s was better than the monetarist one, and Rymalov shares in that vindication. What separates the two men is not the conclusion but the instruments — Mandel reaches it through the falling rate of profit and the long wave, the two tools Rymalov's orthodoxy had placed off limits — and, decisively, the reflexive question that Mandel's framework could ask and Rymalov's could not.

Which brings us to the finding the whole book is arranged to prevent. Every category Rymalov deploys — crisis, stagnation, overaccumulation, the anarchy of production, unemployment, shortage, uneven development — is an instrument for diagnosing capitalism. Not one of them is ever turned on the economy Rymalov was writing from.

"Stagnation" appears six times, all of it capitalism's. "Shortage" appears seven times — labour shortages in the industrial West, food shortages in the former colonial world — and never once the shortage economy that every Soviet citizen queued in. The socialist economy enters the book only as its serene opposite: planned, crisis-free, and racing ahead. "The countries belonging to CMEA are the most dynamically developing economic community in the world," he writes; "in 1968–79 alone the volume of the gross social product in the European members of CMEA increased more than fourfold, while that of all the developed capitalist countries increased by only 140 per cent."

Read the date on that sentence. It was published as the Soviet growth rate was collapsing toward zero, in the terminal stagnation of the Brezhnev years; Brezhnev himself died in November 1982, the year of this edition. And here is the book's most revealing moment — not a silence, but an admission instantly overridden. Quoting the Twenty-Sixth Congress report, Rymalov concedes: "The past few years have not been among the most favourable for the national economies of some socialist states. Still, in the past ten years the economic growth rates of the CMEA countries have been twice those of the developed capitalist countries. The CMEA members continued to be the most dynamically developing group of countries in the world." (I have corrected the scan's obvious slips here silently.) The mechanism is exact and it is worth naming, because it is the discriminating test for this whole series: error is admissible; the category is not. A Soviet economy may have a bad few years — that can be said. What can never be said is that the categories of crisis, stagnation and overaccumulation might apply to it. The admission is allowed; the diagnosis is forbidden. The analyst who could describe the stagflation trap in a single flawless sentence was structurally incapable of pointing the same instrument at the queues, the shortages and the falling growth rate outside his own window.

The answer this book needed was already in print, and from the tradition it could not name. The classical statement is Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), whose chapters on the Soviet Thermidor and the growth of inequality supply exactly the reflexive analysis — the bureaucracy as a privileged stratum, the planned economy as a contradictory and crisis-prone formation rather than a serene one — that Rymalov's frame forbids. Nearer to his own moment, the same Intercontinental Press that carried Mandel's recession analyses was, through the 1970s and early 1980s, applying the categories of crisis to the "actually existing socialist" economies as readily as to the capitalist ones — the argument Rymalov's book is constructed to make unthinkable. And the

deepest of the disagreements between the Marxisms was being fought out in these very years in the pages of *Quatrième Internationale*, where Mandel and Alec Nove argued over whether a planned economy could dispense with the market at all — a debate that presupposes, as its first premise, that the socialist economy is a proper object of economic analysis and not merely its triumphant subject. That premise is the one thing *The World Capitalist Economy* cannot grant.

None of this cancels the value of the book. Rymalov's account of the transnationals, the terms of trade and the structural crisis of the postwar order is real economics, and on the West he was frequently more accurate than the establishment he criticised. But the book is finally a document of a particular unfreedom. It shows an intelligent economist given a first-rate instrument and permitted to point it in one direction only. The instrument was sound. What the 1982 reader was not allowed to notice — and what the reader of 1991 could not miss — was that the economy seizing up fastest was the one standing behind the author's chair.

MARXISM

What Is To Be Done?

The 1902 pamphlet that a later state turned into scripture - written to win an argument among exiles about theory, police conditions and what a socialist newspaper is for.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Introduction to This Edition

No pamphlet of the twentieth century has been made to carry a heavier load of later meaning than this one. What Is To Be Done? was written at the end of 1901 and the beginning of 1902 by a thirty-one-year-old exile who signed himself N. Lenin, and it was meant to settle a quarrel inside a small, illegal, and quarrelsome movement. Half a century on, the Soviet state that traced its lineage to that movement had turned the pamphlet into scripture: the founding charter, as the official phrase would have it, of "the party of a new type." The distance between the occasion and the use is the whole story of this book, and it is worth keeping in view from the first page.

