Progress PublishersMoscow

The End of the Third Reich

The book

This introduction was written for The End of the Third Reich, V. I. Chuikov.

Shortly before four in the morning on 1 May 1945, General Hans Krebs, the last Chief of Staff of the German army, was shown into a hall with black pillars in a building in southern Berlin that served as a Soviet command post, and announced the news he had come to deliver. "You are the first foreigner to be told that on April 30 Hitler departed this world of his own will; he has committed suicide." The Soviet general facing him replied: "We know." It was a bluff, and the general admits it a few pages later: "I must confess that I knew nothing of Hitler's death at the time and had not expected the announcement from Krebs."

That general was Vasily Chuikov, and the scene is the best-known passage in this book. It is worth starting with because it shows both of the things the book is. It is a first-hand record, by the man in the room, of how the Third Reich ended, candid enough to confess its author's own bluff. And it is a book written by a man who knew exactly what to say and what not to say. Chuikov kept his composure in front of Krebs. He kept it, in a different sense, for the whole of this memoir.

The general and his book

Chuikov (1900–1982) was one of the outstanding Soviet commanders of the Second World War. He joined the Red Army in 1918 and commanded a regiment in the Civil War before he was twenty. In September 1942 he took over the 62nd Army in the ruins of Stalingrad and held the west bank of the Volga through the autumn. That was the battle that made his name, and the army, renamed the 8th Guards in 1943, stayed under his command all the way to Berlin. This book follows it from June 1944 to May 1945: from the Dniester to the Vistula, across Poland to the Oder, through the Seelow Heights into Berlin, and finally into the cellars where the German high command came to surrender. After the war Chuikov commanded the Soviet forces in Germany and headed the occupation administration until 1953. He was made a Marshal of the Soviet Union in 1955, ran the Soviet ground forces in the early 1960s and then civil defence. When he died he was buried, at his own request, on the Mamayev Kurgan, the hill above Stalingrad where his army had fought.

The book has a history of its own, and the date on the spine is not the date of the text. Chuikov first published an account of the Berlin campaign in the mid-1960s. It drew him into one of the few open quarrels among Soviet marshals. He argued that Berlin could have been taken in February 1945, and Zhukov, who had commanded the front, rejected the claim in print. That earlier version reached American readers in 1968 as The Fall of Berlin, published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston. The text translated here is a later one. Its copyright page gives the Russian original as Konets tret'ego reikha (The End of the Third Reich), published by Sovetskaya Rossiya in 1973, and describes this Progress edition of 1978 as an "English translation of the revised Russian text". The revision went on after 1973: General Babadzhanyan, who commanded a tank corps in these pages, appears as "now Chief Marshal of the Armoured Forces", a rank he received in 1975. The reprint of 1985, which is the copy reproduced here, still calls him that, eight years after his death.

The revision shows. In the 1973 text the February question is still present, but it has been defused. Chuikov prints the front's own directive of 4 February, which ordered the armies "in a swift assault take Berlin on February 15-16". He then sets out the German threat from Pomerania, quotes Zhukov's memoirs on it at length, and ends: "The GHQ decided to smash the enemy group in Pomerania before undertaking a decisive assault on Berlin." The documents of the old argument are laid out, and the argument itself is gone. The decision belongs to "GHQ", the Supreme Command, which here, as throughout the book, has no named head. Stalin is mentioned in the book five times outside the word "Stalingrad". Four concern his wartime correspondence with Roosevelt and Churchill. The fifth comes from Krebs, who tells Chuikov that "there is only one leader who does not want to destroy Germany, and that is Stalin."

That is the frame for everything that follows. This is a Brezhnev-era book about the war, when the victory of 1945 had become the state's central story about itself, and a marshal's memoir was a public monument. Progress issued it in English for readers abroad as testimony from the victors. Much of it is exactly that. But a monument is built to be looked at from the front, and the book has sides it does not show.

1939: "whatever help was possible"

The book's account of the war's origins comes in a single passage, written as the Polish army formed in the Soviet Union goes into action alongside the 8th Guards in July 1944. It blames the Polish government of the 1930s for refusing to let the Red Army cross Poland to defend Czechoslovakia in 1938, and for fearing "the revolutionary working class of Poland" more than it feared Hitler. Then it reaches September 1939:

The nazi invasion of Poland in September 1939 appalled us. The Polish people were threatened with extermination. Only the Polish Communist Party which had been driven underground by the obscurantists and reactionaries refused to down arms and was determined to carry on the unequal struggle. The Soviet Union rendered the Poles whatever help was possible in the prevailing political situation in Europe.

