Progress PublishersMoscow

How the National Question Was Solved in Soviet Central Asia

The book

This introduction was written for How the National Question Was Solved in Soviet Central Asia, R. Tuzmukhamedov.

Near the end of this book, after a long run of figures for the five-year plan ending in 1975 (tons of raw cotton, hectares of newly irrigated land, kilowatt-hours from the dams on the Vakhsh), the author stops counting and addresses the world directly: "Friends, look and emulate their experience!" And then: "Enemies, envy and gasp with impotent fury!" A few pages later he gives the critics of Soviet policy in Central Asia an Eastern proverb to think about: "The dog barks, but the caravan continues on its way".

Both halves of the book are in those lines. One is a record of real and sometimes astonishing change in four republics (Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Kirghizia) that half a century earlier had been a tsarist colony and two feudal protectorates. The other is an indictment of everyone who had described that change in any other spirit. The record deserves a hearing. The indictment needs checking, and so do the things the book leaves out.

The spine says 1973, and the copyright page says Progress Publishers, Moscow, first printing 1973, translated from the Russian by David Fidlon. The text is a little older. Its latest sources are the directives of the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (spring 1971), the 1970 census returns as published in Izvestia in April 1971, and Pravda of 22 February 1972, which carried the Central Committee's resolution on the coming fiftieth anniversary of the USSR. The first units of the Nurek hydroelectric station, due to start "at the end of 1972", are still in the future. So this is a jubilee book, written in 1971 and early 1972 for the fiftieth anniversary of the Union on 30 December 1972, at the moment when the Party was announcing that a "new historical community, the Soviet people" had taken shape. Its author, R. Tuzmukhamedov (the running heads spell it Tuzmuhamedov), writes of "the author's native Uzbekistan". He was an international lawyer, and it shows: a footnote credits him as co-compiler of a Moscow collection of documents on independent Africa (1965), and his arguments keep returning to treaties, to the 1936 Constitution and to the United Nations declaration of 1970 on friendly relations between states.

The subtitle, A Reply to Falsifiers, states the commission. Western writing on the Soviet nationalities had grown fast in the 1960s, peaking around the revolution's fiftieth anniversary in 1967, and the charge of "Soviet colonialism" was being put to the newly independent states of Asia and Africa. The book is aimed at those states. It compares Soviet Central Asia with India, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, African border wars and South African medical schools, and it presents the people's republics of Bukhara and Khorezm (1920-24) as "the first successful experiment in non-capitalist development", the doctrine Moscow was then offering to its allies in the Third World. There was also a second front. When the First Secretary of the Kirghiz party, quoted in the last chapter, lists the enemies of Soviet friendship, he includes the "Peking splitters". The two states had fought along their border in 1969, including on the Kazakh frontier, and as the Fourth International's press reported, Chinese propaganda was full of references to "oppressed nationalities" in Soviet Asia (A. Miles, "Sino-Soviet Conflict: Military Face-Off in Central Asia", Inprecor no. 5-6, 3 August 1974). This series also includes Devendra Kaushik's Central Asia in Modern Times (Progress, 1970), a more scholarly account of the same region by an Indian sympathiser. This one is the official reply.

Start with what holds up, because a good deal does.

The book's strongest chapter is the seventh, on the British intervention of 1918-19, and on the main point it is right. General Malleson's force crossed from Persia into Transcaspia in August 1918. On 19 August it signed an agreement with the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik committee that had seized power in Ashkhabad, and the agreement made British help conditional on the struggle against "Bolshevism". British and Indian troops fought the Red Army at Dushak and elsewhere and stayed for months after the armistice had removed their official reason for being there. Tuzmukhamedov makes the case from the participants' own words. Colonel Tod is quoted as writing that the aim was to "clear the Bolsheviks out of Turkestan", and F. M. Bailey, the intelligence officer working with the anti-Soviet underground in Tashkent, as regretting that had all the forces moved together, "there is in my mind no doubt that Bolshevism would have been crushed in Turkestan". That is a fair way to argue. The book is less safe where it pushes further. Its claim that the British command directly ordered the shooting of the twenty-six Baku commissars in September 1918 rests mainly on the testimony of the Ashkhabad leader Funtikov, given after the Soviet authorities had arrested him. The British officer it names, Reginald Teague-Jones, denied it to the end of his life, and the question is still disputed. British complicity in the climate that killed them is easy to show; a British order has never been proven.