The occasion first. By 1901 Russian Social-Democracy was a scatter of local study circles (*kruzhki*), each producing its own leaflets, most of them absorbed in the day-to-day economic grievances of the factory. Lenin, writing from abroad for the new paper *Iskra* (The Spark), set out to break the hold of what he called Economism — the tendency to confine the workers' movement to wage demands and trade-union bargaining and to let socialist politics look after itself. Against it he argued three things that still read with force. First, that theory is not a luxury: "Without revolutionary theory there can be no revolutionary movement," and a movement that despises theory hands its members over to whatever ideas are already in the air, which in a class society are the ruling class's ideas. Second, that politics cannot be improvised from the shop floor alone but must reach into "the sphere of relationships of all classes and strata to the state." Third, that in the conditions of the tsarist police state an amateur, decentralised movement would simply be arrested piecemeal, and that survival required a core of trained, full-time organisers — "professional revolutionaries" — bound together by a single all-Russia paper, which he compared to "the scaffolding erected round a building under construction."

Read whole, and in its own setting, the pamphlet is far stranger and more attractive than its reputation. It is not a cold manual of conspiracy. Its most famous title is itself an homage —

Lenin borrowed it from Chernyshevsky's 1863 novel, the book that had formed a generation of Russian radicals, his own dead brother among them. At the centre of the argument sits an unexpected defence of imagination, quoted from the critic Pisarev: "We should dream!" Lenin wrote, and added that "of this kind of dreaming there is unfortunately too little in our movement." The closing image is not of a machine but of comrades "marching in a compact group along a precipitous and difficult path, firmly holding each other by the hand." This is a document of a besieged and hopeful minority, not of a state. Its polemical heat — the mockery of "freedom of criticism" as, in practice, "freedom to convert Social-Democracy into a democratic party of reform" — is the heat of an argument its author expected to lose as often as win.

That is precisely what the Soviet apparatus that produced the present edition could not afford to let the reader feel. This translation, by Joe Fineberg and George Hanna, comes from Volume 5 of Lenin's Collected Works, issued by the Foreign Languages Publishing House in Moscow in 1961 — the house that two years later would be renamed Progress Publishers. It is a careful, readable text, set from the 1902 edition and checked against the one Lenin revised in 1907. But the framing around it does quiet and consequential work. The editorial notes ("— Ed.") that thread the volume are, for the most part, cross-references and identifications; where they touch the pamphlet's status they tend to seal it. The most telling move is an omission. The volume reproduces the minor footnotes Lenin added in 1907, and an editorial note even records that he then abridged the text "with slight abridgements." What it does not reproduce is the 1907 preface itself — the place where Lenin, looking back, warned that "the basic mistake made by those who now criticise What Is To Be Done? is to treat the pamphlet apart from its connection with the concrete historical situation of a definite, and now long past, period." The one passage in which the author most sharply dated his own book, and told his readers not to make a timeless doctrine of it, is precisely the passage the timeless-doctrine edition leaves out.

The apparatus needed the omission because the single most

quoted sentence in the book is also its most vulnerable. "There could not have been Social-Democratic consciousness among the workers," Lenin wrote; "it would have to be brought to them from without." Class political consciousness, he insisted, "can be brought to the workers only from without." Two things about this formula deserve to be said plainly, and the edition helps with neither. The first is that it was not Lenin's invention. The long passage he quotes in support is from Karl Kautsky, the acknowledged authority of German and international Social-Democracy, who had written that socialist consciousness is "something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without" — von Aussen Hineingetragen — and not something that grows within it on its own. What later readers took for a uniquely Leninist heresy was, in 1902, orthodox Second-International Marxism; Lenin was leaning on the movement's central teacher, not defying him. The second thing is that the formula is genuinely dangerous, and the danger is not imaginary. If consciousness must be carried to the class from outside it, by an intelligentsia that possesses the science the workers cannot generate, then the door stands open to a politics in which the party knows the class's interests better than the class does — and may, in the end, act in its name against it.

This is where an honest account has to hold two truths at once. Lenin's insistence that the labour movement does not become socialist automatically, that it can be captured by liberalism or narrowed to trade-union horizons, was and remains correct; the twentieth century is a long confirmation of it. But the "from without" formula, pressed as a general theory rather than a polemical exaggeration of the moment, points toward substitution — the party for the class. It was Lenin's own comrades who saw this first and said so at once. In 1904 the young Trotsky, then his opponent, warned in *Our Political Tasks* that the logic could run downhill: the party organisation substitutes itself for the working class, then the leadership for the organisation, and finally a single man for the leadership. Rosa Luxemburg pressed the same objection from Germany. Lenin, to his credit, did not treat the pamphlet as a graven tablet; by 1907 he was telling readers it had "bent the stick" too far in one direction and should not be read as a statement of principle. The tragedy is that the state built in his name reached for the stick exactly where he had bent it, and broke it off.