Three things are wrong with this. Each is checkable, and the author knew them all.

First, the Polish Communist Party was not in a position to carry on any struggle in September 1939, because it no longer existed. The Communist International had dissolved it in 1938, after most of its leaders living in the Soviet Union had been arrested and shot in Stalin's purges.

Second, the help the Soviet Union rendered the Poles in September 1939 was an invasion. On 17 September the Red Army crossed Poland's eastern frontier under the secret protocol of the Nazi–Soviet Pact, signed on the night of 23 August, which divided Poland between Germany and the USSR. The Pact is not named anywhere in the book. The words "non-aggression pact" appear exactly once, in a question Chuikov puts to two German officers: "Then why did Germany violate the non-aggression pact in 1941 and attack our peace-loving country which had threatened no one?"

Third, and this is what turns an evasion into something harder to forgive, Chuikov did not need to read about September 1939. He was there. He commanded the Soviet 4th Army in the invasion of eastern Poland. A few months later he commanded the 9th Army in the Soviet invasion of Finland, and the book mentions that war in passing as a source of useful experience: "the experience I had gained during the war against the White Finns in 1939 stood me in good stead." The man who writes that the Soviet Union gave the Poles "whatever help was possible" led one of the armies that crossed into Poland under the Pact.

It would be unfair to stop there. Part of Chuikov's charge against the prewar Polish government is true, and Marxist critics of Stalin have said so. Ernest Mandel's The Meaning of the Second World War (1986) agrees that the Polish regime's refusal to accept Soviet military assistance made the Allied military talks of summer 1939 "a farce". But Mandel draws the conclusion the book suppresses: "In these circumstances, Stalin preferred to ally himself with the likely victor rather than with the probable victim," and "By acting thus, he undoubtedly helped Hitler commence hostilities by invading Poland" (ch. 10, p. 100). Trotsky had said it on 25 September 1939, eight days after the Red Army crossed the frontier: "In order to gain the possibility of occupying Poland through a military alliance with Hitler, the Kremlin for a long time deceived and continues to deceive the masses in the USSR and in the whole world" ("The USSR in War", The New International, November 1939).

The day Warsaw rose

On the morning of 1 August 1944 the 8th Guards Army began crossing the Vistula at Magnuszew, about sixty kilometres south of Warsaw. That afternoon the Home Army, the Armia Krajowa, the underground army loyal to the Polish government in London, rose in Warsaw against the German garrison. The fighting lasted sixty-three days. The Germans crushed it, killed tens of thousands of civilians, deported the survivors and then dynamited the city street by street.

The Warsaw Rising does not appear in this book. There is no uprising, no insurgent, no Home Army. The book is not silent about Warsaw: the city is named twenty-three times. But every mention is military geography. In August 1944 the Soviet fighters cannot cover Chuikov's crossings because "they were in action at Warsaw". The Hermann Goering Panzer Division attacks the bridgehead after being "hastily transferred from the Warsaw area". Then, in the plan for the January 1945 offensive, comes this sentence: "The overall concept of the operation was to rout the enemy without, however, condemning Warsaw and other Polish cities to destruction." By January 1945 there was very little of Warsaw left to condemn. It had been destroyed, after the Rising, in the months the Red Army spent on the Vistula.

Here the honest position is the double one, and Chuikov's own pages supply half of it. His bridgehead was fighting for its life in August 1944. He describes the German panzer counter-attacks of 5 and 6 August in detail, and his army had come five or six hundred kilometres since June. The Soviet offensive had real military limits. Mandel, no apologist for Stalin, grants exactly this: "the Wehrmacht assembled a still impressive force to counter both the Red Army's drive and the Warsaw insurrection." But he goes on: "And Stalin blocked all help to Warsaw, letting the Germans do the dirty work of liquidating the Armija Krajowa he would otherwise have had to do himself" (ch. 15, p. 144). The book will not let the reader weigh these two things, because it removes the event they are about.

What the book puts in Warsaw's place is politics of another kind. A few pages before the crossing it sets out at length the formation of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Moscow-sponsored body whose founding decree was "made public at Chelm on July 23", with its members, its manifesto and its condemnation of the London government. The Polish government that fills these pages is the one Moscow sponsored. The one whose army rose in Warsaw has been written out.