The social record is the other thing to credit. The book's figures are official and cannot all be checked, but their direction is not in doubt. Before the revolution, by the book's account, "Only 1.5 per cent of the population could read and write" in Turkestan. By the late 1960s the four republics had universal schooling, universities, academies of sciences and more doctors per head than Britain. Its pages on women, who went from the ichkari (the women's quarters of the house) and the paranja (a heavy horsehair veil) to a third of the seats in the republican Supreme Soviets, describe a real change, though those Soviets had little power. Tuzmukhamedov also quotes his opponents fairly when they concede the point. Geoffrey Wheeler, the British specialist he attacks most often, wrote that the Muslims of Soviet Central Asia were "far ahead of those of any non-Soviet Muslim country". The book also reprints things worth having in print: the resolutions of the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses against "great-power chauvinism", and Lenin's note of 31 December 1922 insisting that the internationalism of "'great' nations, as they are called (though they are great only in their violence, only great as bullies)" must make up in practice for past oppression.

On this the book has an unexpected ally. In The Revolution Betrayed (1936, chapter 7, "Family, Youth and Culture"), Trotsky granted the same achievement without reservation: lessons in eighty languages, new alphabets, a press that reached nomad shepherds for the first time. "The bureaucracy is laying down a bridge for them to the elementary benefits of bourgeois, and in part even pre-bourgeois, culture." On the gains, Tuzmukhamedov and Trotsky agree. They differ over who decided what those gains would cost, and who was allowed to say so.

The trouble begins with the revolution itself. In the book's account, Russian workers in Turkestan were "the nucleus of the vanguard" and the local peoples joined them, and the setbacks were "unavoidable difficulties and errors, which were rectified as early as 1918, particularly on Lenin's instructions." That leaves out what the errors were. The Soviet government set up in Tashkent in November 1917 was made up almost entirely of Europeans, and the regional congress of soviets that set it up formally resolved that Muslims could not yet be admitted to the highest organs of power, in a country where Muslims were the great majority. The errors were not put right in 1918. The book's own epigraph comes from Lenin's letter "To the Communists of Turkestan" of November 1919, sent with a special commission from Moscow because colonial habits among the Russian communists there were still undermining Soviet power. The book's account of Kokand is worse. It says the autonomous government there "incited a carnage in Kokand in January and February" 1918, and that "Today the defenders of the 'Kokand Autonomy' allege that Soviet power was responsible for this." They allege it because it is true. In February 1918 Red Guards from Tashkent, joined by Armenian nationalist militia, stormed the old city of Kokand, burned it and killed thousands of its inhabitants. That massacre did much to start the basmachi movement (from a Turkic word for "raiders"), the armed rising that the book treats from start to finish as British-backed banditry and that, by its own chronology, was still fighting in the 1930s. The British did arm some basmachi leaders. The book never asks why so many dehkans (peasants) followed them.

The book does mention the great revolt of 1916, which is to its credit, in the chapter on Kirghizia: "The uprising was crushed with extraordinary brutality. Many Kirghizes were killed." But it gives the causes as "tsarism's arbitrary rule, extortionate taxes and confiscations of land." It does not mention what set the revolt off, the tsar's decree of June 1916 conscripting Central Asian men for labour behind the front. Nor does it mention that armed Russian settlers took part in the killing. The book's Russians in Turkestan are capitalists and officials on one side, workers and exiles on the other. The armed settler is missing.

Then come the silences, and they are where the book is most revealing, because the author had the facts, had every reason to use them, and did not.

Collectivisation does not appear. Neither does Stalin, whose name occurs only inside the title of a British book and the word "Stalingrad". Kazakhstan lies outside the four republics, but the book does not leave it alone: it uses Kazakh census returns to rebut the charge of Russification, it counts the Kazakhs living outside Central Asia, and it waves away a 1956 British book called Kazakh Exodus. Its own census figures show that the Kazakhs were under a third of their republic's population. That is the mark left by the famine of 1930-33, when forced collectivisation and the forced settlement of the nomads killed on the order of one and a half million Kazakhs, perhaps two in five of the nation. The estimates vary and are disputed, but the scale is not.

