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ANTI-IMPERIALISM

USSR and Countries of Africa

The Institute of Africa's own account of Soviet engagement across the continent - the Aswan dam, the Algerian steel works, the wells, the scholarships, and the arms that went to the MPLA, FRELIMO, the PAIGC and SWAPO.

Evgenii Anatolevich Tarabrin

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

This book asks to be judged by a single standard, and states it plainly. The foreword, signed by Anatoly Gromyko, Director of the Institute of Africa of the USSR Academy of Sciences, hopes the reader "will come to appreciate the lucid and consistent nature of Soviet policy vis-à-vis Africa, that on the African continent as elsewhere the USSR does not pursue a 'conflict strategy' but is on the side of the forces working for national independence, social progress and democracy." USSR and Countries of Africa is the collective work of research workers of the Institute of Africa and other Soviet bodies, edited by E. A. Tarabrin, Dr. Sc. (Hist.), and it is a serious book — a socio-economic survey, densely factual, with a proper scholarly apparatus. It is genuinely a Progress Publishers title (the imprint appears on the title page and in the footnotes, unlike several volumes in this series misfiled under Progress), translated from a Russian original published in 1977 and, as the note "To the Reader" says, "revised and supplemented" for this 1980 English edition.

The revision matters, because the revising is where the book was tested. The 1977 Russian text was closed before the event that would put "lucid and consistent" under the most strain: the Soviet Union's reversal of alliances in the Horn of Africa in 1977–78. The supplemented English edition — its latest datable events are Mengistu Haile Mariam's 1978 visit to Moscow, the second Shaba episode of mid-1978, and a count of diplomatic relations current "by 1979" — is the version that had to narrate that reversal. It is fair, then, to date the argument to about 1979 and to read it as a book that already knew how the Ogaden war had ended.

Begin with what is true, because a great deal of it is, and because the criticism that follows means nothing if the book is treated as a tissue of inventions. It is not. The material record it documents was real and often decisive. Soviet engineers built the Aswan High Dam and the El Hadjar iron and steel works, Algeria's first; Soviet organisations sank wells in the Sahel,

built hospitals and polyclinics in Algeria, Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia, and, by the book's account, had helped erect or were building around a hundred educational institutions across the continent and trained tens of thousands of specialists. The Soviet Union armed and backed the liberation movements that won: the MPLA in Angola, FRELIMO in Mozambique, the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau, SWAPO in Namibia. None of this was an imperialist fabrication, and the Western Cold-War literature that treated African decolonisation as a Soviet plot was frequently an apology for the colonial power. When the book documents the aggression of the other side, it is largely documenting fact. South Africa did send regular troops into Angola in 1975; Namibia was under illegal South African occupation; the arms embargo and the campaign against Pretoria's nuclear programme were real; the United States and China did back the FNLA and UNITA against the MPLA. On the central Angolan question the book's own antagonist agrees with it. The contemporaneous Trotskyist review *Africa in Struggle* — a small mimeographed journal, priced in pence, whose subtitle is "in the whirlwind of permanent revolution" — wrote in June 1978 that the Cuban role in Angola "was progressive to the extent that it represented a defence against the South African army." Where the book records Western and South African violence, believe it.

The test the foreword invites is therefore not whether the book tells lies about imperialism. It is whether any category the book applies to imperialism is ever allowed to apply to Soviet conduct — whether "lucid and consistent" survives the one case built to break it. That case is the Horn.

The book tells the reader a great deal about Soviet involvement with Somalia. It records the Soviet-Somali Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 11 July 1974; the Fanole dam and hydroelectric station built under a 1975 protocol; the meat-packing complex, the fish cannery at Las Khoren, the wells drilled to irrigate pastures, the free aid against the drought. Somalia, in these pages, is a client the USSR equipped and sustained. Then, in 1977, the Soviet Union changed sides. It transferred its support, together with a Cuban

expeditionary force, from Somalia to Mengistu's Ethiopia, and helped the Ethiopian army reconquer the Ogaden. The book must account for the break, and it does, in a single sentence about the aid to Somalia: "This cooperation, however, came to an end in 1977, and not through the fault of the Soviet side."

The war itself is narrated so that the Soviet Union never appears as a party to it. "In the summer of 1977 an explosive situation developed in the north-east of Africa when hostilities broke out in the eastern and southern regions of Ethiopia between the invading regular units of the Somali army and the Ethiopian forces. In contrast to the imperialists and other reactionary forces which frenziedly tried to aggravate the conflict between these two African states, the USSR, from the very outset, did its best to help Somalia and Ethiopia to reach a negotiated settlement." Somalia then "continued its aggression" and abrogated the treaty; "history shows that aggression always ends in defeat, and such was the lot of the chauvinistic circles in Somalia. On their part the USSR and other socialist countries, including Cuba, once again demonstrated their fidelity to internationalism." The Soviet Union arms one side to a decisive military victory and appears in the account only as a frustrated peacemaker; the Cuban brigades that turned the campaign are dissolved into "the socialist countries" and their "fidelity to internationalism." The word "Cuban" — the adjective, the troops — does not occur in the book at all. Neither does "Ogaden": the territory over which the war was fought is never named, so the Somali claim to it can be presented purely as "chauvinistic and expansionist feelings," with nothing at issue but Somali aggression. This is the reflexivity test in its cleanest form. The very act — foreign military intervention that decides an African war — is "aggravating the conflict" when imperialists are imagined doing it and "fidelity to internationalism" when the Soviet Union and Cuba actually do it. The category never turns inward.

The sharpest silence is a single word. "Eritrea" does not appear in this book — not once, in a hundred thousand words on the Soviet Union and Africa, including a chapter on "Socialist Ethiopia." The Eritrean war of independence — armed since the early 1960s and, by 1979, favouring the nationalists across almost the whole territory — in which the same Soviet- and Cuban-backed Ethiopian army the book celebrates was engaged in crushing a national-liberation movement led in large part by Marxists, has been made to vanish. This cannot be excused as the ordinary tunnel vision of a state that never criticises its clients, because the Soviet Union's own earlier conduct convicts the omission. Here the reply corpus is not merely an outside voice but a witness to what the book

removes. *Africa in Struggle*, writing in June 1978 and verified against the page, records that "before the expulsion of the Russians from Somalia and the beginning of the Ogaden war, the Soviet Union proposed" a "'socialist' federation to the entire Horn with autonomy for Ogaden and Eritrea." The USSR had itself once countenanced Eritrean autonomy — when Ethiopia was an American client and Somalia was Moscow's. Once the pieces were reversed, Eritrean autonomy became unmentionable and the movement itself unnameable. The same review notes that in the late 1960s, when Ethiopia was still Washington's, it was American napalm that fell on Eritrean villages while "Cuban advisers were brought in to train" the Eritrean guerrillas. Within a decade every one of those alignments had flipped, and Cuban soldiers stood on the other side of the same war.

Africa in Struggle drew the conclusion the book exists to prevent: "This cynicism towards the class character of the state explains why it is possible for the Soviet Union to support brutal petit bourgeois regimes in Somalia and Ethiopia. Indifference to the struggle and interests of the masses in those countries means alliances can be shifted at will — yesterday's 'progressive' becomes today's 'reactionary'." Soviet policy, on this reading, was "guided by the need to extend Soviet influence: primarily political and strategic, secondarily economic," and its preferred outcome was not workers' power but "states which remain capitalist while firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence." The Cuban internationalism the book invokes had, in this account, become something else, "as the Cubans have become no more than shock troops of the Soviet Union." One need not endorse every position of a small journal — its call for the secession of both Eritrea and the Ogaden Somalis was a hard one, and it is offered here as the contemporaneous reply, not as settled doctrine — to see that it was describing something the official book had painted over. The reversal in the Horn was not an anomaly that "lucid and consistent" could absorb; it was the refutation of the phrase.

Behind the Horn stands the book's governing idea, and it is worth stating because it is the idea the whole anti-Stalinist tradition was formed to contest. The book's organising category is "socialist orientation," the "non-capitalist road": the claim that a string of newly independent states — Angola, Mozambique, Benin, the Congo, "Socialist Ethiopia," Guinea, Tanzania, Madagascar — could pass over to socialism under the leadership of "revolutionary democrats," largely military and petty-bourgeois in composition, provided they took the Soviet Union for their guide and model. This is precisely the proposition against which *Africa in Struggle* set permanent revolution in its very subtitle. Trotsky's second thesis in *The*

Permanent Revolution (1930) states the counter-argument exactly: "With regard to countries with a belated bourgeois development, especially the colonial and semi-colonial countries, the theory of the permanent revolution signifies that the complete and genuine solution of their tasks of achieving democracy and national emancipation is conceivable only through the dictatorship of the proletariat as the leader of the subjugated nation, above all of its peasant masses." What is at stake between the two books is not sympathy for African liberation, which both share, but whether a petty-bourgeois military regime tied to Moscow constitutes the road to socialism — or a national state whose alignment can be, and in the Horn was, sold and re-sold according to the interests of the guiding power. The events the book itself narrates answer the question in the tradition's favour.

There is a small, exact emblem of the book's method, and it is a quotation. Opening its treatment of Soviet disarmament diplomacy, the book reaches for authority: "Back in 1916 Lenin in an article entitled 'The "Disarmament" Slogan' wrote: 'Disarmament is the ideal of socialism.'" The footnote is honest — Collected Works, Vol. 23, p. 95 — and the sentence is Lenin's. But it is the first sentence of a paragraph, and the paragraph goes on, in the version reprinted in our own tradition, to say the opposite of what the book wants it to mean: "But whoever expects that socialism will be achieved without a social revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat is not a socialist." Lenin's article was a polemic against putting disarmament in a socialist programme; its conclusion is "Our slogan must be: arming of the proletariat to defeat, expropriate and disarm the bourgeoisie." The book quotes the ideal and cuts before the "But," turning a warning against pacifism into a warrant for it. This is the same operation performed on the Horn, in miniature: keep the phrase that flatters the policy, drop the sentence that would embarrass it. It is a habit this whole series meets again and again — and here it happens to be Lenin's own text that is truncated.

One absence, finally, that is not a matter of doctrine but of authorship. Soviet policy in this book has no authors, only an incumbent. Brezhnev is quoted and cited some thirty-three times; his 1977 report on the anniversary of October is the book's recurring authority. Khrushchev, under whose leadership the Soviet turn toward the newly independent African states actually began — the wave of recognitions the book itself dates to 1960 — appears not once. The initiatives are attributed to "the Soviet Union," "the Soviet Government," "the Soviet delegation." Even Somalia's ruler, Siad Barre, whose government the USSR armed for years, goes unnamed while his country is discussed twenty-one times; the emperor

the Ethiopian revolution overthrew, Haile Selassie, is likewise absent. A policy with a living author and no dead ones is a policy that cannot examine its own past, because its past has been depopulated. That is the deepest sense in which the foreword's "consistent" is a claim the book cannot afford to test: consistency, here, is produced by forgetting.

Read USSR and Countries of Africa for its documentary weight, which is genuine — the aid projects, the treaties, the voting records, the sheer scale of Soviet material engagement with the continent are all here, and much of it is not so fully assembled anywhere else. But read the Horn chapters beside Africa in Struggle of June 1978, and read the disarmament epigraph beside the rest of Lenin's paragraph. The book set itself a single test — whether Soviet policy was one thing everywhere, answerable to one standard — and the one African war it had to revise its pages to include is the war in which that policy changed sides, disowned its own client, unnamed the movement it had helped to crush, and called the whole of it internationalism.

PHILOSOPHY

Georgi Plekhanov Selected Philosophical Works (Volume IV)

Plekhanov on Chernyshevsky, Belinsky and Herzen - the first Russian Marxist reclaiming his country's own revolutionary tradition and arguing that Marxism was its lawful heir rather than a foreign import.

Georgi Plekhanov

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

The three companion volumes to this one carried Plekhanov the philosopher and the polemicist: the founding pamphlets of Russian Marxism, the demolition of the Narodniks (the Populists, who denied that Russia would take the capitalist road), the long war against the revisionists who wanted Marxism without its dialectics. Volume IV carries a different Plekhanov, and in some ways the most attractive one. This is the volume of Russian intellectual history — the fourth of the five, promised in the Publishers' Note as the one given over to "Russian philosophy and social thought." It collects the works in which Plekhanov, the first Russian Marxist, turned back to reclaim his own country's revolutionary past: the big monograph on the critic and revolutionary Nikolai Chernyshevsky, worked and reworked across two decades; four studies of the literary critic Vissarion Belinsky; three on Alexander Herzen, the founder of the free Russian press abroad; and a closing sheaf of reviews on the "Westerners" and Slavophiles. It is Plekhanov proving that Belinsky, Herzen and Chernyshevsky were the forerunners of Marxism in Russia, and that Marxism, as he put it in a sentence the introduction quotes, was their "lawful heir": "Our present views and aspirations are the organic product of the history of the Russian revolutionary movement."

First, the date, because the series exists to get this right and this volume is a trap for the careless. The spine and the copyright page agree on 1980 — "First printing 1980," the English translation new that year — and unlike Volume I, which went through printings in 1960, 1974 and 1977, this one really is a fresh English publication, appearing two decades after its predecessor. But the scholarly apparatus is not new. It belongs to the Soviet academic edition prepared by the Institute of Philosophy of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, the post-Stalin Selected Philosophical Works out of which the whole English series was quarried, and its editorial essay — by M. Iovchuk, a career historian of philosophy of

that Institute — reads as a document of that project rather than of the Brezhnev year on the title page. The texts themselves span 1890 to 1913. Nothing in the volume was written later, and that fact, as we shall see, is not an accident of the material. It is the design.

The design is worth stating at the outset, because it differs from what the earlier introductions in this series found in the companion volumes, and the difference is the most interesting thing about the book. In Volume I, V. Fomina narrated Plekhanov's political fall as a bell curve — rising superlatives to 1903, then a clinical vocabulary of desertion and error, a single sentence for the First World War, a subordinate clause for October, and a burial near Belinsky. In Volume II, B. A. Chagin did something more drastic: he simply stopped the clock at 1903, ended his essay on Lenin, and let the war, the revolution and the death go entirely unmentioned. Iovchuk can do neither. He cannot stop the clock at 1903, because roughly half the texts in his volume were written after it. The 1909 edition of the Chernyshevsky book, the 1909 and 1910 and 1911 pieces on Belinsky, the 1911 and 1912 studies of Herzen, the 1913 essay "Chernyshevsky in Siberia" — all of them are what the Soviet apparatus calls the "Menshevik period," the years after the Bolshevik–Menshevik split of 1903, when Plekhanov sided with the Mensheviks (the minority who looked to alliance with the liberals). The clock has already run past the danger point on the first page of the contents. So Iovchuk adopts a third method, and it is the method this introduction is finally about: he prints the compromised works, and inoculates each one.

But begin where the book earns its place, because it earns it. Whatever the frame does to him, the Plekhanov of these pages is a great critic doing the thing he did best — reading a body of Russian writing forward, tracing in Belinsky and Chernyshevsky the materialism and the dialectics that would find their finished form in Marx, and doing it with a generosity of attention that is the opposite of a hanging judge's. The method is the one Volume II praised in his essays on Holbach

and Helvétius: he rescues thinkers his own tradition had been content to patronise, locating exactly where they reached and exactly where their age stopped them. Of Chernyshevsky, held back from Marxism by the backwardness of serf-owning Russia and by twenty years of Siberian exile, Plekhanov writes the finest sentence of admiration in the volume: "you are surprised not that Chernyshevsky was behind Marx and Engels, but that he was so little behind them." The closing essay, "Chernyshevsky in Siberia," written in 1913 from letters newly released from the archives, states the verdict with a moving precision: "Chernyshevsky's thought was developing along the same path which led West-European thought to Marxism; but the unfavourable conditions of Russian social life prevented our great writer's thought from reaching the end of this path and it remained at the penultimate stage, i.e., the philosophy of Feuerbach." That is intellectual history of a very high order: it refuses both to inflate Chernyshevsky into a Marxist before Marx and to write him off as a mere anthropological materialist, and it grounds the whole judgment in the concrete backwardness of the society that produced him.

