


PROGRESS QUARTERLY

Critical Introductions to the Reissued Classics

VOLUME IV · NUMBER 2

ПРОГРЕСС · МОСКВА



XIV

IN THIS ISSUE

HI

LIBERATION MISSION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR

PH

THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLT

IN

INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE SPANISH REPUBLIC 1936--1939

SO

FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

and 3 more · introductions by Dmitry Chasovennikov

Volume IV, Number 2

HI	LIBERATION MISSION OF THE SOVIET ARMED FORCES IN THE SECOND WORLD WAR Andrei Antonovich Grechko	3
PH	THE PHILOSOPHY OF REVOLT Eduard Yakovlevich Batalov	7
IN	INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY WITH THE SPANISH REPUBLIC 1936--1939 Dolores Ibarruri and others	12
SO	FUNDAMENTALS OF POLITICAL SCIENCE Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev	16
PH	ON RELIGION Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels	20
ML	SELECTED CORRESPONDENCE Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels	22
IN	LENINIST THEORY OF SOCIALIST REVOLUTION AND THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD Petr N Fedoseyev	25

HISTORY

Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War

The Soviet Minister of Defence argues that the Red Army came to liberate Eastern Europe, not to occupy it - the official case of the high command, written for the thirtieth anniversary by the man then commanding the armed forces.

Andrei Antonovich Grechko

Introduction to the 1975 Edition

The book opens with a soldier. "Almost sixty years ago a new type of soldier appeared on the historical scene. He had the same old grey greatcoat but there was a big red star on his cap. He was a Soviet soldier who not only did not threaten the toiling masses, but, on the contrary, was prepared to endure the greatest privations and give his life for their interests." The lines are Marshal Andrei Grechko's, and they set the terms of everything that follows. This is not a military history in the ordinary sense. It is a 156,000-word argument that the Soviet soldier who marched into Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Austria and Czechoslovakia in 1944 and 1945 came only to liberate, never to occupy — and that the regimes he left behind him rose from the will of the peoples he had freed, not from the weight of his boot.

The claim is made by a man in a position to know the difference. The preface is signed "A. A. Grechko, Marshal of the Soviet Union." Andrei Antonovich Grechko was, when the book appeared, Minister of Defence of the USSR — he held the post from 1967 until his death in April 1976 — and from 1973 a full member of the Politburo. He was, in other words, the serving head of the armed forces whose conduct the book narrates and defends, writing at the very apex of the Brezhnev-era military-party state. The Liberation Mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War carries a Progress Publishers copyright of 1975. Nothing in it argues from a date later than 1975; it quotes Brezhnev's détente speeches of 1973 as the latest political horizon, and it was plainly written for the thirtieth anniversary of the victory in 1945. This is a commissioned anniversary book, the official war memorial of the Soviet high command, produced for export in the language of international circulation. Its date is its date.

Two things must be said before anything else, and the second

does not cancel the first.

What the Red Army actually did

The Soviet war against Nazi Germany was the decisive military fact of the twentieth century, and no honest reader can leave this book without feeling the weight of it. Grechko is not exaggerating when he writes that "the main battles of the Second World War were fought on the Soviet-German front where 607 enemy divisions were destroyed, routed or taken prisoner — almost three and a half times as many as on all the other fronts taken together," that "the Anglo-US troops in Africa and Western Europe smashed or took prisoner 176 enemy divisions," and that "the Wehrmacht sustained 80 per cent of its casualties on the Soviet-German front." These proportions are broadly what the historiography records. The Eastern Front was where the German army was broken. It was Soviet soldiers who reached the death camps first — the book names Oświęcim (Auschwitz) and Majdanek among the "giant" extermination camps the invaders built on Polish soil — and it was the Red Army's advance that ended the most systematically murderous regime in human history.

The book gives the Soviet death toll as "twenty million Soviet people, or 40 per cent of the total human casualties in the Second World War." That was the official figure of 1975; the toll has since been reckoned upward, and the number generally cited today is around 27 million. Either way it is a wound without parallel in modern history, and it is the ground of everything the book asks its reader to feel. No country paid what the Soviet Union paid, and the men in the grey greatcoats who paid it were, overwhelmingly, workers and peasants who believed they were fighting fascism. All of that is real, and it must be credited without stint and without the reflex, common in Western Cold War writing, of setting Stalin's crimes beside Hitler's as though the two states had been the same thing. They were not the same thing, and the tradition from which this

introduction is written never said they were. The point of the critique that follows is not that the liberation was a fraud. It is that the word "liberation" was made to carry more than it can hold.

The word that does the work

The organising word of the book is liberation, and its unspoken twin is occupation. Watch which advance gets which word. The Nazis occupy; the Anglo-Americans, in the book's telling, half-occupy; but the Soviet Army, wherever it goes and whatever it does after it arrives, only ever liberates. The regimes it installs are never imposed. Grechko states the thesis flatly in his opening pages: "The new social system in these countries was not established under pressure from the Soviet Army, as bourgeois falsifiers of history are now asserting, but as a result of the conditions that had matured in the liberated countries for moving towards new social relations, in keeping with the will and desire of their peoples."

This is the sentence the whole book exists to defend, and it is the sentence that will not survive contact with the book's own narrative. For the same volume that denies any "pressure from the Soviet Army" also records, with no apparent sense of contradiction, the machinery of that pressure. When the Red Army entered Poland in the summer of 1944, Soviet GHQ issued an order — reproduced approvingly here — that "any mobilisation arrangements carried out on Polish territory by Polish organisations not connected with the PCNL" (the Soviet-sponsored Polish Committee of National Liberation) "were illegal," and that "persons engaging in such activity were to be immediately arrested as German agents sowing discord among the Polish population." The Polish Home Army — the largest resistance movement in occupied Europe, which had fought the Germans for five years — was to be, in the same order, "disarmed." To recruit soldiers for a Poland other than the one Moscow was building was, by decree, to be a "German agent." A book that prints this and then insists the new order owed nothing to Soviet pressure is refuting itself on facing pages.

The tragedy the book cannot narrate honestly

Nowhere does the machinery grind more visibly than in the chapter Grechko titles, without irony, "The Tragedy of Warsaw." The facts, stripped of the book's framing, are among the most terrible of the war. On 1 August 1944 the Polish Home Army rose against the German occupier in Warsaw, expecting the Red Army — which had reached the Vistula on

the city's eastern edge — to come to its aid. For sixty-three days the insurgents fought the Wehrmacht almost alone. The Red Army stood on the far bank and did not come. Stalin refused, for weeks, to let British and American aircraft use Soviet airfields to drop supplies. When the fighting ended on 2 October the Home Army had been annihilated; on Hitler's order the Germans then deported the surviving population and levelled the city block by block. Something between 150,000 and 200,000 civilians died. The book's own figures — "the insurgents' losses totalled 22,000 ... losses among civilian population of the capital amounted to 180,000. On Hitler's orders the Polish capital was levelled with the ground" — are not far from the historians'.

What the book does with those facts is the finding. In Grechko's account the catastrophe is the fault of its victims. "Acting on orders from the emigre government," he writes, "Armia Krajowa on August 1, 1944 provoked an uprising in Warsaw paying no heed to the situation at the front and without informing the Soviet Command, thus dooming it to failure." The uprising, "as regards the plans of its organisers and its political substance ... was anti-Soviet in character and designed to prevent the victory of people's rule in Poland." The Soviet government "declared that the Warsaw action was a reckless and fearful gamble," and the Soviet command "had to dissociate itself from the Warsaw adventure." When Polish troops under Soviet command did finally attempt a crossing in mid-September, it was, Grechko says, the insurgents who betrayed them: "the Polish troops encountered outright treachery." The whole disaster is summed up in a single sentence: "The Polish people paid a heavy price for the adventurism of the Polish reactionaries." The insurgents, "blinded by class hatred," had summoned "the almost unarmed people to fight against German panzer divisions."

Read that back. Fifty thousand Poles die fighting the SS in the streets of their own capital, the city is razed, and the lesson the Soviet Minister of Defence draws is that the dead were reckless adventurers blinded by class hatred. The military-necessity defence — that the Red Army was simply exhausted, its supply lines 500 kilometres behind — the book makes at length, and it is not baseless; the front had genuinely outrun its logistics. But it cannot explain the five months the Red Army then sat on the Vistula before resuming its advance in January 1945, and it cannot explain the airfields. What the framing does explain is why an uprising against the Germans could be filed under "anti-Soviet": because its organisers wanted a Poland that Moscow did not control. That, and not military logistics, is why the Home Army had to be a gang of reactionaries and its rising an "adventure."

The Fourth International's own tradition read Warsaw differently at the time, and its reading has worn better. Ernest Mandel, in *The Meaning of the Second World War* (Verso, 1986), corrects the class libel first: the Home Army was "dominated by the social-democratic PPS rather than by bourgeois reactionaries," and it rose "anxious to obtain the maximum amount of weapons for self-defence against ongoing repression by the NKVD." As for the Red Army's inaction, Mandel is blunt: "Stalin blocked all help to Warsaw, letting the Germans do the dirty work of liquidating the Armia Krajowa he would otherwise have had to do himself" (ch. 15, "The Final Onslaught"). Whether or not one accepts Mandel's imputation of motive in full, the underlying sequence — a national resistance movement destroyed within earshot of an army that could have helped and did not — is exactly the sequence Grechko's chapter is built to make unspeakable.

The silence at the centre

If the Warsaw chapter is an inversion, the book's treatment of the Soviet-Polish rupture is a silence, and it is a revealing one. Grechko records that when the Red Army reached the Polish border, diplomatic relations with the Polish government in London had broken down, and he assigns the blame: "it was the Polish reactionary circles which were responsible for the fact that the relations between the two countries were still not re-established." He does not say what broke them. The relations broke in April 1943, when the London Poles asked the International Red Cross to investigate the mass graves the Germans had just uncovered in the Katyn forest — the bodies of some 22,000 Polish officers, policemen and members of the intelligentsia. They had been shot in the spring of 1940 by the NKVD, on the direct authorisation of the Soviet Politburo. In 1975 the official Soviet position was still that the Germans had done it; the truth was not admitted by a Soviet government until 1990.

The word Katyn does not appear anywhere in this book. Neither does NKVD. Neither does the word deportation, in a volume much occupied with what happened to Poles. The book discusses at length the army of General Anders — the Polish force raised on Soviet soil in 1941–42 and then, in Grechko's telling, treacherously "evacuated to Iran" by an émigré government that "let down the interests of the Polish people." It does not mention that Anders's soldiers were men released from Soviet prisons and labour camps, nor that the officers who should have led them were the men already lying in the pits at Katyn. A war memorial is entitled to its dead; it is not entitled to bury other people's. The silence on Katyn is not

an oversight in a book of this scale and this authorship. It is the load-bearing omission on which the Polish chapters stand.

What "liberation" installed

Behind the particular cases lies the general claim, and it is here that the book must be met on its own ground rather than the imperialist one. Grechko's thesis is that the "people's democracies" of Eastern Europe were the free choice of their peoples. The anti-Stalinist left answered this argument as the events were happening, and its answer was neither that the transformation was a good thing imposed by liberators nor that it was simply Soviet imperialism of the ordinary kind. It was that the Soviet bureaucracy first suppressed the independent revolutionary movements the war had thrown up, and then, when the Cold War forced its hand, carried through the social transformation from above, by military and police power, precisely so that it should not be carried through from below.