The purges are handled in a way that is almost cruel. In chapter 6 the author answers émigrés who complain that the memory of Faizulla Khojayev (the book spells him "Hojayev"), the first head of government of Soviet Uzbekistan, has been "relegated to oblivion". He replies by quoting Khojayev on the national delimitation of 1924 and calling him "a great son of the Uzbek people of the 20th century, a genuine patriot and fighter for their bright socialist future". He does not say that Khojayev was shot in March 1938, convicted as a traitor at the show trial of Bukharin and twenty others, together with Akmal Ikramov, the head of the Uzbek Communist Party, who is not named in the book at all. Khojayev's Selected Works, from which the book quotes, could appear in Tashkent in 1970 only because he had been rehabilitated in the 1960s. Bukharin himself does appear, once, as the man who was wrong when Lenin corrected him at the Eighth Party Congress. He was not rehabilitated at all. When his son, Yuri Larin, appealed in the late 1970s, he was told the verdict stood, and answered that co-defendants such as "Ikramov, and Khodzhaev" had already been cleared ("Report on Rejection of Bukharin's Rehabilitation", Intercontinental Press, vol. 16 no. 29, 24 July 1978). In chapter 5 the book lists Abdulla Qadiri and Abdurauf Fitrat among the writers "whose talents blossomed only after the October Socialist Revolution". Both were shot in Tashkent in October 1938. Mirsaid Sultan-Galiev, the Tatar Bolshevik who argued for a Muslim road to socialism, was arrested in 1923 and shot in 1940. Trotsky, in "Pages from Trotsky's Journal" (written December 1936 to January 1937), recalled Kamenev telling him in 1926 that this was "the first arrest of a prominent party member, carried out on Stalin's initiative." He appears only inside a quotation from the French scholar Alexandre Bennigsen, as a "notion" the West hopes to revive.

The book's sharpest charge against its critics is treason. Baymirza Hayit, the émigré historian who served in the Nazi-sponsored Turkestan Legion, is condemned in a sentence of its own: "He is a traitor." Khojayev was convicted of treason too, and the verdict was reversed. A book that wanted to use the word honestly would have to say how the Soviet state had come to use it on the first Soviet leader of Uzbekistan. This one quietly makes him a hero again and changes the subject. Among the poems it quotes is "These Fearful Times" by Zavki, written about the misrule of the khans:

Friends rise against friends. For what reason? Ah, better not ask! A father won't trust his own son, who once in his love used to bask.

Tuzmukhamedov offers the lines as a picture of the old order. A reader in Tashkent in 1973 would have known another time they described.

The deportations are the plainest case. Chapter 7 holds the British guilty of "Murder, violence and even forcible deportation of people from Transcaspia to India", and a footnote counts the deported: sixty-five registered cases. The book never mentions the whole peoples that the Soviet state deported into Central Asia: the Koreans of the Far East in 1937, the Volga Germans in 1941, the Chechens and Ingush in February 1944, the Crimean Tatars in May 1944 and the Meskhetian Turks that November, sent by the hundred thousand to Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Uzbekistan, where very many died in the first years. The book boasts that Tashkent has people of "more than 100 nationalities". It does not say how many of them got there. In 1965 a delegation of Soviet Germans, most of them still living in Kazakhstan, asked Anastas Mikoyan, then the Soviet head of state, to restore their Volga republic. He told them, in a transcript that reached the West through samizdat (typescripts copied by hand), that the virgin lands of Kazakhstan could not be farmed without them, and that "We cannot correct everything that has happened in the course of history" ("Soviet-Germans Confront Mikoyan", Intercontinental Press, vol. 10 no. 46, 18 December 1972). The book also praises Chirchik, near Tashkent, as "the chemical centre" built under the first five-year plans. Chirchik was one of the towns where Crimean Tatars deported to Uzbekistan had settled. A Supreme Soviet decree of 1967 had cleared them of the wartime charge of collaboration but had not let them go home. Pyotr Grigorenko, a former Soviet major general who took up their cause, described what happened on 21 April 1968 in a letter to the Soviet Prosecutor General that Intercontinental Press published: "in the municipal park of Chirchik, an attack was made by the Uzbek police ... upon a peaceful outing of Crimean Tatars, which was dedicated to the birthday of the founder of the Soviet state" ("Grigorenko's Denunciation of the KGB", Intercontinental Press, vol. 7 no. 23, 16 June 1969). Grigorenko was himself arrested in Tashkent in May 1969, where he had gone to defend Crimean Tatar activists in court. In January 1970, two years before this book was finished, a Tashkent court sentenced the Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev and the Moscow teacher Ilya Gabai to three years each for "anti-Soviet slander" ("Gabai and Dzhemilev Sent to Prison Camp", Intercontinental Press, vol. 8 no. 6, 16 February 1970). Slander is the word Tuzmukhamedov uses on almost every page for what his opponents write. In the courts of his own republic it was a criminal charge. The Fourth International's Inprecor later told the whole story of the Crimean Tatar petitions, delegations and trials, and set it against "the liquidation of the national intelligentsias and non-Russian cadres" in the 1930s (G. Stepanovich, "USSR: Crimean Tatars: The Struggle of an Entire People", Inprecor no. 44, 19 February 1976). (That article dates the Crimean deportation to August 1944. It began on 18 May 1944.)