The same gift runs through the studies of Belinsky. "Belinsky and Rational Reality" (1897) — a product of the "clean" pre-Menshevik years — is a small classic on how a mind moves. It reconstructs, without contempt, Belinsky's notorious period of "reconciliation with reality," the episode when the young critic, misreading Hegel, briefly made his peace with Tsarist Russia; Plekhanov shows the reconciliation as a step forward and not backward, a groping after objective foundations that Belinsky lacked the developed Russia to complete. And Plekhanov's Hegel, in that essay, is drawn with a sympathy and a sharpness that few Soviet philosophy primers of the period could manage: "In his youth Hegel sympathised strongly with the Great French Revolution, but with time his love of freedom grew weaker and the desire to live at peace with the existing order of things became stronger, so that the July Revolution of 1830 made a painful impression on him." Best of all is a conjecture Plekhanov permits himself about where Belinsky, dead at thirty-seven, was heading: "we would permit ourselves to suggest that with time he would have become a zealous adherent of dialectical materialism." Plekhanov's love for these men is plain on the page — he calls Chernyshevsky's *What Is To Be Done?* by the enthusiasm it kindled in his own generation: "Who has not read and re-read this famous work? Who has not been enthralled by it, who has not become purer, better, brighter and bolder under its beneficial influence?" For most of these texts, in Julius Katzer's and R. Dixon's translations, this volume remains the only English home. A reader who wants Plekhanov on the Russian nineteenth century still has to come here, and will not

be sorry.

Now the frame, and the method of inoculation. Iovchuk's essay is intelligent and, on the philosophy, scrupulous — it is not crude, and it is not falsification in the narrow sense. What it does instead is attach to every post-1903 text a warning that the reader is now handling damaged goods. The 1904–13 works, he writes, "bear the mark of the political sin which Plekhanov committed after the Second Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1903), when he went over to the Menshevik position." The errors in Plekhanov's history of Russian thought "manifested themselves mainly in his Menshevik period under the influence of political opportunism." The phrase "the works of the Menshevik period" recurs like a refrain, a stamp pressed onto each piece as it is introduced. The effect is to let the reader have the late Plekhanov while never letting him forget, for a paragraph together, that the late Plekhanov is not to be trusted. It is containment by perpetual asterisk, where Chagin's was containment by amputation.

To Iovchuk's credit — and the credit is real, the same order of editorial candour the companion volumes earned — the inoculation is at one point backed by genuine evidence, and the evidence is damning in a way the reader can check for himself. Iovchuk sets the 1890 articles on Chernyshevsky, written for the émigré paper *Sotsial-Demokrat*, beside the 1909 book Plekhanov made from them, and shows, following Lenin's own notes, that in revising his youthful text Plekhanov quietly cut its fiercest attacks on the liberals. Gone from 1909 was Chernyshevsky's charge, which Plekhanov had endorsed in 1890, that the liberals "are the same exploiters in politics as they are in the sphere of the economy," and that "it was for these exploitative inclinations that Chernyshevsky hated them." Gone was Plekhanov's own barbed gloss, aimed at the revolutionaries of his own day "who, while calling themselves revolutionaries, pin all their hopes on a liberal 'society.'" Iovchuk draws the obvious conclusion: the cuts "are explained not so much by the fact that this time it was being published legally in tsarist Russia, but by the influence of the political opportunism and conciliatory tendencies of Menshevism." This is a small masterpiece of textual detective work, and it is honest against interest, because the volume prints the 1890 text with the excised passages restored, so that any reader can watch Plekhanov soften his own radicalism at exactly the moment his politics were softening toward the liberals. Lenin's point, which Iovchuk quotes his marginal notes to make, is the sharp one: gripped by the theoretical contrast between the idealist and the materialist view of history, Plekhanov the historian had come to overlook the practical, political, class difference between a liberal and a democrat — the very

difference his 1890 self had hammered. Here the apparatus is doing real work: it shows the political drift registering in the man's own revisions, phrase by deleted phrase.

Which makes what the essay will not do all the more visible. The candour stops precisely where the companion volumes' candour stopped. For all the forensic care lavished on the difference between the 1890 and 1909 Chernyshevsky, the catastrophe that gives the whole story its meaning — Plekhanov's support for the Allied war effort in 1914, his public break with Lenin, his denunciation of the October Revolution as a violation of the laws of history, his death near Petrograd in 1918 — is nowhere narrated. The word "social-chauvinist" (the term for a socialist who backed his own government's side in the imperialist war) occurs exactly once, and it occurs in a subordinate clause, describing the Plekhanov of 1912–16 as one who "later became also a social-chauvinist." No wartime writing is named, dated, quoted or answered. The essay's own clock, having been forced by the material to run past 1903, is stopped instead at 1913, with "Chernyshevsky in Siberia," and it never ticks into the war. And the one book of Plekhanov's that would force the issue — the unfinished *History of Russian Social Thought*, on which he laboured from 1912 into the war years — is not merely condemned but excluded. Iovchuk stamps it in the abstract as reflecting "the liberal theory of 'state principles'" and as evidence that "in the final years of his life he abandoned Marxist views of history," and then rules that Plekhanov's legacy "must be studied and assessed not in terms of *A History of Russian Social Thought* but of his earlier work. The reader is told the book is bad and told not to read it, and is given not one sentence of it to judge. Even within the "clean" period the selection quietly narrows the case: of the four *Sotsial-Demokrat* articles on Chernyshevsky, only the first, the general and philosophical one, is printed; the second, third and fourth, on his politics and economics and his utopian socialism, are dropped from the five-volume edition altogether.

So the three volumes give three solutions to one problem, and Volume IV's is the subtlest. Fomina muted the fall; Chagin removed it; Iovchuk brands the middle years and silences the end. In each case the object is the same — to preserve the philosophical Plekhanov by sealing off the political one — and in each case the giveaway is the asymmetry of specificity. Plekhanov's misreading of Feuerbach, his one-sidedness about Chernyshevsky's dialectics, his exaggeration of Western influence on Russian thought: all named, dated, tied to a page. Plekhanov's support for an imperialist war and his opposition to a workers' revolution: a single adjective in a dependent

clause. That is not an essay running short of space. It is an essay that has decided what its reader may be trusted to weigh.

What the frame withholds, the reply tradition supplied, and for this volume it supplied it with an uncanny fittingness, because the reply is itself a piece of writing about Plekhanov and the history of Russian thought. In a note composed on 24 April 1922, four years after Plekhanov's death, as part of the preface to the first volumes of his own collected works, Trotsky drew the balance that Iovchuk's essay declines to draw. It reached English readers in the *American Fourth International*, vol. 4 no. 3 (whole no. 31), March 1943 — the year of composition, 1922, is what matters here, not the wartime reprint. It is not a demolition; it is a claiming. "This was a truly great man," Trotsky writes, and the estimate of Plekhanov's achievement is close to the Soviet edition's own: Plekhanov did not create historical materialism but "introduced it into Russian life," overcoming "the homegrown revolutionary prejudices of the Russian intelligentsia, in which an arrogance of backwardness found its expression." Where the note speaks directly to this volume is in two places the official essay could not match. First, Trotsky places Plekhanov exactly where the volume's subject-matter places him — inside the tradition he was writing about: "he remained entirely a representative of the old Russian school of publicists (Belinsky, Herzen, Chernyshevsky)," the very three whose forerunners' status this book was built to establish. And second, "into the history of Russian social thought he has entered as a great figure" — a sentence that lands on the title of Plekhanov's own last, condemned book.

For it is over that book, the *History of Russian Social Thought*, that the two accounts most sharply diverge, and the divergence is the whole argument in miniature. Iovchuk and Trotsky agree the book fails; they part on whether the reader may see how. Iovchuk stamps it "social-chauvinist" and turns the page. Trotsky opens it. He quotes the sentence from its introduction in which Plekhanov limits the class struggle to a nation's internal life and, between nations, substitutes "more or less friendly collaboration where the question of the defense of the country from external attack arises," and the bare moral maxim to which the fallen theoretician had reduced himself — "defensive war is a just war" (the companion Volume I introduction lays out these passages in full; the point here is only that Trotsky quotes what Iovchuk merely labels). And Trotsky, unlike the Soviet editor, offers a cause that is internal to Plekhanov rather than a stain applied from outside. Plekhanov was "a forerunner, the first crusader of Marxism on Russian soil," a theoretician without a party and without practice, marooned in Swiss émigré politics; and "this

disturbance of the balance between theory and practice, which arose from the whole circumstances of Plekhanov's life, proved fatal for him." Already the 1905 revolution "took him by surprise." As far back as the Paris congress of 1889 he had declared that the Russian revolution would triumph as a workers' movement or not at all — from which it followed that a victorious revolution must place power in proletarian hands, a conclusion from which Plekhanov "recoiled in horror." The economism, the reading of every political question off the level of the productive forces, was not a stain on his method; it was his method, carried to its end. The earlier introductions in this series traced that same thread through Löwy and Mandel and Novack, who located the theory of permanent revolution in a break with precisely "the economism ... of Plekhanov's Marxism"; Volume IV needs only to add that Trotsky's own hand had drawn it, in 1922, in an obituary that doubles as a reader's guide to this exact book.

None of which is a case against reading it. Quite the reverse — and here Lenin, the authority Iovchuk invokes on every second page, is the best witness. Lenin's judgment — quoted at the close of the companion Volume II — that no one can become a real, intelligent Communist without studying all of Plekhanov's philosophical writings, because nothing better has been written on Marxism anywhere in the world, is why all five volumes exist. But notice what Lenin does not do in these pages. Where Iovchuk records Lenin's private criticism of the 1909 Chernyshevsky, he also records that Lenin "evidently did not consider it necessary to criticise publicly the erroneous elements in Plekhanov's writings on Chernyshevsky, especially as Plekhanov was close to the Bolsheviks at that time in the defence of nineteenth-century revolutionary and materialist traditions." Lenin held his fire on Plekhanov the historian even where he disagreed, because on the ground that this volume covers — the defence of Belinsky, Herzen and Chernyshevsky against the liberal and mystical falsifiers of the Russian past — Plekhanov was still fighting the right enemies. That is the distinction the whole series turns on, and that this volume, read against its own introduction, makes as clearly as any: between Plekhanov the philosopher and historian, whom Lenin studied and Trotsky claimed, and Plekhanov the wartime politician, whom both fought. Iovchuk's essay honours the first by half-suppressing the existence of the second.

So read the book, and read the Belinsky and the Chernyshevsky first — the 1897 "Belinsky and Rational Reality" and the 1890 Chernyshevsky articles, where the young Plekhanov is at the height of his powers and none of the warnings apply. Then read the later, warned-against pieces, and watch, with Iovchuk's own honest apparatus as your guide,

the political drift settle into the very words on the page. Then read Iovchuk's introduction, but read it for what it is: the third and most ingenious of three attempts, across three volumes, to keep in print the one great Menshevik a state descended from October could not do without — this time not by muting his fall, nor by cutting it away, but by printing his compromised years under a running caption and letting his ruinous ones simply stop being narrated at 1913. The book, once again, is more honest than the essay that frames it. It prints the sentences Plekhanov deleted; it prints the man Lenin studied and Trotsky claimed. What it will not print is the road from here to 1917 — and that road, as it happens, runs straight through the one book of Plekhanov's this volume names only to forbid.

HISTORY

Lenin the Revolutionary

The official short introduction to Lenin, written by six named academics for the 110th anniversary - a Party-school primer made for export, and revealing in what a book this brief chooses to leave out.

Vladimir Petrovich Filatov

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

This is not a biography, and the reader should know that before opening it. Lenin the Revolutionary is a short thematic textbook — a little over fifty thousand words — written by six Soviet academics and assembled by Progress Publishers for the 110th anniversary of Lenin's birth in April 1980. The contributors are named on the copyright page, which is more than the Institute of Marxism-Leninism ever did for its official Lenin: A Biography: Professor V. P. Filatov took the opening address to the reader, the chapter on the making of the Party and the conclusion; Professor A. A. Babayants the chapter on the Soviet state; Professor V. N. Konyukhovskiy four of the five sections on the revolution; Assistant Professors V. T. Kuzmin, G. P. Pozhidayev and Professor Yu. A. Sherkovin one section each. Liv Tudge translated it. There is no date-of-original problem here, which is worth stating because there usually is: the text refers to the 110th anniversary in the past tense, its most recent source is a Brezhnev article in World Marxist Review of 1977, and its closing pages quote his report to the Twenty-Fifth Congress. This is a 1980 book about 1980, and it argues from the fully mature Brezhnev doctrine of "the developed socialist society" — a phrase that appears in the last three pages like a refrain.

The structure tells you what it was for. Chapter I is Lenin as thinker: philosophy, social psychology, economic theory. Chapter II is the building of the Party. Chapter III is the revolution. Chapter IV is the state. The narrative spine is thin and the exposition is thick; whole years pass in a sentence while a dozen pages go to the theory of surplus value. It is a Party-school primer dressed for export — the sort of book a foreign communist or a sympathetic student would be given as a first serious approach to Lenin, short enough to finish and authoritative enough to trust. That combination is exactly what makes it worth examining. A short book cannot mutilate a document at length. It can only omit, and omission at this scale is a technique with its own signature.

Begin with the arithmetic, because in this volume the counts

are the argument. Trotsky is named twenty-five times, always as an obstacle. Stalin is named five times, all of them in a single passage about the "Letter to the Congress" and its aftermath. Nadezhda Krupskaya — Lenin's wife, his co-worker in exile, his link to the Georgian oppositionists in his last months — is not named once. Neither is Inessa Armand, nor Kollontai, nor Lunacharsky. The words "Georgia" and "Georgian" do not occur. "Kronstadt" does not occur. The Tenth Party Congress, which is quoted in a footnote, is never narrated as an event. The Military Revolutionary Committee is described but its chairman is never named, and neither is the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, at any point, in either 1905 or 1917.

What emerges is a Lenin without collaborators. This is the volume's distinguishing device and it is not the same device the Institute of Marxism-Leninism used three years later in Lenin: A Biography. The 1983 official life is a de-Stalinised book that still needs Stalin: it has to place him at the Thirteenth Congress, has to explain the Testament, has to concede in an index entry that he committed "gross violation of socialist laws". The 1980 primer simply removes almost everyone. There is no Stalin in October, none in the Civil War, none in the national question, none as author of the autonomisation plan. But the removal is not even-handed, and that is the point. Every anti-Trotsky verdict manufactured in the Stalin period is retained, in full working order, while the man in whose interest they were manufactured has been lifted out of the frame. The reader is left with the conclusions of a factional history whose faction has been made invisible.

