Halfway through its chapter on "The One-Party and Multi-Party Systems", this book quotes Lenin writing in the first weeks of Soviet power: "Soviet power has been won in Russia, and the transfer of government from one Soviet party to another is guaranteed without any revolution, simply by a decision of the Soviets, simply by new elections of deputies to the Soviets." The author prints the sentence with approval. It is meant to show that the Bolsheviks, though they held a majority, were generous to their rivals. A paragraph later the generosity is over. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, the peasant party that shared the first Soviet government, are said to have had "no intention of co-operating loyally", and their entry into the government was "simply a trick to gain time for the organisation of a counter-revolutionary uprising". The result was "the elimination of the S-Rs and the formation of a one-party government." The rest of the book defends that government's descendant.
The two paragraphs together are a fair sample of Socialist Democracy: Aspects of Theory. It is a more intelligent and more candid book than most Soviet writing on the subject, and it quotes the evidence against its own conclusion more often than it seems to notice. Lenin's promise that power could pass from one soviet party to another by a vote of the soviets is the standard by which the one-party state it defends should be judged. The book supplies the standard and then declines to apply it.
Georgii Khosroevich Shakhnazarov (1924–2001), who signs himself here G. Shahnazarov, was born in Baku, trained as a lawyer, and worked through the 1950s for the Party's publishing house and then for the Prague-based journal Problems of Peace and Socialism, the theoretical review of the pro-Soviet communist parties. From 1964 he worked in the Central Committee apparatus, in the departments that handled relations with foreign communist parties. In 1980 the British political scientist Ronald J. Hill, writing in the British Journal of Political Science, could describe him as president of the Soviet political science association and deputy head of a department of the Central Committee. He was, that is, an intellectual of the apparatus, writing from inside it about the institutions he served.
The English text translates a book first published in Russian by Politizdat, the Party's political publishing house, in 1972 as Sotsialisticheskaya demokratiya (nekotorye voprosy teorii); Hill cites it under that title. Its latest references bear that date out. The newest events it cites are the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU in 1971, whose Central Committee report it quotes again and again, and a Central Committee decree of the same year on the district and town soviets. Nothing from 1972 or 1973 appears. This is an early-Brezhnev text, written in the years when "developed socialism" became the official description of Soviet society, when the economic reform of the mid-1960s was still being discussed as "current", and when the occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 was three years old. Progress issued it in English in its "Socialism Today" series, for readers abroad.
The commission shows in the book's choice of opponents. Its targets are not only "bourgeois theoreticians" but "fellow-travellers and sympathisers", the "strong current of political thought" in the West "that approves of public ownership and the socialist economic system" but insists that the one-party system is "mainly to blame" for the absence of political freedom. It quotes, without comment, the French Communist Party's resolution that the party "has rejected the thesis that a single party is an essential condition for socialist revolution". The book is written for that audience: Western communists and sympathisers who wanted socialism with elections, and who had watched what happened in Prague.
The chapter on parties begins with a concession that a reader of earlier Soviet doctrine will find remarkable. "Neither in the works of the founders of the theory of scientific communism nor in documents of the international communist movement", the author writes, "is it anywhere stated that socialism precludes a plurality of parties." He goes further. Against the French sociologist Maurice Duverger, who argued that parties represent social strata rather than whole classes, he replies that Marxists "'recognised' long ago that parties may represent various strata of the same class. Indeed, it was they who discovered this principle."
In 1936 Stalin had told an American interviewer that "Where there are not several classes, there cannot be several parties, for a party is part of a class." Trotsky took that formula apart in chapter 10 of The Revolution Betrayed: "since a class has many 'parts' – some look forward and some back – one and the same class may create several parties." On the point of theory, Shakhnazarov has quietly come round to Trotsky's side of the argument and abandoned Stalin's. He keeps Stalin's conclusion. Parties may represent strata, socialism may in principle have several, but the one-party system has "tremendous advantages", especially "where such a system has already become a firmly-rooted political tradition". A tradition, in the Soviet case, that had been created by banning the other parties.