The evidence for the first half was already in print in October 1944, while Warsaw still smouldered. The editors of Fourth International wrote that month — in "The Kremlin's Counter-Revolutionary Role in Eastern Europe" (vol. V, no. 10, whole no. 47, October 1944) — that the Soviet Union had "emerged as a first class military power" and that "the economy nationalized by the October revolution proved its superiority in action"; the Soviet masses had "performed miracles in beating back the German imperialist assault." That is the credit given honestly, by the book's sharpest critics, in the moment. But the same editorial went on: "Stalin employs the Red Army to uphold the capitalist status quo, to bolster reactionary dictatorial regimes, to crush all attempts of the masses to take their fate into their own hands, to oppose every effort towards Sovietization." Two years later, reviewing the whole arc, E. R. Frank (Bert Cochran) put it in one line: "the Red Army entered Eastern Europe as an executor of the counter-revolutionary politics of the Kremlin. It did not support the uprisings of the masses; it suppressed them" ("The Kremlin in Eastern Europe," Fourth International, vol. VII, no. 11, whole no. 72, November 1946). Frank's article records what Grechko's cannot: that in Bulgaria, in Poland, in Yugoslavia, the arrival of the Red Army first touched off mass seizures of factories and land, and that the Kremlin's first task was to disarm the militias and prop the old apparatus back up.

The second half — the eventual, deliberate assimilation of the buffer states — is Mandel's subject in his closing chapters. The Soviet bureaucracy, he argues, opted only around 1947–48 for "creating a glacis of client states at its Western borders structurally assimilated to the Soviet Union — i.e.

characterised by the overthrow of capitalist state power and property relations through military-bureaucratic compulsion ('revolution from above')" (ch. 17, "The Aftermath"). This is the analysis of the deformed workers' state, and it is worth stating plainly because it is what separates the socialist critique of this book from the reactionary one. Capitalism was indeed abolished in Eastern Europe; landlords and industrialists did lose their property. But it was done from above, by an occupying army and a political police, over the independent organisations of the working class rather than through them — the opposite of the self-emancipation Grechko claims. The standing measure of this argument remains Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), with its portrait of the Soviet bureaucracy as a privileged, nationally minded caste whose foreign policy was governed not by the world revolution but by the defence of its own position and the status quo that secured it. Grechko's "will and desire of their peoples" is the formula that caste used to describe the results of its own bayonets.

The doctrine that reached forward

There is one more reason this 1975 book is not merely a historical curiosity, and the book supplies it itself. The doctrine of the "liberation mission" — the Soviet army as the selfless internationalist servant of other peoples, entitled to enter their territory to protect them from "counter-revolution" — did not stay in 1945. Grechko carries it forward across thirty years and applies it, in so many words, to the event that had most recently tested it. Writing of the Warsaw Treaty's solidarity, he records without a flicker that "in fulfilment of their internationalist duty the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic and Poland, in August 1968 agreed to move their troops into Czechoslovakia in order to help the Czechoslovak people, to protect them against the threat of counter-revolution and the intrigues of reaction and imperialism."

That sentence is the hinge of the whole book. The invasion that crushed the Prague Spring is described in the identical vocabulary as the march of 1944–45: "internationalist duty," "help," protection against "counter-revolution" and "imperialism." The reader is meant to hear no difference between liberating Auschwitz and occupying Prague, because in the book's grammar the Soviet army cannot occupy — it can only assist. This is the same phrase, "fraternal assistance," that the book uses for the rebuilding of Warsaw and the arming of Polish divisions; here it is doing the work of legitimising tanks in Wenceslas Square. The 1968 intervention was the living

demonstration of what the "liberation mission" meant once it hardened into what the West would call the Brezhnev Doctrine — the claimed right of the Soviet bloc to reverse, by force, any move by a member state out of its orbit. That Grechko, the Minister of Defence who commanded the armies that carried it out, should reach back into a book about 1945 to bless 1968 is not incidental. It is the point. The category that cannot be turned on its own author — the army that liberates and never occupies, even as it occupies — is the category doing all the work.

How to read it

None of this means the book has no value. Its operational military history is detailed and, on the movement of fronts, divisions and matériel, largely reliable; the Vistula–Oder operation, the Balkan campaigns, the raising of the Polish, Czechoslovak, Romanian, Bulgarian and Yugoslav formations on Soviet soil are set out with a specificity that the Western literature often lacks, and a reader who wants to know how the Red Army actually fought its way across Eastern Europe will learn a great deal here. The scale of the Soviet sacrifice, and the reality of the Soviet contribution to the defeat of fascism, are not in question and should not be minimised in reaction against the book's politics. That is exactly the trap the book is built to spring: to make anyone who questions the word "liberation" sound as though they are denying the victory.

They are not. The victory was real and it was decisive. What the reader must hold separate is the fighting from the framing — the soldier in the grey greatcoat from the doctrine written over his grave thirty years later by the man who then sent his sons into Prague. Grechko wanted those two things to be one thing, indivisible, so that to doubt the second was to insult the first. The whole discipline of reading this book is to keep them apart: to honour the twenty-seven million, and to refuse the sentence that turns the Home Army into German agents and the tanks of 1968 into fraternal aid. The Red Army did liberate Europe from the Nazis. It also, in the same months, disarmed the Polish resistance, sat out the destruction of Warsaw, buried the truth of Katyn, and installed by force the regimes that this book insists arose from the free will of their peoples. Both are true. Only one of them is in this book.

PHILOSOPHY

The Philosophy of Revolt: Criticism of left radical ideology

A serious Soviet study of Marcuse, Sartre, Debray, Mills and the counterculture, read in the original and cited by the page - with Marcuse footnoted to his own works more often than Lenin is to his.

Eduard Yakovlevich Batalov

Introduction to the 1975 Edition

The surprise of this book is that it is a book. Most of what Progress Publishers issued against the Western left in these years was assembled from clippings and Party resolutions. The *Philosophy of Revolt* is a monograph. Eduard Batalov has read Marcuse in English and in German — *One-Dimensional Man*, *Eros and Civilization*, *An Essay on Liberation*, the *Five Lectures*, *Reason and Revolution*, and an article on the prospects for socialism in the Zagreb journal *Praxis* — read Sartre's *Critique de la raison dialectique* and *L'imaginaire* in French, read Debray, Mills's 1960 "Letter to the New Left" in *New Left Review*, both of Theodore Roszak's books on the counterculture, Brzezinski, and the Belgrade literary weekly *Književne novine*. He follows an argument across an author's career and notices when it changes. Set beside the export polemics of the period, this is a different kind of object, and the reader should be told so before anything else.

That is worth stating in a form that can be checked, because the standard finding about these volumes is the opposite one. Elsewhere in this series the test that settles the matter is the citation test: whether the opponents a book condemns are quoted from their own printed texts, or only characterised. Volume 3 of the Institute's *International Working-Class Movement* cites Luxemburg's *Gesammelte Werke* sixteen times, Kautsky nine, *Die Neue Zeit* twenty-four — and no work by Trotsky once. Batalov mostly passes that test, and the numbers are not close. Marcuse is footnoted to his own editions thirty-four times, against thirty-one references to Lenin: in a Progress monograph the man under attack is cited more often than the authority in whose name he is attacked. Debray is quoted at paragraph length from Bobbye Ortiz's 1967 translation, with page numbers. Mills is quoted from *New Left Review* no. 5.

Where the apparatus thins out, it thins out in an instructive pattern. Adorno is discussed for most of a chapter and named

some sixty-seven times, and not one of those mentions is sourced to a work of Adorno's. Every Adorno footnote goes through an intermediary — Zoltai in *Voprosy filosofii*, Davydov in *Sovietskaya muzyka*, Zhitomirsky on music for the millions — so that the reader who wants to check the "logic of disintegration" against Adorno's own page cannot. Fanon's book is listed in a footnote, Paris 1961, but never quoted: what Fanon is made to have argued about revolutionary violence comes from Sartre's preface and from a German essay on him published in Munich in 1969. Cohn-Bendit appears once, at second hand, in another writer's paper on Marcuse, and is made to have become a student leader over the rules governing hostel visits. And Trotsky's name occurs exactly once in the book, in a clause with no source attached to it at all. The scholar and the functionary are visible in the same bibliography, and it is possible to say where each of them was working.

That mixture makes the book's central silence harder to explain away, and worth examining carefully, because it is the most instructive thing in the volume.

Begin with the date, and do not take it from the spine. The English edition is 1975, but the argument closed earlier. The latest substantive sources Batalov uses are Theodore Roszak's *Where the Wasteland Ends*, New York 1973, and a *Pravda* item of 24 June 1972; after those, nothing. The 1974 and 1975 dates in the footnotes all belong to Moscow editions of Marx and Engels, which is what a translator substitutes when preparing an English text. The internal evidence agrees: Chile does not appear, Allende does not appear, and neither Portugal nor Lisbon appears anywhere in eighty-nine thousand words. A book about the Western revolutionary left that went to press after September 1973 or April 1974 could not have been silent about both. So this is a manuscript of 1972–73 issued in English in 1975 — which matters, because 1975 was the high point of détente and of a Western European conjuncture the Soviet leadership watched closely, and Batalov was not writing into it. He was writing into the aftermath of 1968, and

Progress was selling him into a later situation than the one he had analysed.

The commission, though, is stated plainly in his concluding pages. He warns the Western parties against "adopting a mentor's pose" towards the young; he says "the communists recognise militant youth as a force, whose sympathies are worth fighting for"; he concedes that the New Left "cast doubt on the ideals which official institutions claimed to be in step with the times" and that "it forced many people to stop and think about the fate of society in which they lived." The book is not an excommunication. It is a recruiting instrument, written to give a Western Communist cadre something intelligent to say to a student who has been reading Marcuse — which is why it had to engage Marcuse seriously, and does.

The engagement is real, and in places it is good. Batalov gives his opponents their strongest formulations before answering them, which is the elementary courtesy of intellectual history and is not common in this genre. He quotes Marcuse's 1969 statement that "the radical transformation of a social system still depends on the class which constitutes the human base of the process of production. In the advanced capitalist countries, this is the industrial working class." He records, accurately, that at the end of 1968 Marcuse denied that the students could substitute for the workers — that Marcuse said "he had never said or thought that the student movement could replace the proletariat or working class as a revolutionary force." He quotes Mills's own caveat: "Of course we can't 'write off the working class'." A polemicist looking for a soft target would have suppressed all three.

Having granted that, he presses where the argument is genuinely weak. Marcuse's case for the integration of the working class rested on the closing of the consumption gap; Batalov's reply is that this is an argument about needs masquerading as an argument about class position, and that it fails empirically in two ways. Marcuse, he writes, "carries over trends typical of society in present-day America to other capitalist countries" without regard for the very different situation of workers in Italy, France and Japan — a point that reads oddly for anyone who remembers that Marcuse published *An Essay on Liberation* the year after the Italian Hot Autumn and the French May. And Marcuse "ignores the unstable character of the situation in the capitalist world, assuming that high economic standards are to be a permanent feature in the life of the most developed capitalist countries." That sentence was written before the oil shock and printed in its wreckage. It has aged extremely well.

Behind it lies a serious piece of Marxist argument. Batalov denies that the revolutionary character of the working class was ever deduced from its impoverishment, and cites Engels's 1891 criticism of the draft Social-Democratic programme: "This is incorrect when put in such a categorical way. The organisation of the workers and their constantly growing resistance will possibly check the increase of misery to a certain extent. However, what certainly does increase is the insecurity of existence." If the revolutionary potential of the class rests on its position in production and on the insecurity of its existence, then a rise in living standards does not settle the question, and the whole architecture of the "one-dimensional" thesis loses its foundation. This is a real blow, honestly landed.