Look at what this does to October. The chapter on Lenin's role in the revolution — Pozhidayev's — describes the formation of the Military Revolutionary Committee (it inverts the name to "Revolutionary Military Committee", RMC) accurately enough at first: "a legally constituted body responsible for directing the rising". Then comes the sentence: "The RMC was a non-party body, in contact with the workers and soldiers at large, and united all the sources of revolutionary strength. Though attached to the Petrograd Soviet, it exercised its authority countrywide, under the supervision of the Bolshevik

Central Committee and of Lenin, who was himself one of its members." Lenin was in hiding until the night of 24–25 October and belonged to no such body. The chairman of the committee, who did belong to it, is not mentioned. And on the following page the old legend surfaces intact: at the meeting of 16 (29) October, we are told, "operations were to be directed by a Revolutionary Military Centre appointed at a closed session of the Central Committee and subordinated to the Revolutionary Military Committee." Who sat on that Centre is not stated. It is a directing organ with no members.

Its members were Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky and Dzerzhinsky. We know this because Trotsky forced the minute into print. In his Letter to the Bureau of Party History, reprinted as the long opening document of *The Stalin School of Falsification*, he quotes the Central Committee record of 16 (29) October exactly as Pravda published it on 2 November 1927: "The Central Committee created a military revolutionary center with the following members: Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky and Dzerzhinsky. This center is to be a constituent part of the Revolutionary Soviet Committee." His comment on the legend built from it is the one sentence this 1980 chapter most needs and cannot survive: of that centre, he writes, "Trotsky was not a member. Neither was Lenin a member of that committee. That fact alone demonstrates that the committee had only a subordinate organizational significance." Trotsky also recovered what Stalin himself had written for the first anniversary, in Pravda of 6 November 1918: "All the work of practical organization of the insurrection was conducted under the immediate leadership of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky." (Readers should note that the direct contemporaneous refutation lives in this Letter to the Bureau of Party History, not in the book's late chapter "How the October Insurrection Actually Took Place", which deals with a different falsification — the charge of "constitutional illusions" — and demolishes it with a 1920 jubilee speech in which Stalin admitted that the Central Committee had proceeded against Lenin's demands and that Lenin, arriving at the Smolny, said: "Yes, you were right.")

That charge, too, is here. "Matters were further complicated when Trotsky also opposed Lenin's line and advised postponement, which would have placed the rising yet deeper in jeopardy." The sentence follows immediately on the account of Zinoviev and Kamenev's disclosure in *Novaya Zhizn*, so that the reader carries the word "treachery" forward into it.

None of this is new, and it had been identified in print, in English, twenty-one years before this book was printed. Writing as Ernest Germain, Ernest Mandel devoted "Thirty

Questions and Thirty Answers about the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union" (Fourth International nos. 10 and 11) to the Khrushchev-era official history, and paused on precisely this passage. The 1959 History, he noted, had abandoned the Short Course's claim that a "Party Centre" with Stalin at its head "in practice guided the insurrection", and correctly reported that the Military Revolutionary Committee "did carry out all the practical work of the insurrection". Then: "one lie by omission committed here by the authors of this History is not to recall that its president was Leon Trotsky." And having named the five members of the Centre, the 1959 editors added the line Mandel quotes with an exclamation: "The entire work of organizing the insurrection was directed by Lenin." Set that beside 1980's "Lenin, who was himself one of its members" and the continuity is not a family resemblance. It is the same operation, performed again, in a book for beginners.

The Testament follows the same law. This volume prints Lenin's remedy: the Congress "should consider replacing him as General Secretary of the Central Committee by someone who 'in all other respects differs from Comrade Stalin in having only one advantage, namely, that of being more tolerant, more loyal, more polite and more considerate to the comrades, less capricious, etc.'" But the diagnosis that produced the remedy is gone. The word "rude" does not occur anywhere in this book. Lenin's postscript of 4 January 1923 begins by saying that Stalin is too rude, and that this fault, bearable among communists, becomes unbearable in a General Secretary; the primer replaces it with "Lenin was afraid that Stalin, once in a position of power, would fall victim to the grave flaws in his character and wield his authority recklessly" — a vague apprehension about power in general in place of a specific charge against a man.

On Trotsky the treatment is not omission but invention. Lenin's text, as Trotsky published it in "On the Suppressed Testament of Lenin" (December 1932), reads that Trotsky "is distinguished not only by his exceptional abilities — personally he is, to be sure, the most able man in the present Central Committee — but also by his too far-reaching self-confidence and a disposition to be too much attracted by the purely administrative side of affairs." The 1980 book keeps the two faults, discards the judgement they qualify, and adds a charge Lenin never made: Lenin "expressed his lack of faith in Trotsky's political intentions. Trotsky had often opposed the Bolshevik line and defied the Central Committee; Lenin judged him to be an overly self-confident person, fascinated by bureaucratic procedure." Lenin cited one such conflict, over the Commissariat of Ways and Communications, and cited it

as evidence of ability. "Often" is the editors'. So is "lack of faith in Trotsky's political intentions" — a phrase Trotsky had anticipated by half a century when he observed that the faults Lenin named "do not bear any relation to 'underestimating the peasants' or 'lacking faith in the inner forces of the revolution' or any other of the inventions of the epigones." And the sentence in which Lenin ruled the whole question out of bounds — that the October episode of Zinoviev and Kamenev "ought as little to be used against them personally as the non-Bolshevism of Trotsky" — is not here at all. The 1983 official life at least printed a version of it, inverted. The 1980 primer does not print it, so there is nothing to invert.

Mandel's fourteenth question described the method exactly, of a book published in 1959: the History "passes over in silence all the praises uttered by Lenin concerning the Bolsheviks he mentions in his Testament (Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Piatakov) and keeps only the criticisms." That is a complete description of this page. Lenin called Bukharin the party's most valuable theoretician and its favourite; the primer records that he "underlined the ideological instability of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin and Pyatakov". Nothing but the negatives survives. Mandel's closing remark on the 1959 text — that the omissions are the more grotesque because the Testament had been published in the USSR, so that any reader could compare — held with more force in 1980 than in 1960.

What follows the Testament is the passage a reader should copy out. "Since Stalin was a reliable opponent of Trotsky and the opportunist line and assured the Congress that he would correct the faults that Lenin had spoken of, he was kept on as General Secretary. He took the criticism to heart, was pivotal during the confrontation with Trotsky and the Rightwing opportunists after Lenin's death, and made a valuable contribution to the drive towards socialism." Then, in a new paragraph: "But in time Lenin's words began to lose their power over him: he made some serious mistakes, violating the Leninist norms of Party life and socialist legality." That sentence is where the collectivisation famine, the Terror, the destruction of the officer corps and the deported nations are housed in this book. Twenty-four words, in the past perfect, about a man who has otherwise been erased from his own century.

The national question is handled by a method more economical still. Lenin's last dictated intervention, "The Question of Nationalities or 'Autonomisation'", occurs in this book exactly once: as a footnote reference, supplying the source for an inspiring sentence about the awakening of the colonial peoples. Its actual subject — that Great-Russian

chauvinism had been reproduced inside the Soviet apparatus, that the bullying of Georgian communists had been carried out in the name of the revolution, that Stalin and Dzerzhinsky bore responsibility for it — is not summarised, refuted or mentioned. The formation of the USSR is narrated as a placid ascent to voluntary union; the autonomisation scheme appears only as one of the "other suggestions which arose", authorless. There was in fact a fight, and Trotsky set out its documents in the 1932 essay: Lenin's insistence that it was necessary "to hold Stalin and Dzerzhinsky responsible for all this out-and-out Great-Russian nationalistic campaign"; his warning, passed through a secretary, that "Stalin will make a rotten compromise ... in order then to deceive"; and the note of 5 March 1923 asking Trotsky to take the Georgian case: "That affair is now under 'prosecution' at the hands of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Indeed, quite the contrary!" It is the last day of Lenin's political life. The primer's conclusion, sixty pages later, describes a society "for which the national question, history's most vexing social problem, is no longer an issue, a society permeated with national accord."

Compression is doing work here that scholarship could not do. The 1983 biography had to narrate the Tenth Congress and so had to explain the ban on factions; it praised the ban and passed over Kronstadt in the same paragraph, and the seam showed. The 1980 primer has no chapter in which the Tenth Congress can occur. The New Economic Policy simply appears — "introduced in the spring of 1921" — as the intelligent successor to War Communism, prompted by economic exhaustion. There are no peasant risings, no Kronstadt, no Workers' Opposition, no ban on factions, no 1921–22 famine on the Volga. The opposition of that year survives only as a slogan to be refuted: enemies "launched the catchphrase 'Soviets without Communists'". A shorter book need not lie about a crisis it never had room to mention. That is the specific advantage of the popular form, and it should be named as such.

One further falsification is worth isolating because it is checkable by date alone. In the section on Lenin's wartime writings, the book states that "The articles 'On the Slogan for a United States of Europe' and 'The Military Programme of the Proletarian Revolution' established that socialism could triumph in one country", and adds: "Lenin's fiercest critic on this issue was Trotsky, who denied that the socialist revolution could triumph in one country and insisted that socialism in Russia was out of the question until the proletariat was in power in Europe." No such controversy existed in 1915 or 1916. The doctrine of socialism in one country was advanced

in the autumn of 1924, ten months after Lenin's death, and Trotsky's demonstration of this in *The Third International After Lenin* (chapter I) rests on the plainest possible evidence: the first, 1924 edition of Stalin's own *Foundations of Leninism*, which stated that for "the final victory of socialism, for the organization of socialist production, the efforts of one country, particularly of such a peasant country as Russia are insufficient", and concluded that these were "the characteristic features of the Leninist theory of the proletarian revolution". The passage was reversed in the next edition. Trotsky quoted it from the 1928 Russian collection *Lenin and Leninism*. Sixteen years earlier this book's back-dating had been retrospectively contradicted by the man who invented the doctrine.

Now the other side of the account, which is real and should not be swallowed.

The pre-1917 narrative is, with the exception of the passages on Trotsky's "centrism", sound. The account of Lenin's family and of Alexander Ulyanov's execution in May 1887, of Kazan and Samara and the Fedoseyev circles, of the fight over organisation after the Second Congress, of Iskra and the Bureau of Bolshevik Committees and *Vperyod*, is the standard chronology and it is correct. The war chapters on Kautsky's "ultra-imperialism" and on the collapse of the Second International are a competent short exposition of Lenin's position and no worse for being partisan.

More than that: the account of 1917 between February and October is in places better than its tradition. It reproduces Lenin's September offer of a compromise to the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries in his own words — "We may offer a compromise to these parties. ... And I think we should do so" — and states plainly that "A peaceful takeover again became a possibility", which the Short Course lineage was never comfortable admitting. It reports that Kamenev was Chairman of the Central Executive Committee, that he and Zinoviev and Rykov resigned over the demand for a coalition government, and — most unexpectedly — it argues at length that Lenin never held the dictatorship of the proletariat to require a single party: "the Party and the Soviet Government were ready to reach an agreement with any political party that was not hostile to Soviet power", and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries did enter the government in November 1917. A reader who takes that argument seriously, and then asks what happened to it, will have begun to read the book against itself.

And Sherkovin's section on Lenin and social psychology is the one chapter here that could not have been written anywhere

else. It is an attempt to read Lenin as a theorist of mass consciousness — of "socio-psychical conditions", of the transformation of moods into political fact — and it draws on a real Soviet literature (V. N. Kolbanovsky's essay on Lenin and social psychology, in a 1965 Moscow collection) that has scarcely been translated. The claim that before Lenin "no one had seriously studied social moods, or realised that changes in the mass consciousness have a vital effect on the course of history" is not defensible; the underlying interest is genuine, and it is a reminder that the Soviet academy contained working disciplines and not only liturgy.

The book closes on the developed socialist society, on the Twenty-Fifth Congress, and on Brezhnev's remark that Marxism-Leninism "is the only reliable basis for formulating the right strategy and tactics". It was printed in the year Soviet troops were fighting in Afghanistan and Polish workers were building an independent trade union at Gdańsk. On the second of those, the Fourth International's press was writing in the same weeks: a survey of Polish workers' struggles in *Intercontinental Press* (vol. 18, no. 34, 15 September 1980) recovered a passage by Andrzej Mandalian from *Nowa Kultura* of January 1957, which puts the case for reading Lenin's last writings and this book together — Lenin's notes on the national question, he wrote, are "as much if not more of a mindboggling document for Communists as his famous 'Letter to the Congress'", because "As regards nationalities policy, Stalinism found its fullest expression in great power chauvinism."

Read this book, then, for what it is: a competent short exposition of Lenin's thought, resting on a narrative from which the entire subject of Lenin's last struggle has been removed — not argued away, not explained, removed. Its final chapter describes a dying man following the Thirteenth Party Conference of January 1924, which "branded Trotsky's position as a petty-bourgeois deviation, a revision of Leninism", and adds that he did so "with such interest that a full recovery seemed likely". Whatever Lenin was following in those last weeks, that is what the six professors of 1980 needed him to be encouraged by. His own last dictated request, of 5 March 1923, was that someone take up the defence of the Georgians against Stalin. It is not in this book, and neither is Georgia.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

The Agony of a Dictatorship

Two Soviet correspondents on the ground for the fall of Somoza - the seizure of the National Palace, the dynasty's forty-five years of American backing, and eyewitness reportage from a Sandinista camp.

Oleg IGNATIEV and Genrikh BOROVIK

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

At twenty past noon on 22 August 1978, two light-green trucks pulled up to the side entrances of the National Palace in Managua. Twenty-five Sandinistas in stolen National Guard uniforms jumped out, seized a building holding some two thousand people, including most of the Nicaraguan Congress, and held it for two days until the dictator Anastasio Somoza gave in to their demands. The *Agony of a Dictatorship* opens on that raid because its two authors watched the Somoza regime from close range in exactly those months. Oleg Ignatiev and Genrikh Borovik were Soviet journalists — Ignatiev the Pravda correspondent who also wrote *Secret Weapon in Africa* (Progress, 1977), the companion volume in this series, Borovik a reporter with a novelist's eye — and they were in Central America "some six months before the downfall of the Somoza regime," as their note to the reader puts it. The book is two books bound as one: Ignatiev's *The Storm of Tiscapa*, a chronicle of the dynasty's rise and fall with the documents laid end to end, and Borovik's *Sandinista Camp Glimpses*, a piece of literary reportage from a guerrilla hideout and a refugee camp. It is not theory and does not pretend to be. It is war journalism with a thesis, and the thesis is a true one: that the tyranny falling in Nicaragua had been built, armed, trained and protected for forty-five years by the United States. Much of what the book documents under that heading is real, and an honest introduction should say so before it says anything else.

The date. The spine reads 1980 and the translation, by Arthur Shkarovsky, is of that year; but unlike several titles in this series the text is not older than its jacket. Ignatiev's chronicle runs to the morning of 19 July 1979, when the first foreign newsmen — five Soviet reporters among them — landed at the newly captured Managua airport and saw the red-and-black flag flying over Somoza's abandoned bunker on Tiscapa Hill. Borovik's section is dated "Central America — Moscow, October 1978–January 1979." So this is a genuinely late-1970s book, written in the heat of events and published within a year of the victory. That matters for how it should be read. It was

commissioned as the Soviet press apparatus commissioned such things: a well-connected Pravda man, back from the spot, delivering to readers at home and abroad the fall of a hated American client at the precise moment it happened. Somoza fled in July 1979; the New Jewel Movement had taken Grenada that March; a revolution was building in El Salvador. For Moscow the Nicaraguan revolution was a gift, and a book celebrating it — datelined Managua, carrying the eyewitness authority the reference volumes in this series so conspicuously lack — was exactly the export the moment called for.