The banning is where the book's history thins out. The Left Socialist-Revolutionaries appear only as tricksters; the Mensheviks "openly defected to the camp of the enemies of socialism". A footnote quotes Lenin admitting that "In relation to the petty-bourgeois democrats our slogan was one of agreement, but we were forced to resort to terror". What is missing is the record between 1918 and 1921, when Menshevik and SR deputies still sat in some soviets and the restrictions on them were tightened and relaxed with the course of the Civil War. Kronstadt is not mentioned at all, nor is the Tenth Congress's own setting: it met in March 1921 as the Kronstadt sailors rose, demanding new elections to the soviets and freedom for the left socialist parties. Trotsky's judgement, in the same chapter of The Revolution Betrayed, was that "The prohibition of opposition parties was a temporary measure dictated by conditions of civil war, blockade, intervention and famine", and that under Stalin "The prohibition of other parties, from being a temporary evil, has been erected into a principle." This book is the principle, restated in the language of the 1970s.
It even reaches for the same document. The book's evidence that the Party's leading role was "officially established" is the clause of the 1936 Constitution which makes the Communist Party "the leading nucleus of all the organisations of the working people, both public and state". Trotsky quoted that clause in 1936 and called it an "astoundingly candid formula", the one that "reveals the whole fictitiousness of the political role of those 'social organizations'". Here it is offered, unchanged, as the foundation of socialist democracy.
The book never names the Prague Spring, the reform movement of 1968 in Czechoslovakia, or the Warsaw Pact invasion that ended it. It is nevertheless present on the first pages. The Introduction warns that "Both 'Left'- and Right-wing opportunists have done serious damage to the cause of socialist construction in some countries of the world socialist system in the last few years by their gross distortions of the principle" of Party leadership. The "Left" means China, which the book discusses by name. The "Right" is left unnamed. It surfaces in a footnote listing the allied parties of Eastern Europe, where the author notes that in Czechoslovakia "counter-revolutionary elements tried to oppose these parties to the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, by attaching to them, to begin with, the role of an official opposition. These attempts failed."
They failed because the armies of the Warsaw Pact crossed the border in August 1968. The book cannot say so. It can say, in its chapter on Party and government, that discussion between ruling parties is "of a friendly nature" and "on no account to be regarded as attempts to interfere in the affairs of this or that Party and encroach on its sovereign right to resolve all its own problems independently". And it can close with a thesis that "the basic laws and trends of development of socialist democracy are the same for all countries", which was precisely the doctrine invoked against the Czechoslovak reformers' claim to a model of their own. Here the silence is the finding. A book about socialist democracy, written three years after the most important attempt to democratise a ruling communist party, refers to it once, in a footnote, as counter-revolution.
The chapter on "Democracy within the Party" is the book at its most revealing. It opens well, with Marx on the need for a party to "subject its own past activity to criticism", and with a 1920 resolution calling for "Broader criticism of both local and central Party institutions". Then it reaches 1921. The Tenth Congress, the author says, "forbade the formation of factions", and he defends the ban as a permanent principle: a faction "is itself an infringement" of majority rule, and "Faction, far from being consonant with intra-Party democracy, is directly hostile to it."
Then comes a sentence that deserves to be read slowly. "The decisions of the 10th Party Congress were not in fact adhered to by the factionalists, who merely paid lip service to them while in practice continuing their splitting action and opposition to the Party line more fierce than ever. This was naturally resisted by the Party, and Stalin's role in the organisation of such resistance increased his authority tremendously." The book adds that "it would be naive to suggest that this was the only reason for the appearance of the personality cult", but "There is no denying, however, that the anti-Party methods of action adopted by the opposition indirectly stimulated it."
The factionalists are not named. They are the Left Opposition of 1923 and after, Trotsky and his allies among them, along with the Workers' Opposition before them. Most were later expelled, imprisoned or shot. Here they are made partly responsible for the cult of the man who had them killed. This is the furthest the book goes towards the Terror. Elsewhere it allows that censorship, after 1930, had a "negative influence" that "made itself increasingly felt and the detrimental effect on Soviet society was considerable", and it speaks of "the restoration of socialist legality". The purges, the camps and the trials do not appear.