Majdanek and Lódz

In July 1944, on the outskirts of Lublin, Soviet troops captured the Majdanek camp. His account is one of the most emotional passages in the book, and the emotion is plainly real. He could not bring himself to visit it: "I just could not." And then: "Millions of human beings brutally murdered and burned in furnaces. Millions! Men, women, children—no one was spared."

The figure is the one the Soviet–Polish investigating commission announced in 1944. The Majdanek museum's own current estimate is about 78,000 dead, most of them Jews. Chuikov could not have known the later research, and the error in itself is no great charge against him. What he could have known, and what Soviet accounts of the camps consistently left out, is who the victims were. The word "Jews" occurs once in the whole book, six months later and far to the west, in the liberation of Lódz. There, in a paragraph about the sufferings of the Poles, "A narrow bridge was built across the main street for Jews to cross from one part of the ghetto to another, for they were banned from the streets." That is all. The book does not say that by the time the 8th Guards entered Lódz in January 1945 the ghetto had been emptied the previous August, its inmates sent to Chelmno and Auschwitz, and that only a few hundred people were found alive in it.

"Victors and not killers"

Majdanek leads Chuikov to a question he asks honestly: "Was there any force on earth that could stay the Soviet soldier's hand of vengeance when he entered nazi Germany?" His answer comes in two parts. First, he cites an order of the army's Chief Political Department of 19 July 1944, under which the German nation "was not to be held responsible for the crimes perpetrated by its nazi rulers". Then, as the army crosses the German frontier, he quotes an editorial from Red Star, the army newspaper, of 9 February 1945: "It is inadmissible to think that if, say, the two-legged nazi beasts publicly raped our women or went marauding and looting we should do the same in revenge." And then, in his own voice: "Victors and not killers were entering nazi Germany. The arrival of the Red Army spelled not only defeat for the Hitler regime, but also freedom for the German nation, one of the world's greatest."

This is not a silence. It is a claim, and it can be tested. As a description of what happened in eastern Germany in the spring of 1945 it is false. The mass rape of German women by Soviet soldiers, in East Prussia, in Silesia, in Pomerania and in Berlin itself, is one of the best-documented facts of the end of the war. Historians, beginning with Norman Naimark's The Russians in Germany (1995), put the number of victims in the hundreds of thousands, with some estimates approaching two million. The Soviet authorities knew. Lev Kopelev, a Red Army political officer who protested the violence in East Prussia, was arrested in April 1945 and eventually sentenced to ten years in the camps; among the charges was "bourgeois humanism". The editorial Chuikov quotes is evidence that the high command saw the problem, not that it was solved. Nor was the army's propaganda as consistent as the book implies. The writer Ilya Ehrenburg, whose name does not appear here, had spent the war telling Soviet soldiers that every German was a killer. Pravda publicly corrected him only on 14 April 1945, two days before the final offensive opened.

Here, too, the book has allies it would not have expected. The Fourth International statement "International Solidarity with the German Proletariat", published in January 1946, attacked the doctrine of German collective guilt in terms Chuikov would have recognised. It named "Vansittart in England, Morgenthau in America, and Ehrenburg in Russia" as preaching "with equal hatred that the entire German people bear the guilt for Hitler's crimes". The principle Chuikov sets down, that the German nation was not to be held responsible for its rulers' crimes, was a right one. The book's fault is to present the principle as if it had been the practice.

And Chuikov's own pages contain a more truthful sentence than his conclusion. Watching the artillery preparation for the storming of central Berlin, he writes: "Thousands upon thousands of Germans were being killed simply because Hitler had put arms in their hands and sent them into the annihilating fire of our artillery." A soldier who could write that saw more than his book was allowed to say.

Hitler's body

The book's account of Hitler's end goes no further than Krebs. "Where is Hitler's body?" Chuikov asks, and Krebs answers: "In Berlin. Burned, according to his will. Today." The book then reflects that there are "no impartial witnesses" to the last days of the Reich, and that its leaders "Quite possibly … have taken the truth about the last days of the Third Reich to their graves."