What is true, and it is most of the reporting

Begin with the credit, because the criticism that follows is worthless if a reader thinks the book is invented. It is not. The Somoza dictatorship was real, and so were its crimes, and the American hand behind it was real to a degree that would embarrass any apologist. On the family's wealth the book is precise and, in its own dry way, devastating: Ignatiev walks the reader through Managua pointing out that the airline, the hotel, the department store, the textile mill, the brewery, the power station, the television and radio stations and the newspaper are all Somoza-owned — a whole country run as, in Borovik's phrase, "a sort of family heirloom." When a disastrous earthquake killed more than ten thousand people in December 1972, Somoza had himself made head of the relief committee and pocketed much of the roughly \$190 million in international aid; the book documents this from the Nicaraguan opposition's own manifestos and from the Italian magazine *L'Europeo*. None of it is Soviet fabrication.

Nor is the American record. The National Guard that tortured and "disappeared" Nicaraguans was a US creation — trained at Fort Gulick in the Canal Zone and at Fort Bragg, its officers schooled at West Point, its rifles shipped from the United States. Ignatiev reconstructs the founding crime of the dynasty carefully: in February 1934 the guerrilla leader Augusto César Sandino, who had fought the US Marines to a standstill, was lured to Managua and murdered on Somoza's orders — and, on the testimony of a National Guard lieutenant present, with the

express blessing of the US ambassador Arthur Bliss Lane. He notes that one of the first aerial bombings of a civilian town in the hemisphere was the Marine raid on Ocotal in 1927, "eight years before Mussolini's Italians exercised in gunning down defenceless Abyssinians from the air" and ten before Guernica. He records that the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was launched from Nicaraguan soil. And he catches the Carter administration in its own contradiction: in mid-1978, the Washington Post reported, President Carter sent Somoza a personal note congratulating him "for promises to improve the human rights situation," weeks before a military-training grant for the Guard went through Congress.

The book's method here deserves the same credit the Africa volume earned. Ignatiev cites, and he convicts Washington out of Western mouths — Newsweek on the fortune the Marine Corps had installed, the Washington Post and the New York Times on Somoza's paid friends in Congress, the Wall Street Journal admitting that "we established the National Guard, trained it and gave it guns." When he quotes the "catechism" drilled into Guard recruits by an American mercenary instructor — "'What do tigers feed on?' 'Red blood.' 'Whose blood?' 'The blood of the people'" — he is reproducing testimony published in a Costa Rican paper, not composing it in Moscow. And the human core of the book, the pages that stay with a reader, are the testimonies: the poet Ernesto Cardenal, whose island commune the Guard destroyed, saying that "to be young in Nicaragua today is a crime"; the fourteen-year-old who lost an arm to his own bomb and was tortured with electricity in five jails; the mother reading aloud the last letter of a dead son. This is real suffering, honestly transmitted. Where the book records the violence of Somoza and his sponsors, believe it. The epigraph the book hangs on Franklin Roosevelt — "Somoza is a sonofabitch, but he's ours" — is almost certainly apocryphal, and no introduction should present it as documented; but the relationship it names is not in doubt, and the book proves that relationship from the archive rather than the quip.

The party that was not there

The trouble is not with what the book documents but with the frame it fits the documentation into — and the frame becomes visible at the one point where the Soviet author steps out of the chronicle to give a political judgement. Ignatiev is anxious, throughout, to place a particular organisation at the moral centre of the revolution: the "Nicaraguan Socialist (Communist) Party," the pro-Moscow PSN. He gives its founding in 1944 a loving paragraph, its persecution its due,

and — crucially — presents its caution as wisdom. The PSN, he explains, believed in the early 1960s that armed struggle against Somoza was "premature" and that a revolution needed first "an independent working class party" to lead it; the young Sandinistas, by contrast, "ignored explanatory work among the masses." Both sides, he concludes, "were maximalists," and he reaches for two passages of Lenin from 1905 to hold the balance between them — quoting Collected Works on the need to combine armed action with patient work among the masses.

It reads as even-handed. It is not. The party the Soviet account credits with the correct line was the party that stood aside from the insurrection that actually won. The Sandinista Front was founded, in 1961–62, by militants who left the pro-Moscow party precisely because it would not fight; Carlos Fonseca Amador, whom the book rightly honours as a founder and martyr, was one of them. The Fourth International press said so at the time, in the same weeks Ignatiev's book was being set. Writing in *Intercontinental Press* on 3 September 1979, six weeks after the victory, Pedro Camejo, Sergio Rodríguez and Fred Murphy described the FSLN as having been founded by "young rebels who broke with the reformism of the Stalinist Nicaraguan Socialist Party." The organisation the Soviet book routes the revolution's legitimacy through — the responsible vanguard, gently instructing the hotheads — is the organisation the revolutionaries had to break with in order to make the revolution. Ignatiev cannot say this, because the whole architecture of official Communism rests on the claim that history vindicates the pro-Moscow party. So the party's abstention becomes prudence, the Sandinistas' break becomes youthful excess later corrected, and Lenin is enlisted to make the two look like halves of one truth. The silence is not about a fact the author lacked. It is about the one fact that would spoil the shape.

There is a related evasion in how the book handles the Sandinistas' own politics. It quotes their 1977 programme at length and approvingly, dwelling on the passages that promise most: that the revolution's goals will be secured "given a Marxist-Leninist approach and a firmly knit vanguard to direct the revolutionary process," that a worker-peasant government will "make socialism triumphant and create that society of free people of which Augusto Sandino dreamed." Ignatiev italicises these lines himself. What he selects for emphasis is the vocabulary that assimilates the Sandinistas to the Soviet model — the vanguard, the Marxist-Leninist direction, the road to socialism. He is reading the revolution he wants back into its founding documents.

The one category that never turns

This series applies a single test to every volume, and it is worth naming plainly because it is the test that separates propaganda from analysis. The test is whether a category the book uses against its enemies can ever be turned back on the book's own side. Ask two questions of any accusation. First, is it cashed out into a specific act that could be shown not to have happened? Second, could the category, as the book itself defines it, ever apply to the author's own camp?

On the first question *The Agony of a Dictatorship* scores well — better than most of this series. Its charges are concrete and, in the main, refutable and true. It names the torturers, dates the massacres, prints the aid figures, quotes the American congressmen by name. This is the honest end of the Soviet spectrum: a book that does its accusing with evidence rather than with essence.

It is the second question that undoes it. The book's governing category is "dictatorship," and it fills that word with real and terrible content: a censored press the ruler literally owns, elections that are rigged when they are held at all, a political police that disappears the young, torture chambers, a single family in possession of an entire economy, a ruling group answerable to no one. Every one of these is documented against Somoza with force. And not one of them is ever, for a single sentence, permitted to swing toward the state the book is written from, or toward the state it hopes Nicaragua will become. A censored press owned by the powerful, a police that jails people for their politics, elections without choice, a narrow group in unaccountable command of everything — these were structural facts of the Soviet Union in 1979, and the book's own moral vocabulary describes them exactly. The vocabulary is simply never allowed to point east. The word "dictatorship" in this book has a compass needle that swings only one way.

The most poignant instance is not an evasion by the authors at all, but a line they transmit without hearing it. Ernesto Cardenal, describing the disappeared of Nicaragua — the bodies on the refuse heaps, the gouged eyes, the young killed only for being young — turns to the reporter and pleads: "We want the Soviet Union daily to publish exposures of the atrocities perpetrated by Somoza." "For us," he adds, "what the Soviet Union says is most important." The reader in 1980 who knew what the Soviet press did not publish — about its own camps, its own disappeared, its own silenced — feels the irony the authors could not. Cardenal was appealing, in perfect good faith, to the one great power whose defining characteristic was

that it never published exposures of that kind about itself. The book records the appeal as a tribute. It is, without anyone intending it, the sharpest sentence in the volume about the limits of the tradition that produced it.

Borovik's reportage, being literary rather than analytic, sometimes comes closer to a universal standard than Ignatiev's chronicle does — and then stops short in the same way. Writing down a guerrilla's account of a massacre, he notes: "I still remember the sessions of the International Commission of Inquiry into the crimes of the Chilean military junta and know that at some time in the future all these details will be needed." The instinct is exactly right: crimes must be recorded so that they can be answered. But the commissions of inquiry that Borovik's tradition supported met to judge Pinochet and Somoza, never Kolyma. The idea that a crime against a people must one day be answered was cashed, in Soviet practice, only against the enemy's clients. A movement that explains its opponents by their guilt and its own side by its ideals has told you how it means to govern — and here, uncomfortably, that observation applies as much to the framework Ignatiev writes within as to any dictatorship he describes.

It should be said, in fairness, that on one large question the Soviet account and its critics stood together. Both denounced the American scheme the book calls "Somozaism without Somoza" — Washington's mid-crisis manoeuvre, through the Organisation of American States, to drop the dictator while keeping his National Guard, his economy and his state intact, and even to send an "inter-American" force under a peacekeeping flag. Ignatiev's pages on the OAS mediation, and on the June 1979 vote where the United States failed to win backing for intervention, are accurate and were shared, almost point for point, by the revolutionary left elsewhere. This was a real imperialist design, and the book is right to nail it.

The reply, and how to read the book

The Fourth International — the anti-Stalinist Marxist tradition from which these introductions are written — followed the Nicaraguan revolution week by week, and stood on the same side of the barricade as Ignatiev did: for the FSLN, against Somoza and against US intervention. Its American weekly, *Intercontinental Press*, devoted whole issues to the war in 1979, and the contrast with the Soviet book is not one of sympathy but of where each tradition located the revolution's driving force. For Ignatiev, agency runs through organisations and programmes — the vanguard party, the Marxist-Leninist direction, the correct line arrived at after error. For *Intercontinental Press* it ran through the self-activity of the

masses. Reporting the fall of Managua on 3 September 1979, its correspondents relayed the eyewitness Melvin Wallace: "What took place here was a popular insurrection, in the fullest political and military sense of the term." The working-class and poor districts of the eastern city rose first; people prised up the paving stones — made, as it happened, in Somoza's own cement factory — to build barricades, and improvised contact bombs and molotov cocktails because they had no other arms. Where the Soviet chronicle credits the insurrection's success to the maturing of a vanguard, the Trotskyist paper credited the poor of Managua who made weapons out of the dictator's pavement.

A reader should weigh the two together, and weigh the reply critically too. The Fourth International's enthusiasm ran ahead of events in its own way — Intercontinental Press wondered aloud whether Nicaragua might become "the second socialist revolution of the Americas," a hope the following decade would qualify. But the tradition that answered Ignatiev had one habit his did not: it went on reporting the revolution's internal life after the cameras left, including the parts that did not flatter. That is the same difference the companion volume, *Secret Weapon in Africa*, exposed on the terrain of Angola, where the Soviet reporter could see the enemy's violence in fine detail and had no words at all for his own side's. Here the failure is gentler, because Somoza was as bad as the book says and the American hand was as heavy; but it is the same failure. The book has an exact and unsparing name for every crime on the far side of the barricade and no name whatever for the possibility of crime on the near side.

So read *The Agony of a Dictatorship* for what it genuinely is: a vivid, well-sourced, first-hand record of the Somoza tyranny and of the United States' four decades of responsibility for it — a book that convicts Washington largely from Washington's own press, and that preserves the testimony of Nicaraguans who would otherwise be lost to the record. On that subject it is a real source, and better than most of what this series reprints. Read its politics — its rehabilitation of the party that stayed home, its one-way compass, its programme quoted for the words that suited Moscow — against the Fourth International's contemporaneous coverage in *Intercontinental Press* through the summer and autumn of 1979, which backed the same revolution and still insisted on seeing all of it. The men and women in Borovik's camp, laughing over their coffee before setting out to fight, deserved both things: the honour the book pays them, and the honesty it could not quite manage. "We only look weaker," one boy tells him at the end, "actually we're stronger." He was right, and the book is at its best when it simply lets him say so.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

Peking Reaches Out

Moscow's case file on the Sino-Soviet frontier, assembled as the thirty-year alliance lapsed - Pravda dispatches alongside long archival essays by Sladkovsky, Tikhvinsky and Myasnikov on the nineteenth-century treaties.

G. V. Vasilyev and others

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

The English title is an editorial act. On the copyright page of this volume, in transliterated Cyrillic, stands the Russian original: Territorial Claims of Peking: Present and History. That is a lawyer's title — flat, defensive, promising a dossier. Peking Reaches Out: A Study of Chinese Expansionism is something else. "Reaches out" is a grab, and "A Study of" claims a scholarly form that the Russian title does not claim for itself. Somewhere between Moscow and the export list, a brief for the defence was repackaged as an indictment. Readers should keep the Russian title in mind throughout, because the book is at its most revealing exactly where it is defending, and at its weakest where the English title promises attack.

For once in this series the date on the spine is the real date. Progress translations often lag their Russian originals by years, and several volumes we have reissued are older books in newer jackets. Not this one. The compilation is signed by five hands — G. V. Vasilyev, M. V. Kapasov, R. A. Mirovitskaya, V. S. Myasnikov and Y. S. Semyonov — and the latest datable item in it is a Pravda despatch from Delhi of 23 February 1980, reporting an election speech by Indira Gandhi. The book was closed in the spring of 1980 and it is arguing about the spring of 1980.

What was happening that spring is the key to everything the book does and does not say. In February and March 1979 China had invaded Vietnam, to "teach a lesson," and had been badly handled in the process. In April 1979 — as the volume itself records — "the Chinese government said that it did not intend to renew the Treaty on Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance between the USSR and the PRC, which will thus be terminated in April 1980." The thirty-year alliance signed by Stalin and Mao in February 1950 was about to expire, and Moscow wanted the record to show whose fault that was. A first round of Soviet-Chinese normalisation talks ran in Moscow from 23 September to 10 December 1979 and produced nothing but an agreement to meet again. This book is

the paper accompaniment to that failure: a case file assembled for the moment the alliance formally lapsed.

It is an anthology, and its sources are worth reading off the page. Roughly half the contents are journalism reprinted from Pravda with the date attached, running from 1 April 1978 to February 1980. The other half is scholarship: long historical essays by M. Sladkovsky, S. Tikhvinsky and V. Myasnikov, three of the most senior names in Soviet sinology, on the Russo-Chinese frontier treaties and on the treatment of history inside the People's Republic. Interleaved are official documents — a Declaration of the Soviet Government, statements by the governments of Vietnam and Laos, a piece by Yumzhagiin Tsedenbal of Mongolia. It is a state's brief with an academic annexe.

One byline deserves a note. "Contrary to the Historical Truth," printed here over the name I. Alexandrov, is sourced in the book itself to Pravda of 8 December 1979. Soviet readers of that period understood "I. Alexandrov" not as a person but as a signal: the byline was reserved for statements carrying the authority of the Central Committee apparatus, and its appearance told everyone in the Soviet bloc and every embassy in Moscow that what followed was policy, not commentary. The internal evidence is consistent with that reading — the article speaks throughout in the first person of the state ("our country," "the Soviet side"), quotes Brezhnev twice, and announces the lapse of the 1950 treaty. It appeared two days before the normalisation talks broke up. This is the Soviet government talking to itself in public, and it is the most important text in the volume.

Now to the honest part, which has to come first, because everything else in this introduction depends on the reader trusting that we are not simply reversing the book's polarity.