For the later use is where this text earned its introduction. Stripped of its date and its opponents — all of them, as the pamphlet's own dogged polemics against Rabocheye Dyelo (Workers' Cause) and the rest now testify, long dead — *What Is To Be Done?* was refashioned into the founding proof of a

doctrine Lenin never held: that the party is the sole legitimate bearer of the class's consciousness, that its discipline is beyond question, and that dissent within it is by nature a leak of "bourgeois ideas." The line "Give us an organisation of revolutionaries, and we will overturn Russia" — which Lenin offered as a deliberate variation on Archimedes' boast about a lever and a place to stand — was read back as sober constitutional principle. Democratic centralism, a rule for keeping an underground both united and alive, hardened into the bureaucratic centralism of a ruling machine, and then into the 1921 ban on factions, and then into a single party that forbade to its own members the "freedom of criticism" whose abuse by others Lenin had mocked. The Short Course of 1939 read 1902 backward through Stalin's needs, and the Collected Works that carried this pamphlet were an instrument of that reading. A book written to keep revolutionary theory and open argument alive against the current, inside a persecuted minority, became the license for a state that abolished both.

None of that is Lenin's confession, and the reader should resist the mirror-image Cold-War habit of treating the pamphlet as the seed from which the labour camps grew by simple logic. It was neither. It was a brilliant, overstated, situational intervention by a serious revolutionary who said, four years later, that it should not be read as anything else. The service this edition can still perform — against its own framing — is to let the pamphlet be read as it was written: dated, embattled, and arguing. Restore the 1907 preface in your mind as you read, remember that the "from without" was Kautsky's before it was Lenin's, and the book becomes what it always was — not the charter of a monolith, but the record of an argument about how a movement keeps its head in bad conditions. That argument is still worth having, which is more than can be said for the use to which the argument was put.

MARXISM

One Step Forward, Two Steps Back

The 1903 split reconstructed minute by minute by the man who lost the vote on the party rules - written in defeat, and later read as the founding charter of democratic centralism.

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin

Introduction to the 1964 Edition

No book in the Marxist canon has been more relied upon, and less read, than this one. One Step Forward, Two Steps Back is remembered as the founding charter of the disciplined Marxist party — the text that supposedly licenses a single line, a single centre, and unquestioning obedience to it. What it actually is is something narrower and stranger: a furious, forensic, chapter-by-chapter reconstruction of the minutes of one small émigré congress, written by a man who had just lost control of his own newspaper. The gap between the two is the whole story.

Lenin wrote the pamphlet between February and May 1904, and it appeared in book form in Geneva that spring. Its occasion was the Second Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, held in Brussels and London the previous summer, at which the party that was meant to be unified split instead — into a "majority" (bolshinstvo, hence Bolsheviks) and a "minority" (menshinstvo, Mensheviks). The break came, as Lenin is at pains to insist, not over programme or over tactics but over organisation: first over the wording of Paragraph 1 of the Party Rules — whether a member need merely support the party (Martov's formula) or must belong to one of its organisations (Lenin's) — and then over the composition of the editorial board of Iskra and of the Central Committee. On the Rules Lenin lost; on the boards he won, only to see the Mensheviks recapture Iskra soon after. He wrote this book, in other words, as the aggrieved and outvoted party, hammering at "the new Iskra" that was now in his opponents' hands. This edition prints it as Volume 7 of the Moscow Collected Works (Progress Publishers, 1964, translated by Abraham Fineberg and Naomi Jochel), with the additions Lenin made when he republished it in 1907.

What the book gets right is real and lasting. It is the first sustained attempt in Marxist literature to think about organisation as a theoretical problem rather than a housekeeping one — to ask what kind of structure a revolutionary workers' party needs in a state that has outlawed

it. Lenin's answer is that in the fight against the autocracy the proletariat cannot afford the loose, sentimental, "circle" arrangements of the movement's childhood; it needs a party built deliberately "from the top downwards, starting from the Party Congress and the bodies set up by it," accountable and welded together. The polemic culminates in one of the great sentences of the tradition: "In its struggle for power the proletariat has no other weapon but organisation." Disunited by competition and ground down by capital, the workers can become "an invincible force only through" the material unity of organisation — and there is nothing bureaucratic in the thought. It is a claim about power: the exploited have numbers and nothing else, and numbers count only when organised. The book's other enduring image is its portrait of the revolutionary as against the temporiser — "A Jacobin who wholly identifies himself with the organisation of the proletariat—a proletariat conscious of its class interests—is a revolutionary Social-Democrat," while the Girondist "who sighs after professors and high-school students, who is afraid of the dictatorship of the proletariat" is an opportunist.