Cotton is where the book's own analysis turns against it. Its fifth chapter is a sharp account of the tsarist colonial economy: Turkestan made into a supplier of raw materials, its sown land turned over to cotton for the mills of central Russia, until "a land of cotton and silk did not have a single textile mill." Five chapters later the same structure is presented as an achievement. Uzbekistan, "Producing more than two-thirds of the national output of cotton," grew 4.5 million tons in 1970 and was to grow 4.9 million by 1975. The Kara-Kum Canal, already 850 kilometres long, "has turned Turkmenia into a major cotton-producing region". The book even explains why the colonial pattern survived: under the "socialist division of labour", "there remained and developed those sectors of the economy which appeared in the national outskirts during the colonial period". Every one of these schemes drew on the Amu Darya and the Syr Darya, the two rivers that feed the Aral Sea. The sea is never named. It had begun to shrink in the early 1960s, and within a generation it had lost most of its water, leaving salt flats and a ruined fishery. The only sign of trouble is a line from the five-year plan: "Further efforts will be made to desalinate and prevent the swamping of the irrigated lands". The damage was already on record; the cause went unnamed. The Uzbek leader quoted at length in chapter 11 on the brotherhood of the peoples is Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary from 1959 to his death in 1983. In the later 1980s his administration was found to have been inflating cotton figures for years, and the "cotton affair" became the largest corruption case of the late Soviet period.

On Russification the book answers with the 1970 census: nearly every Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen and Kirghiz still gave the national language as their native tongue, and the share of each nation in its own republic was rising. Those figures are real, and they matter. But the book says nothing about language policy. A decree of 1938 made Russian a compulsory subject in every school, and in 1940 the Central Asian languages, which had been moved from Arabic script to Latin around 1928-30, were moved again, to Cyrillic. In 1936 Trotsky had praised the Latin alphabets as "more democratic". Four years later they were gone, and a generation of new readers had to learn its third script in a dozen years. The book also says nothing about how the conquest is described. Tuzmukhamedov calls tsarist Turkestan a colony, yet he writes of Central Asia "Prior to its accession to Russia" and "After joining Russia", the language of the doctrine, revived under Stalin, that conquest by the tsars had been historically progressive. Writing as Ernest Germain in 1949, Ernest Mandel called that doctrine "nothing more than a justification of the piratical wars carried on by Czarism against the neighboring peoples of the present USSR" ("Purge of Soviet Culture", Fourth International, vol. 10 no. 11, December 1949). And in the same months this book was being written, seventeen Latvian Communists sent abroad an open letter protesting against Russification in their own republic. It warned that once the local people were reduced to a minority, a republic could be abolished, as the Karelian republic had been: "A similar fate awaits the Kazakh SSR and Latvia." (The letter was printed in full in Intercontinental Press, vol. 10 no. 26, 3 July 1972.)

Are the critics fairly represented? Partly. Some of its targets were real instruments of the Cold War: Radio Liberty was funded by the CIA, as was officially acknowledged in 1971, and the Turkestan émigré committee had been created under Nazi patronage. But the method is guilt by association. The book's list of the "most notorious" anti-Soviet writers puts Alec Nove, a socialist-minded economist whose own study of the region with J. A. Newth (The Soviet Middle East: A Model for Development?, 1967) took Soviet development there seriously, next to Ann Sheehy, Edward Allworth and Richard Pipes. It then moves on to men it accuses of SS war crimes. The charges against the West German scholar Boris Meissner, that he was "a practised torturer and killer of Soviet citizens", rest on testimony at a Soviet military trial in Leningrad. The claim that the Central Asian Research Centre in London was run by British intelligence rests on a "summary" of a document that is never produced. Hayit's wartime biography, with its hundreds of personal killings, rests on a single footnote to a Moscow publication of 1970. The book's question is always "Who pays them and gives orders?", seldom whether what they wrote was true. Where it does argue the evidence, over Kokand, it is wrong.