Chinese territorial claims in this period were real, they were extensive, and they were officially sponsored. The book's foreword notes that China: A General Survey, published in Peking in English and French in October 1979, carried a

detailed inventory of "lost lands," and that the exhibition mounted in the Peking Museum of the Chinese Revolution for the PRC's thirtieth anniversary opened with a section on China's "alienated territories." The chapters by Tikhvinsky and Myasnikov document the historiographical apparatus behind this with named journals and dates a reader can check: a February 1962 article in *Minzu tuanjie* claiming that China's "Western area" had once taken in Kashmir, northern Afghanistan, Kokand, Kazakhstan, Khorezm and parts of Iran; a 1961 academic conference at which a speaker argued that "One should not label those who seek expansion as aggressors and those who fall into decay and are on the verge of perishing, as victims of aggression worthy of sympathy"; the Kuomintang-era geographer Hua Chi-yun's map of "old borders" running from Kamchatka to Singapore. That is a genuine bibliography of a genuine phenomenon, and Soviet sinology was documenting it in detail a decade before most Western scholarship caught up.

The account of the 1969 fighting on the Ussuri also holds up better than a hostile reader might expect. The book states that on the night of 1 March 1969 a Chinese unit of about three hundred moved onto Damansky Island — Zhenbao to the Chinese — with anti-tank guns, mortars and heavy machine guns pre-positioned on the Chinese bank, and opened fire on the Soviet border guards who approached them on the morning of 2 March. Chinese archival material that has since become available broadly supports this: the March 2 action was planned in advance and approved at a high level. Thirty-one Soviet border guards were killed. The book is not lying about that, and the reader who assumes it must be will be wrong.

And the invasion of Vietnam happened. Five hundred thousand Chinese troops crossed the border of a country that had been at war almost continuously since 1945, wrecked several northern towns on the way out, and their government then spent a year threatening a "second lesson." No amount of context makes that anything other than what the book calls it. On the specific charge that the People's Republic under Mao and under his successors used force and subversion against most of its neighbours, the book's factual case is substantially sound.

The trouble begins where the book has to explain why the Soviet side of the same frontier is different in kind.

Every serious question here converges on two treaties: Aigun, signed 16 May 1858, which gave Russia the left bank of the Amur, and Peking, signed 2 November 1860, which gave Russia the Ussuri region and the Maritime Territory —

together some hundreds of thousands of square kilometres, transferred from a Qing state then in the fourth year of a war with Britain and France and in the middle of the Taiping rebellion. The historical chapter narrates this with unusual candour and then draws the opposite conclusion from its own facts. It records that the Anglo-French army took Tianjin in May 1858; Aigun was signed on 16 May 1858. It records that by August 1860 Anglo-French troops were in Tianjin, had sacked and burned the Yuanmingyuan, and that the Emperor had fled — and the Peking Treaty was signed in the Russian Ecclesiastical Mission that November. In the book's telling, Russia was not exploiting this catastrophe but mitigating it: Count Ignatiev "was the mouthpiece of a friendly country," and the Aigun negotiation was "six days of hard bargaining" concluded, at China's own suggestion, "by common consent, for the benefit of the greater and eternal mutual friendship of the two states."

Then comes the sentence the book cannot survive: "So obviously equitable was the Aigun Treaty that the Qing Emperor without hesitation issued an edict on 2 June 1858 to endorse all 'that was discussed in the talks'." Two paragraphs later the authors quote, with evident satisfaction, Alexander II's reaction to the same document: "We could not hope for better." An equitable settlement is not one that exceeds the hopes of one party. The Tsar's remark is in the book because the compilers read it as evidence of Russian good fortune; it is in fact the best short refutation of their thesis, printed by them, in their own text.

Which brings us to the hinge, and to the reason this volume matters more than most of the anti-Chinese literature Progress was producing in these years. On 25 July 1919 the government of Soviet Russia issued a Message to the Chinese People and the Governments of North and South China, restated in a Note of 27 September 1920 — the Karakhan Declarations, after the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs whose name they carry. They renounced the Tsarist treaties with China, the extraterritorial rights, the concessions, the Russian share of the Boxer indemnity. They were, for a generation of Chinese nationalists and for the men who founded the Chinese Communist Party two years later, the most electrifying thing any European government had ever said to China. This book is, in substantial part, a sustained argument that they did not mean what China took them to mean.

The argument has three moves, and each is worth watching.

The first is periodisation. The book quotes Lenin, in 1900, on the plunder of China — "The bourgeois governments of

Europe have long been conducting this policy of plunder with respect to China, and now they have been joined by the autocratic Russian Government" — and then says: "The treaties demarcating the Russo-Chinese frontier were signed much earlier, and Lenin and the Soviet government never regarded them as unequal, as a result of the imperialist policy of brigandage that tsarism began pursuing at the turn of the century." The periodisation of Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism is thereby converted into a statute of limitations. Annexations carried out in 1858 are pre-imperialist, and therefore not annexations. It is an ingenious use of a Marxist category and a completely illegitimate one; nothing in Lenin suggests that territory taken from a prostrate state at gunpoint becomes legitimate by being taken forty years too early.

The second move is textual. The 1919 Message, the book insists, listed the specific treaties it regarded as unequal — the Treaty of 1896, the Peking Protocol of 1901, the agreements with Japan of 1907–1916 — and said nothing about the frontier. "There is thus not a word in the Message of 1919 about the frontier between China and Russia or about the Russo-Chinese treaties demarcating that frontier." As a reading of a list, that is defensible. But the book then quotes the Message's own general clause, and the general clause is not a list. The Soviet Government, it says, "has renounced all the conquests of the tsarist Government, which had wrested Manchuria and other regions from China. Let the peoples of these regions decide for themselves within the frontiers of what country they wish to live and what form of government they wish to have." That second sentence is not a treaty-validity test at all. It is a plebiscitary principle, and a plebiscitary principle has no natural stopping place at the Amur.

The book knows this, and its third move is the one that should be read slowly. Having invoked Lenin's dictum that "Frontiers are determined by the will of the population," the authors apply it to the disputed territory:

In the other regions adjoining China—the Maritime Territory and the Amur region—the population, which had long consisted mainly of Russians, exercised its right to self-determination and, together with the rest of the Russian people, formed the Soviet Socialist State.

There it is. The Maritime Territory had a Russian majority in 1917 because of what happened in 1860; the settlement was the content of the annexation. Self-determination is being administered to the settlers and the result read back as a ratification of the conquest that put them there. Every colonial

power in the twentieth century made this argument, usually in worse faith and rarely in the vocabulary of Lenin. It is the single most damaging sentence in the book, and the compilers printed it because they could not see it.

There is a fourth manoeuvre, the driest and in some ways the saddest. What exactly, juridically, was the 1919 Message? The book's answer: an offer. "A proposal to conclude an agreement on the annulment of treaties is juridically quite different from a unilateral renunciation of these treaties." Since no Chinese government of the warlord period ever formally accepted, "the Soviet proposal to consider the unequal treaties null and void was left hanging in the air. There are absolutely no grounds for referring to the 1920 Note as proof of the Soviet government's unilateral renunciation of any treaties." The volume then quotes the Soviet Mission's note of 13 December 1923 to make the point in the language of contract: the Chinese government "will acquire the rights arising from the principles of the Soviet declarations only when these principles are formalised in a bilateral act of international significance."

Measure the distance travelled. In 1919 a revolutionary government told the Chinese people that it had given back what the Tsars had stolen, and asked nothing in return. By 1980 the same state's lawyers explain that this was a conditional offer which lapsed for want of acceptance, and that whatever survived of it was discharged in full by the Agreement of 31 May 1924. That is not a falsification of the historical record — the 1924 Agreement exists, the negotiating history is roughly as described, and the book is right that Sun Yat-sen's Kuomintang and, later, Mao himself both praised the 1924 settlement in exactly those terms. It is something more disquieting than falsification: the complete conversion of a revolutionary act into a piece of treaty administration, performed by people who no longer register that anything has been lost.

The reply to this argument was in print eleven years before the book appeared, and it came from people with no investment in Chinese nationalism either. Under the heading "The Sino-Soviet Border Dispute," Intercontinental Press of 7 April 1969 carried a long analysis over the name Pierre Gousset, written on 24 March, three weeks after the fighting on the Ussuri. It starts from the same 1920 Note that the Progress compilers spend so many pages narrowing, and quotes it: the Soviet government "declares null and void all treaties which the former Russian government concluded with China. It renounces claim to all the territory taken from China and restores to China unconditionally and forever everything that the czarist government and the Russian bourgeoisie

rapaciously took from it." The 1980 volume's case is that "all treaties" here means some treaties, enumerated elsewhere. Gousset's is shorter: "Marxists and the revolutionary anti-imperialist movements have never recognized as eternal the dictated treaties by which the imperialist powers carved up the flesh of the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Oceania. When the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, Lenin and Trotsky officially disavowed all dictated treaties." What went wrong came later: "after the proclamation of the People's Republic of China, Stalin failed to respect the promise made by Lenin and Trotsky. There is where the main responsibility lies for the conflict in the Far East between the two workers states."

What makes that article worth recovering is that it declines the mirror-image error. Gousset does not hand the Maritime Territory to Peking. "Of course, nineteenth-century imperial China was an empire oppressing many nationalities in the same way as czarist Russia or the European imperialist powers. The ultimate fate of the territories Lenin and Trotsky promised to return to China was to depend on the application of the right of nationalities to self-determination." He allows that the inhabitants might well "have opted in favor of autonomy within the USSR, or of independence, or of a Sino-Soviet condominium," and adds that "The same principle would no doubt have applied to not a few national minorities living on the territory of the People's Republic of China." That is precisely the position the 1980 volume claims to hold and does not: self-determination as a live question with an unknown answer, rather than a certificate issued retrospectively to whoever the annexation had already installed. On the clashes themselves the piece refuses to act as prosecutor for either party — the question "is not so much who provoked the last two incidents on March 2 and March 15 as why these incidents have been deliberately inflated by both sides."

The same current said the same thing about the war this book was written to denounce. The Fourth International's statement of 21 February 1979, printed in Intercontinental Press on 12 March, condemned the invasion of Vietnam without qualification — "The military offensive launched by the Chinese bureaucracy cannot be seen simply as a border incident. It is an act of war" — while refusing the Soviet framing of it: "It is the conflict between the Soviet and Chinese bureaucracies, for which the Kremlin bears the historic responsibility, that constitutes the framework for the clashes between the Chinese, Vietnamese, and Khmer Rouge leaderships." And Livio Maitan, in "How Can There Be Wars Between Workers States?" (Intercontinental Press, 9 April 1979), supplied the explanation this volume most

conspicuously lacks. Once "socialism in one country" is accepted, he wrote, "it becomes logical to accept and even to advocate a division into spheres of influence; and therefore to become preoccupied with the defence—and eventual extension—of these spheres. Border questions in turn acquire an importance which far exceeds their intrinsic significance." That is a description of the book you are holding.

The tradition offers no comfortable alternative claim to the Amur, and should not pretend to. What it does offer is the method the book has abandoned. Trotsky's *The Third International After Lenin* (1928), in the third section on the Chinese revolution, turns on the distinction the compilers of 1980 cannot afford to make: "Lenin really taught us to differentiate rigidly between an oppressed and oppressor bourgeois nation. From this follow conclusions of exceptional importance." Applied to 1858 and 1860, that distinction places Tsarist Russia unambiguously on the oppressor side of the transaction — which is why the book has to argue that the transaction took place before the categories switched on. And on the underlying question of whether Soviet policy toward the Far Eastern frontier was ever a matter of principle rather than of state convenience, Trotsky's judgement in "The Beginning of the End" (October 1937) is worth setting beside the 1980 volume's insistence on the sanctity of the treaty line: "The surrender of the Amur Islands has completely untied the hands of Japan with respect to China." Islands on the Amur were negotiable in 1937, when Moscow was placating Tokyo, and non-negotiable in 1980, when Moscow was isolating Peking. The frontier did not change. The requirement did.

Two silences complete the picture, and both are in the book's own field of vision.

The first is Afghanistan. Y. Dimov's chapter, "20,000 Kilometres of Provocations," contains a full section on Afghanistan, denouncing Peking for "smuggling arms to Afghan tribes inhabiting the villages along the border with China" and for weaving conspiracies against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan from its earliest months. The chapter was written in 1979. The book was closed in the spring of 1980, at least three months after Soviet forces entered Afghanistan in December 1979, and there is not one word about them anywhere in the volume. The foreword, meanwhile, defines the enemy: imperialism's "urge to dominate other countries and peoples, to interfere, both covertly and openly, in their internal affairs, to dictate terms, to establish spheres of influence, and to 'teach them lessons' by main force." And when the book has to explain the Soviet divisions stationed in Mongolia, it reaches for a formula that

was, at the moment of printing, being used daily about Kabul: "These troops are in fraternal Mongolia at the request of the Mongolian government." The compilers were not being sly. They had a category for cross-border force — hegemonism — and it simply did not attach to their own state.

The second silence is Kampuchea. The book is entirely right about the Pol Pot regime, whose overthrow was a deliverance, and right that Peking sponsored it. But the overthrow arrives in these pages as spontaneous combustion: national patriotic forces formed a United Front in December 1978, and "The Pol Pot-Ieng Sary regime collapsed in January 1979." A chapter titled "Victory of the People's Revolution" is contributed by Ros Samay. The Vietnamese armoured columns that actually took Phnom Penh in the first week of January 1979 are not in the book. Six weeks later China crossed the Vietnamese border and the book calls it aggression, correctly. The two events are given opposite categories, and the only operative difference is which side did it.

The same asymmetry runs through the volume's treatment of islands. N. Borodin's chapter on the Senkakus takes Japan's side in full against the Chinese claim, which rests on possession before the Japanese seizure of 1895. Elsewhere the book denounces "the Peking rulers" for supporting "these monopolies' unlawful claims to the Kuriles, which are Soviet territory" — the Kuriles having been taken from Japan in 1945. Prior possession settles the matter in the East China Sea and settles nothing in the Sea of Okhotsk.

What is worth keeping? More than the foregoing suggests. The historical chapters by Sladkovsky and Myasnikov are the work of trained scholars and, read against their own conclusions, are a usable documentary spine: Nerchinsk, Kyakhta, Aigun, Peking, the Chuguchak Protocol of 1864, the St Petersburg Treaty of 1881, the Pamir exchange of 1894, the 1924 Agreement and the diplomatic correspondence of the 1920s are set out with dates and archival references that can be checked. The survey of irredentist historiography inside the PRC is a real contribution. The foreword's use of the writer it calls Lu Xin — Lu Xun — is honest and well chosen, particularly his 1934 demolition of the claim that Genghis Khan was Chinese, which ends with the observation that "The Russians were subjected earlier than we were, so they should have been the ones to say" it. That is a Chinese internationalist mocking Chinese great-power myth-making, quoted accurately, and it is the best thing in the book. And the chronology of border incidents, stripped of its adjectives, remains a serviceable reference.

Read it, then, as two books bound together. One is a competent and largely accurate dossier on the nationalism of the Chinese state at the end of the Mao era, compiled by people who knew the material. The other is a legal defence of a frontier drawn by Tsarist gunboat diplomacy during the Opium Wars, conducted by the heirs of the government that once offered to give it back. The second book is the historically important one, because it contains its own indictment. The Message of 25 July 1919 survives in these pages, quoted at length — but only inside an argument for why it did not mean what the Chinese people understood it to mean. A state that has to explain, at that length, why its own revolutionary promise was merely an unaccepted offer has already told you what became of the revolution.