The same chapter then quotes, as proof that the Party guarded against abuse of the ban, a resolution warning that "the leading Party bodies must obey the voice of the broad Party masses, not regard every criticism as a manifestation of faction and thereby drive conscientious, disciplined Party members onto the path of isolation and faction." The book dates this only to "shortly after the 10th Congress". It is in fact the Central Committee's "New Course" resolution of December 1923, adopted under the pressure of the Opposition. Trotsky quoted the same sentence that month in "Bureaucratism and Factional Groups", one of the articles later collected as The New Course, insisting that "the phrase which we have just underlined is only a textual extract from the resolution of the Central Committee". He was using it against the apparatus that was already ignoring it. Ernest Mandel, in Trotsky as Alternative (Verso, 1995), describes what the majority did next: "They affirmed the need for a 'new course' and more party democracy. But at the same time they started a campaign against Trotsky and the other representatives of the opposition, which they first accused of 'factionalism'". Shakhnazarov quotes the promise the Opposition won and blames the Opposition for the regime that broke it.
Trotsky's account of the ban, in chapter 5 of The Revolution Betrayed, is the opposite of the book's. The Tenth Congress acted "in the days of the Kronstadt revolt", and "This forbidding of factions was again regarded as an exceptional measure to be abandoned at the first serious improvement in the situation." In his view, "The present doctrine that Bolshevism does not tolerate factions is a myth of epoch decline." The historical record supports Trotsky on the emergency character of the measure. The book does not consider the possibility.
The chapter's treatment of leadership elections makes the same move on a smaller scale. It argues against "compulsory 'rotation in office'", on the ground that a party free to choose its leaders need not be forced to change them. It notes approvingly that the 23rd Congress in 1966 amended the Party Rules "to ensure that with the constant influx of new blood and change and renewal of the leading cadres, continuity and reasonable stability are maintained". The argument assumes that the Party collective is "free to choose its leaders as it sees fit". The book does not show that it was.
The book's best pages state the standards of a democracy clearly. In its chapter on public participation it quotes Lenin from 1918 at length: "The masses must have the right to choose responsible leaders for themselves. They must have the right to replace them, the right to know and check each smallest step of their activity. They must have the right to put forward any worker without exception for administrative functions." It quotes The State and Revolution on reducing state officials to "responsible, revocable, modestly paid 'foremen and accountants'", functions "stripped of every shadow of privilege". It insists, in its chapter on Party and government, that Party organisations must not usurp the work of the soviets, and that when they do "they are acting in an unconstitutional manner."
The test this series applies to every such volume is simple. A Soviet book may admit that individuals erred. What it may not do is let its own categories turn on its own institutions. Shakhnazarov's book passes the first part and fails the second. It concedes a good deal of error: "dogmatists" who equate leadership with command, "callous officials, bureaucrats and boors", Party committees that interfere in the soviets, critics silenced by officials who take criticism "as a personal insult". What it never does is apply Lenin's criteria to the system that chose the Party's own leaders, the ministers and the factory directors.
That system had a name, which the book never uses: the nomenklatura, the Party's list of posts that could be filled only with its approval and of the people approved to fill them. The book describes it in other words. "Party guidance also involves the Party playing a major part in the selection and deployment of leading cadres." The Party "develops the principles underlying the mechanism of selection and appointment of cadres", and Party organisations "reserve the indisputable right to recommend" candidates. The Communist Party "forms the government in socialist society", the author writes, "Like any other party elected by an absolute majority of the electorate". He does not mention that in Soviet elections there was one candidate in each constituency. By Lenin's standard, the right of the masses to choose, replace and check their leaders, the system fails at every point. By the book's own standard it is never examined.
The handling of The State and Revolution shows how the gap is managed. Lenin's text, as the book quotes it, says of revocable, modestly paid officials: "This is our proletarian task, this is what we can and must start with in accomplishing the proletarian revolution." The book's gloss moves the programme into the distant future: "What he is saying is that in communist society their fulfilment will not involve any privileges." Trotsky read the same passage the opposite way in chapter 3 of The Revolution Betrayed: "You must not think that Lenin was talking about the problems of a decade. No, this was the first step with which 'we should and must begin upon achieving a proletarian revolution.'" Trotsky was right about what the words say. Lenin said "start with". The book quotes him saying it, and then postpones it to the end of history.