Where the book falls short is in the same place its later admirers found it most usable. Lenin is so intent on winning the argument that he lets a genuine problem — how a defeated minority stands in relation to the whole — collapse into a war of two wings, the "revolutionary" and the "opportunist," with himself on the side of the angels. He embraces, defiantly, the very epithet his opponents throw at him: yes, he says, this is "bureaucratic" centralism, and so much the better, for "Bureaucracy versus democracy is in fact centralism versus autonomism; it is the organisational principle of revolutionary Social-Democracy as opposed to the organisational principle of opportunist Social-Democracy." It is a debater's inversion, brilliant and reckless, and it would be quoted for the rest of the century by people who had no interest in the distinction Lenin was drawing. Lenin himself came to feel he had overshot: republishing the pamphlet in 1907, he granted that in the heat of the Congress fight he had bent the stick, exaggerating for effect against the opposite exaggeration. Two of his sharpest contemporaries said so at once and at length. The young

Trotsky, in *Our Political Tasks* (1904), warned that methods of this kind led by their own logic toward the party organisation standing in for the party, the Central Committee standing in for the organisation, and at last a single leader standing in for the Central Committee — a prophecy whose accuracy he would spend his life regretting. Rosa Luxemburg, the same year, answered that the discipline of a workers' party has to grow out of the living movement and cannot be manufactured by a central committee, and that the errors of a genuinely revolutionary movement are more fruitful than the infallibility of the cleverest committee. Neither was an enemy of organisation. Both were pointing at the sentence about bureaucracy and centralism.

Then comes the question this series exists to ask: was the state that canonised the book faithful to it? The answer is that it inverted the book while quoting it. Read the pamphlet for what its author was actually doing, and the situation it describes is the opposite of the one it was later made to justify. Lenin is writing as the losing side. His whole complaint is that a minority has captured the party's institutions and is using them against him; his whole demand is the right of a defeated wing to publish, to agitate, to appeal to the next congress, to fight its corner in the open. The party he describes is one of verbatim published minutes — he begs the reader to study the minutes, and dares the movement's opponents to produce anything so candid about their own affairs — of rival newspapers, of factions that lose a vote and live to argue another day. He even makes the openness a point of pride, promising that the Russian Social-Democrats are "stepped enough" to continue "their work of self-criticism and ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings" in full view of their enemies. Every one of those features — the published minutes, the rival press, the surviving minority, the self-criticism in the open — was abolished by the state that put *One Step Forward* at the head of its reading lists. Stalin's *Foundations of Leninism* (1924) recast the book as the blueprint of "the party of a new type," monolithic and homogeneous; the 1921 ban on factions, an emergency measure of the civil war, was read backward into 1903 as eternal doctrine; and within a decade the "opportunist wing" that Lenin had been free to denounce in print, and that had been free to denounce him back, was the wing being shot. Centralism was kept and canonised; the democracy it was supposed to serve was amputated and then criminalised.

That betrayal is not written into the 1904 text, and it does not follow from it. Its causes lie where the Marxist historians of the defeated revolution located them: in the isolation of the Soviet republic once the German revolution failed, in the backwardness of a peasant country, and above all in the civil

war that physically destroyed the very working class in whose name the party ruled — and then in the usurpation of the emptied party by a bureaucratic caste. Trotsky, in *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), put the transformation in a single sentence: "The historic role of Stalin's faction was to destroy this duplication, subjecting the party to its own officialdom and merging the latter in the officialdom of the state. Thus was created the present totalitarian regime." A pamphlet arguing that the workers' organisation is the workers' own weapon had been turned into the instrument by which an apparatus expropriated them. The canonised book became the measure of the distance travelled from it.

Which is why it is still worth reading, and worth reading against its cult. Strip away the seventy years of official misuse and what remains is a young movement's first hard thinking about a problem no serious socialist has ever escaped: how to combine the striking power that only a disciplined organisation gives with the accountability and openness without which discipline curdles into command. Lenin's answer in 1904 was unbalanced, and he knew it; the tradition that stayed loyal to him rather than to the icon — Luxemburg correcting him on the side of the movement's spontaneity, Trotsky warning where the logic ended, Ernest Mandel later insisting that democratic centralism means the democracy is not decoration — kept the argument open. The proletariat has no other weapon but organisation: the sentence is true, and it is a weapon that can be turned against its makers. This book is where the tradition first said so, and where, read honestly, it still says so.