Last comes the test this series applies to every Soviet book on the nationalities: does the book's own standard ever apply at home? The standard here is the Bolshevik one, the right of nations to self-determination "up to and including secession", and the book recounts Lenin's defence of it against Bukharin in 1919 and invokes it against the Western powers in West Irian, British Honduras and Djibouti. It even quotes Lenin in November 1917: "We have nothing to fear, whatever the number of independent republics." Then it explains why the right can never be used at home. Secession from the USSR "would undoubtedly result in the seceding nation losing everything it has achieved." "Still more reactionary are the summons for the 'balkanisation' of the multinational Soviet Union". Self-determination by secession is progressive for colonies, but "it is reactionary for the peoples of the USSR, who are jointly building communist society." And finally: "the peoples of the Soviet Union are free to secede, but they do not wish to do so". There was no way to find out, and the jubilee year itself shows why. In late 1972 the party in Kirghizia was attacking two historians of the republic, K. Nurbekov and R. Turgunbekov, for nationalism. Intercontinental Press, drawing on the Christian Science Monitor, reported that Nurbekov "was accused of making a fetish of a people's right to self-determination and secession" (Cliff Conner, "Just a Question of History? Evidence of Nationalistic Unrest in Kirgizia", Intercontinental Press, vol. 11 no. 1, 15 January 1973). Elsewhere the price was higher: in 1961 the Ukrainian lawyer Levko Lukyanenko was sentenced to death, later commuted to fifteen years, for organising a group that planned to campaign for Ukraine's secession by the means the Constitution itself allowed.

The book admits error, as in the "errors" of 1918, but never applies its categories at home. Colonialism and great-power chauvinism are things the tsars did, and after 1918 they are things only the critics accuse Moscow of. Even Lenin's note of December 1922 is quoted without its target. As Trotsky wrote in The Revolution Betrayed (chapter 7), "It was upon the national question that Lenin intended to give his first battle to the bureaucracy, and especially to Stalin", over the bullying of the Georgian Communists. The same trimming shows in a quotation from Lenin's speech of March 1919 on the peoples "who to this day are under the influence of their mullahs", which the book cites in chapter 4 to show the need for patience. When a minority of the Fourth International's United Secretariat quoted the same passage in 1980, against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, they began it one sentence earlier: "We cannot deny [the right of self-determination] to a single one of the peoples living within the boundaries of the former Russian Empire" ("Draft Resolution on the Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan", Intercontinental Press/Inprecor, vol. 18 no. 8, 3 March 1980). That sentence is the one that matters, and the book leaves it out.

The fullest answer was written thirty years earlier. In "Problem of the Ukraine" (22 April 1939, published in the American Socialist Appeal), Trotsky took the Constitution's right of secession at its word, and the objection that secession would weaken the Soviet Union head on: "What is so terrible about that? we reply. The fervid worship of state boundaries is alien to us." He also named the gap this book papers over. The right existed only on paper: "The slightest attempt to raise the question of an independent Ukraine openly would mean immediate execution on the charge of treason." In the 1970s execution had given way to the labour camp and the psychiatric hospital, but the gap was the same. Tuzmukhamedov's claim that a nation leaving the Union would lose everything could have been put to the peoples of Central Asia and tested by their answer. The book's point is that it must never be put. Trotsky's general verdict on the Soviet national question, from The Revolution Betrayed, still describes the book: "the will of the population of the Soviet Union in all its national divisions is now wholly replaced by the will of a bureaucracy which approaches both economy and culture from the point of view of convenience of administration".

One honest complication belongs at the end. When the peoples of Central Asia were finally asked, in the all-Union referendum of March 1991, well over ninety per cent of voters in each of the four republics voted to keep the Union. They did not leave it. It was dissolved around them that December. Tuzmukhamedov was not simply wrong that they had much to lose, and the independent states that followed have mostly been ruled by the same apparatus that ruled the Soviet republics, under new flags. What the book could not allow was the question itself. A "solution" that may not be tested is not a solution. Read it for the British in Transcaspia, for the figures on schools and doctors, for the poems of Zavki, Awaz and Aini, and as a careful record of what a Soviet Uzbek international lawyer was required to say in 1972. Then put back what it leaves out: the Kokand massacre, the Kazakh famine, Khojayev and Ikramov, Qadiri and Fitrat, the deported peoples and the park in Chirchik, and the shrinking sea at the end of the canals.

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