The chapter on participation follows the same pattern. It divides administration into ten stages and asks where the public may take part. Public control is welcome at the stages of "stating the problem", "decision-making", routine control and "assessing the results". It is excluded from organisation, which "is the 'holy of holies' of administration and therefore not easily subjected to any form of interference", and from the choice of "people to be entrusted with carrying it out". The public may comment on the problem and grade the result. It may not choose who does the work.
The chapter on "Democracy and Technocracy" is the book's most interesting piece of argument, and its weakest point. Against Western theorists of a coming rule by managers and experts, it makes a sound case about capitalism: the specialist administrators "only receive a tiny fraction of these profits", the owners of capital keep control, and the managers who fail are "off-loaded". It is when the argument turns to the Soviet Union that it falters. The book dismisses Milovan Djilas's "new class" thesis with three arguments: property relations have not changed, the goals of the revolution have not been abandoned, and "one of the basic features of a ruling elite is its more or less stable composition. Yet it is common knowledge that in the socialist countries the leading cadres undergo constant renewal to a considerable extent."
That last claim sits badly with the earlier chapter, which argued against compulsory rotation in office and welcomed rule changes made for the sake of "continuity and reasonable stability". It sits badly with the book's own statistics too. The survey it cites from Sverdlovsk found that "the entry of our young people to the specialist ranks is so far still considerably higher from specialists' families." The figures on the worker and peasant origins of Party secretaries and ministers are real, and they matter. But they answer a question about recruitment. The question about a privileged stratum is a different one.
Trotsky put that question in 1936, and it is the question this book is built to avoid. He wrote in chapter 6 of The Revolution Betrayed: "In Soviet political literature you often meet with accusations of 'bureaucratism' as a bad custom of thought or method of work. (The accusation is always directed from above downward and is a method of self-defense on the part of the upper circles.) But what you cannot meet anywhere is an investigation of the bureaucracy as a ruling stratum – its numbers and structure, its flesh and blood, its privileges and appetites". Nearly four decades on, Shakhnazarov's book fits that description exactly. Its chapter on "The Guiding and Unifying Force" offers a careful scheme of the social strata of Soviet society, based on economic branch, profession, nationality, territory, and "sex, age, health". Position in the apparatus of power is not among them. When a Western writer lists "the upper cadre", "the middle cadre" and "the lower cadre" as classes in Soviet society, the book holds the list up for ridicule.
There is a real difference between Trotsky's position and Djilas's, and the book's arguments against Djilas do not touch it. Trotsky did not claim that the bureaucracy was a new owning class. He argued that it was a privileged stratum which had seized political power in a state whose property forms remained socialised, and that democracy could be restored without a new social revolution. That is why, in the same book, his programme for the Soviet Union called for "a revival of freedom of Soviet parties, beginning with the party of Bolsheviks, and a resurrection of the trade unions." His Transitional Programme of 1938 put it more briefly: "Democratization of the soviets is impossible without legalization of soviet parties. The workers and peasants themselves by their own free vote will indicate what parties they recognize as soviet parties." Joseph Hansen, writing in the International Socialist Review in spring 1958, took up the question after Khrushchev's Secret Speech: "Shouldn't the one-party system in the Soviet Union – as Trotsky proposed more than twenty years ago – give way to democratic freedom for all Soviet parties?" That was the demand the book was written to refute, and it never states it.
The last two chapters turn to individual freedom. The book's chapter "The Legend of the Free World" is an attack on Western claims, and much of it lands. It documents segregation in Washington, the McCarthy blacklists, the Tennessee law against teaching evolution, the press monopolies of Springer and the British "press barons", the gap between the productive capacity of the world and its hunger. These charges were true, and the book is right to make them.
The chapter that follows, "The Way and the Measure of Freedom", contains the book's most honest sentence. The author refuses to pretend that a restriction of freedom becomes freedom because it serves a good end. When the state deprives people of the opportunity to act as they see fit, "it is nevertheless a restriction of freedom in fact. It cannot be glossed over by any amount of arguments on the good of society, etc." He then poses the decisive question: "what criterion should be adopted as a basis for establishing restrictions to individual freedom, and who, and according to what procedure, should have the authority to decide that a restriction is necessary?"