It was also being landed from the other side of the Cold War, by people the Soviet state would not print. Robert Langston's "Herbert Marcuse and Marxism," in the November–December 1968 *International Socialist Review* — the journal of the American Socialist Workers Party — made the same case first, and years earlier. Marcuse's conclusion about the working class, he wrote, "is not the result of any new theoretical discovery"; it "comes from the fact that by and large for the past 20 years the working class in the most advanced capitalist countries has shown few signs of any revolutionary activity," and by taking that quiescence "as the overriding reality to guide his analysis of social phenomena, Marcuse departs from the method of historical materialism." That is Batalov's objection, in Batalov's order, from a man Batalov could not cite.

The difference is in what surrounds it. Langston pauses to call *Reason and Revolution* (1941) "Marcuse's finest work and possibly the best book on Hegel yet written in English," and he tests the theory against the French May exactly as Batalov does — with the addition that Batalov could not make. Marcuse's second explanation of France, the living French revolutionary tradition, will not do, Langston argues, because that tradition "so far as it was carried by the Communist Party and the trade-union federations, was a zombie, not a living reality": the PCF "did everything it could to destroy the revolutionary movement and must be assigned major credit for derailing it." Same diagnosis of Marcuse; opposite operation. One critic is free to praise the book he is refuting and to name the party that demobilised the strike; the other is not. The review was noticed in *Intercontinental Press*, vol. 6 no. 39, 18 November 1968. A reader who wants to see how much of Batalov's critique of substitutionism is Marxism and how much is Soviet *raison d'état* can usefully read the two texts side by side.

Where the framework breaks is exactly where the Leibson volume in this series breaks, and for the same reason. Batalov can see bureaucracy perfectly well when it is somewhere else. On the Chinese Cultural Revolution he writes that it "was not a spontaneous movement but a specially staged grandiose happening," that "instead of bureaucracy being destroyed, one variety was replaced by another," and that the outcome was "the liquidation of socialist democracy and the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship." Those are categories with sharp edges. They are never once turned east of the Urals.

The scale of the omission is best shown by counting. In a book of eighty-nine thousand words about a movement whose formative political experiences were the Twentieth Congress, Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968, the word Czechoslovakia does not appear at all — not under that spelling, not as Czecho-, not as Slovak, not as Dubček, and no scanner damage accounts for it. Hungary appears once, inside a quoted phrase about the revolution of 1919. There is no 1956, no Khrushchev, no Twentieth Congress, and no Prague except as a place where books were published. Trotsky's name occurs once, in a single clause asserting that the idea of war as the motive force of history "was actively propagated by the Trotskyites and in recent years (although with certain modifications) it has become an essential part of the Maoist ideological arsenal." Stalin's name occurs once. It occurs inside quotation marks, in the mouth of somebody else. And the Communist Party of the Soviet Union is not named at any point in the volume; the words Soviet Union occur twice. A Soviet philosopher explaining to Western Communists why the young have gone past them has written a book in which his own party does not appear.

That one appearance is the hinge of the book, and deserves quoting in full. Batalov reports that "the majority of the New Left expressed critical attitudes to real socialism since, from their point of view, 'Stalinist bureaucracy' had led Soviet society to deviate from the socialist 'ideal'." This is a fair statement of the charge — it is what Marcuse, and a great many others, actually thought. And the reply, in the very next sentence, is this: "It should be mentioned, that the vast majority of the radical Left is ill-acquainted with the real state of affairs in the socialist countries and the tone of their criticism is shaped to a large extent by general principles of the radical negative approach to existing societies."

That is the whole answer. The scholar who traced Marcuse's position on the working class across four books and a decade meets the central political accusation against his own state with the observation that the accusers are poorly informed. No

evidence is offered for what the real state of affairs is. The theoretical supplement, a few lines later, is worse: the "so-called 'deviation' from socialism," Batalov writes, "emerges on closer examination to be none other than the influence of non-proletarian strata or Utopian illusions which their ideologists would impart to the revolution." Stalinism, on this account, was petty-bourgeois contamination — the same diagnosis the book applies to the students. The Terror is reclassified as a species of left radicalism and thereby disposed of. It is an ingenious move, and it is the point at which the intellectual historian stops working and the functionary takes over. Not one of the men and women who were shot is named. The phrase "socialist democracy" appears twice in the book, once about bourgeois legality and once about China.

The same asymmetry governs the treatment of France. Batalov's account of May 1968 is the French Communist Party's account, sourced to the July 1968 Central Committee plenum, to Waldeck Rochet, and to a long footnoted interview with René Andrieu in *Le nouvel observateur* of 22 November 1968 — "We did not think that there was a power vacuum." The students, Batalov concludes, "did not undermine even one of the institutions of power, they did not bring about the emergence of a revolutionary situation in Paris, let alone the provinces." What the ten million strikers were doing, and what the PCF and the CGT did with them, is not discussed. The contemporary reply is locatable: Pierre Frank, "Crisis of Revolutionary Leadership in France," and Ernest Mandel, "From Revolt Against the Bourgeois University to Revolt Against Capitalist Society," both in *Intercontinental Press* vol. 6 no. 22, 10 June 1968; and "First Lessons of the Revolutionary Upsurge in France," the statement of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International, vol. 6 no. 24, 24 June 1968. Whether or not one accepts their verdict, they are arguing about the strike, and Batalov is not.

The deepest reply to this volume, however, is a text Batalov could not have answered in print: the resolution "The New Rise of the World Revolution," adopted by the Ninth World Congress of the Fourth International and published in *Intercontinental Press* vol. 7 no. 26, 14 July 1969. It offers precisely the explanation of the youth radicalisation that Batalov's framework forbids. The prestige of the Communist parties among the young, it argues, had been undermined by de-Stalinisation, the Sino-Soviet conflict and the inadequate defence of Vietnam; the crisis in the workers' states was a crisis of bureaucratic economic management, in which a technocratic wing and a conservative apparatus quarrelled over market reforms while neither would "take a stand for workers' self-management, even in principle"; and the young

intellectuals of Eastern Europe were moving first because the demand for freedom of creation and of debate "is a vital need without which they threaten to stifle." The same journal, in the same issue that carried the Marcuse review, printed a discussion document from Czechoslovakia on the party statutes and socialist democracy. Two traditions were reading the same generation. One of them could name what that generation was reacting against.

Fairness requires more than one concession in the other direction, and the same document supplies the first. Batalov's central charge against the New Left theorists — that a skepticism about the revolutionary capacity of the Western working class is a petty-bourgeois reflex dressed as theory — is in substance the Ninth Congress's own. Among the dangers facing the new youth vanguard the resolution lists "third-worldism; adventurism of an anarchistic nature; refusal to take into consideration the need of drawing ever broader masses into anti-imperialist and anticapitalist action," and adds: "The ideologies of Fanon, Marcuse, and Sweezy are only adaptations to this kind of mentality, which is objectively petty bourgeois even if it is inspired by the sincerest revolutionary motives." Its answer to Marcuse is Batalov's answer: "The experience of May 1968 in France dramatically confirmed this and refuted the pessimistic analyses of Sweezy, Marcuse, and others." Batalov was right about substitutionism, and he was not right alone or first.

His jab about the Trotskyists and revolutionary war is unargued and unsourced, but it too is not aimed at nothing: the Ninth World Congress had in fact adopted an orientation to rural guerrilla warfare in Latin America, and that orientation was contested inside the Fourth International for years afterwards at considerable cost. Batalov does not know this, or does not say it; he reaches for a stock phrase where an argument was available to him. But a reader should not conclude that the charge was invented.

Which leads to the test worth applying to a book like this one, and it is not a matter of counting militant words. Batalov uses the whole family of deviation labels — opportunism, revisionism, dogmatism, sectarian — twice each in eighty-nine thousand words, far below the average for these volumes, and nobody should convict him on vocabulary. The two questions that do discriminate are these. Is the charge cashed out into a specified act that could be shown not to have happened? And could the category, as the book defines it, ever apply to the author's own side?

On the first, Batalov's record is mixed and mostly creditable:

his case against Debray is attached to a named book, a quoted passage and a named critic, and is refutable. His single sentence on the Trotskyists is attached to nothing at all. On the second the answer is uniform, and it is no. Compare the documents of the Fourth International's Tenth World Congress, printed in *Intercontinental Press* vol. 12 no. 46 of 23 December 1974 — that is, within weeks of Batalov's English publication — which attack ultraleftism at length and then turn the charge inward, by name and with dates. The adopted General Political Resolution records flatly, among the reasons the International has not grown, that "many of the organizations of the Fourth International continue to manifest a sectarian attitude on the question of recruitment." The congress document "Balance-sheet and Orientation for the Bolivian Revolution" calls the Teoponte guerrilla action of 1970 the "bitterest fruits of focoist adventurism," resting on "a basically petty-bourgeois concept" — the very charge Batalov levels at the New Left, turned on an operation carried out in the International's own political orbit — and dates its own Bolivian section's error to a specific signature: "The POR accepted that criticism in its self-criticism of April 1, 1972." Batalov's petty-bourgeois category is never once available for use on the party that commissioned the book. It is, on the contrary, the device by which that party is protected — Stalinism itself reclassified as contamination arriving from outside. A charge that cannot travel in both directions is not a finding about the world; it is a boundary marker.

Read the book, then, for its subject rather than its verdict. On Marcuse it remains a serviceable guide, and on the substitutionist temptation — the search for a new revolutionary subject that begins by writing off the old one — it makes an argument that the anti-Stalinist left also made, and that has not been superseded. Batalov's later career as a specialist in American political thought and in the history of utopia is already legible in the fourth chapter, which is the best writing in the volume. The translation is uneven, and a scholar who knew the Frankfurt School well is made to call its home the "Institute of Social Sciences" more than once.

And then note where the argument stops. In the chapter on violence, Batalov quotes Marcuse's claim that "precisely this coexistence explains to a large extent the distortion of socialism in relation to its original idea" — quoting it, characteristically, from the original German article in the Zagreb journal *Praxis* — and answers it by reciting what "communists, as is well known, have stated quite clearly" about peaceful coexistence, and by reminding the Western parties that in weighing any risk "they have to weigh up the gains scored by the whole international communist

movement." The charge is that Soviet foreign policy had deformed Soviet socialism. The reply is Soviet foreign policy.

It is worth noting how that reply is sourced, because the pattern recurs across this series. The word coexistence appears thirteen times in the book and not once inside a quotation from Lenin. The only authority actually quoted for the doctrine is the International Meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties held in Moscow in 1969 — a conference resolution. A man who could produce Marcuse's German, Sartre's French and Engels's 1891 criticism of the draft Social-Democratic programme, and who cites Lenin thirty-one times on everything else, does not quote Lenin here, and the reason is that the passage he would need does not exist. Batalov was capable of better, and almost certainly knew it.

INTERNATIONALISM

International Solidarity with the Spanish Republic 1936--1939

The international volunteers for the Spanish Republic, documented by their own veterans' organisations across twenty-one countries - how the money was raised, who crossed which frontier, and what the battalions cost. Opened by Dolores Ibarruri and Luigi Longo.

Dolores Ibarruri and others

Introduction to the 1975 Edition

The catalogue records this book under the name of Dolores Ibarruri, and that is wrong in a way worth pausing over. Ibarruri wrote four pages of it. The volume is an anthology issued by the Institute of the International Working-Class Movement and the Soviet War Veterans' Committee, and its real authors are named plainly in the front matter: the Association of Austrian Volunteers for Republican Spain, the International Brigade Association and Friends of Republican Spain in Britain, the Anti-Fascist Fighters' Committee of Bulgaria, the Fraternity of Former Yugoslav Volunteers, the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, and sixteen others. After Ibarruri come Luigi Longo, former Commissar General of the International Brigades and by 1975 Chairman of the Italian Communist Party, and Franz Dahlem of the East German party; then twenty-one country chapters, in alphabetical order from Argentina to Yugoslavia; then an afterword by the Soviet editorial board, I. S. Kremer and I. N. Nesterenko.