ANTI-IMPERIALISM

The Truth About Afghanistan

The Soviet answer to the UN vote on Afghanistan, assembled within weeks by the Novosti agency - including "eyewitness" reports by Western communist journalists flown to Kabul and commissioned by the book's own publisher.

Dmitry Chasovennikov

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

The dated items in this book run from 27 December 1979

to early February 1980; the last is a dispatch on Zbigniew Brzezinski's trip to Islamabad and Riyadh. It was in English and in circulation later that year. A turnaround of a few months tells you what the volume is. The Truth About Afghanistan is not a study. It is a rapid-response file, assembled to be handed to a foreign journalist, a friendly parliamentarian or a Western Communist Party press officer who needed something to say.

It was also not published by Progress. The imprint is the Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow, 1980 — this series spans several Soviet imprints, and the distinction matters. Progress was the prestige house: Marx, Lenin, philosophy, textbooks. Novosti — APN — was the Soviet Union's other news agency, founded in 1961 and formally sponsored by public organisations rather than by the state, which was precisely its usefulness. TASS spoke as the government; Novosti supplied material presentable as something other than an official Soviet statement. Note the credit line under almost every eyewitness report here: "Specially for APN."

That phrase is the key to the volume's construction. The "Eyewitness Reports" chapter is the section a reader is meant to find most persuasive, because it is not Brezhnev talking. The witnesses are Phillip Bonosky of the American Daily World, K. Gopalakrishnan of Janayugam and Masood Ali Khan of New Age, Janis Ligas of Rizospastis, Roland Michel of L'Humanité Dimanche, Miloš Krejčí of Rudé Právo, Miguel Urbano Rodrigues of Portugal's Diário — the papers of the Communist Parties of the United States, India, Greece, France, Czechoslovakia and Portugal, plus Pravda staffers and an APN man. Every one was flown to Kabul in January 1980 by the government he then vindicated, and most filed "Specially for APN": commissioned by this book's publisher. The independent corroboration is a closed circuit. It is not that these men lied — Bonosky's account of the emptied cells at

Pul-i-Charkhi has the texture of something seen. It is that the book presents as external testimony a set of reports it arranged, paid for and printed itself.

The word that never appears

The commission is easy to date. Soviet troops crossed the Amu Darya on 25 December 1979. On 7 January 1980 the USSR vetoed a Security Council resolution calling for withdrawal; the matter went to the General Assembly, which on 14 January demanded the withdrawal of foreign troops by 104 votes to 18, with much of the non-aligned world voting against Moscow. This book is the answer to that vote, and its chapters are aimed at the constituencies that were lost: "US Imperialism and Its Allies Are the Worst Enemies of Afghanistan and All Islamic Peoples" for the Islamic states, "Subversive Activities of Chinese Hegemonists" for the Sino-Soviet front, "Arab Reaction Sides with Imperialism" for Cairo and Riyadh, Gromyko in Damascus and Delhi for the non-aligned.

The vocabulary is uniform across two hundred pages and never slips. There are no Soviet forces in Afghanistan; there is a "limited contingent." It was not sent; it was "brought in at our request." It is not an intervention; it is "assistance," "fraternal solidarity," "internationalist assistance." Brezhnev states the negative outright: "It goes without saying that there has been no Soviet 'intervention' or 'aggression' whatsoever." A further refutation of "slandorous concoctions about 'Soviet occupation of Afghanistan'", one report adds, is "the almost total absence of Soviet soldiers in Kabul." Brezhnev allows one moment of weight — "It was no easy decision for us to send Soviet military contingents to Afghanistan" — the only sentence in the book that sounds like a man rather than a communiqué.

Under the vocabulary sits a question of fact the book cannot keep straight: who asked, and when. It gives three incompatible answers. Brezhnev says the request came "already during the lifetime of President Taraki and later" —

Taraki was dead by October 1979, so "later" means under his successor. Brezhnev again, more precisely: "Three successive Afghan governments pressed us to give assistance." And then the book's own account of Karmal's press conference of 10 January 1980: "Karmal said it was the old government that had invited in a limited contingent of Soviet troops. This was not done by Amin, who has been proved to be an agent of the CIA, but by the majority of the Revolutionary Council."

Hold those together. The three successive governments were Taraki's, Hafizullah Amin's and Karmal's — and the second is the one the book devotes an entire chapter to establishing was run by an American agent. On the book's own arithmetic, a CIA asset invited the Soviet army in. Karmal's fix is to split the Amin government from its own Revolutionary Council: the request came from "the majority" of a body whose chairman was Amin, at a time when Karmal was not in the country. The book concedes the exile elsewhere, noting that Amin's campaign against loyal members "including Babrak Karmal and Anahita Ratebzad" forced some "to emigrate or go underground." Karmal had been shipped out as ambassador to Prague in 1978 and refused to return. He came back to Kabul after the assault, not before. The book never says how he got there.

Amin

The chapter that gives this volume its permanent interest is "Amin, Murderer and Imperialist Agent," and its charges are laid out with confidence. Amin was recruited as a student — "Many Afghans who were trained in the United States in 1962–1964 can confirm that Amin, during his period of residence there maintained close contacts with known American CIA agents and officials." The handling continued: "We now know for sure who recruited Amin and guided his spying activities inside our Party and we can say exactly which CIA agents Amin met, and where, in 1973–1978, when he received the assignments to blow up the Party." He was paid — in 1978 "Amin boasted that he had received some very expensive gifts." He murdered Taraki, then plotted with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami a joint coup for 29 December at which the PDPA was to be dissolved and its cadre liquidated, with Washington's representatives promising support "by the strength of US armed forces in case of necessity". Karmal claimed "indisputable documented evidence, including Amin's personal records," showing that Amin "would not have hesitated to annihilate half of Afghanistan's population." The conclusion: "The facts irrefutably demonstrate that Amin and his associates were CIA

agents on the payroll of imperialist forces hostile to Afghanistan."

Now ask what evidence is produced. For the CIA charge: nothing. Not one document, photograph, intercept, name of a handler or date of a meeting — despite the claim to know "exactly which CIA agents Amin met, and where." The "personal records" Karmal invoked on 21 January 1980 were never published, then, during the nine years of Soviet presence, or since. The sources are in every instance assertions by members of the government installed on 27 December: Aslam Watanjar, Noor Ahmad Noor, Karmal himself. The indictment rests on the word of the beneficiaries.

The murder of Taraki is a different matter and deserves a different judgement. The chapter prints testimony from Jandad, commander of the presidential guard, and a guard named Hadud, given to an "examining judge" — the shooting outside Taraki's office on 14 September 1979, the disarming of the guard, the house arrest, the order to kill. This is confession evidence taken from men held by the government that overthrew Amin, which is reason for caution. But it is broadly consistent with the settled account: Amin had Taraki smothered, and the announcement of death by illness was a lie. On this charge the book is in substance right — and is using a true accusation of murder to smuggle in an unproven accusation of treason, which is the oldest trick in the file.

And then there is what the chapter does not say. It never mentions that Hafizullah Amin was a founder of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan; that he led its Khalq faction; that he built the clandestine network of officers inside the Afghan army; that it was that network which carried out the coup of 27 April 1978; that he was foreign minister and then prime minister of the republic this book exists to defend. The April revolution is celebrated on nearly every page — General Abdul Kadir is named among the officers "active in the April revolution," the defence minister credited with having "ensured the success of the April revolution," Taraki given full honours as founder and martyr. Amin's name never appears in that company. The chapter's own chronology has him on CIA assignment "to blow up the Party" from 1973 to 1978 — throughout the period in which he brought that party to power. The contradiction is not addressed because it cannot be. The silence is the finding.

Anyone who has read the transcripts of the Moscow trials of 1936–38 will recognise the form: the defeated leader is not merely wrong, not merely criminal, but revealed to have been a foreign agent from the beginning, his whole revolutionary

biography retrospectively converted into deep cover. Trotsky dissected the method in *The Stalin School of Falsification*; the Dewey Commission took it apart charge by charge in *Not Guilty* (1938). The difference in 1980 is that there was no trial at all, not even a rigged one — because there was no defendant left to try.

What happened at the Tajbeg Palace

The book's account of 27 December 1979 is unambiguous, and it is the point on which the whole volume breaks. A PDPA official, Abdul Zuhoor, is quoted ridiculing "the story widely spread by the American, Chinese and Pakistani media that Amin's overthrow was the handiwork of the Soviet Union which allegedly ousted him by bringing in the Soviet Army." On the contrary: "The entire planning and execution of the uprising of December 27 was the work of the Leadership Committee of the People's Democratic Party, in coordination with the Kabul City Committee and Army units loyal to the April revolution." Brezhnev says the same: "the people under the leadership of the People's Democratic Party, headed by Babrak Karmal, rose against Amin's tyranny and put an end to it." The chapter's closing sentence has the party "exposed and eliminated Amin."

Eliminated by whom, and how, the book will not say. In two hundred pages it never states that Amin died, never describes his death, never mentions a trial, a sentence or a grave. He simply stops.

What happened is now a matter of record, including in Russian sources: on the evening of 27 December 1979 Soviet KGB and GRU special forces stormed the Tajbeg Palace and killed Hafizullah Amin there. The Politburo had taken the decision to send troops on 12 December. Karmal's proclamation, printed here as a message delivered "over Kabul radio" on 27 December, was in fact broadcast from Soviet territory while the fighting was still going on; the transcript reproduced is dated "Kabul, December 29, 1979."

So: a state killed the head of a foreign government, installed a new one, and then published a book — in English, for the world — devoting a chapter to proving that the man its soldiers had shot was a murderer and an imperialist agent, while denying that its soldiers had anything to do with his removal. The chapter is not an argument for the killing. It is a substitute for admitting the killing happened.

What the book gets right

A reader told that everything here is worthless will be badly served, and unprepared for how much of it is true.

The April 1978 government's reform programme was real and so were its enemies. The book's summary of what reached the villages — "cooperative, agrarian reform, cancellation of debts to money-lenders" and the abolition of illiteracy — is accurate. Peasant debt was cancelled; a ceiling was placed on landholdings and land redistributed; a mass literacy campaign was launched in a country where, as the book correctly and repeatedly states, "Ninety per cent of the population is illiterate," and it was extended to women, which is precisely why village mullahs and landlords fought it. Teachers were killed for teaching women to read. When one of the book's reporters puts that to a counter-revolutionary spokesman — "The killers said they were hounding village teachers because they taught not only children but also village women to read and write" — the charge is not fabricated.

Nor is the external backing invented. The insurgency was armed and sheltered from Pakistan with Islamabad's connivance; the Peshawar parties — Hekmatyar's Hezb-e Islami, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi's National Liberation Front — are named correctly, and the camps listed at Parachinar, Miram Shah, Chitral, Warsak and Quetta were real places. The book notes Senator Charles Percy calling publicly for direct US aid to the rebels, and prints a photograph of Brzezinski at the Khyber Pass. It was right about the direction of travel, and right earlier than it could prove: President Carter authorised covert support to Afghan opponents of the Kabul government in July 1979, months before Soviet troops entered — confirmed by Robert Gates in *From the Shadows* (1996) and boasted of by Brzezinski in a 1998 interview with *Le Nouvel Observateur*. Saudi matching funds and the ISI's control of the pipeline are documented. The mujahideen were not innocents and their sponsors were not disinterested.

The long historical chapter, "A Hundred Years of Gross Outside Interference," is the most solid thing in the volume: Anglo-Russian rivalry, British efforts to make Afghanistan a base against Soviet Turkestan, British backing for the revolt that destroyed Amanullah's reforming monarchy, Axis interest in the 1930s, American courtship after 1945. The continuity it draws — that Afghan modernisation had been strangled from outside before, and by some of the same families — is real.

Three corrections

First, Herat. The book describes the March 1979 rising as an incursion: bands "equipped with American and Chinese weapons, intruded into Herat, Afghanistan's third largest city, occupied military installations and food stores." Herat was a mutiny of the army's 17th Division joined by a mass urban insurrection, in which Soviet advisers and their families were among the killed, and which the government suppressed by bombarding its own third city. Estimates vary widely and the historiography is contested, but the dead run into the thousands. Converting an internal revolt into a foreign invasion is the most consequential falsification here, because the legal case for the "limited contingent" — Article 51, collective self-defence against external aggression — depends on the insurgency being imported rather than domestic.

Second, the terror. The book states that "over two thousand Party members were arrested within as few as nine or ten months preceding the December change of government, and close on 500 of them were shot," and calls Pul-i-Charkhi "Amin's Bastille." Those arrests and executions happened. But the prison filled from 1978, under Taraki — this book's martyr — with Amin the operative power beneath him. Confining the terror to Amin's hundred days rescues the April revolution at the cost of the record.

Third, the promises. Karmal's proclamation of 27 December is printed in full: prisoners released, freedom of the press and assembly, "the freedom to create progressive patriotic parties," and, on the war, "The fate of those persons who were involved in the armed struggle against the government will be decided by political means." The 40th Army left in February 1989, after nine years, upwards of a million Afghan deaths and five million refugees.

The reply

The claim this book cannot survive is the one it never states outright: that a socialist state may settle a political crisis in a neighbouring party by sending its army to kill that party's leader. It would be dishonest, though, to pretend the anti-Stalinist left met that claim with a single voice. It did not, and the record is public. Intercontinental Press of 3 March 1980 printed three rival resolutions side by side, noting that the first "was adopted by the United Secretariat of the Fourth International by a majority vote at its January 26-29 meeting", and that "Following the resolution are two resolutions supported by minorities at that meeting."

The majority refused political endorsement — "They do not give the slightest political support to this intervention" — but

also refused the demand for withdrawal, arguing that invoking Afghan sovereignty here "would be nothing but a democratic guise for the aims of reaction and imperialism", and that "In so far as the Soviet army actually is opposing the enemies of the workers and peasants, they favor its victory over them." The first minority went further: Soviet military power used against the reactionary forces "is progressive, regardless of the motivations of the Kremlin". Such positions were reached honestly, by people who had watched Chile in 1973 and would not be neutral about a mujahideen victory. They were also wrong, and conceded Moscow the one thing that mattered.

The second minority did not concede it. Written in January 1980, before any archive had opened, it says exactly what this book denies: "Without a doubt, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan is being carried out in gross violation of the right of peoples to self-determination. It is, in fact, well known that the Soviet troops themselves overthrew Amin in order to replace him by Karmal, who they brought from exile with them." It adds that "there is no qualitative difference between the regimes of Taraki, Amin, and Karmal, each of which has been supported in turn by the Kremlin" — disposing of the agent story in a line — and concludes that "it is imperative that the Soviet troops withdraw from Afghanistan immediately", while insisting the demand not be confused with support for the "mujahideen". Set that beside Abdul Zuhoor's claim about the Leadership Committee: the book is answered by a contemporary, from the left, on the evidence then available.

The argument ran another year and the withdrawal position won it. A report from the Belgian section's *La Gauche*, translated in *Intercontinental Press* of 8 March 1982, records the International Executive Committee vote: "one defended the old majority position (it was rejected by a vote of 24 to 9, with 6 abstentions); the other proposed a change in orientation and was adopted by a vote of 20 to 13, with 6 abstentions." Michel Lequenne, in *Rouge* and reprinted in the same issue, described a government "put in the saddle by Soviet troops" which no longer had a social base of its own, and ended: "What will go rotten in Afghanistan is the Soviet army." He was six years early.