He answers the first half. The criterion is anything that threatens "the pillars of the socialist system", including "hostile propaganda calling for the abolition of the socialist system" and "refusal to do military service". He never answers the second half. Who decides, and by what procedure, is the whole question of democracy, and the book drops it. In the same year this edition appeared in English, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn was arrested and expelled from the Soviet Union. The book's only use of the word "dissidents" refers to the United States: "The persecution of 'dissidents' is something that is still going on today." It allows that Soviet science was once damaged by "hasty, unfounded judgments", "as happened at one stage with cybernetics and radiation genetics", without naming the campaign against genetics or the scientists who suffered from it.
Three years later the Fourth International took up exactly this question. Its United Secretariat published a set of theses, "Socialist Democracy and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat", in Inprecor (new series no. 10, 7 July 1977), as a draft for its next world congress. On the point of principle it agrees with Shakhnazarov's own concession: "In no way does the Marxist theory of the state entail the concept that a one-party system is a necessary precondition or feature of workers power, a workers state, or the dictatorship of the proletariat." Where he stops, it goes on. It quotes the same passage of The Revolution Betrayed on classes that "arrive at the solution of common problems no otherwise than through an inner struggle of tendencies, groups and parties", and draws the conclusion he would not: "Unless there is freedom to organize political groups, tendencies, and parties there can be no real socialist democracy." And it answers his unanswered question by showing why it cannot be answered his way. If only parties not "engaged in anti-socialist or anti-soviet propaganda and/or agitation" are to be legal, the theses ask, "how is one to determine the dividing line?" Their reply is that the choice lies between "workers democracy with the right of the masses to elect whomever they want" and "a decisive restriction of the political rights of the working class itself". The theses also demand what Shakhnazarov's chapter on Party and government half-wants: "Party and state-and still more party apparatus and state apparatus - remain strictly separate and distinct entities." On that point the reforming official and the Fourth International were closer than either would have liked to admit. The difference is that the theses saw that separation could not be achieved while one party held the monopoly of power.
None of this makes the book worthless, and it would be dishonest to read it only for its evasions. Within the limits it sets itself it argues for real changes, and some of its proposals are concrete. It argues that Party committees should stop running the soviets and the economic ministries, and quotes a 1971 Central Committee decree admitting "many cases" of "replacement and petty tutelage of the Soviets". It wants administrative information that is not secret to be available to deputies and public organisations on request, and asks that the duty and the penalty for refusal be fixed in law. It wants the appointment of managers to "depend more on the opinion of the collective", and reports with approval the experimental election of school principals by their staff, appointment by open competition, and Soviet jurists' proposals for "a strictly collegiate procedure on all questions of appointments, sometimes through secret ballot". It admits that early Soviet censorship "also tended to restrict a healthy criticism of shortcomings and defects".
Even its defence of Western democratic forms is more generous than the genre usually allows. Competition between parties, it says, "prevents to some extent the development of such anti-democratic tendencies as the government usurping the functions of parliament, graft and corruption among leading officials and the higher echelons of the civil service". The reader is left to wonder what prevents them where there is no such competition.
These were not empty words from this author. They are the arguments of a reform-minded official pushing as far as the line allowed in 1972, and the line is visible on every page where he stops.
The irony of the book lies in its author's later career. In March 1988 Mikhail Gorbachev took Shakhnazarov out of the Central Committee apparatus to serve as one of his personal aides, and he stayed at Gorbachev's side through the political reform of 1988–91 and into the Gorbachev Foundation afterwards. His memoir of those years, Tsena svobody (The Price of Freedom, 1993), presents Gorbachev's reform as seen by one of his aides. In March 1990 the Soviet constitution was amended to end the Communist Party's constitutional monopoly: Article 6, the successor to the 1936 clause this book quotes as its foundation, was rewritten, and the way was opened for other parties.
What part Shakhnazarov played in that particular decision is not established here, and this introduction does not claim one. But the distance between this book and the end of the regime it defended is the distance between two sentences he could have read in his own pages. One is his conclusion that "the one-party system is capable of serving as the instrument of social development and ensuring social progress at all stages of construction of the new society." The other is Lenin's promise, which he also quoted, that power in a soviet republic could pass from one party to another "simply by new elections of deputies to the Soviets". In 1974 the book chose the first. The case for the second had been made, long before, by the critics it would not name.