The provenance matters because it is unusual. "From the Publishers" dates the project to a Berlin meeting of Spanish war veterans in July 1966, records that an International Editorial Board was formed, and states that the Board "discussed and approved for publication the materials presented by a number of national organisations of Spanish war veterans" at a meeting in Moscow from 10 to 19 January 1970. Publication followed five years later. This is not a Progress title written to order by an institute staffer. It is a negotiated document, assembled over nine years by the surviving veterans' bodies of a dozen ruling parties and a dozen Western communist parties, cleared by a committee in Moscow, and issued in English for export in the year Franco died. Every silence in it was agreed by someone.

Take the courage first, because it is not in dispute and this

book documents it better than most.

The country chapters are, in large part, ordinary institutional history done competently: how money was raised, how volunteers were smuggled out, who was arrested at which frontier, what the newspapers printed. The Britain chapter, written by Nan Green — who served in Spain and whose husband was killed there — is a model of the type. Its account of the reception of Basque children after the bombing of Guernica has a specificity that no polemic could manufacture: "A miracle of voluntary organisation transformed bare fields outside the port of Southampton into a well-equipped transit camp", from which four thousand children went to homes organised by trades councils, union branches and religious bodies, and were taught in their own language. The Italian chapter gives the political composition of its four thousand volunteers down to the individual: 1,822 Communists, 137 Socialists, 124 anarchists, 55 from radical democratic parties, and the largest single group unaffiliated. Bulgaria's contingent of roughly 460, we are told, included "a few anarchists, Social-Democrats and members of the Agricultural Union". These numbers were collected by people who knew the men.

And the casualties are not softened. The Thaelmann Battalion at the approaches to Madrid held its positions "at a high price—out of 600 men, only 32 survived". Of the eight hundred men of the Franco-Belgian Sixth of February Battalion who reached the Jarama, "only 150 remained in action after ten days of fighting". More than half of the 1,600 Yugoslav volunteers were killed. Whatever else this book is, it is a war memorial compiled by the survivors, and it should be read as one. The men and women in it went to Spain because they understood, earlier and more clearly than their governments, what fascism was going to do to Europe. Nothing said below diminishes that by a gram.

What the book cannot do is tell the truth about why the Republic lost.

Search the whole 143,000 words and the acronym POUM occurs exactly once. It is in the Austrian chapter, in a single sentence: "Serious contradictions appeared after the POUM putsch in Barcelona in May 1937 over the question of the attitude to be adopted to Trotskyism, but this had no effect on the relations between the members of the International Brigades." That is the entire treatment. The Barcelona May Days — five days of street fighting in the Republic's second city, in which several hundred people were killed — are a subordinate clause. They are called a putsch, which they were not; the fighting began when Assault Guards under the Generalitat's commissioner of public order moved on the CNT-held Telefónica exchange on 3 May 1937.

The Partido Obrero de Unificación Marxista was outlawed the following month. Its leader Andreu Nin — who had been Trotsky's secretary in Moscow, who had broken with him, and who had served as Justice minister in the Catalan government until December 1936 — was arrested in Barcelona on 16 June 1937, taken to a house at Alcalá de Henares, tortured, and killed. His body was never recovered. This was not a fact that had to wait for the Soviet archives: by May 1945 the American Trotskyist monthly *Fourth International* (vol. VI no. 5) could refer to Nin in passing, in a routine note on Spanish party history, as having been "subsequently killed by the GPU", and expect its readers to need no explanation. The name Nin does not appear in this book. It does not appear in the seventeen-hundred-line name index either, an index otherwise so complete that it lists flight commanders and battalion cooks. Neither does the CNT — the anarcho-syndicalist confederation which had over a million members and which held Barcelona in July 1936 — appear anywhere by name in these pages, though its rival the UGT does. Camillo Berneri, the Italian anarchist philosopher murdered in Barcelona during those same May days, is absent from a chapter that otherwise names Italian volunteers one by one.

The silence is not accidental, because the book does have a settled view of the Republic's left, and states it. From the Bulgarian chapter: "The attacks on the Spanish Republic came not only from the right but also from the 'left', from numerically small groups of Bulgarian anarchists, and also Trotskyites who called for a 'proletarian revolution' against the government of the Popular Front." From the German chapter, on the autumn of 1938: "capitulationist feeling mounted among the unstable elements in the Popular Front—the Right-wing Socialists, the bourgeois Republicans, the anarchists, and also among regular officers." From the Soviet chapter, on the International Brigades in Catalonia: "Anarchist extremists tried to present the International Brigades as an

armed force seeking to win power for the Communists."

Anarchists appear in these pages in exactly two acceptable postures — as individual brave men who fought and died, and as admirers of the USSR. The book quotes Durruti's letter to the Soviet proletariat, and it quotes García Oliver: "If the fascists ever attack the Soviet Union I will go and defend it. I am an anarchist." What it never records is what the CNT and the POUM actually argued about — land collectivisation, the militias, workers' control of the factories, whether the war could be won by restoring a conventional bourgeois state or only by extending the revolution — or that the Communist Party's answer to that argument in 1937 was, in the end, the political police.

The most revealing document in the volume gives the policy away without meaning to. In the Soviet chapter, the correspondence of December 1936 and January 1937 between Voroshilov, Molotov and Stalin and the Spanish premier Largo Caballero is quoted at length and described as "full of sincerity and trust". The Soviet leaders assure Caballero that their military specialists have been instructed "on no account to lose sight of the fact" that a Soviet adviser "can be of real use only if he keeps strictly within the limits of an adviser and an adviser alone". And then the book summarises the rest of the letter in its own words: "The Soviet leaders went on to recommend the implementation of certain measures in the interests of the peasantry and the petty and middle bourgeoisie, and also measures to protect the property of citizens of states which did not support the insurgents."

There is the strategy, printed without embarrassment. The Soviet Union was pressing the Spanish government to reassure property owners and foreign investors, in the belief that a Republic which looked respectable would be sold arms by London and Paris. It never was. What that policy did accomplish was to put Moscow at the head of the counter-revolution inside the Republic, and to make the destruction of the POUM and the disarming of the CNT a condition of continued Soviet supply. The book records the consequence in a single flat sentence a few paragraphs later — "After the resignation of Largo Caballero's government in May 1937 the new Spanish Prime Minister, the Socialist Juan Negrín..." — with no hint that Caballero fell precisely because he would not proscribe the POUM at the Communist ministers' insistence, or that his fall followed the Barcelona fighting by days.

There is a second silence, and it is the one the veterans would have felt most. The Soviet chapter names the advisers with

pride: "The post of chief adviser was held consecutively by Y. K. Berzin (1936–37), G. M. Stern (1937–38) and K. M. Kachanov (1938–39)", the ambassador M. I. Rosenberg, the consul-general in Barcelona V. A. Antonov-Ovseyenko, the military attaché V. Y. Gorev, the air commander Y. V. Smushkevich, the Pravda correspondent Mikhail Koltsov. Of these, Berzin was shot in 1938. Antonov-Ovseyenko — one of the men who took the Winter Palace in 1917 — was shot in 1938. Rosenberg was shot in 1938. Gorev was shot. Koltsov, arrested at the end of 1938, was shot in 1940. Smushkevich and Stern, both decorated Heroes of the Soviet Union, were shot together in October 1941. Vladimir Čopić, whom the Yugoslav chapter honours by name and shows in a photograph as commander of the 15th International Brigade, was arrested in Moscow and shot in 1939. Not one of these deaths is mentioned. The book that carefully records how Herbert Tschape was captured by the Gestapo and executed cannot say how Jan Berzin died.

The same erasure operates on the parties. The Poland chapter narrates the Communist Party of Poland's Popular Front work through 1936, 1937 and 1938 and never mentions that the Comintern dissolved that party in 1938 and that most of its leadership then in the USSR was shot. Nor does Santiago Carrillo, General Secretary of the Spanish party since 1960, appear anywhere in the book or its index — nor does Enrique Lister, the civil war commander Moscow had backed against him in the split of 1970. That the editorial board approved these materials in January 1970, at the height of that quarrel, and then let the volume sit five years, is worth holding in mind. A contemporaneous account of the Carrillo–Moscow conflict, and of the use of a Spanish war veteran as the Kremlin's instrument against the Spanish leadership, appeared in *Inprecor* no. 0, which quotes *l'Humanité* of 23 February 1974.

Yugoslavia is the interesting exception, and shows what the negotiation produced. The Yugoslav chapter, written by the Fraternity of Former Yugoslav Volunteers, is the only one that credits its own party rather than Moscow: the solidarity campaign is "led by the Secretary of the LCY Central Committee, Josip Broz Tito", and the Soviet Union barely features. Twenty-seven years after 1948, the Soviet editors let that stand — the price of having Yugoslavia in the book at all. The chapter has its own small anachronism, calling the party the League of Communists throughout, a name it did not take until 1952. Absent altogether, meanwhile, are Belgium and the Netherlands, whose volunteers fill the French chapter's battalion rosters; Denmark, though Sweden and Norway are here; Mexico, the Republic's most consistent state supporter,

whose people Ibarruri thanks by name in her opening piece; and Albania, likewise thanked by Ibarruri but broken with Moscow since 1961. The publishers say only that "the collection could not contain material on all the national contingents that took part in the struggle in Spain."

The reply to this book was written while the events were still happening, by people who were there. The indispensable eyewitness account is George Orwell's *Homage to Catalonia* (1938), which describes the Barcelona fighting from a POUM militia rooftop and then the manhunt that followed, and which was refused by Gollancz and sold a few hundred copies. The political analysis is Felix Morrow's *Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Spain* (New York, 1938), written from within the Trotskyist movement and still the sharpest statement of the case that the Republic's defeat followed from its refusal of the revolution rather than from an excess of it.

But books can be dismissed as the settled positions of a defeated faction. The sharper answer to a volume assembled in committee over nine years is the argument as it was actually conducted, month by month, by people who did not know how it would come out. That record exists: the New York monthly *Fourth International* ran from 1940, and the Spanish question never left it.

Its first substantial statement is Trotsky's, printed in November 1940 (vol. I no. 6) as "The Comintern and the GPU". Set against the 1975 volume's account of Soviet advisers dispatched to help a fraternal republic, one sentence in it does a great deal of work: "In Spain the GPU killed my former secretary, Erwin Wolf, and a number of my political co-thinkers." The piece is dated 19 August 1940; the magazine's editorial note observes that it was finished "a few days before his assassination". He did not live to see it published. The following month's issue (vol. I no. 7, December 1940) carried "The Class, the Party and the Leadership", his last major text on the Spanish defeat, and it is worth reading precisely because it is not a martyrology. Trotsky's judgement on the man Moscow had killed is severe: "The real misfortune was that Nin, covering himself with the authority of Lenin and the October revolution, could not make up his mind to break with the People's Front." He is arguing that the POUM's leaders were destroyed while still trying to stay inside the coalition that destroyed them.

In April 1945 (vol. VI no. 4) the magazine reprinted Trotsky's December 1937 pamphlet "The Lesson of Spain – The Last Warning" — written within months of the killings, and framing them as a pattern rather than an incident: "Why does

every approach to our views or our methods of action (Durruti, Andres Nin, Landau, and others) compel the Stalinist gangsters to resort to bloody reprisals?" By July–August 1950 (vol. XI no. 4), Joseph Hansen's survey "Stalin's Frame-Up System" set Spain inside the Terror rather than beside it: "An outstanding victim was Andres Nin, leader of the POUM (Workers Party of Marxist Unification). Trotsky's former Secretary, Erwin Wolfe, was kidnapped in Spain by the GPU and never seen again." That is the connection the 1975 book most needs its readers not to make — the one running from the Moscow dock to Alcalá de Henares, and back to the fate of its own named advisers.