The final word came from Moscow. On 24 December 1989 the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR adopted a resolution declaring the decision to send troops into Afghanistan deserving of moral and political condemnation. The state that published *The Truth About Afghanistan* repudiated the book's central claim within a decade, in its own parliament, in public. There is no better argument for republishing it. A propaganda document loses its power when

the sponsor recants; what remains is evidence — of how the case was made, to whom, in what words, and at what cost to the people in whose name it was made.

INTERNATIONALISM

The Working Class and Its Allies

The Soviet doctrine of class alliances restated against Eurocommunism - who the working class may march with, and why its leading role was the one thing the Western parties could not negotiate away.

Lev Borisovich Moskvín

Introduction to the 1980 Edition

L. B. Moskvín's *The Working Class and Its Allies* is a book about who the workers may march with, and on whose authority. Its subject is the oldest strategic question in Marxism — the doctrine of class alliances — and its answer is the official Soviet one of its moment: the working class is the "leading force" of every progressive coalition, the peasantry and the "non-proletarian strata" are its allies, and the whole alliance is held together by a party that speaks in the working class's name. The book states that doctrine with unusual clarity, documents it with a mass of contemporary fact, and never once turns it on the state that commissioned it. That refusal is the most revealing thing about it.

Date the text before reading it. The spine says 1980, and for once the spine is close to the truth: this is a genuinely contemporary book, not a reprint in a new jacket. Its latest events are the French National Assembly elections of March 1978, the West German Communists' Mannheim congress of October 1978, and the American farmers' tractor march on Washington in February 1979. Its lodestar is the Conference of the Communist and Workers' Parties of Europe held in East Berlin in June 1976, which it quotes repeatedly, and the 25th Congress of the CPSU of the same year. The author, described on the jacket as a "Soviet historian and expert on international affairs," writes from inside the Academy of Sciences' study of the international working-class movement, and he writes to a brief. The years around 1979 were the crisis of Eurocommunism: the Italian, Spanish and French parties were loudly asserting their independence from Moscow, their acceptance of parliamentary roads and civil liberties, their distance from the Soviet model. Moskvín's book is the CPSU's answer — a theoretical reassertion that whatever national roads the Western parties take, the leading role of the working class (and, as we shall see, of the party that embodies it) is not negotiable. It is a Eurocommunist-era book written to keep Eurocommunism inside doctrinal bounds.

The doctrine, stated fairly

Give the book its due first, because the doctrine is a real one and Moskvín sets it out accurately. The core proposition is that the proletariat cannot emancipate itself alone: it is a minority even in developed countries, and it triumphs only by leading the "scattered and backward sections of the working and exploited population." He quotes Lenin to exactly this effect — only the proletariat is in a "position to unite and lead the scattered and backward sections of the working and exploited population" — and the citation is genuine, from the First Congress of the Communist International. Around this he builds the classical apparatus: the alliance with the peasantry (Lenin's *smychka*), in which the proletariat wins the poor peasant, must "neutralise" the middle peasant and "wrest it from the bourgeoisie," and isolates the rich; the winning-over of the urban petty bourgeoisie and the "new middle sections" — engineers, technicians, office workers — thrown up by the scientific-technological revolution; and, in the West, the strategy of "anti-monopoly democracy," a transitional "left bloc" stage between capitalism and socialism.

This is not invented doctrine, and much of the historical narrative is sound. Moskvín's account of the Paris Commune's failure to hold the peasantry, of Lenin's break with the Mensheviks over the leadership of the 1905 revolution, of the Comintern's turn from "class against class" sectarianism to the united front and then the Popular Front at its Seventh Congress in 1935 — all of this is competent, and where he quotes Lenin on the agrarian question he quotes him correctly and to the point: the proletariat "acts in a really socialist manner only when it comes out and acts as the vanguard of all the working and exploited people." A reader who wants to know what the Soviet theory of alliances was, in its own considered words, will find it here, clearly labelled.

The tell: the leading role of whom?

The doctrine has a hinge, and Moskvín turns it without appearing to notice. Everywhere in the book the leading role of

the working class is quietly restated as the leading role of the party. The move is made most nakedly in a passage Moskvin quotes with approval — Brezhnev, speaking in Belgrade in 1976, naming among the vital matters on which the two states agree "the leading role of the Communist Party (as the vanguard of the working class and all working people)." The parenthesis does all the work. The party leads as the vanguard of the class; therefore the party's leadership simply is the class's leadership; therefore whatever the party does, the working class has done. Elsewhere the same identity is asserted in the author's own voice: the socialist state was "set up by the Soviet people under the guidance of the working class and its vanguard: the Communist Party of the Soviet Union." The class acts only through the party, and the party needs no further mandate from the class.

This is the ancient danger the anti-Stalinist tradition named early and precisely. In 1904 the young Trotsky, in *Our Political Tasks*, warned that in Lenin's method of organisation the party could come to stand in for the class, the Central Committee for the party, and finally a single man for the Central Committee. He was wrong about Lenin's intentions and right about the machine: substitutionism, the replacement of the self-activity of a class by the activity of an apparatus claiming to represent it, is the exact disease of the doctrine Moskvin expounds. And it produces, in his book, a startling asymmetry that no attentive reader can miss.

When Moskvin writes about the working class in the capitalist West, its life is independent self-organisation. He fills chapter after chapter with strikes — the 110-day American miners' strike of 1978, the three-year Fine Tube dispute in Plymouth, the general strikes that put eighteen million Italians into the streets, the occupation of the LIP factory. He celebrates the ten million organised workers of the British Trades Union Congress compelling politicians to reckon with them. He even records, with evident approval, that "so-called 'wildcat' strikes, staged spontaneously without trade union sanction, are becoming more and more common in some countries." Spontaneity, self-organisation, unions independent of the state and sometimes of their own officials — in the West these are the very proof that the working class is the leading force.

Turn to the socialist states, a hundred pages of the same book, and every one of those things vanishes. There are no strikes in the GDR, no wildcat stoppages in Bulgaria, no independent unions in Poland — not because they did not occur but because in Moskvin's frame they cannot be conceived. The working class's "leading role" in the socialist countries is measured instead in seats and posts: so many worker-deputies

in the Volkskammer, "90 out of the 460 deputies in the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic," "every fourth citizen of the GDR who has the right to vote holds an elective post" in the party, the unions, the youth league, the National Front. "The working class plays the leading role in society and the state," he writes of the GDR — and then defines that leading role entirely as participation in structures the party controls. The independent activity that is the badge of working-class vitality in Manchester is, in Leipzig, simply not part of the picture. The alliance in the East is managed from above, and the one thing forbidden to its leading class is precisely the thing praised in the West: to organise itself, strike, and speak in its own voice against those set over it.

The verdict of Poland

Moskvin did not have to wait long for this to be tested, and the test came in the country whose worker-deputies he had counted. The Working Class and Its Allies went to press in 1980. In August of that year, at the Lenin Shipyard in Gdańsk, Polish workers — the leading class of a socialist state, by the book's own doctrine — struck, occupied their yards, and on 31 August forced the government to concede the right to form trade unions independent of the party. Within a year *Solidarność* had close to ten million members, more than the British TUC that Moskvin admired, and it asserted inside a "workers' state" exactly the independence he had reserved for workers under capitalism. The regime's reply, in December 1981, was to declare martial law and intern the union's leaders: the leading class placed under curfew by the party that claimed to embody it. No critic could have devised a sharper refutation than the event supplied on its own. The book's central silence — that the socialist working class might want, and be denied, the self-organisation the book grants the Western one — became, within eighteen months of publication, the largest political fact in Eastern Europe.

Correcting the record

The silence around Poland was not an oversight; it was the operating principle, and it has a history the book actively falsifies. Twice Moskvin narrates the moment when the "alliance from above" turned its weapons on workers' independent organisation, and both times he narrates it from the side of the guns.

The first is Czechoslovakia. Moskvin gives a warm account of the Communist assumption of power in February 1948, and then, of 1968, writes only this, quoting Gustáv Husák: "In the

summer of 1968, the danger of counter-revolution in Czechoslovakia became so great that it began to threaten the existence of the socialist order," a danger that "could be prevented only by the fraternal international assistance rendered by the Soviet Union and our other allies to the working class and working people of Czechoslovakia." The Prague Spring — a reform movement with deep support in the Czechoslovak working class, culminating after the invasion in workers' resolutions and a clandestine party congress held in a factory — becomes "counter-revolution," and the tanks of five Warsaw Pact armies become "fraternal international assistance" rendered to the workers whose country they occupied. That is not a gap in the record; it is the record inverted.

The second is Spain, and here the method is the more damning for being quiet. Moskvin holds up the Spanish Popular Front of 1936 as a model of the alliance policy, and quotes the Communist leader José Díaz reassuring the small proprietors that "the Anarchists, Socialists and Communists are not persecuting them, and that we all consider them our allies." Not a word follows about May 1937 in Barcelona, when the Communists, having grown strong on Soviet arms, moved against their anarchist and POUM allies, suppressed the party of Andreu Nin, and had Nin himself murdered. The anarchists and the POUM enter Moskvin's book only as friends being reassured; they leave it, unmentioned, as the alliance's victims. A doctrine of alliances that cannot say what happened to these particular allies is telling the reader something about all of them.

And there is the absence that is loudest of all. A book on the worker-peasant alliance in the socialist states, discussing the "people's democracies" of Central Europe at length, says nothing of Hungary in 1956 — of the workers' councils of Budapest, the most authentic organs of proletarian self-rule the Eastern bloc produced, crushed by the same army that in these pages only ever "assists." Between the two of them, 1956 and 1968, the socialist working class twice built exactly the institutions Moskvin praises in the West, and was twice put down. His book records neither event as what it was.

The reply

The anti-Stalinist left had answered every part of this before Moskvin wrote it. On the Popular Front — the book's proudest example — Trotsky drew in *The Lessons of Spain: The Last Warning* (December 1937) the distinction the doctrine erases: between the united front, a bloc of working-class organisations that can multiply their strength, and the popular front, a

coalition that chains the workers to a section of the bourgeoisie. "The political alliance between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie," he wrote, "whose interests on basic questions in the present epoch diverge at an angle of 180 degrees, as a general rule is capable only of paralyzing the revolutionary force of the proletariat." The Spanish workers were not defeated in spite of the Popular Front but through it; the alliance that was supposed to lead them disarmed them. Moskvin celebrates precisely the mechanism Trotsky identified as fatal, and passes over precisely the outcome that proved him right.

On the substitution of party for class, the standing answer is *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), which every Soviet account of Soviet society in this series must be read against. Trotsky's description of what became of the workers' own organisations under the bureaucracy could serve as the caption to Moskvin's chapters on the socialist states. In the USSR, he wrote, there had disappeared "the democracy of the soviets, the trade unions, the co-operatives, the cultural and athletic organizations. Above each and every one of them there reigns an unlimited hierarchy of party secretaries." That is the reality behind Moskvin's worker-deputies and elective posts: forms of participation from which the power to say no has been removed. The unions the book counts in the East are the unions Trotsky described — administrative belts, not fighting organisations — which is why the same author who lauds independent unionism in Britain need never mention its absence in Poland.

On the *smychka* itself, the reply is to restore Lenin's meaning against its bureaucratic counterfeit. For Lenin the worker-peasant alliance was a real bargain between real, independent social forces — the New Economic Policy was its economic form, a concession wrung by a peasantry that could still, as Trotsky's account of the grain strikes shows, withhold its grain and be answered by negotiation rather than only by force. What the doctrine became under Stalin — and what Moskvin's language of "neutralising" the middle peasant and drawing him to the workers' side quietly assumes — was an alliance in which only one partner retained any independent power, and forced collectivisation was its true monument. Moskvin's book, tellingly, has nothing to say about 1929–33.

The reader should set this volume beside its siblings in the same Progress catalogue, which execute the same identity of party and class in neighbouring fields: Chkhikvadze's *The Soviet Form of Popular Government* (1972) and Machulsky and Topornin's *Socialism and Democracy* (1974), which redescribe the monopoly of the party as the fullest democracy,

and the two Fundamentals volumes — the Kuusinen-Dutt Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism (1963) and the Fundamentals of Political Economy (1980) — where the same substitution is stated as bedrock. Moskvín is not an eccentric; he is a specialist writing one chapter of a single, coordinated doctrine.

What survives

None of this makes the book worthless, and the series does the reader no service if it pretends so. Two things in it hold up. The first is the empirical record of the Western class struggle of the 1970s. Moskvín was a diligent compiler, and his chapters on the developed capitalist countries are dense with usable fact — strike chronologies, the wave of peasant-farm bankruptcies across France and West Germany, the changing occupational structure of the "new middle sections," the sociology of engineers and technicians and office workers as the fastest-growing part of wage labour. Stripped of the framing, this is a serviceable data-book on the labour and social movements of the decade.

The second, more surprising, is the chapter on Chile. Writing on the fall of the Popular Unity government, Moskvín is genuinely candid where doctrine might have counselled evasion. He names the "underestimation of the class nature of political institutions," above all the army; he condemns the ultra-left provocations that "provoked clashes with the small and middle entrepreneurs" and drove the middle sections into the opposition just when the revolution needed them; he sees that the social base of Allende's government narrowed at the decisive moment. This is real analysis of a real defeat, and it is the more valuable for coming from a source with every reason to blame only the CIA. It also, quietly, cuts against the book's own optimism: if the class nature of the state and army can undo a peaceful road in Santiago, the reader is entitled to ask the same questions of every "anti-monopoly" transition the book recommends elsewhere — and of the states that call themselves already socialist.

That is the use of a book like this. It is the most authoritative statement we have of what the doctrine of class alliances meant to the state that ruled a third of the world's Communists, set down at the exact moment when the doctrine was about to be tested, in Gdańsk, by the class it claimed to lead — and to fail the test. Read it for the doctrine, and for the fact, and read Poland in the margin.

Capital: A Critique of Political Economy, Volume III

Profit, interest, credit and rent - the volume where Capital reaches the surface of everyday economic life, assembled by Engels over a decade from manuscripts Marx abandoned in 1865.

Karl Marx

Introduction to This Edition

Volume Three is where Capital comes up for air. The first volume took the reader down into what Marx called the hidden abode of production and found there the secret of surplus-value; the second followed that value as it circulated and was realised; and the third climbs back to the surface of society, to the daylight world of profit and interest and rent, and shows how the laws worked out in the depths appear — disguised, inverted, almost unrecognisable — in the ordinary consciousness of businessmen and economists. It is the volume that speaks the language of the everyday, of the balance sheet and the bank and the landlord's rent-roll, and for that reason it is the one a reader can open at almost any page and feel the shock of recognition. It is also the volume Marx never lived to complete. He drafted its manuscript in 1864 and 1865, before Volume One was even in print, and then left it; and after his death in 1883 it fell to Engels to make a book of the fragments, a labour that took him the better part of a decade and gave the world, in 1894, the text you now hold — here in the English of Progress Publishers, Moscow, the edition prepared by the Institute of Marxism-Leninism and long co-issued in the United States by International Publishers of New York.

Engels was, as always, candid about the state of what Marx had left him, and his candour is the honest place to begin, because no volume of *Capital* passes through a second hand as visibly as this one. What Marx left was not a manuscript needing tidying but a great unfinished argument — whole chapters sketched, others broken off, the reasoning sometimes worked to a fine polish and sometimes only indicated. Engels ordered it, filled its gaps, smoothed its transitions, and in places sharpened Marx's tentative formulations into firmer statements than Marx himself had committed to. This was not falsification; it was the only way the book could exist at all, and Engels laboured at it with a self-denial that does him honour. But it matters, and it matters especially for what came later. When the Marx-Engels Gesamtausgabe finally published Marx's own 1864–65 manuscript a century afterward, scholars could at last measure editor against author, and they found that

the shape of some of the volume's most famous doctrines — above all the status of the law of the falling rate of profit — owed more to Engels's editing than the sacred-text treatment of Volume Three would ever admit. A book already shaped once is a book especially easy to shape again.