The truth about one of them was in a Soviet file. In the first days of May 1945, Soviet military counter-intelligence found the burned remains in the Chancellery garden and identified them. Moscow kept the identification secret. Through the summer of 1945 Stalin let his allies, and the world, believe that Hitler might have escaped. The autopsy was eventually published in 1968, in the West, by the Soviet journalist Lev Bezymensky in The Death of Adolf Hitler. A memoir revised in 1973 by the marshal who had sat across the table from Krebs still treats the question as an open mystery.

What the book is worth

None of this makes The End of the Third Reich a book to throw away. Strip out what it cannot say and a great deal remains, most of it found nowhere else in English.

It is first a field commander's account of how a Soviet army actually fought its way from the Ukraine to Berlin in eleven months, written with a grip on terrain, logistics and timing that no official history matches. The crossing at Magnuszew, the defence of the bridgehead against two panzer divisions, the five-hundred-kilometre drive from the Vistula to the Oder, the month-long siege of the Poznan citadel, the storming of the Seelow Heights and the street fighting in Berlin are described by the man directing them, with his orders, his timings and his mistakes. Chuikov's real contribution to military history, the use of small mixed assault groups for fighting in cities, is visible here as practice. At Poznan "as we had done at Stalingrad, formed assault groups and detachments"; in Berlin the method was taken through a whole capital.

He is also more candid about failure than most Soviet memoirs of the period. Of Poznan he admits that "the assault of Poznan dragged out for a whole month instead of the several days allotted for the operation by the Front Command." Of Zhukov's famous searchlights at the opening of the Berlin offensive, meant to blind the German defenders, he says, with polite restraint, that "The searchlights did not penetrate this screen, and it was difficult for us to watch the battle." The candour has a limit. The book itemises German losses down to aircraft, "1,600,000 men, 6,700 panzers and over 12,000 aircraft" for the summer and autumn campaign of 1944, but gives no total for Soviet losses in any operation it describes. The Soviet General Staff's own figures, published only after the Soviet Union ended, put the Red Army's dead and missing in the three weeks of the Berlin operation at close to eighty thousand.

Above all, the chapters "Krebs' Visit" and "Berlin May Day" are a primary source of the first rank. They give, nearly in dialogue form, the negotiations of 1 May 1945, which Chuikov's aide and the writers Vsevolod Vishnevsky and Yevgeny Dolmatovsky "took down" as they happened: Krebs's attempt to win recognition for Hitler's successor government, the telephone calls to Zhukov, "Moscow's orders were to wait", and the surrender of General Weidling and the Berlin garrison the next morning. Historians of the fall of Berlin have drawn on them for half a century, and with reason.

The reply

Critics on the left did not need to wait for the archives to answer this book's account of what the Red Army brought to Eastern Europe. Writing in Fourth International in November 1946, Bert Cochran put it in one sentence: "the Red Army entered Eastern Europe as an executor of the counter-revolutionary politics of the Kremlin. It did not support the uprisings of the masses; it suppressed them." The Warsaw Rising was not a workers' rising, and Cochran's argument does not depend on pretending it was. But the logic Cochran described is the one that kept the Home Army out of Chuikov's pages and put the Lublin committee into them.

The book ends with Chuikov in his seventies, looking back on almost sixty years in uniform and on the war's lesson: "We have the moral right to sit in judgement over the aggressor and those who aided and abetted him." Within its own frame the sentence is true. The Soviet people bore the heaviest weight of the war against Nazism, and the soldiers of the 8th Guards Army paid for Berlin with their lives. But the frame leaves out September 1939, when the author's own army marched into Poland as Hitler's partner, and it leaves out what came after 1945. Chuikov himself governed Soviet-occupied Germany until the spring of 1953. Weeks after he left, the workers of East Berlin rose against the regime he had helped install, and Soviet tanks put them down. George Clarke, reviewing that June rising in Fourth International ("The June Days in Review"), noted that "the civilian Semionov replaced General Chuikov as head of the occupation command" just before it. The issue that carried his article is dated March–April 1953, but it was evidently printed months late, since it reviews the June events. The "freedom for the German nation" promised on the book's last pages turned out to mean something narrower.

This book is worth reading for what it records, and for what it will not record. The record is that of a brave and capable commander who was present at the end of the Third Reich and wrote down what he saw there. The silences belong to the state that published him: about the Pact, about Warsaw, about the women of Berlin, about the body in the Chancellery garden. Read the campaign for the truth it carries. Read the gaps for the shape of what had to be left out.

Download the whole number as a PDF