The most useful item, though, is the least famous. Across three issues — December 1945 (vol. VI no. 12), January 1946 (vol. VII no. 1) and February 1946 (vol. VII no. 2) — Fourth International translated the theses adopted in May 1945 by the Internationalist Communists, the Spanish section, in exile and a few years out from the events. On Barcelona they describe what the Austrian chapter calls a putsch as "the proletarian insurrection in Barcelona of May 1937", and their target is not only the Communists: it is the CNT ministers who ordered the ceasefire, and the failure they name is one of leadership — "The May Days in which a great number of militants of the CNT and Anarchist Youth rose up against the latest counter-revolutionary acts of the government put in sharp relief the gulf that existed between the most conscious part of the anarchist movement and the anarchist leaders who were participating in the (bourgeois) government." On the POUM they are harsher still, calling it "the most genuine centrist Party in the workers' movement" and writing that it "trampled on the Marxism that it professed and disarmed itself and disarmed the working class in the face of the events which were threatening both the Revolution and its own head". Trotsky's own writings on Spain, gathered in English as *The Spanish Revolution* (1931–39), had argued the same from 1931 onwards.

The contrast with the volume in hand is not one between two propagandas. Here is a tendency that fought the POUM's politics in public, without pause, for a decade — and that nonetheless recorded who killed Nin, when, and on whose behalf. Twenty-one veterans' organisations and an editorial board in Moscow took nine years to produce one subordinate clause about Barcelona; a scattering of Spanish exiles, meeting in May 1945 with nothing to protect, produced a document that spends pages on their own side's errors. That is the difference between an argument and a settlement.

Read this volume, then, for what it honestly is: the collective memory of the men who went, edited by the institutions that

outlived them. The regiments, the frontier routes, the fundraising, the casualty figures — these are testimony, and much of it exists nowhere else in English. The politics are a settlement reached in a Moscow committee room in January 1970 about what those men were to be remembered as having fought for. The book itself supplies the standard by which to judge it. It closes on the hope that readers will "draw from the experience of the past lessons that will be of use". The lesson the Republic's defeat actually teaches is the one lesson these twenty-one chapters were assembled to prevent anyone drawing.

Fundamentals of Political Science

The Party's own primer on where power lies, written by a team from the Central Committee's International Department and ideological apparatus - and headed by the man who, fifteen years later, became the architect of glasnost.

Aleksandr Nikolaevich Yakovlev

Introduction to the 1975 Edition

A primer on political science is a revealing thing to hold up to the light, because it must tell the beginner where power lies. That is its subject. *Fundamentals of Political Science* was written for exactly that beginner — "those who are beginning to study Marxism-Leninism," in the words of its own opening page — and it sets out, lucidly and at length, to explain the state, class rule, democracy, the party, and the world political process. It is competent, orderly, and frequently accurate about the societies it does not have to live in. On the one society it exists to justify, it goes silent at precisely the point where a science of political power would have to begin. That silence is the most interesting thing in the book, and this introduction is chiefly about it.

Start with the object itself. The volume was prepared, its title page states, "by a group of authors headed by A. N. Yakovlev" and including S. I. Beglov, N. B. Bikkenin, K. N. Brutents, F. F. Petrenko, V. V. Zagladin and others, translated by David Fidlon and issued by Progress Publishers in Moscow. These are not academics working in isolation under constraint. They are the constraint. Zagladin was a deputy head of the International Department of the Central Committee; Brutents worked in the same department; Bikkenin belonged to the ideological apparatus and would later edit *Kommunist*, the Party's theoretical journal. The senior name is the one that carries the sharpest irony. A. N. Yakovlev, then among the most powerful figures in the CPSU's propaganda machinery, is the same Aleksandr Yakovlev who a decade later returned from a long ambassadorial posting to become Mikhail Gorbachev's closest ideological lieutenant — the intellectual architect of glasnost and perestroika, the man who did more than any other single official to dismantle the very ideological monopoly this book was written to defend. In 1975 he headed the team that told Soviet beginners the Party's leading role was the guarantee of everything. Within fifteen years he was arguing that it was the obstacle to everything. The book is a fossil of the apparatus in its unquestioned prime, signed by a

man who lived long enough to disown it.

The date is worth fixing, because it is genuinely the date it looks like. Progress translations often lag their Russian originals by years, and several volumes in this series carry a jacket date that badly overstates their real vintage. Not this one. The latest events cited are the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet of 16 June 1974 and the world capitalist recession that "broke out in 1974 and is still continuing." The reference points are the 24th Party Congress of 1971, the fiftieth anniversary of the USSR in December 1972, and Brezhnev's speech marking it. There is no 25th Congress (February 1976) and no hint of the 1977 "Brezhnev" Constitution. So this is a text of 1974–75, and it argues from the high plateau of the Brezhnev era — the doctrine of "developed socialism," the theory that the USSR had passed beyond the transitional period into a stable, mature socialist society building communism at its own pace. Nothing in the book reads as retrospective. It is the confident self-portrait of a system that believed it had solved the problems of its own construction and had only to administer the results.

It helps to ask what such a book was for. This was a commissioned export primer, translated into the language of international circulation and aimed at students beginning Marxism-Leninism at home and sympathisers abroad — and its governing doctrine, "developed socialism," did specific political work in 1975. Under Khrushchev the Party Programme of 1961 had promised the material foundations of full communism "in the main" by 1980; the Brezhnev leadership quietly retired that deadline and put in its place the far more comfortable proposition that the USSR had already reached a stable, "mature" or "developed" stage of socialism — an achieved condition to be perfected and administered rather than a horizon to be raced toward. The book is the pedagogy of that settlement. Its recurring note is not revolutionary striving but consolidation: the economy managed, the nations merged, the class struggle at home essentially concluded, the state transformed into the peaceable "state of the whole people." A doctrine that declares the

fundamental social questions already answered is, among other things, a doctrine that relieves its readers of the need to ask them. That is the political function of the theory this primer teaches, and it is inseparable from the analytical blindness examined below.

What the book teaches

The doctrinal spine is orthodox and should be stated precisely, because the reflexive failure only shows up against an exact account of what the book claims. The Marxist-Leninist theory of the state runs as follows, and the primer transmits it faithfully: the state is not a neutral arbiter standing above society but an instrument of class rule, "an apparatus of coercion and an apparatus of administration with which it protects and upholds the existing order," equipped with "the army, courts and prisons." Every state is the organised power of one class over others. On this the book is entirely sound, and it is real Marx.

From this follows the theory of transition. The proletarian revolution smashes the bourgeois state and erects "a qualitatively new type of state—the dictatorship of the proletariat." The book is careful and correct about what this term does and does not mean in the classical texts: it is class rule by the majority, exercised in various forms — the Paris Commune of 1871, the Soviets, the post-war People's Democracies — and its task is both to suppress the resistance of the dispossessed exploiters and to organise the building of the new society. So far this is a defensible reading of Marx, Engels and Lenin.

Then comes the specifically Soviet innovation, and here the book states the doctrine that the rest of this introduction must test. Once the exploiting classes are gone and socialism has won "finally and irrevocably," the dictatorship of the proletariat "gradually develops into a socialist state of the entire people." The formula recurs like a refrain: the state that "arose as the dictatorship of the proletariat, became the state of the whole people, the political organisation of the people in which the leading role is played by the working class." This is the theoretical centrepiece of Brezhnev-era political science — the announcement that the Soviet state no longer represents a class dictatorship at all, having become the common instrument of a socially unified people.

Two further doctrines complete the frame. First, the withering away of the state: the book faithfully preserves the classical Marxist promise that under full communism the state as a special apparatus of coercion becomes unnecessary and

dissolves into "communist social self-government." Second — and this is the load-bearing pillar of the whole structure — the leading role of the Communist Party. "Without a revolutionary Marxist-Leninist Party to guide it," the book declares, "the working class cannot accomplish a socialist revolution and build socialist society." The Party is the vanguard, the teacher, the organiser; socialist democracy means "the participation of the masses in the administration of the state" under that guidance. The state belongs to the whole people; the Party leads the whole people; the two propositions are asserted side by side and never allowed to collide.

The question the science cannot ask

A science of political power is judged by its willingness to locate power — to say who actually decides, by what mechanism, and how the decision could be reversed. On any society but its own, this book does exactly that, and does it well. It dissects the "petty details of the suffrage" through which capitalist democracy excludes the poor; it names property qualifications, residence rules, and literacy tests, state by American state, that keep working people off the electoral rolls. It quotes Lenin sharply on how bourgeois democracy hides "restriction after restriction upon democracy" behind formal equality. This is genuine political analysis, and much of it is true.

Turn the same instrument on the USSR and it goes blind. The book's account of Soviet democracy rests on participation figures: "In June 1974, 99.98 per cent of the voters took part in the elections to the USSR Supreme Soviet." It offers this as "convincing proof of the broad democratic rights exercised by Soviet people." But a near-unanimous turnout is evidence of nothing about the distribution of power unless the voters had a choice, and the book never once mentions the decisive fact of Soviet elections: that each seat carried a single candidate, nominated through Party-controlled channels, running unopposed. A political science that spends three paragraphs anatomising residence requirements in California and not one sentence on the single-candidate ballot at home is not analysing power. It is looking away from it on cue.

The same evasion governs the treatment of the apparatus. The book knows perfectly well that the selection and placement of leading personnel is where Soviet power is really exercised — it says so, describing how Party committees handle "the selection, placement and training of top personnel for the economy" and "promote to administrative positions people possessing the necessary political and managerial qualities." This is a plain-language description of the nomenklatura (the

Party's confidential roster of appointments, the mechanism by which the apparatus staffed every position of consequence in the state and economy). The book describes the machine and withholds the word, and having described it, draws no conclusion from it. Where bureaucracy is admitted at all, it appears only as a defect of individuals: the 24th Congress "called for decisive actions against callous officials, bureaucrats and boors," people to be "exposed" one by one. Bureaucracy is a problem of bad manners, never a stratum, never a structure, never a distribution of power. The category that would let the book see itself is simply absent from its vocabulary.

Most revealing of all is what the book can theorise. It offers a genuine sociological account of why capitalist societies contain several workers' parties: "The existence of several political parties (and trade union organisations) of the working class is above all a result of its heterogeneous social composition," compounded by the way "the monopoly bourgeoisie bribes the small upper layer of the working class." So political pluralism has causes; it reflects the real complexity and stratification of a class. But the Soviet single party is never subjected to the same analysis. It is not explained; it is assumed — the natural and self-evident expression of a society that has achieved unity. The one-party state is the premise the political science is built to protect, and a premise cannot be examined by the science it founds.

This is where "the leading role of the Communist Party" does its real work. It is presented as an answer — the answer to how a classless people governs itself. In fact it is the device that forecloses the question. Ask who rules in the "state of the whole people," and the doctrine replies: the whole people, led by the working class, led by its vanguard, the Party. Each term hands the question to the next, and the last term — the Party apparatus — is exempted from any further asking. The book's own logic, applied consistently, points straight at that apparatus as the site of power; the book's own doctrine forbids it to look there. That is the reflexive failure of the whole genre, and in a primer whose declared subject is political power it is not a marginal blind spot. It is the hole where the centre should be.

The reply the book had already been given

None of this needed to wait for hindsight. The Marxist tradition the book claims had answered these arguments before they were made, and the sharpest answers come from the two authors the book most wants on its side and most cannot afford to read closely.