The volume's architecture is a descent from the abstract to the concrete. Part One converts surplus-value into profit and shows how the rate of profit, calculated on the whole capital advanced, disguises the rate of exploitation that produced it. Part Two takes the great step: the formation of a general rate of profit across competing capitals, and with it the transformation of the values of commodities into their prices of production — the demonstration that individual prices systematically diverge from values precisely so that the law of value can assert itself over the system as a whole. Part Three states the law Marx thought the deepest tendency of the whole mode of production, the tendency of the rate of profit to fall as accumulation raises the weight of machinery over living labour, together with the counteracting influences that hold it off — the theory from which every serious Marxist account of capitalist crisis has since been built. The later parts anatomise the forms in which surplus-value is divided among its claimants: commercial profit, interest and the whole architecture of credit, and the ground-rent that the landlord draws. And it closes, in the chapter on the trinity formula, with the most concentrated statement Marx ever wrote of what he called the fetishism of economic relations — the way capital, land and labour come to appear as three natural sources each yielding its natural return, so that the divided spoils of exploitation present themselves as the just wages of three cooperating "factors."

Two things in this volume have proved more durable than almost anything else Marx wrote. The first is the analysis of credit and what he named fictitious capital — paper claims on future surplus-value that circulate, swell, and collapse with a logic of their own, the moneyed world of the stock exchange and the bill of exchange traced back to the real accumulation it both serves and mocks. A reader who lived through 2008 will find these chapters uncannily current, as though written about our own age of leverage and asset bubbles rather than about

the mid-Victorian money market. The second is the closing vision of the realm of freedom. Beyond the sphere of material necessity, Marx writes, "begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis." And then the sentence that ought to be carved over the door of every socialism that claims his name: "The shortening of the working-day is its basic prerequisite." Wealth, for the Marx of Volume Three, is finally measured not in output but in free time — in the disposable hours a rational society wins back for the free development of its members. Hold that sentence; we shall need it.

It is an honest introduction that also says where the volume is unfinished or unsure, and here that duty is heavy, for Volume Three left the movement two problems it has quarrelled over ever since. The first is the transformation of values into prices, which Engels, in his preface, turned almost into a sporting challenge: he had defied the economists, he recalls, to show "in which way an equal average rate of profit can and must come about, not only without a violation of the law of value, but on the very basis of it." Marx's own solution, when it appeared, satisfied few; within a decade Bortkiewicz had shown that Marx's arithmetic could not hold both of its promised identities at once, and the "transformation problem" has been a hundred-year battlefield of Marxist economics down to the present. The second is the falling rate of profit itself, which Marx stated as a tendency hedged by counter-tendencies so powerful that he never claimed to have shown which must win — a genuine openness that Engels's editing narrowed and that the later official Marxism closed altogether, hardening a subtle tendency into an iron law of collapse. To read the volume as Marx left it, rather than as the manuals recited it, is to feel the questions still live.

Which brings us to the strange career of this book in the state that made it scripture. Of the three volumes, Volume Three was the one the Soviet Union found most useful as a weapon and most awkward as a mirror. Its crisis theory was pressed into the doctrine of the general crisis of capitalism, the promised final breakdown forever arriving; its anatomy of profit and rent and interest was read out, chapter and verse, as the indictment of the Western economies. But the categories it dissects — profit, rent, interest, the unequal rates that competition equalises — were forbidden to turn homeward. Officially the USSR had abolished them: no profit, no rent, no law of value, only the plan. And yet they would not stay abolished. The law of value under socialism became the great undead question of Soviet economics, conceded by Stalin himself in 1952 to "operate" still, in "transformed" form, even

as he denied that surplus or rent could exist in a workers' state; and when the economy seized up, the Liberman proposals and the Kosygin reform of 1965 quietly smuggled profit back through the front door as the enterprises' index of success. The differential rent that Volume Three had made a precise instrument was exactly the tool Soviet planners were ideologically forbidden to use, and so they priced land and oil and ore at nothing and squandered them on a continental scale. The state that canonised the anatomy of capitalist exploitation could not bring itself to ask whether its own extraction of a surplus it did not distribute, its own unpriced rents, its own driving of labour, wore any of the same forms. That refusal — to cite the book endlessly and to think with it never — is the exact signature of reification.

Nowhere is the inversion sharper than at the volume's emancipatory summit. Marx had made free time the measure of wealth and the shortening of the working day the prerequisite of freedom; the Soviet order made labour output the measure of everything and lengthened, in every real sense, the working day of the Soviet worker — the storming and the tonnage-plan, the queue and the second shift, the old rule that those who will not work shall not eat turned from a rebuke to idle owners into a discipline over the exhausted. The book's own telos, the association of free producers rationally regulating their metabolism with nature and winning back their hours, stood as the standing measure of how far the regime had departed from it. This is no charge against Marx, and none against the revolution that first raised his work to a banner; a backward and blockaded country genuinely had to accumulate from a low base, and the tragedy is that a real necessity was administered by a bureaucracy that had usurped the workers' power and could permit no rival reading of the texts it recited. It was Trotsky, in *The Revolution Betrayed*, who turned the volume's own question homeward and asked whose surplus the plan was pumping; and it was Ernest Mandel, whose *Late Capitalism* built its whole theory of the long waves and the crises on these chapters, who did with Volume Three what the manuals forbade — used it as a living tool rather than an embalmed relic.

So what is Volume Three worth now, past the state that mined it for slogans and buried what it could not use? It is worth more, perhaps, than when it was written, because the world has grown into it. Ours is the age of fictitious capital come of age — of finance towering over production, of asset bubbles and leverage and the rentier's return, of an economy in which the trinity formula's naturalised returns to "capital" and "land" are the common sense that Volume Three exists to shatter. Its account of why profit, interest and rent appear as the innocent

yield of cooperating factors, rather than as the divided plunder of unpaid labour, is still the deepest answer we have to the naturalisation of what capitalism distributes. And its closing horizon — free time, not output, as the measure of human wealth — is the anti-productivist, ecological, emancipatory core that both capital and its bureaucratic caricature contrived to bury, and that a living Marxism recovers against them both. Read as Marx drafted it and Engels assembled it, cleared of the catechism that froze it into an icon, this last and most worldly volume of *Capital* is not the charter of any plan but the anatomy of the economy we actually inhabit — and, turned homeward as Trotsky turned it, the measure of every order, Western or Soviet, that still extracts a surplus in the dark and calls the daylight forms of it natural. The living current in this book is simply Volume Three put back to work.

MARXISM

Anarchism and Socialism

Plekhanov's 1894 weapon in the Marxist war with the anarchists for the Second International - in the only English translation there has ever been, made by Eleanor Marx Aveling, with her own combative preface.

Georgi Plekhanov

Publisher's Introduction

In the autumn of 1979 the British section of the Fourth International reprinted, in its journal *The International*, a review of Yvonne Kapp's two-volume life of Eleanor Marx. The reviewer was Diane Feeley, and she was doing what the movement does with its dead: taking an ancestor's measure and drawing the lesson. Her Eleanor Marx is a working revolutionary rather than a tragic daughter — an organiser of the Second International's congresses, a partisan of the North in the American Civil War at the age of eight, a defender of the Chicago anarchists on the platform in 1886 even as she fought the anarchists inside the International. And somewhere in the middle of the piece, in a list, comes this:

Among her political translations are Lissagaray's classic History of the Paris Commune (1886), articles by the Russian revolutionary Stepanik (1884, 1885), and Plekhanov's Anarchism and Socialism (1895).

That single clause is, so far as we can establish, the only trace this book has left in a hundred years of the revolutionary press in English. It is a book that survives as an item in someone else's bibliography.

The book deserves better, and so does the translation, which is the reason for this edition. Feeley is worth quoting a second time on what Eleanor Marx was trying to do as a translator, because it bears directly on the English you are about to read:

In an age of stilted translations, she attempted more than just a literal rendition. She took as her goal the task of making translation 'sound' so authentic that the reader would not be constantly aware that it was a translation at all.

Eleanor Marx Aveling's *Anarchism and Socialism* of 1895 is the only English translation there has ever been, and it reads like a pamphlet written in English by someone in a hurry to win an argument, because that is what she meant it to be.

Georgi Plekhanov wrote it in French in 1894, at the height of a war inside the international workers' movement that is now largely forgotten and was then bitter and consuming: the war between the Marxists and the anarchists for control of the Second International. Within two years the anarchists would be excluded from its congresses for good, at Zürich in 1893 and finally at London in 1896, and this pamphlet was a weapon in that fight. Feeley's Eleanor was on the same side of it and for the same reasons: convinced that the International must have a revolutionary socialist programme, she opposed those socialists who believed it could accommodate such divergent trends as the anarchists. Her preface, printed in this volume, presses the argument into the service of the British movement of her own day, pointing to the Socialist League — founded by William Morris, herself and others, and then abandoned by them to the anarchists — as the standing example of what was at stake. "Anarchism is but another word for reaction", she writes, and she is not being decorative.

The author was the founder of Russian Marxism. Plekhanov (1856–1918) began as a Populist, broke with terrorism and the peasant road, emigrated to Geneva, and in 1883 founded there the Emancipation of Labour group, the first organised body of Russian Marxists. He was the teacher of Lenin's whole generation. When he turned his fire on the anarchists he did so as the movement's recognised theoretical authority, and the confidence shows on every page.

Within its chosen limits the pamphlet is very good. Plekhanov's central move is to deny the anarchists the radicalism they claim, using the tools of historical materialism. Anarchism, he argues, is not the far frontier of socialism but a throwback to something socialism had already outgrown: the utopian habit of mind. The utopian, whether the eighteenth-century philosophe dreaming of a perfect legislation drawn from abstract human nature, or the modern anarchist demanding an absolute liberty drawn from the same abstraction, makes the same error. He steps outside history, appeals to man-in-general, and mistakes the idealised image of his own class for a universal truth. From this angle Plekhanov dismantles the anarchist pantheon in turn: Stirner, whose

League of Egoists he calls the utopia of a petty bourgeois in revolt; Proudhon, caught forever between property and its abolition; Bakunin, the *décadent* of utopianism. The class reading is the pamphlet's enduring contribution — the demonstration that a doctrine advertising itself as the most extreme enemy of the existing order reproduces that order's deepest prejudice, the sovereign individual, and so serves reaction while flying the blackest of flags.

Now say where it falls short, and here we can call a sharp witness for the prosecution. This edition prints as an appendix the note the Charles H. Kerr company placed at the front of its American reprint, in which Lenin's verdict from *The State and Revolution* is quoted at length. Lenin admired the historical-literary part, the material on Stirner and Proudhon, and convicted Plekhanov of a fatal evasion. Plekhanov, he wrote, "managed somehow to treat the question without touching on the most vital, controversial point ... the relation of the revolution to State, and the question of the State in general." The whole polemic is conducted around the one issue that actually divides Marxists from anarchists — what the working class is to do with state power once it has it — and Plekhanov walks past it. Where he does descend to particulars he descends to abuse, resting at one point on the theme, as Lenin scornfully paraphrased it, "that an anarchist cannot be distinguished from a bandit", which Lenin called ignorant and narrow-minded. The omission and the abuse are two faces of one weakness, and the weakness belongs to the man Plekhanov was becoming: the theorist who by 1903 was drifting toward Menshevism, who in 1914 rallied to his own government's war, and who in 1917 opposed the workers' taking of power that his life's teaching had prepared.

This is where the question this series always asks turns homeward. Was the state that canonised Plekhanov faithful to him, or did it use him?

It used him, and the using is instructive. The Soviet apparatus made Plekhanov the ancestral father of Russian Marxism, and gave him the handsome *Progress Selected Philosophical Works* in five volumes. Then it performed a careful surgery on the corpse, preserving the philosopher and burying the politician. His materialism was scripture; his Menshevism, his defencism, his horror at October were an embarrassment to be handled in a footnote or not at all. This particular book it kept out of the philosophical canon precisely because it was political, and political in a way that pointed at its author's later apostasy. The Kerr note we reprint shows the same machinery working in miniature and from the other side of the world: it recommends the book warmly for its anti-anarchism, then in

the same breath hands the reader Lenin's correction of it. Keep the weapon, discipline the man. That is how a canon is built.

A bibliographical warning, which is also a political one. Anyone searching the socialist press for discussions of Anarchism and Socialism will collide almost at once with a different book. Stalin wrote a long pamphlet of nearly the same name, and it has its own afterlife: in a review note published in *Quatrième Internationale* in the late 1950s, the Fourth International's leadership was still arguing about it, insisting against Henri Lefebvre that it is "an absolutely mistaken track" to try to explain Stalin and Stalinism from the dogmatic cast of his mind at the age when he wrote *Anarchism and Socialism*, and from his early taste for the authority of the State. Stalin, the reviewer argued, was not a dogmatist who imposed his ideas on Soviet society but a pragmatist who theorised after the fact the opportunist practice of the Soviet state, the spokesman of a bureaucracy that had expropriated the proletariat politically. The two pamphlets are worth keeping apart, and the accident of the shared title is worth noticing: the young Georgian seminarian reached for the founder of Russian Marxism's subject, and the world afterwards had two anti-anarchist classics to choose from, one by the man who taught Lenin and one by the man who buried him.

There is a deeper irony still, and it is the reason this pamphlet repays a reading its author's heirs did not intend. Plekhanov's whole case rests on ridiculing the anarchists' fear of the workers' own state — their insistence that any state, even a proletarian one, must harden into a new machine of domination standing over the class in whose name it rules. In 1894 that could be dismissed as petty-bourgeois panic. Read from inside the Soviet Union that Stalin built, it reads differently. This series does not draw the anarchist conclusion, and the reader should be clear why: the dictatorship of the proletariat is Marx's own category, drawn from the Paris Commune, a state already beginning to wither, its officials elected and revocable, its army the armed people, and to abandon it is to leave the working class disarmed before its enemies. The degeneration of the Russian revolution is to be explained by its isolation once the German revolution failed, by the ruin and backwardness of the country, and by the bureaucracy's usurpation of power, not by an original sin in the doctrine of the workers' state. But honesty, which this series prizes above consistency, requires the admission that the anarchists had hold of something real. The genuine Marxist answer to it was never Plekhanov's silence. It was the Commune-state of The Civil War in France and of The State and Revolution, the state that dies away from its first day.

Plekhanov declined to theorise the state at all, and it was the untheorised state, swollen and permanent, that in the end swallowed the revolution.

So the book still lives, and lives best read against both of the errors it can be made to serve: against the libertarianism that periodically returns promising an absolute freedom conjured out of the individual and against all organisation, and against the bureaucratic statism that wore Marx's clothes and called its own permanence socialism. What survives when both are cleared away is the materialist question the pamphlet everywhere presses and its author everywhere half-answered. Not whether we are for the individual or the state in the abstract, but which class holds power, to what end, and under whose control.

The present text follows the complete Charles H. Kerr edition of Eleanor Marx Aveling's translation, collated against the shorter 1895 printing, which drops part of her preface, with American spelling brought into line with the British usage of the rest of this series. Nothing of the translation itself has been altered.