The first is Lenin. The book quotes him constantly and selectively. It cites *The State and Revolution* (1917) for the Party's mission of "leading the whole people to socialism," and it endorses "the withering away of the state" as a distant goal. But it silently drops the two constraints that give Lenin's theory its teeth. Lenin's proletarian state was to begin withering immediately — the more democratic it became, the less of a state it would be; here, on the contrary, "the development of Soviet society is accompanied by the strengthening of its political organisation, the Soviet state," the exact inversion of Lenin's expectation, presented without embarrassment. And Lenin's state was to be kept in the hands of the masses by a specific institutional mechanism: every official elected, paid a worker's wage, and subject to recall at any time. The book even quotes the principle — "All officials, all leading bodies, and all institutions of the Party are subject to election, are responsible to their constituents" — and preserves the recall clause too; but it confines the whole principle to inner-Party elections and never extends it to the state, whose officials answer to no comparable right of recall. The recallable official, the ceiling on official salaries, the armed people in place of a standing bureaucracy — the whole apparatus by which Lenin proposed to stop the state escaping popular control — has vanished from a book that invokes his name on almost every page. Lenin had warned, in the passage Trotsky would later throw back at the bureaucracy, against exactly the danger of state organs turning "from servants of society to lords over society." The primer describes that transformation as an accomplished and benign fact and calls it the state of the whole people.

The second and more devastating reply is Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936), written when the doctrines this book repeats were new. The primer praises the 1936 Constitution as the document in which "the victory of socialism ... was reflected"; Trotsky devoted a chapter, "In the Mirror of the New Constitution," to that same document, and it reads as a point-by-point demolition of the argument this 1975 primer would still be making forty years later. On the elections the book celebrates, Trotsky wrote that the Soviet citizen "will have the right to choose their 'representatives' only from among candidates whom the central and local leaders present to them under the flag of the party," so that "politics is thus once for all declared the monopoly of an uncontrolled bureaucracy." On the very argument the primer makes about parties — that a unified society naturally has one — Trotsky had already answered Stalin's version of it: a society "incomparably more heterogeneous and complicated" than any class could furnish "adequate nourishing soil for several parties," and the one-party monopoly reflected not social unity

but the political expropriation of the working class by the apparatus that ruled in its name. Where the primer sees the withering state, Trotsky saw its opposite — a swollen bureaucracy consuming an ever-larger share of the national product and defending its privileges; where the primer sees the state of the whole people, Trotsky saw a privileged stratum that had risen precisely by "freeing the bureaucracy from the control of the proletarian vanguard." One need not accept every line of Trotsky's analysis — the degenerated-workers'-state thesis was and remains contested within the Marxist tradition — to see that he had named, in 1936, the exact reality the 1975 primer is organised not to name. The book's category of the "state of the whole people" is the theoretical seal placed over the thing Trotsky called the Soviet Thermidor: the political rule of the bureaucracy.

It is worth adding, in fairness to the standard this series holds itself to, that the book's polemic against Trotskyism is conducted in the usual manner — by characterisation without citation. Trotsky is charged with "asserting that the victory of the proletarian revolution in the West was an essential condition for the victory of socialism in the USSR," a compressed and tendentious gloss on the theory of permanent revolution that the book condemns by name and never actually states, and never quotes. The reader is given the verdict and denied the evidence. That, too, is a way of foreclosing a question.

What holds up

A reader told that everything here is worthless would learn nothing, and it would be false. Where the book transmits the classical materials rather than the apologetics built on them, it is often genuinely good, and a beginner could do worse than read it for those passages alone. Its exposition of historical materialism — the base and superstructure, the succession of socio-economic formations, the derivation of politics from class interest — is clear, economical and substantially accurate; the account of the state as an instrument of class rule is real Marxism, competently taught. Its critique of the formal character of bourgeois democracy is not propaganda but a serious point, and the Lenin it quotes on the "petty details of the suffrage" is Lenin at his most acute: universal suffrage can coexist with the systematic exclusion of the poor from real political life, and the twentieth century supplied ample confirmation. The book is right that there is no "democracy in general," that democracy always has a class content, and that formal equality before the law can mask deep material inequality of political power. The tragedy — and the reflexive

comedy — of the volume is that it possesses every one of the analytical tools required to see its own society clearly, and is forbidden by its function to turn a single one of them inward.

This is not a peculiarity of one book but the house style of an entire shelf, and *Fundamentals of Political Science* should be read alongside its siblings in this series: V. Afanasyev's *Scientific Communism* (1967), V. Chkhikvadze's *The Soviet Form of Popular Government* (1972), Machulsky and Topornin's *Socialism and Democracy* (1974), and the companion *Fundamentals* volumes on political economy and scientific socialism. They share a division of intellectual labour and a common limit. Each can dissect the class content of a foreign state with real rigour, and each falls silent, in the same place and with the same doctrinal formula, when the analysis approaches home. Put them side by side and the pattern is unmistakable: a mature, self-confident political science, fluent in the anatomy of power everywhere except in the one country whose power it was commissioned to explain. The leading role of the Party was the answer these books were built to give. It was also the question they were built not to ask.

PHILOSOPHY On Religion

What Marx and Engels actually wrote about religion, from the 1841 dissertation to Engels on early Christianity - including the passage on the sigh of the oppressed creature that the famous half-quotation leaves out.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

Introduction to This Edition

The pieces gathered here span more than half a century, from a footnote in Marx's 1841 doctoral dissertation to Engels's essays on early Christianity written in the last year of his life. They were never conceived as a book. It was the Soviet editors who made them one, cutting extracts from Capital, Anti-Dühring, The German Ideology, the Manifesto and a dozen other works, adding letters and journalism, and framing the whole as a single doctrine. The Foreword states the purpose without embarrassment: these are "works in which Marx and Engels expound their views on the essence and origin of religion," and "these works lay the theoretical foundations of proletarian, Marxist atheism." The present collection, first issued by Progress Publishers in 1957 and reprinted in this revised form through the 1970s, is thus two things at once — an anthology of what Marx and Engels actually wrote about religion, and a monument to what a later state wanted that writing to mean.

The distance between the two is the subject of this introduction. The materials are genuine and often magnificent; the frame around them is a construction, and the construction tells its own story.

Read on their own, the texts are far richer than the label "atheism" suggests. Their core is a materialist explanation of where religion comes from — not a sneer at the credulous but an account of need. In the earliest human societies religious belief arose from helplessness before nature; in class society it is fed by "the social oppression of the working masses and their apparent helplessness in the struggle against their exploiters." Engels's definition, which the Foreword rightly places at the centre, is that religion "is nothing but 'the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life, a reflection in which the terrestrial forces assume the form of supernatural forces.'"

Strip out the polemic and what remains is a theory of religion as a real response to real powerlessness.

Two things in the collection are stronger still. The first is Marx's own famous passage, from the 1844 Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, and it is worth quoting in full because it is almost always quoted in half: "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people." That is not contempt. It is close to compassion — religion as the protest of suffering as much as its sedative — and it issues not in a programme of unbelief but in a demand for a different world: the criticism of religion, Marx writes, ends "with the categorical imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being." The second is Engels's late work on the origins of Christianity — the essays on Bruno Bauer, the Book of Revelation, and above all On the History of Early Christianity, which opens with a startling comparison: "The history of early Christianity has notable points in common with the modern working-class movement," both of them "originally a movement of oppressed people." Here Marxism looks at a religion not to debunk it but to understand it as a form the hopes of the poor once took.

The weakness of the collection is not in these texts but in the flattening they are made to undergo. The Foreword takes the "opium" sentence, detaches it from the sigh of the oppressed creature that gives it its meaning, and announces that "this saying has become the cornerstone of the whole Marxist outlook on religion." A dialectical remark about suffering is thereby turned into a slogan about narcotics, and the half of Marx that heard religion as protest is quietly dropped. Engels bears some responsibility too: his confidence that natural science had simply retired religion can read, in the framing, as a tidy Enlightenment optimism that his own subtler essays contradict. The anthology's fault, in short, is that it knows in advance what Marx and Engels are permitted to have meant.

Whether the state that printed this book was faithful to it is the decisive question, and the answer is no — twice over.

Marx's conclusion was that religion withers when the conditions that require it are abolished: remove the "heartless world," and the sigh falls silent of itself. The Soviet state did close to the opposite. It waged administrative war on belief — the League of the Militant Godless, churches shut and dynamited, clergy arrested and worse, the 1929 law that hemmed religious life on every side. This was not the disappearance of illusion as its social roots were dissolved; it was coercion by a state that had by no means abolished oppression, only changed its management. Marx had warned that a criticism of religion which stops at unbelief, and does not go on to overturn the debasing conditions, has misunderstood itself. Militant atheism as a policy of persecution was exactly such a stopping-short, dressed as its opposite.

The deeper inconsistency is the one this very anthology cannot help exposing. The book was assembled to reveal religion as "the fantastic reflection in men's minds of those external forces which control their daily life," in which earthly powers "assume the form of supernatural forces." But that is a precise description of what the Soviet regime was building around itself. The embalmed body in the mausoleum, kept on display over Krupskaya's protest; "Marxism-Leninism" recited as a catechism; the ritual pairing of Lenin and Stalin, and Stalin hailed as the Lenin of today; the founders' texts edited, purged and re-edited to fit the leader of the year — this is a fantastic reflection of an alien power exactly of the kind Engels analysed, the deification of a state that controlled its subjects' daily lives. The atheist state made itself into a church, with relics, saints, heresies and an infallible scripture, and printed Marx's critique of religion without once turning it homeward.

This is where the Fourth International reads the book. The point is not to defend religion against Marxism, nor to convict Marx and Engels of the persecutions carried out in their name; it is to insist, with Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed*, that the cult was the property of a privileged bureaucratic caste, and that its idols measure the distance the revolution had been dragged from its own materialism. The tools of criticism the anthology sharpens are the very tools that expose the sharpener. A doctrine that can explain the worship of Lenin's corpse as one more fantastic reflection of an alien, earthly power is a doctrine the regime could not afford to let its readers apply.

Taken back from its frame, *On Religion* is more valuable now than the catechism allowed. Its materialism holds: belief has social roots, and the way to answer the sigh of the oppressed creature is to end the oppression, not to jail the creature for sighing. Its method turns in every direction, including the one its Soviet publishers forbade — onto the secular cults, the state religions of the twentieth century, the sacralised leaders and unquestionable creeds that manufacture their own supernatural forces out of very earthly power. And its finest pages, Engels on the slaves and freedmen who first carried the Christian hope, and Marx on the heart of a heartless world, are a standing rebuke to every reading, official or hostile, that reduces this tradition to a war on faith. Marx and Engels wanted a world in which human beings no longer needed to project their stolen powers into the heavens. The state that canonised them built new heavens of its own. Reading this collection against that betrayal — hearing the protest in the sigh, and refusing the reflection — is the only way to read it as its authors meant.

MARXISM

Selected Correspondence

265 letters across half a century - Marx and Engels thinking aloud to each other and their friends, including Engels's late letters to Bloch and Mehring trying to stop a younger generation turning the method into a machine.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels

Introduction to This Edition

Every finished book is an argument in its Sunday clothes.

Correspondence is the argument in its shirtsleeves — thought caught in the act, before it has decided what it wants to say. That is what makes this volume unlike almost anything else in the Marxist library. Here are Marx and Engels not lecturing the world but writing to each other and to their friends across half a century, from the first letter Engels sent to Marx in the autumn of 1844 to the last Engels wrote a few months before his death in 1895: arguing over proofs and rent theory and the state of the stock exchange, complaining about money and printers, sizing up men and movements, and — again and again — working out in the margins of a private letter ideas that would only later harden into doctrine. Lenin, in the appreciation the edition places at its head, put the value exactly. Its worth, he wrote, "is tremendous," because the two men "return again and again to the most diverse aspects of their doctrine," and if one had to name in a single word the focus of the whole correspondence, "that word would be dialectics." He meant that here you watch the method at work rather than its results laid out for inspection.

The present text is the Progress Publishers edition — first issued in Moscow in 1955, revised and enlarged in 1965, and given a third revised form in 1975, from which this printing descends. It was translated by I. Lasker and edited by S. W. Ryazanskaya, and it is a serious piece of scholarship: 265 letters chosen from a surviving correspondence of several thousand, furnished with a substantial body of explanatory notes, a name index that tells you who every obscure figure was, and a bibliography. A reader should understand from the outset that this is a selection, and that selection is itself an argument — a point we will return to, because who chooses the letters chooses, to a considerable degree, which Marx and which Engels the reader is allowed to meet.

Take first what is strongest here, because it is genuinely first-rate, and because it bears directly on the misuse to come.

The glory of this collection is the handful of letters Engels wrote in his last years — to Joseph Bloch, to Conrad Schmidt, to Franz Mehring, to Borgius — in which, watching a younger generation turn his and Marx's work into a crude machine, he tried to pull the emergency brake. To Bloch, in September 1890, he set it down as plainly as it can be said. "According to the materialist conception of history," he wrote, "the ultimately determining factor in history is the production and reproduction of real life. Neither Marx nor I have ever asserted more than this. Hence if somebody twists this into saying that the economic factor is the only determining one, he transforms that proposition into a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase." The economy is the base, but law, politics, philosophy, religion "also exercise their influence upon the course of the historical struggles"; there is "an interaction of all these elements." And then the sentence that ought to be carved over the door of every Marxist school: "We make our history ourselves, but, in the first place, under very definite antecedents and conditions." History is not a conveyor belt on which the economy delivers ready-made results; it is made by human beings, in circumstances they did not choose, out of the collision of "innumerable intersecting forces."

The same warning runs through the neighbouring letters. To Mehring, in 1893, Engels diagnosed the way ideas come to float free of their real roots: "Ideology is a process which is indeed accomplished consciously by the so-called thinker, but it is the wrong kind of consciousness" — the thinker mistakes the true motives driving him for the reasons he invents. And the deepest note is sounded not by Engels but by Marx, in the letter he drafted around 1877 to the editors of the Russian journal *Otechestvenniye Zapiski* (Notes of the Fatherland). Warned that Russian disciples were treating his account of how capitalism arose in Western Europe as a timetable that every nation must follow, Marx refused the honour. His sketch of the Western road, he insisted, must not be transformed into a passe-partout, a skeleton key: one "will never arrive there by using as one's master key a general historico-philosophical theory, the supreme virtue of which consists in being supra-historical." No formula, however grand, can be applied

over the head of the actual, particular history it claims to explain. It is hard to imagine a sharper repudiation, from Marx's own hand, of the idea of Marxism as a universal recipe.

That is the summit of the book. It would be dishonest not to add that a correspondence is also an uneven and partial thing. Much of it is occasional — feuds with forgotten rivals, the grind of party administration, condolences and cash. The letters are elliptical, written by men who could assume everything between them and therefore spell out little; a reader without the notes will often be lost. And the record contains real tensions as well as triumphs, which the volume, to its credit, does not hide. Engels's last years carry the seed of a genuine problem: his growing confidence that the German workers' party could ride universal suffrage and its own swelling vote toward power gave a handle, after his death, to those who wanted to file Marxism down into patient parliamentary waiting. The Correspondence lets you see the founders whole — their reach and their blind spots — precisely because it was never composed for display.

Now turn the critical lens where a Progress edition asks it to be turned: not on the letters, but on the packaging. The editing is scholarly, but it is scholarship with a line to hold, and the line shows. It shows in the vocabulary of the notes and the index, where opponents are sorted with the flat finality of a verdict — this figure a "renegade," that one "opportunist," a third the bearer of "petty-bourgeois" views — the fixed epithets of a church rather than the distinctions of a historian. It shows, above all, in what such an apparatus is willing to say about omission when the omission is someone else's. One of the edition's own notes describes, with entire accuracy, how the leadership of the German party, printing Engels's last great essay in its paper *Vorwärts* (Forward), "distorted Engels' arguments and gave them an opportunist turn by omitting important passages on the revolutionary struggle." The note is correct: the 1895 bowdlerisation of Engels's introduction to Marx's *Class Struggles in France*, which cut the fighting passages to leave a tame apostle of the ballot box, is one of the classic falsifications in the movement's history, and the edition is right to brand it. But read that sentence again and ask who is speaking. An apparatus that condemns the doctoring of a text by selective omission is an apparatus whose own entire method — in its selections, its introductions, its silences — was selective omission in the service of the current line. The charge is just. It is also a mirror.

For this is where the reflexive question becomes almost unbearable. Was the state that lovingly reprinted these letters faithful to them? The house that set Engels's warning to Bloch

in type — the warning that reducing history to the economic factor produces "a meaningless, abstract, absurd phrase" — was the same house that turned out, by the ton, the textbooks of official dialectical and historical materialism in which history was reduced to exactly that: a base mechanically grinding out a superstructure, iron laws unrolling toward a guaranteed end, the whole of human striving demoted to the froth on an economic tide. Stalin's canonical summary of 1938 taught the doctrine Engels had called absurd, and taught it to millions as the last word of the founders. And the letters' manner — provisional, self-correcting, forever qualifying yesterday's formula in the light of a new fact — was the living rebuke to a Marxism that had become a catechism, a set of answers to be recited rather than a way of asking questions. The Correspondence, in short, is the internal refutation of Soviet Marxism, bound in the same buckram as the thing it refutes. The bureaucracy printed its own indictment and shelved it among the relics.

None of this convicts Marx or Engels; it measures the distance between them and the men who governed in their name, and the Fourth International's reading has always turned on that distance. The degeneration of the Russian Revolution was not written into the founders' doctrine. It grew from causes Marxism itself can explain — the isolation of a workers' state in a backward country once the German revolution failed, the ruin of the working class in the civil war, the encirclement — and it was completed by a bureaucratic caste that usurped the revolution and then rewrote its scriptures to license the theft. Trotsky, in *The Revolution Betrayed*, named the mechanism; the point for a reader of this book is that the falsification reached into the classics themselves. The living, dialectical, self-questioning Marxism of these letters had to be flattened into a fatalist doctrine precisely because a fatalist doctrine is what a conservative bureaucracy needs — a science that proves the present order is history's verdict and that the custodians of the science are history's appointed managers. The canonised text became the measure of the betrayal, not its cause.

Which is exactly why the book is worth so much more than its place on the shelf of sacred objects. Read against its own shrine, the Correspondence gives Marxism back as what its founders practised: not a passe-partout but a method, not a timetable but an argument that has to be made afresh for every new situation. "We make our history ourselves" is the opposite of the fatalism that was preached in Marx's name. The refusal of a "master key" that is "supra-historical" is the opposite of a doctrine imposed from above on peoples it never troubled to study. The recognition that ideology can be "the wrong kind of

consciousness" is a tool that turns, with beautiful precision, on the official ideology that wielded it. Ernest Mandel, among others in this tradition, spent a lifetime recovering this open, investigative Marxism from under the cement of the manuals; these letters are the quarry he worked. Against the Stalinist caricature that froze Marx into a lawgiver, and against the liberal reflex that dismisses the whole enterprise as a machine for producing tyrants, the Correspondence offers the actual article — two enormously learned, quarrelsome, self-revising human beings, thinking in public with each other for fifty years, and never once mistaking their own formulas for the movement of the world. That is the inheritance worth claiming: not the classics under glass, but the workshop with the door left open.

INTERNATIONALISM

Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Contemporary World

The official Soviet theory of world revolution, codified for export at the high tide of detente: the three detachments of the world revolutionary process, the non-capitalist path, peaceful coexistence, and the ban on exporting revolution.

Petr N Fedoseyev

Introduction to the 1975 Edition

This is the book in which the Soviet state set down, in one place and for export, its official theory of world revolution. Leninist Theory of Socialist Revolution and the Contemporary World was printed by Progress in James Riordan's translation in 1975, and unlike many titles in this series it carries no lag: the Russian original is of the same moment, and the latest events in the text — the 1972 "Basic Principles" agreement with Washington, Brezhnev's meetings with Ford, Schmidt, Giscard d'Estaing and Wilson in 1974 and 1975 — place its composition at the very high tide of détente, in the run-up to Helsinki. It is a keystone doctrinal volume, and it should be read as one: not a monograph with an argument to defend but a codification, the theory of revolution as the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU (1971) wished it to be understood.

The first thing to notice is that no one signs it. The book names Marx, Engels and Lenin on every page and its own author nowhere. It speaks in the first-person plural of the Party — "Lenin has bequeathed us a great theoretical heritage" — and it locates the authority for its doctrine not in scholarship but in decisions: the theory "was developed further in the Programme adopted at the 22nd Congress," "analysed in the documents of the 23rd and 24th CPSU congresses," and in "the Declaration of the Meeting of Representatives of the Communist and Workers' Parties of the Socialist Countries in 1957, the Statement... in 1960 and the documents of the International Meeting... in 1969." This is worth stating plainly, because it is the key to everything that follows. A theory of revolution whose warrant is a congress resolution has already answered the question the book pretends to be asking. Revolution here is not a wager on the self-activity of the exploited; it is a body of settled propositions, ratified from above, of which the Soviet party is custodian.

The doctrine, stated precisely

The organising idea is what the book calls "the world revolutionary process." In this conception the revolution of our age has three great forces: the world socialist system built around the USSR; the working-class movement of the developed capitalist countries; and the national-liberation movement of the former colonies. The three are to be welded into "a single turbulent stream," and the book is explicit about which of them commands. The socialist community — in practice the Soviet bloc — is "the bastion and vanguard of the world-wide revolutionary movement." The advance of "a country that had broken free from the capitalist system itself became one of the decisive levers in the world revolution." The other two detachments are auxiliaries; their revolutionary value is measured by their alliance with, and subordination to, the existing socialist states.

From this follow the book's characteristic doctrines, each of which is genuinely Leninist in vocabulary and something else in substance. The "non-capitalist path of development" offers newly liberated states a route to socialism by leaning on the socialist camp rather than passing through a full capitalist stage — fifty separate invocations of the phrase, but the content is that these states advance to the degree that they align with Moscow. "Peaceful coexistence" governs relations between the two world systems: forty-four occurrences, the "Leninist principle" that lets socialism build in security while the class struggle continues by other means. And the whole is bounded by a firm repudiation of what the book calls the export of revolution — "Revolution cannot be accelerated, nor made to order, nor pushed on from outside."

The "non-capitalist path" deserves a closer look, because it is where the subordination of the third detachment becomes a printed policy rather than an implication. The doctrine — that former colonies can reach socialism "by-passing the capitalist stage" — has a real Marxist pedigree, and the book cites it

honestly: Marx on the Russian commune, Engels on the "force of example of the proletarian revolution for backward, pre-capitalist societies." But the operative sentence is not the pedigree; it is the mechanism. "The countries of the Third World cannot possibly attain complete national liberation," the book states, "without the closest bond between the national liberation struggle and the international working-class movement and, above all, without developing multilateral co-operation with the Soviet Union and other socialist states." The road to socialism, for the newly independent state, runs through Moscow, and the theory supplies the map. This is a clue to what the book was for. It is not, or not only, an export primer for Western sympathisers; the emphasis on states of "a socialist orientation," the anti-imperialist young republics of Asia and Africa, points to a book meant to furnish the cadre of allied and client movements with a doctrine that made alignment with the USSR the very definition of revolutionary progress. The theory and the foreign policy are the same object seen from two angles.

Each of these can be defended in Lenin's words, and the book defends them in Lenin's words. What it never does is let the words carry the doctrine. The pattern the reader should watch — it recurs across this whole series of Progress titles — is that the pedigree is asserted in the authors' own voice and the quotation, when it comes, says something narrower. "Peaceful coexistence" is the clearest case. The phrase is attributed to Lenin throughout as "the Leninist principle of peaceful coexistence," but the genuine Lenin quotations the book supplies do not contain it. When Lenin is actually quoted on the subject he says the Soviet republic has won "conditions enabling us to exist side by side with capitalist powers" — side by side, not peaceful coexistence. The one place the phrase appears next to Lenin's name inside quotation marks — "the peaceful coexistence of countries with opposite systems means a sharp political, economic and ideological struggle" — is a passage from a later Soviet document that itself paraphrases him, not a citation to his collected works. The doctrine is real; the attribution is a bridge the authors build in their own voice and label Lenin's. Readers of the sibling volumes in this series will recognise the manoeuvre: Tomashevsky's *Lenin's Ideas and Modern International Relations* (1974) performs it with the identical phrase and the identical missing citation.

The Trotsky the book cannot quote

The theory this book exists to displace is Trotsky's, and Chapter I's treatment of it is the volume's most revealing few pages. It is candid enough to admit what most of the doctrine's

popularisers conceal — that "the idea of permanent revolution is central to the theory of socialist revolution" and that "Lenin relied upon it." Having conceded the term to Marx and to Lenin, the book then has to detach it from the one Marxist most associated with it, and it does so by splitting the phrase in two: there is the good "Marxist idea of uninterrupted revolution," and there is "the Trotskyist theory of permanent revolution," which "was first advanced by Parvus and Trotsky during the First Russian Revolution (1905–1907)" and which amounts to "the Menshevik rejection of the revolutionary role of the peasants."

That last charge is the whole case, and it is false in a way that is easy to check, because Trotsky wrote the answer out at length and this series holds the text. In *Results and Prospects* (1906) — its chapter "The Proletariat in Power and the Peasantry" — and again in the theses of *The Permanent Revolution* (1930), the argument is not that the peasantry is negligible but the reverse: that the proletariat, having taken power with peasant support, would be driven into conflict with the propertied section of the peasantry and could survive that conflict only if the revolution spread. The book's own summary inadvertently records this — it complains that Trotsky held "the working class, in the course of revolution, would come into hostile confrontation with the broad mass of the peasants" — and then treats a prediction of difficulty as a denial of alliance. The two decisive theses are worth setting beside the caricature. Thesis 9: "The conquest of power by the proletariat does not complete the revolution, but only opens it." Thesis 10: the revolution "begins on the national arena... and is completed on the world arena." The theory is about the incompleteness of a national seizure of power and the necessity of international extension. The Soviet operation is to collapse that into a claim about the peasantry, dispose of the claim, and never state the thesis.

And here is the tell that runs through the entire chapter, and through the sibling volumes *Contemporary Trotskyism* (Basmanov, 1972) and *The Revolutionary Vanguard* (Basmanov and Leibzon, 1977): the book quotes Lenin against Trotsky many times — Lenin's *Collected Works*, volumes 8, 15 and 16, all from the 1905–1907 polemics — and it quotes Trotsky not once. Trotsky "wrote about an allegedly definite isolation of the proletariat"; Trotsky "put forward the adventurist slogan"; Trotsky "opposed this with his vulgar subjectivist concept of 'combined development.'" Characterised, paraphrased, condemned — and never, in a book built to refute him, cited to a page of his own. An opponent who is quoted can be checked. An opponent who is only described cannot, and that is the point of describing him.

The one modern Trotskyist the book does quote directly, the historian Pierre Broué, it quotes accurately and to its cost: "no less today than in 1918 or 1938, the future of the USSR cannot be separated from the fight to overthrow capitalism on a world scale... the prospects for socialist victory in the world are opposed to those of peaceful coexistence." That is a fair statement of the disagreement. The book prints it and then answers it not with an argument but with an accusation — that such a view would "put at risk the first real place d'armes of world revolution." The place d'armes is the USSR. The revelation, unintended, is that in this doctrine the interest of world revolution and the security interest of the Soviet state have become the same sentence.

The amalgam at Brest

One specific falsification is worth isolating, because it is not this book's invention but a house habit, and this volume is at least the fourth title in the series to commit it. The book presents Trotsky as a champion of revolutionary war — of "encouraging revolution from without," of "provoking revolution by war against the world bourgeoisie." At the Brest-Litovsk crisis of 1918, it says, "the proponents of petty-bourgeois revolutionarism — the 'Left'-wing Communists and Trotskyists — attempted to foist upon the Party an adventurist policy of provoking revolution by war." The footnotes to the surrounding passage cite the Left Communists' own journal, *Kommunist*, of March 1918.

The amalgam is in that dash. The revolutionary-war position at Brest was the Left Communists' — Bukharin's — and the citations correctly point to their paper. Trotsky's position was neither Bukharin's nor Lenin's: it was "neither war nor peace," to refuse to sign but not to fight, using the negotiations as a platform for revolutionary agitation across the German lines. One does not have to take a Trotskyist's word for the distinction. Writing in the *International Socialist Review* in 1970, Ernest Mandel — surveying exactly this history in "Peaceful Coexistence and World Revolution" — locates the opponents of the Brest peace precisely: "outside the Bolshevik Party (the left SRs) as well as inside the Bolshevik Party," never Trotsky among the advocates of revolutionary war. Mandel recalls, too, what the Soviet book omits: that Lenin himself defended Trotsky's conduct at Brest — "when he started negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, by using them perfectly for agitation, we were all in agreement with Comrade Trotsky." To fold Trotsky into the Left Communist position, while quoting the Left Communists in the footnotes, is to convict a man of an argument the record shows he did not

make and that Lenin, at the time, approved.

The same chapter carries the argument forward past 1918 with the same method. Trotsky's critique of the draft programme of the Comintern — the book means *The Third International After Lenin* (1928), a work this series holds in full — is reduced to the assertion that "socialist construction within national boundaries would lead to a 'collaborationist' policy." And "the documents of the Trotskyist Fourth International" are cited, without quotation, as having "maintained that, after the war, the main centre of the revolutionary movement had moved to the colonial states," a position then lumped together with a Chinese newspaper, with Garaudy, with the Venezuelan Teodoro Petkoff and the Italian Manifesto group. The technique is constant: name the document, state what it "maintained," never let the reader see the words.

What the book will not say about itself

The deepest problem is not any single distortion but a silence, and the test that exposes it is not frequency of usage — this book uses "opportunism" and "revisionism" heavily, but so did Lenin, and so did the congresses of the Fourth International, and the measure discriminates nothing. The test that holds is reflexivity. In a book whose entire subject is the world revolutionary process, can revolution ever be something the exploited do against a state that calls itself socialist? Read for that, and the volume answers with terrible consistency.

Revolution abroad is celebrated. The French general strike of May–June 1968 — "an unprecedented general strike" — is a high point of the narrative; guerrilla struggle in Latin America, Asia and Africa is honoured; the Vietnamese war of liberation is supported by name and the book is careful to insist that peaceful coexistence "leaves no doubt about the sacred right of the oppressed peoples to employ every means in their fight for liberation, up to and including armed struggle." But workers moving against a socialist state appear in these 150,000 words exactly once, and only to be crushed. Hungary in 1956 — the year of workers' councils in Budapest — enters the book solely as "the armed counter-revolution in Hungary in 1956," with the man Soviet tanks installed, János Kádár, quoted to explain why "the Hungarian bourgeoisie" had to be put down. There is no Soviet strike anywhere in the volume. There is no Kronstadt. The name Stalin does not occur at all — the entire Stalin period, in a book on the theory and history of Soviet revolution, has simply been lifted out.

And there is Czechoslovakia. The Prague Spring and the Warsaw Pact invasion of August 1968 — seven years before

this book, and directly on its theme, since it was precisely a dispute about the forms and ownership of socialist development — are absent. Czechoslovakia appears in 1948, where the Communist seizure of power is rendered as "mass demonstrations in support of the people's democracy." It appears in 1975 through the mouth of Gustáv Husák, the First Secretary installed by the 1968 invasion, quoted on the "methods" of imperialist subversion. The event that put Husák where he was quoting from is the one thing the book cannot mention. This is the finding, and it is not an inference from what the book says but from the shape of what it will not: the doctrine can narrate the working class making revolution everywhere on earth except inside the states it governs, where the working class making its own history becomes, by definition, counter-revolution to be suppressed. The category of "opportunist," likewise, is inexhaustible outward — Right and "Left" revisionists, Trotskyists, Maoists, Garaudy, Broué — and can never once turn inward. Nobody who stayed inside is ever named an opportunist. That asymmetry, not the word-count, is the tell.

The Fourth International had made exactly this argument about exactly this doctrine, and made it in advance. The classical statement is Trotsky's *The Revolution Betrayed* (1936): the Soviet bureaucracy as a privileged stratum whose "foreign policy" is the defence of its own position and which measures every revolution abroad by whether it strengthens or endangers that position. The Transitional Programme (1938) drew the practical conclusion this book inverts — that the political revolution of the workers against the bureaucracy is a task of the revolution, not a crime against it. And Mandel's 1970 essay traces the whole descent the book enacts: from the internationalism of the first four congresses of the Comintern, through the theory of "socialism in one country" — a phrase, one notes, that appears nowhere in this volume, though the doctrine is on every page — to a "world revolutionary process" administered as an annex of Soviet foreign policy. The book quiet on all of it because to state the counter-position is to have to answer it, and the method of the volume is never to let the counter-position be stated.

What holds up

None of this makes the book worthless, and a reader told it were worthless would be badly served. Where it transmits Lenin rather than glossing him, it transmits real Lenin, and some of it is done well. The exposition of Marx and Engels on the internal contradiction of capitalist production — the socialisation of labour against the private form of

appropriation — is clear and accurate. On the question that most tempts Progress authors into softness, the book is firm and correctly Leninist: the working class "must win complete power, demolish the bourgeois state-coercive machine and establish proletarian dictatorship," and the state cannot simply be inherited but must be smashed. It insists, against reformism, that "the peaceful path is not a renunciation of revolution, not reformism," and it backs the point with a genuinely apposite and honestly handled quotation — Lenin's 1899 "A Retrograde Trend in Russian Social-Democracy," where he grants that the workers "would, of course, prefer to take power peacefully" but calls it "madness" to renounce revolutionary seizure should the bourgeoisie resort to force. On the parliamentary road, in short, this book is more careful than its détente framing would lead one to expect: it distinguishes a peaceful form of revolution from a reformist renunciation of revolution, which is a distinction the Eurocommunist parties of the same decade were busy erasing. Handled fairly, that is the strongest and most usable part of the volume.

The tragedy of the book is that these genuine fragments of Lenin sit inside a frame that empties them. A theory that can quote *State and Revolution* on smashing the bourgeois state, and in the same covers reclassify the workers' councils of Budapest as "the armed counter-revolution," has not preserved Lenin's doctrine but hollowed it and worn the shell. The self-emancipation of the working class — the sentence with which the First International opened, that the emancipation of the workers must be conquered by the workers themselves — is the one Leninist proposition this Leninist theory of revolution cannot afford, because its whole architecture rests on an experienced hand at the wheel, "that of the communist party," and on a socialist community that is bastion and vanguard both. The reader who wants to know what the largest state descended from October taught the world about revolution, in the language of international circulation, at the calm centre of the 1970s, will find it set out here with unusual completeness. The reader who wants to know what became of the idea that revolution is something people do, rather than something a state administers, will find that too — in the silences.